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THE 

CONSTITUTIONAL 



AND 



POLITICAL HISTORY 






OF THE 



UNITED STATES. 



BY 



Dr. H. yon HOLST, 

PROFESSOR AT THE UNIVERSITY OP FREIBURG. 



TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN BY 

JOHN J. LALOR and ALFRED B. MASON. 



1750-1833. 
STATE SOYEEEIGNTY AND SLAYEEY. 



CHICAGO : 
CALLAGHAN AND COMPANY. 

1876. 




press, in the year 1S76, 

Bl < \1 I M.IIAN & I 

i Congress, in Washington. 



BUSfrl BraM. 

I 









PUBLISHERS' NOTE. 



We beg leave to announce that by arrangement icith 
the authpr we have secured the exclusive right to the pub' 
lication of this, the only English translation ichich will 
be authorized by him. 

The future volumes of the icork will appear simulta- 
neously toith those of the German edition. 



CALLAGHAN & CO. 



TO THE 

Hon. THOMAS M. COOLEY, 

ONE OF THE JUSTICES OF THE 

SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN, 

AND ONE OF THE 

MOST EMINENT EXPOUNDERS OF OUR CONSTITUTION, 

THIS TRANSLATION IS RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED. 






PREFACE. 



WRITTEN IN ENGLISH BY THE AUTHOR. 



The United States are about to commence the second 
centurj of their life as an independent commonwealth and 
as a republic. It is a curious fact that, at the same time, 
they evidently are entering upon a new phase of their po- 
litical development. The era of buoyant youth is coming 
to a close: ripe and sober manhood is to take its place. 

I take i f , to be a good omen for the success of this work 
that just at this moment an English translation of it is to 
be offered to the American public. As all the sources I 
have been able to use, are, without a single exception, 
printed books well known to every student of American 
politics, no new facts are to be found in the work* and I 
even cannot claim that new views of importance have pre- 
sented themselves to my mind. Yet I trust that it will not 
be considered as lost labor. There are, among the authors 
who have written on the constitutional law or the politics 
of the United States, more than one, whom, in all candicl- 
ness, I do not pretend to equal in many very important 
respects. But I venture to assert that among all the works, 
covering about as large a ground as mine, there is not one 
to be found which has been written with as much sober- 
ness of mind. And it is not strange that it should be so. 

Among foreign authors there is but one whom, to some 
extent, I can consider as a predecessor. Tocqueville's work 
will alwa} r s be read, not only with interest, but also with 
great profit. Yet even at the time it appeared, it failed to 



PB 

| French scholar was a 

on French Bubjects the 
reasoning, consequent upon this 
lU ,l nnpolitical turn of his mind, is to a great 
ap by the vastness and thoroughness of his 
h, hie work on " Democracy in 
•ran. It makes itself strongly felt on 
... [acka the necessary positive knowi- 
ng rican p r , re I have one great ad- 
;i ]l of th. -in: I am a foreigner. This I con- 
... . though, during my sojourn in 
; L872), 1 had frequently t<> hear: 
.. v, . you cannot fully understand our Bys- 

'IIIH'llt." 

I. . ■ . ,l«, not deny that there is a certain something 

character of every nation which a foreigner will 
completely understand, because it cannot 
ed by the judgment; it can only be felt, and in 
i and blood must be filled with 
biment. But, however often my shot may 
mark in consequence of this lack of the 
. though it might greatly impair the 
rk for other foreigners, it cannot possibly 
to it with regard to American readers, for they 
etive in their American feeling. 
r hand, it is much easier for a foreigner to 
from being betrayed by his feeling. 
[Ie has onlj to ward off his prejudices. This, though no 
ne to a high degree, while it is im pos- 
itional sentiment, because 
part of the individuality. 'Die attempt 
would ii Scylla into Charybdis; 

n effort to do the work, bo to Bay, as a 
.v it boat any feeling whatever. There 
philosophers who pretend that 



PREFACE. IX 

this is the only correct way to treat historical and political 
problems. They may be good chroniclers and quite fit 
statesmen for some commonwealth in the clouds, but they 
will never be able to write a history or to make us under- 
stand the nature and the working of the government of an 
actual state. There is nothing in the life of a nation into 
which the nation's way of feeling does not enter as a con- 
structive element of great force; and in order to under- 
stand a nation's way of feeling one has to feel with it. 

Several European critics of my work have been of opin- 
ion that my judgment of the American system of govern- 
ment and its working is an almost unqualified condemnation, 
and I do not doubt that some American readers will receive 
the same impression and laugh at my claiming to " feel" 
with the people of the United States. Yet the claim is 
well-founded. I came to the United States as an emigrant, 
and one of the first things I did was to have my declara- 
tion of intending to become a citizen registered in the city 
hall of New York. I, in fact, felt with the people of the 
United States, before I commenced to study them and their 
institutions. For a considerable time, however, this feel- 
ing was partly of a kind to render my studies pretty fruit- 
less. 

On the continent of Europe the United States are, even 
among the best educated classes, in a really astonishing 
degree, a terra incognita. Just on this account they have 
always been used with predilection as an illustration in the 
service of party ends. Their fate in this quality has been 
pretty varied. In quick succession and more than once 
they have run through all the phases from the idol to a 
bugbear. I was inclined to look upon them in the light of 
the former, for Laboulaye was the butler who had filled my 
knapsack of expectations. So I was rather unprepared for 
Tammany Hall, the first institution I got somewhat better 
acquainted w T ith. 

For a long time I was fairly bewildered by the throng 



PR] i 



|tD d even after I had read 

lltlllk . I searched id vain for ^a 

through this labyrinth. Only 

I in finding out what , up to tine 

80I1 W hy all my efforts time 

much a wild chase. Without 

of it, I expected to find in everything 

, quite different from what was known 

tudyorby personal observation; and this 

.1 had failed to distinctly show m< 

could not but be fatal to the success of my 

came aware of the mistake, is the 

; before that I have studied 

rfthmore Boberness of mind than any of my 

: _ leave to add that, after this 
from my eyes, ray interest in the subject 

pact r; from that moment it was 
I had found the principal task of my life J 

writer, for it is the work of a lifetime I 

ken. Now it had fully come to what I would 

U consciousness that here was only an act 

ran, a, the history of western civilization; 

strongly in order to be distinct— 

in it, the principal 01 well as the great 

either derai-goda nor devils, but men, 6trug- 

many shortcomings, bu f . with great energy, 

!, not with startling leaps, but advancing 

it nations of the 

id to do. Nothing was left of either the misty 

•id and wonderful fairy-tale or of the 

; I felt myseM 

it air of stern historical truth. 

a ill find in this " confession of 

• method" of my studies, >o far as 

it. Whether my hope, based on its 



PREFACE. XI 



principles, is well founded, that my labor is not lost, 
though no new materials of any kind have been at my ser- 
vice, this question I have to leave to my readers to decide. 

H. von HOLST. 



Freiburg, 1875. 



il 



TRANSLATORS' NOTE. 



We herewith present to the American people the first 
part of the most important work on the internal history of 
the United States that has emanated from the European 
press, and one of the most valuable contributions that has 
as yet been made to our historical literature by any writer, 
whether native or foreign. 

We were led to undertake the task of its translation when 
we did because we considered the Centennial year the most 
opportune time for its publication. The people of the United 
States are just now looking back with intense interest over 
their past to the birth and growth of the nation, and to the 
lives of the great men who projected the scheme of govern- 
ment under which we live. At such a time they cannot but 
feel disposed to welcome a production in which so much abil- 
ity and research have been lavished upon the subject upper- 
most in their thoughts. That the work is the production 
of an eminent foreigner, will give it a zest which it might 
not have coming from an American author. 

Professor Yon Hoist possesses in an eminent degree all 
the qualifications necessary to fit him to accomplish his un- 
dertaking in the most creditable manner. We have heard 
it said that only an American can write the history of this 
country. As well say that Grote could not have written the 
history of Greece, nor Mommsen that of Rome. But if not 
an American, the author sojourned long enough in this 
country to catch the spirit of the people, of their history 






! ;. intends, besides, before completing 

more. Elow industriously he has 

al at his command, every 

Americans will not all 

:h him in at men who 

r in ln's view of questions which 

• of debate here from the very begin- 

nol to be expected. Removed from 

party passion, he may have formed a 

opinion of their character than ie possible 

What the American people need more than 

nr time, is to take an objective 

and that is best furnished them by 

y an earnest of those which 

and which will excite, we are confident, a de- 

• inferior to that produced by De Tocque- 

I K m< >cracy in America. 

The Translators. 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER I. 

PAGE. 

The Origin of the Union, the Confederation and the Strug- 
gle for the Present Constitution 1 

CHAPTER II. 
The WoRSHir of the Constitution and its Real Character. . G4 

CHAPTER III. 

The Internal Struggles during Washington's Two Admin- 
istrations. Alexander Hamilton. The First Debate on 
the Slavery Question. Influence of the French Revolu- 
tion. Consolidation of Parties. Gradual Intensifica- 
tion of Geographical Differences SO 

CHAPTER IV. 
Nullification. The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions.. 138 

CHAPTER V. 

The Presidential Election of 1801. The Fall of the Fed- 
eralist Party. Jefferson and the Purchase of Louisiana. 
The Burr and Federalist Intrigues 1G8 

CHAPTER VI. 

The Embargo. Madison and the Seqond War with England. 
The Hartford Convention 200 

CHAPTER VII. 

History of the Slavery Question to 1787. The Compromises 
of the Constitution on Slavery 273 

CHAPTER VIII. 

History of the Slavery Question from 1789 until the Mis- 
souri Compromise 302 






CHAPTER IX 

i un>BLi 

"40 


( HAPTEB X. 

Betweek theFrei 



CHAPTER XI. 

.,;..! \ \M> THE FEDERAL GOVERN- 



CHAPTEB XII. 

\rn.iFi. \'ii«'N. Tin: COMPROMISE BETWEEN 

imi mi. Federal Government 459 



STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 



CHAPTER I. 

The Origin of the Union, the Confederation and the 
Struggle for the Present Constitution. 

The opinion is not uncommon in Europe, that American 
politics, up to the outbreak of the civil war, were exceed- 
ingly complicated and difficult to be understood. Such, 
however, is not the case. If we do not allow ourselves to 
be confused by matters of secondary consideration, and 
once get hold of the right thread, it soon becomes evident 
that the history of the United States, even as far back as 
the colonial period, is unusually simple, and the course of 
their development consistent in a remarkable degree. 

Turgot 1 and Choiseul 2 had very early recognized that 
the separation of the colonies from the mother country 
was only a question of time; and this irrespective of the 
principles which might guide the colonial policy of Eng- 
land. The narrow and ungenerous conduct which parlia- 
ment observed towards the colonies in every respect, brought 
about the decisive crisis long before the natural course of 
things and the diversity of interests growing out of this 
had made the breach an inevitable necessity. 

1 1750. DeWitt, Thomas Jefferson, p. 40. 

2 1761. Bancroft, History of the United States, IV., p. 399 ; DeWitt, 
1. c, p. 42. Durand wrote in August, 1766 : " They are too rich to remain 
in obedience." 



STATE 80V 1 WIKY. 

iribed that the colo- 

:m amicable solution would be 

debated between them and the 

England had given the most 

would not, on any consid- 

inciple in issue. A few zealots like 

• d, during the English-French colonial 
wish thai the guardianship of England 

it, shortly after the conclusion of 
to be found who would not have 
at Britain." 1 
the ill-will, which the systematic die- 
rights of the colonists had 
* riniii j.li. thisfeeling. Even in Augustand 

L775, that is, half a year after the battle of 
Anglo-Saxon spirit of conserv- 
5, that the few extrem- 
ik of a violent disruption of all bonds 

* upon themselves and were uni- 
But the eyes of the colonists had 
' &r opened that they hoped to make 

n parliament and the kin- ( ,„] v } )y t j 10 

They considered the situation 

rrant and demand that they should be 

ncy. Both of these things could 

ed in the right wav and with the 

ndition that they should act 

rth, 

owever, were not in- 

onies had been founded in 

y different circumstances. 

•ment, their political institu- 

- -, Di.-kinson'. 



OEIGIN OF THE UNION. 3 

tions, their religious views and social relations, were so 
divergent, the one from the other, that it was easv to find 
more points of difference between them than of similarity 
and comparison. Besides, commercial intercourse between 
the distant colonies, in consequence of the great extent of 
their territory, the scantiness of the population, 1 and the 
poor means of transportation at the time, was so slight 
that the similarity of thought and feeling, which can be the 
result only of a constant and thriving trade, was wanting. 

The solidarity of interests, and what was of greater im- 
portance at the time, the clear perception that a solidarity 
of interests existed, was therefore based mainly on the 
geographical situation of the colonies. Separated by the 
ocean, not only from the mother country, but from the rest 
of the civilized world, and placed upon a continent of yet 
unmeasured bounds, on which nature had lavished every 
gift, it was impossible that the thought should not come to 
them, that they were, indeed, called upon to found a " new 
world." They were not at first wholly conscious of this, 
but a powerful external shock made it soon apparent how 
widely and deeply this thought had shot its roots. They 
could not fail to have confidence in their own strength. 
Circumstances had lon^ been teaching them to act on the 
principle, " Help thyself." Besides, experience had shown 
them, long years before, that — even leaving the repeated 
attacks on their rights out of the question — the leading- 
strings by which the mother countrv souo-ht to £iiide their 
steps obstructed rather than helped their development, and 
this in matters which affected all the colonies alike. 

Hence, from the very beginning, they considered the 
struggle their common cause. 2 And even if the usurpa- 

1 The census of 1790 gives the population, slaves included, at 3,929,8:27. 

a The duty controversies in Massachusetts and James Otis's celebrated 
speech against the writs of assistance (Feb., 1761) found it is true, no 
echo whatever in the rest of the colonies. As early as June, 1765, how- 
ever, Otis induced the Massachusetts assembly to reply to the Stamp 



4 ST A Wi.KY. 

them* Ivea felt In some parte of 
much in. rely than in others, the prin- 

■ qua! extent. 

miciKltMl, in 1 774, the coming together 
ad on September 4, of the same 
. Dominated by the good people of 
uii-t in Philadelphia.* 

lonies thought of separation from 

formed a revolutionary 

tally exercised sovereign power. 3 Howfar 

Ktended, according to 

•f the del t is impossible todeter- 

inty at this distance of time. But it is 

_in:tl intention was that it should con- 

- I >est calculated to remove the 

ind to guaranty the rights and liberties of the 

• , and should propose to the latter a series of resolu- 

But the force of circum- 
iompelled it to act and order imme- 
ple, by a consistent following of its 
»-d this transcending of their written instruc- 
6 not only a revolutionary 
jsumeda thoroughly re VO- 
58, iu fact, met on Oct. 7 
tral only nine of the colonies were rep- 
resents! in it. 

I nstitution of the United States, T.. ?; 

iii"n. which the congress used in its formal 

e in after fears. 

ption of Georgia, wire represented. 

'i. maintains that thi - rereign 

riew on the fact that 

•P" 1 ' lirectly by the people. But he 

alone are sovereign and the only 
*° ur " at that time a recognized principle 

ofla ' A ' Ltutional Limitations, p. 7. 



THE REVOLUTIONARY CONGRESS. 5 

lutionary character. 1 The people, also, by recognizing its 
authority, placed themselves on a revolutionary footing, and 
did so not as belonging to the several colonies, but as a mor- 
al person; for to the extent that congress assumed power 
to itself and made bold to adopt measures national in their 
nature, to that extent the colonists declared themselves 
prepared henceforth to constitute one people, inasmuch 
as the measures taken by congress could be translated from 
words into deeds only with the consent of the people. 2 

This state of affairs essentially continued up to March 
1, 1781. Until that time, that is, until the adoption of 
the articles of confederation by all the states, congress 
continued a revolutionary body, which was recognized by 
all the colonies as de jure and de facto the national gov- 
ernment, and which as such came in contact with foreign 
powers and entered into engagements, the binding force of 
which on the whole people has never been called in ques- 
tion. The individual colonies, on the other hand, consid- 
ered themselves, up to the time of the Declaration of In- 
dependence, as legally dependent upon England and did 
not take a single step which could have placed them 
before the mother country or the world in the light of 
de facto sovereign states. They remained colonies until 
the " representatives of the United States" " in the name 
of the good people of these colonies " solemnly declared 
"these united colonies" to be '-free and independent 
states." 3 The transformation of the colonies into " states'' 

1 " The powers of congress originated from necessity, and arose out of 
and were only limited by events, or, in other words, they were revolu- 
tionary in their very nature. Their extent depended on the exigencies 
and necessities of public affairs." Jay, in "Ware v. Hylton, Dallas' Re- 
ports, III., p. 232; Curtis, Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, I., p. 176. 

2 Story's Commentaries, I., § 213. This view was shared by chief 
justice Jay and justices Chase and Patterson, all very distinguished 
statesmen of the Revolution. Story, Com., § 21G. 

'' " We, therefore, the representatives of the United States, do, in the 



(J Bi A my ami BLAVXRT. 

It of the Independent .action 

ndividoal ooloniee. It was accomplished through 

of the Unite* '* that is, through 

i the oame of the whofe peo- 

•h individual colony became a Btate only in bo far 

. • 1 tu the United States and in bo farasiti 

d a part of the people. 1 The till i 

. as thirteen separate and mutually indepen- 

,enter in to a com pact to sever the bonds 

i with their common mother country, 

Line time to proclaim the act in a common mau- 

tlie world; but the "one people" of the united 

>lved that political connection with the English 

1 themselves resolved, henceforth, to 

perfectly independent people of the 

Declaration of Independence did not 

colonies, solemnly publish . . . . 

ire, and of right ought to be, tree and indepen- 

ration of Independence. Compare also C. C.Pinck- 

ti in the ho >resentatives of South Carolina, od the 18tU 

W8 Elliott, Debates, IV.. p. 301 ; and Ramsay, History of 

. I and 175. 

i have iheir status in the Union, and they have no other 

*t>ttus The Union is older than any of the states, and 

Originally some independent [i.e., 

lonies made the Union; and, in turn, the 

1 their old dependence for them and made them states 

thi ii. - vi r had a state constitution inde- 

. ■■. July 4. 16 ilso King's 

Qvention,June 19, L787. Madison Papers. 

When it becomes n< 
the political bonds which have conn< 

un's view that the colonies, 

lined completely independent 

re in do v. dent on one another 

I ilhoun relies, in this instance, as in 

tion, undisturbed by the contradic- 

- Calhoun, A Disquisition 

dhoun 18 here, as in his 



BIRTH OF THE NATION. I 

create thirteen sovereign states, but the representatives of 
the peopl e declared that the former English colonies, under 
the name which they had assumed of the United States of 
America, became, from the fourth day of July, 1776, ji 
sovereign state and a member of the family of nations, 
recognized by the law of nations ; and further, that the 
people would support their representatives with their blood 
and treasure, in their endeavor to make this declaration a 
universally recognized fact. Neither congress nor the 
people relied in this upon any positive right belonging 
either to the individual colonies or to the colonies as a 
whole. Rather did the Declaration of Independence and 
the war destroy all existing political jural relations, and 
seek their moral justification in the right of revolution 
inherent in every people in extreme emergencies. 

It is important to keep these points in view, for they 
became of the very highest importance in later years, re- 
mote as it was from the congresses of 1774 and 1775, and 
in part from that of 1776, to subject these subtle questions 
to an exhaustive investigation — Inter arma silent leges. 
Congress had not the time to submit its powers to a pain- 
ful and minute analysis. The moment that resistance to 
the mother country ceased to be confined to legal and 

nullification doctrine, Jefferson's disciple. He accepts throughout the 
premises of his master. Unlike the latter, however, he does not stop 
half way, but carries them out, with the most relentless logic, to their 
remotest conclusion. Jefferson considered the Union an alliance formed 
only for the purpose of shaking off the control of the mother countiy, 
and one which should have ceased "of itself" when that object was at- 
tained. Says he : " The alliance between the states under the old ar- 
ticles of confederation, for the purpose of joint defense against the 
aggressions of Great Britain, was found insufficient, as treaties of alli- 
ance generally are, to enforce compliance with their mutual stipulations; 
and these once fulfilled, that bond was to expire of itself, and each state 
to become sovereign and independent in all things." See also Curtis, 
History of the Constitution, I., p. 39, etc.; Farrar, Manual of the Consti- 
tution, pp. 50, 51; Hurd, Law of Freedom and Bondage, I., p. 408, and 
II., p. 354. 



8 8TATE 60VI • AND SLAVERY. 

m.l recourse was had to force, que* 

<■ naturally little considered. The Dec- 

lenoe pnt them aside completely. 

now was one of facts, and the facta were as 

gnlation and transformation of their in- 

e individual colonies did nut take the in- 

ilthongh they refused obedience to the constituted 

dded with England. It was not 

until J had recommended them to do so that they 

- int.* their own hands. 1 

A- far as the legality or illegality of this step is con- 

birely indifferent whether it was the leg- 

« of the several colonies themselves, or con- 

Bpontaneons act of the people of the several 

e the impetus to it; it was under any and 

nil <• illegal. The colonies were engaged in a 

. i!id therefore there is nothing to be said of a 

■: of their measures. Butthesanie blow which 

1 the bonds between the colonies and the 

mother country, threw down the walls which had hitherto 

i the political union of the thirteen colonies. 

■:. thrown together bo as to constitute them 

ivoringto conquer their national independ- 

with the BWOrd. Thi >nld be changed in noth- 

v much it was desired, when the new state 

Journal of Congress, II., pp., 1G0, 174. Farrar 

tion, p '.»"). Btory, Com,, L, ^ 204. 

tone had, before this recommendation of congress 

1775 , bul Bhe expressly declared the 

mvisional "during the unhappy and unnatural 

• tin." The declarations of New Jersey and of South 

similar clauses, but more explicitly framed. Vir- 

eernment as it existed formerly 

Britain. The other states obeyed the recom- 

•ogress only after the publication of the Declaration 

. 



POWERS OF THE CONGRESS. 9 

was being subsequently organized on a legal basis, to retain 
something of the separate existence of the colonial period. 

Congress had. with the consent of the people, taken the 
initiative in the transformation of the thirteen colonies 
into o^e_^oj^ejcejgn ,„stat§. It became thereby per se the 
national government de facto and by the success of the 
Revolution gave its acts, both earlier and later, an addition- 
al and legally binding force. 

Political theories had nothing to do with this develop- 
ment of things. It was the natural result of given cir- 
cumstances and was an accomplished fact before anyone 
thought of the legal consequences which might subsequent- 
ly be deduced from it. But it was clear from the very 
first that the masses of the people, as well as the leaders of 
the movement, would almost unanimously oppose to the 
utmost the practical enforcement of these legal conse- 
quences. 

If the Revolution threw down the barriers which divided 
the English dependencies in America into thirteen inde- 
pendent colonies; if it, in fact, constituted an American 
people, — it is obvious that both law and equity demanded 
that not the former thirteen colonies should be represented 
in congress, but the population of the colonies as a part of 
the people. This consequence was too palpably plain to 
remain completely unnoticed. Patrick Henry of Virginia 
showed how this was at once the irresistible conclusion of 
reason, and the only right policy. In the congress of 1774 
he thus solemnly expressed himself: " Government is dis- 
solved Where are your landmarks, your boundaries 

of colonies? .... The distinctions between Yirginians, 
Pennsylvanians, New Yorkers, and New Englanders are 
no more. I am not a Yirginian: I am an American. 
Slaves are to be thrown out of the question, and if the 
freemen can be represented according to their numbers, I 
am satisfied. I go upon the supposition that government 



STATE SOVERKICNTV UffO BLAVBBY. 

nd All distinctions are thrown down; all America 

ncG to take a decided po- 

• ,. It decreed that -each colony or 

ould l.a. : the congress not being 

•then able to proenre, materials for ascertain- 

• nv.- 

• •;,.;, ii, a- was then indirectly looked upon 

principle, whereas the opposite principle had been 
pted before, and sedulous efforts were made to 
j deficit i<>n of the view that was to pre- 

_run that infinite series of compromises by 
American people have endeavored to put to one 
dng resolutions which might be con- 
wi!l in senses the most diametrically opposite, diffi- 
culties which they ought to have grappled with and overcome. 
ds mode of procedure delay has been gained in every 
.and this gain has frequently been of the highest im- 
But when the direct conflict of opposing views 
d do Longer be postponed, the struggle became more ob- 
l, in proportion as the delay was great- 
. at this distance of time, to say with any 
i p the urgency of circumstances, the en- 



i, II pp Wirt, in his Life of Pat- 

a glowing description of this speech. 

' I an- are all that havecome down to 

inimously testified to the powerful im- 

1 rtis, Hisl ry of the Const., I., p. 15; 

al View of the American 

81. 

V.. p. 181; Pitkin, A Political and 

of America, I., p. 283. The dele- 

:■ 10, 1774, to governor Trumbull: 

- Ived upon; which WAS, 

bul as this was objected 

the journal- to prevent its being drawn 



COLONIAL PREJUDICE. 11 

tlmsiasm of the hour, or a want of insight into the im- 
portance of the question, moved congress to postpone its 
final decision; but it is probable that the three causes co- 
operated to this end. This much is certain, however, that 
nearly all the representatives, the moment they gave any 
real attention to the matter, declared, without a moment's 
hesitation, against Patrick Henry's views. 

Franklin's confederation scheme of 1754 suited the col- 
onies as little as it did the mother country. It imposed 
no limitations or restrictions whatever in the interest 
of the general good, although the French invasion called 
most urgently for common action. And there had been no 
essential change as yet in this feeling, although the mag- 
nitude of the dangers threatening the colonies, and the im- 
portance of the matters in controversy, made them more 
inclined to a firmer union among themselves, so far as this 
was necessary to resist the common enemy. But in regard 
to their relations to one another they were involved in the 
same short-sighted and ungenerous particularism as before. 
" A little colonv has its all at stake as well as a £reat one," 
major Sullivan bluntly replied to the patriotic effusion of 
Patrick Henry. 1 This showed clearly that only the common 
interests of the colonies induced them to make opposition 
to England their common cause, or at least that their com- 
munity of interests did vastly more to bring this about 
than did a feeling of nationality, for which the war first 
paved the way. 

The colonists were certainly not wanting in a kind of 
national feeling; but it did more to dampen the energy of 
their opposition to England than to increase it. It had 
scarcely any influence on their attitude towards one anoth- 
er; for it had its roots, not in the soil of the new world, but 
in the home of their ancestors. 2 As long as it was not be- 

1 John Adams, Works, II., p. 366. 

2 This fact is frequently too much lost sight of in Europe. The col- 
onists severed themselves from England with bleeding hearts. Greene 



trt\ B I ! D SLAVERY. 

ach with England was incurable, 

aeration for the mother conn- 

i r t • • r hatred, nearly all the colonist* 

children of their own particular colony and 

und. The name American was up to that 

little more than a beautiful prophetic vision. It re- 

a of a definite and lasting reality only 

of [ndependei 

Hence the question, how the people were to be repre- 

was decided even before 
Luther Martin Bays rightly in his celebrated 

their feelings for the mother country in the following words: 

. lured their mother country with the lore of children who, for- 

. :■ strong provocation, turn back to them in 

rben time baa blunted the sense of injury, with a lively recol- 

iationsand endearments, a tenderness and along- 

f-reproach. To go to England was to go 

i • nave been there was a claim to special consideration. They 

a the beginning of their own; a first chapter 

oroughly who would understand the sequel. 

literature waa their literature. Her great men were their great 

And when her flag wavi d over them, they felt as if the spirit which 

it in triumph over bo many bloody fields had descended upon 

them with all its Inspiration and all its glory • • • They loved to 

ml'a and Westminster Abbey; and with the Hudson and 

could hardly persuade themselves that 

it not the Aral of rivers. More especially did they rejoice 

ie with them. The very name was a talia- 

v door, broke down the barriers of the most exelu- 

fonned the dull retailer of crude opinions and stale 

Hist. View of the American Rev., pp. 5, 

: 1 to the colonies he, on the other hand, char- 

m." Ibid, p. 12. The same judg- 

distinguished Englishmen. Thus Adam 

established for the sole purpose <>i 

rs, who should be obliged to buy from 

lucera all the goods with which those 

Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth 

117. 

Public Advertiser, March 14, 1781 
M Revolution, II, p. 896. 



PEOPLE VS. STATE. 13 

letter to the Maryland convention that the voting by 
states was not on account of " necessity or expediency," 
but that " on the contrary, it was adopted on the principle 
of the rights of man and the rights of states." 1 In con- 
gress, however, Patrick Henry 's~view "still found some 
warm supporters, 2 but the larger states did not feel them- 
selves justified in insisting on their demand, glad as they 
would have been to have seen it acknowledged. Among 
the numberless amendments to the articles of confederation 
suggested by the several states, there is not one proposing a 
change of the provision governing the mode of representa- 
tion or the manner of voting. 3 

Reason was unquestionably on the side of those who 
advocated the national view. " It has been said that con- 
gress is a representation of states, not of individuals. I 
say that the objects of its care are the individuals of the 
states. It is strange that annexing the name i state' to 
ten thousand men should give them an equal right with 
forty thousand. This must be the effect of magic, not of 
reason." 4 It was not easy to advance any rational argu- 
ment against this reasoning of Wilson. But actual cir- 
cumstances are of more weight in politics than abstract 

1 1788. Elliott's Debates, I., p. 355. 

2 Luther Martin's assertion in the letter above referred to, that Virginia 
was the one state which represented this view, is not correct. Lynch 
agreed with Henry, and desired only that besides population, " proper- 
ty" should be considered. Adams agreed in this, but relied also on the 
fact that congress could not at that moment ascertain the population. 
Wilson was afterwards one of the most ardent advocates of the per capita 
mode of representation. The sketch of a federal constitution submit- 
ted by Franklin, July 21, 1775, to congress, provided that there should 
be one representative for every five thousand people. G. Morris, to 
judge from a speech delivered by him in the "New York congress," 
considered the per capita mode of representation a matter of course. 
Sparks, L ife of Gouv. Morris, I., p. 103 ; see also Elliott, Deb. I., pp. 74-76. 

3 See Elliott, Deb., L, pp. 85-92. 

4 Wilson of Pennsylvania, 1777, in the debates upon the confederation. 
See Elliott, Deb., L, p. 78. 



1 \ \M> SLAVERY. 

nformable to the demands of reason 

inclusion drawn by Wilson 

roneous, Bpite of the 

iment was formally correct. Jle closed 

• with these words: " A.s to those matters 

whicl d to con { e are not so many states: 

We lay aside our individuality 

I j • * desirable in the highest degree, but it was 

e individuality of the colonies'' was not, 
claimed, 1 a "mere sound;" it was an 
undeniab which made itself felt at every step. 

. demanded an impossibility when he ask- 
•epresentativee should put it aside, and leave 
hen they came to congress, as if it were a 
This might have Keen possible to Wilson, for 
he was not born and had not grown up in America. But 
icularism had become to Buch an extent part of the 
of the native-born colonists that it could 
not he renounced; nay, that it became a measure of neces- 
sity to acknowledge it> supremacy after the first moment 
■ i i**n t was over, and the separate interests of the 
inflict, whether really or only apparently, 
with tin* general welfare. 

.n Adams, Wilson's most energetic supporter, affords 

of this. Reason compelled him to 

ind he defended it with great zeal 

- did not get the better of his under- 

: _••. The moment, however, that he allowed his af- 

►f bis leaning to- 
:' the particularis 

I I of this internal 

intimately connected contra- 

triking illustration of Hamilton's 



CONFEDERATION. 15 

saving that men are rather "reasoning than reasonable " 
animals; and that, therefore, in the solution of political 
problems no valuable or lasting results can be obtained by 
relying solely on the reason. 1 

Adams said, in the debate on the articles of confedera- 
tion: "The confederacy is to make us one individual only; 
it is to form us, like separate parcels of metal, into one com- 
mon mass. "We shall no longer retain our separate in- 
dividuality, but become a single individual as to all ques- 
tions submitted to the confederacy." 2 

Adams had no doubt that this was possible, and he can 
scarcely be reproached on that account, as the whole Amer- 
ican people cherished the same belief until late in the 
civil war, and, for the most part, still cling to the same in 
theory. The dictates of reason, however, could not be made 
absolutely to harmonize with the desires of the people, or 
with actual facts over which congress had no control. It 
was not mere caprice that from the very first moment this 
led to unconscious efforts to find in words a solution for 
the insoluble contradiction. 

" Wo die Begriffe fehlen, da stellt zu reenter Zeit ein v 
"Wort sich ein." 3 One man 4 alone saw clearly from the first . 
that it would have been as profitable to rack one's brains 
in the vain endeavor to square the circle. 

The American statesman's dictionary was written in 
double columns, and the chief terms of his vocabulary 
were not infrequently inserted twice: in the right-hand col- 
umn in the sense which accorded with actual facts and was 
in keeping with the tendency towards particularism; in 

1 " Nothing is more fallacious than to expect to produce any valuable 
or permanent results in political projects' by relying merely on the reason 
of men. Men are rather reasoning than reasonable animals, for the most 
part governed by passion." Hamilton to J. A. Bayard, April, 1802, Ham- 
ilton's Works, VI., p. 540. 

2 Elliott, Deo., I., p. 76. 

3 Where ideas are wanting, a timely word may take their place. 

4 Alexander Hamilton. 



16 BTl B kTSKT. 

. ft nd the sense which the logic 
radually and through many a bitter Btrug 
bold relief, and whichit will finally stamp 

;t the bitter experience of many years has 
make American statesmen even partially cou- 
nt they have been using this double-columned 

..n. The nature of the state was to such an 
Jed enigma to them, that they, bona , 
same breath, used the same word in the 
. and employed word- as .synonymous 
idea* absolutely irreconcilable. 
[j gurred to the acute Adams that an "individ- 

ild never be formed of a "confederation," that 
■(■'latum of thirteen state-; that it was a con- 
• •; to require that the confederation, in all matters 
of which it had cognizance, should be a single individual, 
•i words are used SO arbitrarily that the terms " asso- 
ideration," and "individual" are con- 
red identical in meaning, it is not hard to make the 
ible things seem possible; nor is it to be won- 
;hat the Americans ventured to out-do the myatery 
Prinity by endeavoring to make thirteen one, while 
:ie thirteen. 1 
tl realization of this theoretical piece of art 
• difficult; but the results were as melancholy 
Washington demonstrated in a single 
;' the theory, the absurd spectacle 
zation, and the disastrous consequences 
which it entailed. Ee writes, 17 s .">: " The world must feel 
Ion or the states individually are 

Qsidered as emerged from the prin- 

with local convenience and consid- 

tinuing to consider themselves in a 

> In Chisholm v. Georgia, I);il- 

laa, B . jus of the Supreme Court, I., p. GO. 



MAKTXG- ONE OF THIRTEEN. IT 

ereign as best suits their purposes ; in a word, that we are 
one nation to-day and thirteen to-morrow. Who will treat 
with us on such terms?" 1 

" To balance a large state or society, whether monarchical 
or republican, on general laws, is a work of so great diffi- 
culty that no human genius, however comprehensive, is 
able by the mere dint of reason and reflection to effect it. 
The judgments of many must unite in this work. Expe- 
rience must guide their labor. Time must bring it to per- 
fection, and the feeling of inconveniences must correct the 
mistakes which they inevitably fall into in their first trials 
and experiments." 2 

When the American people saw themselves compelled 
to transform the former thirteen colonies into a political 
unity, they were not only destitute of all practical expe- 
rience, but they were not yet clear in their own minds how 
far they should seek to bring about such a unity. 3 

They were, in addition to this, unused to theorizing on 
the laws of state organization. Lastly, they had no leisure 
to grapple profoundly with the many new and difficult 
questions which arose, without compromising their whole 
future from the very beginning. 

It is not therefore to be wondered at that reason and re- 
flection made themselves less felt than might have been 

1 Marshall's Life of Washington, II., p. 97; Life of Hamilton, II., 
p. 331. 

2 Hume, The Rise of the Arts and Sciences, Essays, I., p. 128, Lon- 
don, 1784. 

3 The Mississippi question is, through its various stages, one of the 
most instructive chapters in the history of the gradual expansion of 
the narrow colonial horizon to the conception of a real national power, 
and, finally, of a continental republic. Draper (History of the Amer- 
ican Civil War, I., p. 201), speaking of the universal and complete ig- 
noring of its significance, even after the close of the revolutionary war, 
says: >l Even Washington, so late as 1784, did not think that the owner- 
ship of the Mississippi would be of benefit to the republic ; but, on the 
contrary, was afraid that it might tend to separate the western country 

2 



lg NTV AND SLAVERY. 

from tbe character of the men who composed the 
-. had the circumstances surrounding them 

i m. It was above all things important to 

•v (he demands of the moment, which became greater 

from day to day and assumed a more complicated charac- 

thatthfl revolutionary movement grad- 

oded beyond its original purpose 

and began to embrace objects not at first contemplated. 

Jt was in the very nature of things that even in the most 

rtant matters action frequently followed on the im- 

of the moment, and that the leaders of the revolution 

did not take heed what might be the logical consequences 

which at Borne future time might be drawn therefrom, or 

what practical results might follow from it, when there 

should have been a radical change in circumstances, at this 

moment beyond the possibility of conjecture. This may 

gretted, but it were as foolish to reprove the founders 

of the republic on this account as it would be absurd to 

fact. 

- there was a glaring contradiction in the ac- 
tual Btate of things, it was a natural and inevitable conse- 
quence that the practical measures of congress at first 
should present a Btriking contrast to one another. The 
with England demanded that the colonies should 
j closely and firmly together. The more this struggle, 
1 their attention at the moment, the more 
- taken by congress assume a national ehar- 
And the more exclusively attention was given to 
•i"<i of regulating the relations of the colonic 

►ther, the more did the spirit of particular- 



ly expanded from an Atlantic 

He wished to draw commerce down 

- thai run through the old colonies. In these views he 

ml opinion of the time being that 

raloe of the western I . I >r the payment of the public 

. 



INFLUENCE OF PARTICULARISM. 19 

ism obtain sway. The colonies had not yet realized that, 
aside from their struggle with England, it was their inter- 
est that their fusion should be as complete as possible. 

Moreover, these opposing \iews did not stand directly 
arrayed against each other, but the divergent interests de- 
manded in all important questions almost equal considera- 
tion. The contradiction between the various acts of con- 
gress became, in consequence, ever greater and more 
bizarre; while in congress and out of it the obscurity pre- 
vailing as to the meaning of words, and the confusion of 
theories, kept increasing, and the separate interests of the 
colonies came by degrees to be the only ones which were 
consulted. 

At, the very moment that congress recognized that com- 
plete separation was the possible and even probable conse- 
quence of the quarrel with the mother country, it framed 
the resolution which has been formally 1 the seed from 
which all internal conflicts have sprung, and which, up to 
the year 1865, and after, shook the Union to its center. 

On the Tth of June, 1776, certain resolutions contempla- 
ting the separation of the colonies from the mother country 
were introduced; and on the 10th of June it was resolved 
to appoint a committee to draw up the declaration that 
" these united colonies" are "free and independent states." 

1 1 would again insist that the real cause is to be sought for, not in 
any ill-judged resolution of congress, but in the actual condition of 
affairs. The whole secret of Auy|ucan history is contained in these 
words of Gerry: " We are neither The same nation nor different nations. 
We ought not, therefore, to pursue the one or the other of these 
ideas too closely." Elliott, Deb., V., p. 278. This fact explains all the 
internal conflicts of the Union up to the year 1865. And this fact could 
not be legislated out of existence, or cease to be a fact in consequence 
of a spontaneous act of popular volition. It is an altogether different 
question to what extent political ignorance and moral weakness or cor- 
ruption contributed to perpetuate these opposite views, and thus to make 
them more pronounced, so that a violent disruption became inevitable, 
and after many a crisis had been happily passed, the cure was unduly 
delayed. 



IQ BT'. ' ' « '-'• ' ffl AV]:in '« 

committee, and another to elab- 

mfederation, were chosen. Xo one 

d lurking in these two acts, which 

• w hcn th ibjected to a close verbal 

iration of Independence 

of which, as has been already re- 

lance with the resolution of the 10th 

: the L2th of July, the last- 

• e submitted to congress the draft of the 

( )u the l5thof November, 1777, 

, had nn t several amendments, 

is, and it was resolved to recom- 

:' the states for adoption. 

Monies had, therefore, existed over a year by 

:!i will of the people as an indepen- 

>mmonwealth, when congress submitted 

_ Matures, which placed this common- 

1th on a 1 lIIj different from that on which 

it 1. aed. 

of all the states had ratified the 

:' March, L781, the new constitution was 

univi law. That the legislatures had 

adoption or rejection was 

C e legislatures were not purely 

only as de facto governments. 

. iter and were strictly deter- 

itions which the people of the several 

in obedience to the order of 

inr stricted congress, and 

solved, by its Declaration of the 

•ice to England. 

" 'ken by the .Hires in ex- 

them in their several con- 

• g in binding legal force. 

had constitutional authority 



FICTION" AND FACT. 21 

to vote on a plan of a constitution for the Union. 1 As to 
the legal validity of the act, it was a clear case of usurpa- 
tion based on an untenable fiction. But this fiction was 
then considered an unquestionable right, and naturally 
the act itself was not therefore viewed in the light of a 
usurpation. The consequence was, that, in the course of 
time, this fiction was looked upon not only as an unques- 
tionable right, but as a notorious fact, which had been al- 
ways recognized, whereas, in reality, it gradually became a 
fact, at least in part, only as a result of this confusion of 
ideas. 

In the scheme of confederation which Franklin intro- 
duced into congress on the 21st of July, 1775, there was, of 
course, no question of a " sovereignty" of the colonies. 
Neither is the expression to be found in the articles of 
confederation reported July 12, 1776, i. e. after the united 
colonies had become a political community, by the commit- 
tee appointed on June 11. The third article only declares 
that "each colony shall retain as much of its present laws, 
right and customs as it may think fit," and may " reserve" 
to itself the regulation of its internal affairs so far as they 
do not conflict with the articles of confederation. 2 



1 Several of the states declared themselves in their constitutions as com- 
pletely sovereign. Thus the constitution of New York recites that all 
power in the state has again reverted to the people. Declarations to 
the same effect are to be found in the constitutions of Maryland, North 
Carolina, Massachusetts and New Hampshire. Farrar's Manual of the 
Constitution, pp. 101-103. From what has been said hitherto and from 
what follows in the text, it is evident that these declarations are a con- 
tradiction of facts, at the same time that "they are destitute of all legal 
foundation. But even if the states were actually and legally completely 
sovereign, the legislatures were guilty of usurpation. " If the state in its 
political capacity had it [the right], it would not follow that the legis- 
lature possessed it. That must depend upon the powers confided to the 
state legislature by its own constitution. A state and the legislature of a 
state are quite different political beings." Story, Conim., I., § 628. 

2 " Each colony shall retain as much of its present laws, rights and 
customs as it may think fit, and reserve to itself the sole and exclusive 



8T, rT AHD ffl LTEBT. 

>itioii continued to the 20th of 

the question was allowed to rest en* 

\,.ril, 1777. [t was in the subsequent 

on the L5thof November, 1777, that 

the advocates of particular- 

, n which they carried on their oper- 

. En the three previous proposals, 1 the 

anion preceded that on the reserved 

. Now, on the contrary, the 

asly provided that each 

. John Quincy Adams per- 

,uld retain a sovereignty 

T independence of each 

bad never been declared of right. It never 

tment of Its internal police in all matters that shall 
ithe articles of this eont'.deration." 
.klin in .Inly. 1775; that of the Belect committee in July, 
,• the whole of Aug. 30, 177(3. 

v, freedom and independence, and 
I let Ion and right which is not by this confederation 

a smbled." 

the sovereignty, freedom and inde- 

b the articles of confederation declare it retains? — not 

the whole Union— not from the Declaration of 

from the people of the state itself. It was assumed 

r a of the several states and their 

is, without authority from or consultation with the 

tstitution, p. 19, Cal- 
ictly a union of the state 
\ I., p. 150. 

i Charles 0. Pinckney in Elliot's 

- in his address of the 8th of June 

h is only in our united charac- 

mpire, that "nr independence is acknowl- 

Marshall. I ,11., p. si. See also Farrar, 

Litutlon, p. 52; The Federalist, No. II.; Brownaon, 

tory of the Constitution, I. 

trad, on the 39th of June, 1787, in the con- 

icd tlie essential 



EAULY INCONSISTENCIES. 23 

The articles of confederation start out with the assump- 
tion that from the date of the Declaration of Independence 
each state became de facto and de jure an independent 
state, competent henceforth to form a confederacy with the 
other states whenever it saw fit, and to the extent that it 
saw fit. How this assumption was to be reconciled with 
the fact that the congress had been in existence for years, 
and had actually exercised sovereign power from the first, 
while the individual states had assumed no sovereign atti- 
tude, theoretically or practically, towards England or other 
foreign countries, does not appear. The contradiction is, 
however, easily explained. 

The place that congress occupied was determined en- 
tirely by the relations of the colonies to England. On the 
other hand, the principle underlying the articles of confed- 
eration was borrowed exclusively from the relations of the 
colonies to one another. Until the resolution was taken 
to change the dependency of colonial existence for the 
independence of a political organization, the consideration 
of the former dictated all measures ; now the latter occu- 
pied the foreground because the war with England created 
only a temporary want, while the regulation of internal 
relations was destined to be lasting. 

Apparently and formally, the unity which this want and 
the presumptive future relations of the United States to 
foreign powers caused to seem desirable, was preserved. 
The individual states had attributed to themselves, in the 
articles of confederation, no powers which could place them 
in relation to foreign nations in the light of sovereign 
states. They felt that all such claims would be considered 
ridiculous, because back of these claims there was no real 
corresponding power. Congress therefore remained, as 
heretofore, the sole outward representative of sovereignty. 

rights of sovereignty." Yates's Minutes, Elliott, Deb., I., p. 461. Com- 
pare with this the view advocated by him in 1798 and 1799, of which I 
shall treat more fully hereafter. 



M 8TATE 80V1 WKRY. 

itives was taken from 
it placing it in any other hands. 

of confederation were 

than of a positive nature. They did 

rhich was jnst coming into being a 

. bnt thej began the work of its dissolution. 

essentia] prerogatives which necessarily belong I 

imnnity in its relations with other po* 

. by law to confederate authorities, from whom, 

in].: they withheld all power. On the other hand, 

laJ power to the component parts of 

it did not and could not for themselves, still 

them the right to assume the re- 

- or enforce the rights which regulate the 

a] result of this was that the United States 

to split up into thirteen indepen- 

in the same measure, they virtually 

i member of the family of nations bound to- 

The European powers rightly 

only a shadow without substance, 1 and 

they had : '.mi and no desire to have any re 

"tli the individual sta >vereiern bodies. 2 



; 



wrote i:' 1785: M In a word, the confederation 

NOD> >re than a shadow without the substance; and 

ill's Life of Wash-, IL, p. 99. See 

use contended for by some. 

»«>s the : utures of sovereignty— they could 

Considering them as political 

lib, for they could not Bpeak to any foreign sov- 

: in. y could not hear any proposl- 

y had not even the organs of defense or 

I notofthci ps, or equip vessels, fof 

In the Philadelphia convention, Madison 

Boffin called attention in the debates 

February, 1861, to the fact that 

.na had laid the foundation of 



CHARACTER OF TTIE UNION. 25 

Every existing circumstance, and in some respects even 
the war with England, tended to give affairs this peculiar 
development. 

A new government not founded on force will never im- 
mediately obtain strength and stability, for, on the one 
hand, it generally itself originates in a violent revolution 
which is always to a certain extent attended by a tendency 
to anarchy, and on the other hand, is wanting in the pow- 
erful aids of custom and inherited respect. The new gov- 
ernment of the United States had much to suffer from the 
absence of both these elements. The sovereignty of the 
Union was an abstraction, an artificial idea which could be 
made a reality, only inasmuch as the circumstances which 
had made this idea a necessity should imperatively demand 
it. The sovereignty of the states, on the other hand, was, 
in the minds of the whole people, the first and most natu- 
ral of all circumstances. Each colony had had from its 
beginning a government of its own, which in great part 
was the production of the colonists themselves. The Rev- 
olution had now put into their hands that portion of power 
which previously had been exercised by English officials. 
The further alterations made in the machinery of govern- 
ment were not of so essential a nature that the people 
would be apt to feel themselves complete strangers to its 
operation. The entire transformation was rapidly accom- 
plished, without any of the violent commotions which 
might have produced prolonged reaction. Eight states 1 
had already completed their new constitutions in 1776. In 
the relations of individuals to the government, there was 
nothing to show how wide a breach divided the past from 

a fleet, to which Orth of Indiana replied : " There, then, we have a single 
instance of one of the states taking a step towards sovereignty." None of 
the delegates from the southern states could adduce another instance. 
Chittenden, Debates of the Peace Convention, p. 262. 

1 New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, New Hampshire, 
South Carolina, Virginia, and Pennsylvania. 



ST" WEIGHTY AND SLAVERY. 

irta administered justice in accordance 
with the B il principles and precedents, and the leg- 

i.v r 1 1 « • vote of the people, made laws and 
cee as they had done before, bnt without being sub- 
1 to the control or caprice of a royal governor. In a 
i. long before the close of the war, it was difficult to 
the whole mode of civil life and action thata 
.r revolution was being accomplished. 
[1 was nol an easy task for the colonists to resort to the 
1. But Btanch and sincere as was their loyalty, their 
; veneration for the mother country had by no 
ma been rooted as firmly in the real condition of things 
themselves Bupposed. The greater number were 
acquainted with England only through the accounts of their 
and grandfathers. Bnt with their own colonial 
t, so tar as it had Bprung from themselves and 
tablished by themselves, their affections were inti- 
entwined, for they had grown up with it. It was 
of their flesh and bone of their bone, and it was 
usidered by them as their only real representative. 
as no need of prior reflection to convince the citi- 
jignificance and importance of colonial govern- 
ment. Saving grown up in constant and immediate de- 
e upon it, they were permeated by the feeling of its 
gality. Love and interest conspired to at- 
them to it, for they knew full well that their votes 
a share In it- formation. They looked upon it as the 

natural bulwark of their rights and liberties. 

[f that • in the past, it must be much more 

these bonds could only be strengthened by 
ition of the power of the colonial governments 
•lution. 

. the federal government had 

war with England to place in the Bcales. The love 

1111,1 : • irded by a people to their gov- 

it could certainly not have, for it was a child of 



I 



THE STATUS OF CONGRESS. 27 

yesterday and no one had as yet cast its horoscope. It 
was a product of the Revolution, and as such the practical 
good sense of the American people did not permit them to 
refuse it the completest recognition. But what should be- 
come of it later was an open question, which was by de- 
grees submitted to serious and sober consideration. No 
umbrage was taken that the federal government had ex- 
isted already nearly five years, with the revolutionary 
character it had assumed after the Declaration of Indepen- 
dence, and all attempts authentically to establish its legiti- 
macy were vain. Respect for it was neither increased nor 
diminished by this means. 

Congress, up to the 1st of March, 17S1, did not look up- 
on the articles of confederation as the rule by which it 
was to be guided, any more than it did afterwards, and the 
states gave no more consideration to the wishes, requests, 
and commands of congress after the 1st of March, 1781, 
than they had before. The people, during these five years, 
took to looking upon congress more and more as a creation 
of the Revolution, which had its raison d'etre and was 
necessary only on account of the war with England. 
Hence they thought every good citizen bound to yield it 
just so much obedience as the legitimate power, the state 
government, commanded him to give it. 

The state governments had, in five years, completely 
lost 1 the little revolutionary savor which at first might 
have been observable in civil life. The government of the 
Cnion, on the other hand, suggested no immediate idea 
whatever to the people. It was a means which the states 
employed to secure a definite object; it was not, like the 
state governments, the incorporation of a moral idea pos- 
sessed of independent life in the minds of the people. 

1 Webster says : " The Revolution of 1776 did not subvert government 
in all its forms. It did not subvert local laws and local administrations." 
Webster's Works, III., p. 460. 



SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

if, in thi of the Revolution, it sometimes 

• there v. nscious struggle gradually to 

action of one American people with reality, 
that effect, but all desires having such 
nipped in the bud. 1 
It' it had been possible immediately to elaborate a con- 
stitution which in some essential points should have had 
. and to its instant adoption by 

the people might have gradually adapted 
i it. The disorders of war, which frequently 
Inordinary measures necessary, might have contrib- 
great deal to bring about, in a short time, the union 
of the various elements. But with the single exception of 
D ilaration of Independence, everything that took a 
gal shape and was destined to be of a perma- 
nent raa so framed that the view that thirteen sov- 
ttd independent powers, without any obligation on 
part so to do, had found it. advisable to send dele- 
B common congress, a congress which, by virtue 
•nt made, had cognizance of certain matters 
nation-, took deeper roots among 
the p< articles of confederation expressly stated 
- had entered into " a firm league of friend- 
ship." It wa6 indeed provided at the same time that the 
■ should be "perpetual;" but what foundation was 
for the assumption that this word "perpetual" should 
more literal construction than the " perpetual " 
of the mini!" iiances, offensive and defensive, of 
I, which all experience had shown to be mean- 
the interest of either party die- 
lould be broken 1 
linly was a foundation for this assumption; 

W J : M [nstead of feeling as a nation, 
, Ith indifference, often with hatred, 

"OftotheoUl .' Works, I., p. 113. 



DISTRUST OF POWER. 29 

but it was not understood at the time, arid until it was 
understood, congress could not be looked upon as the head 
of the American people, but must remain a foreign power, 1 
and a congress of delegates, who received instructions from 
their sovereigns, and whose enactments could be enforced 
only to the extent that they met with the approval of these 
same sovereigns. 

The cause which could induce the United States to make 
their "firm league of friendship" really "perpetual" and 
gradually more indissoluble and could produce a corres- 
ponding weakening of the state governments, was the per- 
manent and ever-increasing interest therein of the people 
of all the states. This interest, except in so far as secur- 
ing independence of England was concerned, was entirely 
ignored. It could come to be understood only through ex- 
perience. Besides, leaving out of consideration mere wishes 
and inclinations, the American people were entirely de- 
pendent, in this matter, on speculation, 2 and such was 
the prevailing feeling at the time, that this led naturally 
to a conclusion the very opposite of that which experience, 
in the course of time, proved to be the right one. 

" The Revolution under which they 3 were gasping for 
life; the war which was carrying desolation into all their 
dwellings and mourning into every family, had been 
kindled by the abuse of power — the power of government. 
An invincible repugnance to the delegation of power had 
been generated by the very course of events which had 

1 " It is obvious that the continental government was considered in 
the light of a foreign one. Indeed, the epithet was applied to it by one 
of the leaders of the Massachusetts councils. It was submitted to as a 
matter of necessity, and because such submission was the only practi- 
cable way of concentrating the energies of the other states." Austin's 
Life of Gerry. See Rives, The Life and Times of J. Madison, II., 
p. 177. 

a Story, Comm., I., § 2U. 

3 The colonists. 



|Q ^ WKKV. 

indispensable it be- 

ilousy and the more 

by which it was to be circum- 

iggled against theguardian- 

,which had so needlessly oppressed 

parliament was not suffi- 

at with the condition of affairs in America. 2 

wta a deep antipathy to all ex- 

.. Bat c already remarked, was 

|ghl of a foreign power, spite of the fact 

a from the body of the 

B *>ple thought they must see in con- 

a apt to expect from a power 

nment of the Btate, — unpleasant! 

and usurpation. 

teadily increased and gradually assumed 
The period was big with a peculiarly 
ookoffthe antiquated preju- 
; fr ■: :. former generations; but it 
>und under its feet and aimed at some- 
its original object. It received the 
from thi of actual unbearable 

in lost itself in wild abstractions and be- 
ntured to make a reality of these 
actual world in every respect 
• ith the rules and measures of logic, 

• • trim man and the forms of na- 

ith their own fancy, 

thai R 's writings exercised 

ent of things in America. 

►irtli to Rousseau's phil- 

. importance to Europe, was, 

tion, p. 10. 
* 1 



CRUDE THEORIES. 31 

long before Jefferson grew intoxicated even to madness with 
it in Paris, rampant in America. 1 It, indeed, received 
its full development here only through the French Revolu- 
tion, but a series of fortunate circumstances prevented its 
development to its ultimate consequences. It appeared in 
the new world in a modified form, but was not wanting 
there. And here for the first time it became clearly evi- 
dent that the civilized new world was not separated from 
the old one by any broad unb ridged gulf. They are. not 
only governed by the same historic laws, but the great 
intellectual revolutions which take place in the one act 
simultaneously in the other, although, in accordance with 
the existing natural conditions, they never manifest them- 
selves in precisely the same manner or make their influence 
felt to exactly the same extent. 2 One only needs to read 
the Declaration of Independence to be convinced, that but 
one more impulse was needed, even in America, to permit 
these crude theories 3 to be openly advocated, which, disre- 
garding that which had prescriptive right on its side, in 
virtue of its history, would endeavor to sap the- founda- 
tions of all things, to lay down their arbitrary premises as 
unquestionable truths, and which would have willingly, in 
a night, overturned the state and the established order of 



1 See Kapp, Gescliiclite der Sklaverei, p. 7. 

2 This truth is a priori so evident that, to say the least, it would be su 
perfluous to mention it, were it not that Americans frequently fall into 
the dangerous error, and flatter themselves, that heaven governs them 
by laws altogether peculiar to themselves and their country. In strange 
contrast to this is the disposition to overload their political reasoning 
with analogies, for the most part not pertinent, from Greek and Roman 
history. The tendency here referred to has already perceptibly de- 
creased. This is to be attributed in part to a clarification of political 
thought; but in part also to the fact that the majority of members of 
legislatures and of congress know too little of Greek and Eoman his- 
tory. 

3 Calhoun, with an acuteness very wounding to Americans, calls the 
declarations of these as universal principles, " glittering generalities." 



ST/. . WEIGHTY AND SLAVES 

fchem accord with the ideas which they 
WOJli to cull " natural rights." 

■ interchange of the signification of the words privi- 
and [H-'Acr was the first disastrous confusion of 

- in which the American people were involved by the 

combined influence ».t' their experience in tin- struggle with 

md and the tendency t<» raise obscure philosophical 

abstractions t<> the dignity <>f political laws. 1 From this 

Confusion of ideas there was hut one step to the maxim 

that do power should he delegated which might be abused; 

that i>, that no power whatever should be delegated, be- 

a ao power which may not be abused. 2 *'Con- 

was t<» declare everything, but to do nothing." 3 Had 

there been the slightest idea of what evil effects this must 

inevitably draw after it, things certainly would not. have 

gone .-«• tar. The dread of seeing the power, bestowed in 

the interest of all, turned against the people was not from 

first ><> great, that a few rational concessions might not 

been obtained from envy and mistrust, while the people 

continued to act under the impulse of excitement and the 

of England's supremacy. But here the American people 

from want of experience, left completely to their own 

3. They could judge only from their present feel- 

ind fnun analogy: and both of these might easily, in 

■ fore as, have misled them. 

I' was said that government always sought to increase 

at the expense of liberty. But it was complete- 

cted, that in a popular revolution the 

mlndi should stop at the happy mean which marks the salutary 

•\ <-r and privilege, and combine the energy of govern- 

men! with tin- security of private rights. A failure in this delicate and 

tant point lathe great source of the inconveniences we experience.* 1 

Iton, in No. XXVI. of tin- Federalist 

'"Tint power might beabu [to persons of this opinion] a 

Its being bestowed." Marshall, Life oi 



RELIANCE ON SELF-INTEREST. 33 

ly overlooked that 'this was the case only when power had 
"attained a certain degree of energy and independence," 
while it as surely languishes and decays when it does not 
possess this certain degree of energy and independence. 1 
The people therefore lived in the honest conviction that, 
no matter how little power might be given to congress, it 
should be the first care of all patriots and friends of lib- 
erty to keep a watchful eye upon it and to sound the alarm 
at the first attempt it should make to exceed its powers. 
That the time might come when the states or the state 
governments should not be willing to accede to the equit- 
able demands of congress, made evidently in the interest 
of all, — such a fear at the beginnning of the Revolution 
would have been readily disposed of as foolish and inju- 
rious, lie Tocqueville says of American legislators that 
they rely largely on the intelligence of men; that is, that 
they leave it to the personal interest of all to live accord- 
ing to the laws. 2 That there is some truth in this asser- 
tion, cannot be denied. But at this precise time it was not 
only the " existing European sentimentality" that was in 
search of a " Dulcinea, most beautiful of women, in the 
primeval forests of America, under the names of Nature, 
Liberty, the Eights of Man, and Humanity." 3 

1 Madison wrote to Jefferson, October 17, 1788 : "It has "been remarked 
that there is a tendency in all government to an augmentation of power 
at the expense of liberty. But the remark, as usually understood, does 
not seem to me well founded. Power, when it has attained a certain 
degree of energy and independence, goes on generally to farther degrees. 
But when below that degree, the direct tendency is to farther degrees 
of relaxation, until the abuses of liberty beget a sudden transition to an 
undue degree of power." Rives, The Life and Times of Madison, II., 
p. 641. Hamilton gives expression to the same idea. See also Farrar, 
Manual of the Const, p. 106; Story, Com., I., § 220. 

2 " Les legislateurs americains ne montrent que peu de conflance dans 
rhonnetete* humaine, mais ils supposent toujours l'homme intelligent, 
lis se reposent done le plus souvent sur l'intergt personnel pour l'exe'cu- 
tion des lois." La Democratic en Ame*rique, I., p. 94. 

s Kapp, Leben des americanischen Generals, Joh. Kalb, p. 242. 
3 



VIY AND SLAVERY. 

dal] was doubtless right when he said that the 

a had not drawn the sword in the defena 
ira l rights," hut as English B nbjects,iu every a 

8t he wrongs which they were made 
a Legitimate bnt unjnst government. 1 Bnt 
drawn, the American people, spite oi 
:ill t ;il and wbriety of their character, began to 

indulge in these Bame idealistic, philosophizing reveries; 
and the more they were In accord, or Beemed to be in ac- 
. with the practical wants of the time and with the 
produce^ in individuals by actual events, the 
completely did the}' yield themselves np to their in- 
The ingenuous admiration of one's own ex- 
.- whi.-h was considered the natural resnlt of dent- 
itions, or of the principle that the people arc 
ource ororigin of power, now began, hut it was some 
tini( . ..^ Lt eventually did, through the in- 

£ demagogues, into that pharisaical self-right- 
j, which isoneofthe most characteristic traits of 
•iral thought of the masses of the American peo- 
this time American legislators forgot that self- 
e best guaranty for the observance of the laws. 
they yet Bupposed that a rational self-interest 
would induce both the state governments and individuals 
-t the reasonable measures of congress and to yield 

jon, I.,p.ll7. Sec also the Life and Writings 

HO. Edmund Burke writes: "They [the colonists] 

1 to liberty but to liberty according to 

and on English principles. Abstract liberty, like other 

found. Liberty inheres in sonic sensible 

ition has formed to itself some favorite point which, 

the criterion of their happit i as." Work* 

A-.u.-r. Ltep.,pp. GibDBi 

Iminiatrations of Washington and J. Adams, edited 

' ■ PP. -'. :; - 

.. II., pp. 07, 221,350. Works 

Jl; 11.. p] etc 






THE AWAKENING. 35 

to its equitable demands, in case pure patriotism and un- 
selfish republican virtue might not here and there be quite 
as great and lasting as there was reason to expect. But 
the foundation on which they built was, consciously or un- 
consciously to themselves, the highest ethical elements of 
human nature. These, in their opinion, were destined to 
be the compass by which, certainly during the great and 
holy conflict, and probably also in the future, congress, the 
state governments and individual citizens would with the 
utmost harmony and unanimity guide the ship of state 
into the harbor of the golden age which was dawning. 1 
They overestimated themselves and the people, and this 
both as to their intelligence, their moral purity and moral 
greatness. 2 "We imagined," wrote general Knox, during 
the troubles in Massachusetts, " that the mildness of the 
government and the virtue of the people were so corres- 
pondent, that we were not as other nations, requiring bru- 
tal force to support the laws. But we find that we are 
men, actual men, possessing all the turbulent passions be- 
longing to that animal, and that we must have a govern- 
ment proper and adequate for him." 3 

1 "Have we not already seen enough of the fallacy and extravagance of 
these idle theories which have amused us with promises of an exemp- 
tion from the imperfections, weaknesses and evils incident to society in 
every shape ? Is it not time to awake from the deceitful dream of a 
golden age, and to adopt as a practical maxim for the direction of our 
political conduct, that we, as well as the other inhabitants of the globe, 
are yet remote from the happy empire of perfect wisdom and perfect 
virtue?" Hamilton in No VI. of the Federalist. See also Life of J. Q. 
Adams, II., p. 129. 

2 Washington writes, the 8th of August, 1786, to Jay: " We have er- 
rors to correct. We have probably had too good an opinion of human 
nature in forming our confederation. Experience has taught us that 
men will not adopt and carry into execution measures the best calcula- 
ted for their own good without the intervention of a coercive power." 
Washington's Writings, IX., p. 187. 

3 Marshall, Life of Washington, II., p. 118. Fisher Ames says : " Our 
mistake, and in which we choose to persevere because our vanity 



AVERY. 

leep 

t its evil fruits wen be- 

country goffered from this 

ctent that the fathers <A* the 

ts future. True, 
the real :' tlie 

[ety, had actually 

were 
esting the evil than by ap- 
_:«.»n him- 
Qtly replied: "Influenc 
• nnnent." 1 
Th< have been brought to a ha] 

mistrust in all strong government, 
y in all : lal to tin 

in tlit- virtue of the people 

then del to the extent that it was later. Jus- 

[the colonies] found theme* 

- inl>led for mutual 

ipelled l»y the course of 

to clothe that body with sovereign powers in the 

; miliary manner, and t'.« permit them 

e genera and war, with- 

only by the silent 

srular and 
Bumi in tlie first instance, must 

-.political affairs, by only determin- 
ed when 
dlcct and present the evidence, 
- bat one result 
- but one i hiced 

! irsue. We forget that in 

: >cate and a win 

::o. 



IMPOTENCE OF CONGRESS. 6i 

in the very nature of tilings have continued to operate 
to some extent during the whole course of the war. And 
these causes produced like effects. True, there now existed 
a formal " contract." But the existence of the republic 
was of greater importance than the minute observance of 
the provisions of this contract When, therefore, an una- 
voidable conflict between duties arose, congress partly con- 
sciously, unconsciously in part, violated the contract. 

The interests of the Union came in conflict at every step 
with the provisions of the compact; for, as we have seen, 
congress was not possessed, in any sense, of the power nec- 
essary to carry out its resolutions. But the situation of 
the country demanded above all things a single, strong, 
prompt and energetic executive power. How greatly every 
operation was hindered by the impotence of congress ; what 
frightful distress its powerlessness produced on every hand, 
and especially in the army; how often it brought the coun- 
try to the very verge of the abyss; — to all this Washington's 
correspondence bears eloquent testimony, which will always 
redound to his fame as it will to the confusion of the jeal- 
ous and self-seeking particularism of the state legislatures. 
But congress was neither willing nor able to exceed its 
authority except in the most urgent cases. These indeed 
were not few. The Federalist says: U A list of the cases 
in which congress have been betrayed, or forced by the 
defects of the confederation, into violations of their char- 
tered authorities, would not a little surprise those who 
have paid no attention to the subject." 1 No blame attached 
to it in most cases, partly, because, as in the case of the 
ordinance of 17S7, 2 it was not seen that it had been guilty 
of usurpation, and partly because it was tacitly acknowl- 
edged that the usurpation was absolutely necessary. The 
contemptible impotence of congress was too patent to per- 

No. XLIL 

3 See the Federalist, No, XXXVIII 



mA MV AND SLAVERY. 

[aim with any -rent vehemence 
OD Ltfi part. 

Hence there was obviously no necessity for the genera! 
:•, which might attend too powerful 
Lsolidation" of the CTnion. And 
ill harped upon on every occasion, and not 
■om impure personal motives, but in great part 
from lull and honest conviction. The mure insufficient 
rernraent were proved to be, the stronger 
m toany extension of them. The disincli- 
;i to trust 88 with power at all in keeping with 

great that it began to show 
:i in the debates in congress. 1 
news, however, were not carried to an extreme 
during the war. The governmental machinery of the con- 
ns clumsy and imperfect as it could well be. 
A nnfrequently seemed as if it would cease working 
!•. 1 lut at e\ ery critical moment it received a new 
A* long as the war had not yet been happily 
terminated, there Btood out in bold relief a definite object 
the CTnion absolutely necessary; for even the 
miiis visionary recognized that independence could 
lonly by united effort 8 But the moment all 

9 J I : 

T . . ■ nary unanimity of action and opinion was preserved by 

[dividual Influence of the great men who appeared together in the 

le Diplomatic History of the Admin intra- 

w Adams, p. 10. <r. W. Greene is a decided advo- 

\ ,;h. Greene, passim, 

.: b of June, 1786, to Washington: M I am un- 

pprehensl 30 than during the war. Then we had a 

1 1. and though the means and time of obtaining it were often 

i did firmly believe that we Bhould ultimately suc- 

1 ditl firmly believe that justice was with us." Marshall, 

. r.. p. 9, Bays, and doubtless rightly: 

r it must not !"• supposed that the treaty of peace secured the na- 

it would I iy, that the most criti- 

• mbraced the time between 1783 and 



GROWTH OF CORRUPTION. 39 

external pressure was removed, 1 the crazy structure be- 
gan to fall to pieces with a rapidity which astonished even 
those who had had during the struggle the best opportuni- 
ty to learn its weaknesses. 

If the states were at first satisfied with simply ignoring 
the requisitions of congress, or of complyiug with them 
just as far as seemed good to them, they now began to 
scoff at its impotence and to boast of their neglect of 
duty. 2 
K The demoralizing influences which every protracted war 
produces began now to manifest themselves to an alarm- 
ing extent. Impure motives of every description governed 
the action of the legislatures, and this evil became grad- 
ually more frequent and less disguised. Even during the 
war the most distinguished men gradually left congress, 
because they found in their several states a field of action 
in which they could accomplish more, and one in most in- 
stances much more congenial to their tastes. 3 Now they 
either sought to retire entirely to private life, or they were 
condemned to see their influence in the legislatures grad- 
ually wane. Less remarkable men, who knew little of 
the meaning of the real patriotism which had actuated the 
leaders of the Revolution, by degrees assumed command 
of the helm. Confidence in the virtue of the people and 
denunciation of the slightest attempts to strengthen the 
power of the confederacy were the masks behind which 
the most egotistic ends were concealed. But it was soon 

the adoption of the constitution of 1788." See also Storv, Comni., L, 
§249. 

1 Story, Comm., I., § 254. 

2 Washington writes to Jay: "Requisitions are actually little better 
thanajestora by-word throughout the land. If you tell the legisla- 
tures they have violated the treaty of peace and invaded the prerogatives 
of the confederacy, they will laugh in your face." Marshall, Life of 
Wash., II., p. 108. Justice Story also says : " The requisitions of con- 
gress were openly derided." 

3 Trescot, Dipl. Hist, p. 12. 



NTV AND SLAVERY. 

troely worth whole to make use of any mask, 
-ansparent The acquisitions of the war 
odnpon M bo much booty, of which each state 
rare the Lion's share, without the least re- 
fer the well-being or honor of the whole. In several 
M wh-» were willing to sell even the honor of 
1 a bolder front and grew noisier in 
of increasing their own personal share of the 
and of Beeing it turned as soon as possible into 
■!.' 
I a ess was destitute of even the necessary pecuniary 
ting its most urgent obligations. 2 The 
forces were still in New York when congress was 
compelled, by a handful of mutinous recruits, to remove 
. Philadelphia to Princeton, because it was not able to 
the repeated promises it had made to the troops. It 
due to Washington's influence alone that the whole 
arm v did not refuse to lay down their arms and dissolve, un- 
was done them. The distress grew greater every 
. and threatened daily to induce more serious com- 
itions. The foreign debt was maturing, and cong 
WBB unable to meet the interest upon it, to say nothing of 
payment of the principal. All efforts to prevail on 
■ guaranty the general government a secure 
adequate source of income were without effect. They 

1 '• Public faith and public force were equally out of the question, for 

either authority or resources, the corporation of a col- 

i missionary society were greater potentates than con_ 

federal government had not merely fallen into imbecility and of 

mpt,butthe oligarchical factions in the large states had 

...y made great advances in the usurpation of its powers. The 

on Jersey and Connecticut; and the 

i ith Impatience their tributary dependence on 

and Philadelphia." Fisher Ames, Works, II., p. 370. 

i nmenl of a great nation had barely revenue enough to 

to pay the salary of the doorkeeper." 

L c. 



AGITATION FOE EEPUDIATION. 41 

held fast to the policy of requisitions and even considered 
it a favor when they paid the least, attention to such as 
were made upon them. 1 The evidences of indebtedness 
of the home loan sank, in consequence, to about one-tenth 
of their nominal value. 2 

The pecuniary condition of the individual states was still 
worse, for here there was not only no possibility of pay- 
ment, but the disposition to pay became weaker every day. 
And even when existing legislatures could be reproached 
with nothing on this score, it was so uncertain what might 
be expected from future ones that the state scrip could be 
negotiated only at an oppressive premium. And this be- 
came continually worse, for the number of those who aimed 
at liquidating their debts by a dishonorable exercise of 
the legislative power constantly increased, 3 and in many of 
the states it became more uncertain every day whether 
they would not find a majority in the legislature. 

" Public confidence was shaken to such an extent in con- 
sequence, that even private individuals of undoubted credit 
were obliged to pay a discount of from thirty to fifty per 

1 Hamilton remarked in February, 1787, in the New York legislature, 
that in the preceding five years New Hampshire, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, and Georgia had contributed nothing ; Connecticut and Dela- 
ware about a third of their levy ; Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Mary- 
land about one-half; Viginia, three-fifths ; Pennsylvania, almost her entire 
quota; and New York more than her quota. But it was New York's 
headstroug opposition that defeated the effort made to give congress, for 
twenty-five years, the right to levy a tax of five per cent, on all spirit- 
uous liquors and some other articles, and to increase the tax on all 
other imported goods. Marshall says in relation to this : " New York 
had given her final veto to the impost system, and in doing so had vir- 
tually decreed the dissolution of the existing government." Life of 
Wash., II., p. 123. 

2 It should not be forgotten, however, that congress had, some years 
before, fixed the relation of the continental paper money to specie at 
40: 1. See an interesting account of the depreciation of the continental 
money in 1779 and 1780 in Kapp's Leben Kalb's, pp. 169, 170. 

3 Life of J. Adams, II., p. 131. 



STATE SOYERKIGXTY AXD SLAVERY. 

completely prostrated. 
market, especially for real estate, and bi 
id, could be made, when at all, only at a great sacri- 
A sullen resignation began to take possession of 
lblic lllill( i. People despaired of bringing abonta bet- 
Bjs through economy and labor. Wild fancies 
i„ the garb of radical reform theories, tending to the over- 
throw of all law and order, gradually usurped the place of 
business habits which at all other periods have 
d the American people. 
Under Buch circumstances, it can excite no surprise that 
igive and particularistic tendencies of the time be- 
«r ;in to assume a coarser form of development When the 
confidence of man jn man was undermined, and the sense 
of justice of whole classes of society so dimmed that they 
inght to ex-ape their own embarrassments by the 
mtruin of their neighbors, it could not be expected 
the policy of the states in their relation with one 
another Bhould he guided by healthy politico-economical 
ideas, by great unselfishness, or by high moral principle. 
i state had the exclusive right to regulate its com- 
.!<1 each Btate, most ungenerously and most selfish- 
ly, availed itself, to the utmost limit, of this right. In the 
ilatiou of commerce, regard was had only to self inter- 
and a policy was frequently followed, the aim of which 
was t<» obtain an advantage directly opposed to the welfare 
of th» neighltoring 6tates. This gave occasion to continual 
tions and petty jealousies. The number and magni- 
tude of real and imagined grievances grew on every side, 
bo that the mutual prejudices of the states shot deeper roots 
their animosity became yet more embittered, while 
as a consequence the ruin of their commerce was com- 
ted. 

iction which this internal dissension had on the 

i of the Union t.> the European powers was very 

The political emancipation of the United 



IMPOTENCE OF CONGRESS. 43 

States was established by the war: their economic emanci- 
pation was only a formal one. In this respect they re- 
mained, for a great many years more, in colonial depen- 
dence. The only essential change made in the situation 
served merely to confirm anew Franklin's saying, that "not 
England, but Europe" was the mother country of America. 
The advantage, however, which might haye been reaped 
from this change was scarcely turned to account. The 
United States had of course the right to enter into com- 
mercial relations with such of the European powers as 
might offer them the best terms; but this right was des- 
tined to remain completely unproductive of profit, as long 
as these powers did not consider it their interest to enter 
into commercial treaties with them. And as, by reason of 
the powerlessness of congress and the little reliance that 
could be placed on the state legislatures, there could be no 
guaranty that the terms of any treaty would be observed, 
trans-Atlantic nations were little inclined to bind them- 
selves to anything. 1 England had already experienced how 
little reliance was to be placed on the promises of congress. 
The terms of the treaty of peace were frequently violated 
by the Americans, as Jay, the then secretary of foreign af- 
fairs, frankly avowed. But they were satisfied with making 
this avowal, for the urgent recommendations of congress to 

1 The Duke of Dorset writes on the 28th of March, 1785, to the Amer- 
ican commissioners who were endeavoring to negotiate a treaty of com- 
merce :"...! have been . . . instructed to learn from you, 
gentlemen, what is the real nature of the powers with which you are 
invested, whether you are merely commissioned by congress, or whether 
you have received separate powers from the respective states. ■ ■ ■ 
The apparent determination of the respective states to regulate their own 
separate interests renders it" absolutely necessary, towards forming a 
permanent system of commerce, that my court should be informed how 
far the commissioners can be duly authorized to enter into any engage- 
ments with Great Britain, which it may not be in the power of any one 
of the states to render totally useless and inefficient," Diplomatic Cor- 
respondence, 1783-1789, II., p. 297. Compare Marshall, Life of Wash., 
II., pp., 96, 97. Pitkin, History of the U. S., II., pp. 189, 190. 



STATE SOVEKKKiNTV AND SLAVERY. 

forth make the observance of the treaty an 

• solicitude, were words spoken to the 

wind. England, therefore, thought herself justified in not 

i r part of the contract. Sherefused tovacatethe 

ts; and the [ndians, under the protection of her 

troops, and partly because urged to it by England, carried 

OD a: ;-.lcr warfare against American settler-. 1 

tnplaint8 consequent upon the distress and misery 

growing "ur of this lamentable absence of government 

continued t.> become louder and more general. Congress 

had t.» nse all its remaining resources and energy in order 

to meet the daily demands upon it. Complete ruin had 

oided only because Holland happened to be in 

>ndition t«» make another small loan. But this could 

afford a respite of only a few mouths more. 

Colonel Humphries wrote to \Va>hington that the wheels 
of the political machine could with difficulty continue to 
move. And. indeed, a short time after they came to "an 
awful stand." 1 The United States, which had already 

M • American writers consider it a settled fact that England was 

the first to break the terms of the treaty. It must be granted, also, that 

aid I laim with a certain degree of truth, in his communica- 

of May, L792, to the English ambassador, Hammond, 

and only to recommend the states to deport them- 

rds their English creditors and towards the loyalists in the 

sired by England. But the absolute want of power of the 

■ incut of tin- Union bad given so g >od a pretext to England to fail 

i ongress wasso directly compelled to acknowl- 

r the "sovereign" Btales, that neither England 

■ i- r country would be likely to be induced to undertake any 

- an equivalent new recommendations of 

1 ;.• b In bs have, step by step, matured thein- 

•.viiich baa at length arrested all the wheels of the 
ament and brought them to an awful stand. Cong: 

mean- of keeping up the form- of ad- 

•n till the Btates Can have time to agree upon a more substantial 

.•nte forth shadow of a federal government." Federalist, 






45 

dreamed themselves to be the redeemers of the world from 
political slavery, were, both at home and abroad, an object of 
compassion, of scorn and contempt. 1 This was known to 
all; no one ventured to deny it; but the legislatures re- 
mained obdurate. They have a fatal disinclination to de- 
spoil themselves of the smallest attribute of independent 
or sovereign states, wrote « colonel Humphries, in substance, 
to Washington on the 20th of January, 1787. It was 
necessary that their own existence should be in jeopardy, 
before they would even reluctantly acknowledge that there 
was no salvation for them except in strengthening the 
government of the Union. 

In Massachusetts were witnessed the first commotions 
which showed beyond a doubt that society itself was al- 
ready completely undermined and that a radical political 
reform and the preservation of social order were well-nigh 
identical questions. The malcontents who either openly 
or secretly sided with Shay were equal in number to the 
friends of the state government, and their ultimate object 
was none other than the repudiation of public and private 
debts and a re-distribution of property. 2 The greatest 
evil of all was that it was lon^ doubtful whether the le^is- 
lature would rouse itself to energetic action, or whether 
that part of it which was in secret sympathy with the 
rebels would obtain the upper hand. 

The news of the outbreak of these disorders created a 
very profound impression everywhere. The old leaders of 
the Revolution felt that the time had at last come when 
the question of the " to be" or the " not to be" of the 
nation must be decided. The spectre of civil war rose up 

1 Washington writes to Colonel Lee : "To be more exposed in the eyes 
of the world and more contemptible than we already are, is hardly 
possible." See also Works of Jefferson, L, pp. 509, 518, 532; IL, pp. 
193, 194. 

2 Compare Curtis, Hist, of the Const, I., p. 269 ; Sparks, Wash., IX., 
p. 207; Marshall, Wash., II., p. 107; Rives, Madison, II., p. 175. 



&EIGNTY AND BLA.VEBT. 

in :i tl g attitude before every eye. 1 Colonel 

Bumphriee implored Washington not to remain neutral if 

I break out. And Washington himself was far 

ura aa mere phantoms. lUt wrote 

: "There are combustibles in every state 

park might set fire." 1 And this was the view 

thai rywhere. " It is. indeed, difficult to o 

ny picture of the gloom and apprehensiona which 
pervaded the public councils as well as the private 
:' the ablest men of the country." 3 

- were fermenting into civil war." Fisher Ames, 

• M trenail, Life of Wash., II., p. 119. 

1 :: :.i . 1. §271. A certain Smith, who said of himself: "I 

am a plain man and ^> i my living by the plow," described the rebellion 

in the following words, in the Massachusetts convention: "Then 

a black cloud that arose in the East last winter, and spread over the 

. . . . I mean, Bir, the county of Bristol; the cloud rose 

upon us, and produced a dreadful effect It brought on 

marchy, and that led to tyranny. I say it brought anarchy. 

d to live peaceably and were before good neighbon 
tnd took up arms government . . . I am going, Mr. 

>w yon and my brother farmers what were the effects 
irchv, that you may Bee the reasons why I wish for good govern- 
ment. People, 1 k up arms; and then if you went to speak 
musket of death presented to your breast. They 
would rob you <>f your property, threaten to burn your houses; oblige 
. ird night and day; alarm spread from town to town; 
tender mother would cry: 'Oh, mj 
*hat Bhall I do for my child?' Some were taken captive; 
children taken out of their md carried away. Then we should 

r prisoners in front to be killed 

- How dreadful, how distressing, was this I Our 

Should have been glad to snatch at any- 

..:.-. II . I any one that was aide to pro- 

mdard, we should all haw flocked to it, 

If it had been B monarch, and that monarch might have proved a 

that anarchy leads to tyranny; and better to 

my at once." Elliott. Deb.* II., pp. 102, 108. 

Qtion, p. I If they did not 

iiin the borders Ol each - a repetition of the rebel- 



THE ANNAPOLIS CONVENTION. 47 

It was owing to this general feeling that a desperate 
crisis had been reached, that the report of the convention 
at Annapolis did not fall on deaf ears. This convention 
met in September, 1786, at the invitation of the legisla- 
ture of Virginia, " to consider how far a uniform system 
in their commercial relations" might " be necessary to 
their common interests." But as only five states 1 were 
represented, and the commissioners were soon satisfied 
that their powers were not such as the critical condition of 
the country demanded, they contented themselves with 
drawing up a report which was laid before congress and 
the legislatures of the several states. The commissioners 
therein recommended the calling of a general convention 
" to meet at Philadelphia, on the second day in JVIay next, 
to take into consideration the situation of the United 
States; to devise such further provisions as shall to them 
seem necessary to render the constitution of the federal 
government adequate to the exigencies of the Union ; and 
to report such an act for that purpose to the United States 
in congress assembled, as, when agreed to by them, and 
afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every state, 
will effectually provide for the same." 

This report induced New York to instruct its delegates 
to make a formal proposition that congress should recom- 
mend to the states the calling of a general convention. 2 On 
the 21st of February, 1787, this proposition was accepted 
and the recommendation made which had been advised by 
the Annapolis convention. 

The supporters of a strong government now acted with 

i 

lion kindled by Shay in Massacliu setts, ending, perhaps, in a general 

civil war, they must substitute for the rotten structure of the confedera- 
tion a constitution which would confirm, and not undermine and break 
up, their actual union." See Life of J. Adams, II., p. 131. 

1 New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware and Virginia. 

2 The proposition referred to received a majority of only one vote in 
the New York senate. Marshall, Life of Wash., II., p. 123. 



43 EH M V AND SLAVKRY. 

, fop it was necessary not only to induce 
a ll t ; nd representatives to the conven- 

sanse the choice of delegates to tall upon the 
fished men in the country, that their very 
names might suffice to keep the party of anarchy within 
ds. 
In the first place, it wasnecessary to secure Washington, 
e held a place in the hearts of the people, such as no 
other of his great co-laborers in the work of independence 
. and such as no other can occupy again. To seek 
in Washington's breast any thought hut that of the wel- 
►untry would have been, at the time, a species 
of high treason and an unpardonable offense against faith 
in human nature. It was reserved for the demagogues of 
succeeding decade to deh'le even his name with the 
most disgusting drivel. Washington yet invested every- 
thing he touched with a kind of sacredness. W Washing- 
ton was wanting, the best man, the people's man, was want- 
also; but on the other hand, if even his co-operation 
turned out to be fruitless, the hest card in the game was 
played in vain and the game itself must be given up as 
Washington knew this, as did also all those who un- 
srnificance of the moment. It is therefore 
a correct understanding of the condition of 
affaire to remember that Washington at first absolutely 
nomination, ami accepted it at last, although 
in bo doing 1 i impelled not only to do the gre 

violence to hi- personal wishes, but to disregard the counsel 
whh- to him from persons whose advice was worth 

and which was based on important political 
< done! Elumphries and general Knox strcnu- 
j oppose le they feared, as they said, that 

thin. they could grow better. 

rton would doubtless have followed their advice 
were he not fully convinced, after mature consideration, 



THE PHILADELPHIA CONTENTION. 49 

that this was indeed "the last dying essay" 1 to make the 
continued existence of the Union possible. 2 

The delegates began to meet at Philadelphia on the ap- 
pointed day; but it was the 25th of May before a majority 
of the states were represented. But although there reigned 
here again the careless spirit which prevailed as to all mat- 
ters pertaining to the government of the confederation, it 
must not be inferred therefrom that the impending trans- 
actions were looked upon with indifference. 

One needs only to read the list of names of the delegates, 
to be convinced that people everywhere were penetrated 
with the gravity of the occasion and the times. If there 
was any exit from the labyrinth of conflicting interests and 
views, this meeting must certainly find it; for it was un- 
questionably made up of the best men in the Union, of the 
most experienced, patriotic and intelligent. 

The effect on the one hand was to inspire courage and 
hope in the breasts of even the most disheartened, but on 
the other, this very circumstance served painfully to in- 
tensify the alarming doubts for the country's future; for 
if this convention should dissolve without having accom- 
plished any result, it seemed as if nothing remained but to 
face the approaching chaos with the gloom of resignation. 3 
It was fortunate that this feeling was strongest among the 
members of the convention; for it caused them to realize 
the immense responsibility which weighed upon their 
shoulders and brought it home to their consciousness with 
such force, that a majority of them saw clearly that their 
only alternative was mutual concession or general ruin. 4 



1 See the letter in Marshall, Life of Wash., II., p. 114. 

2 4> The idea of dismemberment had recently made its appearance in 
the newspapers. " Madison's Introduction to the Debates in the Federal 
Convention of 1787, Elliott, V., p. 120. 

3 See Elliott, Deb., V., pp. 553, 557. 

4 Mason gave strong expression to this conviction on the 5th of July : 
M It could not be more inconvenient for any gentleman to remain absent 

4 



MY AND SLAVERY. 

ed, therefore, that its transactions should be 

with closed doors and that the delegates should 

, luilVl l to preserve the strictest silence concerning 

red, in order that the questions in controversy 

; be dragged immediately before the forum ot an 

ted and angry people and all prospect of an under- 

standing thua destroyed from the very beginning. This 

on justified by the course which the pro- 

ok. 

Ir was plain from the first days of the convention that 

„llv number of the delegates— and among them many 

f the most distinguished men— would not limit 

themselves to a literal interpretation of their pov. 

Their instructions authorized them only to propose amend- 

mentfl to the existing articles of confederation; hut they 

B satisfied that all such attempts could, at most, only 

postpone the day oi ruin and that the source of the evil 

could be destroyed only by giving the constitution ana- 

tional basis. 

Well grounded as these convictions might he, justified 
ttives were in not hesitating in their choice 
between exceeding their powers and the salvation of their 
ntry, the people's veto would doubtless have frustrate^ 
their designs, if at that moment an opportunity had bee* 
afforded to demagogues and the honest advocates of partic- 
ularism to denounce them. When the constitution was 
proposed to the people for adoption, thedecisioa 
hung upon asinglehair. There can be no question to 
which Bide the balance would have inclined if the calm ar- 
of Dickinson and Luther Martin's fiery declama- 
had reached the public ear at a time when the outline 
of • titution was not yet complete and the only al- 

. hUprlval but he would bury hisbone9 in this city rather 

ntry to the consequences of a dissolution of the con- 

rithont anything being done." Elliott, Deb., V., p. 287. See 

| 



DISPUTE AND DISSENSION. 51 

ternative did not yet lie between its unconditional accep- 
tance and total rejection ; but as the convention was yet in 
session and so greatly divided, the worst was to be feared 
at any moment. Two of the three New York delegates, 
Lansing and Yates, left the convention while it was in the 
midst of its labors and declared that their constituents 
would never have sent delegates there, if they had dreamed 
that any such projects were on foot. 1 And it repeatedly 
seemed as if half of the deputies would follow their exam- 
ple, and the convention dissolve without having accom- 
plished its task. On two of the most important questions 
the views of the delegates were diametrically opposed 
and it was apparently impossible to mediate between 
them. Complete helplessness threatened them, for every 
attempt at compromise served only to make the gap 
between them wider; and the supporters of the oppos- 
ing views were always forced by the discussion into yet 
more extreme positions, so that at last the signs of per- 
sonal bitterness began to show themselves. 

"When finally, every prospect of an understanding seemed 
to have disappeared, the white-haired Franklin arose and 
proposed that henceforth the sessions should be opened 
with prayer, for now there was no hope of help except 
from heaven; the wit of man was exhausted! 2 The hojite 
of ultimate success must have been small, indeed, when 
such a proposition could be made by Franklin, strongly 
inclined as he was to rationalism, a man who at heart was 
averse to all religious demonstration and who, even in the 
darkest hours of the war, had carried his head very high. 

1 Lansing declared on the 16th of June : " Had the legislature of the 
state of New York apprehended that their powers would have been con- 
strued to extend to the formation of a national government, to the ex- 
tinguishment of their independency, no delegates would have appeared 
here on the part of that state." Yates's Minutes,Elliott, Deb., I., p. 141. 
See also letter from the Hon. Rob. Yates and the Hon. John Lansing, 
Jun., to the governor of New l r ork. Elliott, Deb., I., p. 480 

2 Elliott, Deb., V., p. 254. 






I SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 



,i;h passionate emphasis, declared that South 
r accept a constitution which did 
ffbrd proper protection to the interests of tfc 

, Gouverneur Morris, speaking of the demand 
laller states to have equal representation in con- 
exclaimed in a prophetic spirit: -This country 
united, [f persuasion does not unite it, the sword 
will • ,. solution of these two controverted 

, ;iu ,i, through long weary weeks, to be given in 
(min0 ns words of Gerry: "A secession would take 
, for some gentlemen seemed decided upon it 
. Edmund Randolph, who had been one of the most 
led advocates of a thorough reform of the constitution 
in the oational sense, refused to sign the one which had 
rfted, because itsadoption" would end in tyranny.' ■ 
ir lv four months elapsed before the delegates could 
, upon a plan, of which they said to themselves, with 
nilton, that it was not possible to hesitate between the 
of seeing good come from it and anarchy and 
rnlsion. On the 17th of September it was unanimous- 
red that the plan should be adopted by the state! 
at the time, which was done. When the last 
re signing their names to the document, Frank- 
! that he had frequently asked himself in the 
course of the proceedings whether the sun pictured on the 
president's chair was an ascending or declin- 
>w he had the satisfaction of knowing thai 
i . ' j. qoI a Betting, sun. 

n proved ultimately to be correct; but for 
moment a firm confidence that success was certain 



' [bid, \ 

•Ibid, V., pp. 484, 491, dso Edmund Randolpbi 

El .use of Delegates, Virginia, Ibid, L, pp 
191. 



ADJOURNMENT. 53 

bordered almost on temerity. Much was indeed gained 
when the convention, with something approaching una- 
nimity, could recommend the proposed constitution to the 
people; but there yet remained difficulties to be overcome 
equal at least to those which the convention had sur- 
mounted. 

The convention had, it is true, — unlike the articles of 
confederation, which on all the more important questions 
demanded unanimity , — declared that the consent of nine 
states should give force to the new constitution, so far as 
these nine states were concerned; but it was extremely 
doubtful whether even this number could be won over to 
it. In the convention itself, and up to the very last mo- 
ment, it had been impossible to effect a reconciliation of 
the opposing views. Franklin had purposely given his 

motion an ambiguous meaning, in order that the final bal- 
es O' 

lot might have the semblance of entire harmony. This 
might, for the first moment, have the advantage of 
making a good impression upon the people. The next in- 
stant, however, every one must have known that Mason, 
Randolph, Gerry, and others had decidedly opposed the 
project and refused it their signature; and then the ruse 
might have an effect directly opposed to that which Frank- 
lin had contemplated. There could be no doubt that the 
dissenting delegates would endeavor to justify themselves 
before the public and seek to win public opinion in their 
favor. Besides, the little phalanx on whom the weight of 
the battle with the prejudices of the people and with 
theorizing fanatics and demagogues was to rest, was 
hopelessly divided. The best names were, it is true, 
subscribed to the constitution; but there was a good- 
ly number of names which were not there and which stood 
second only to the best. The consequence was that the" 
prestige which would have been gained for the proposed 
constitution by actual unanimity, was lost. The success 
of its advocates in the several states depended mainly on 



STATE BOVBRBIOHTY AND SLAvjfittY. 

ronnda which could.be advanced in its favor; but the 
^nation to follow the exposition and development of 
>un d8 attentive and calmly and to weigh the 
tt for it again/t the actual state oi affairs, was 
ter than even the most pusillanimous had feared. 1 
son of this was not a change for the better in 
tion which hact-occurred in the meantime. Noth- 
ttdeed,had happened to make internal discord and dis- 
kterthan they had been or to demonstrate how well 
vexatious and suspicious contempt with 
European powers regarded the republic. Every- 
mained very nearly in statu quo. But this very 
caused a radical change in the constitution to appear 
it, that the one proposed met with ardent support 
eleventh hour from parties whom one might have 

in the front rank of its opponents. For 

. . Randolph, who could not be induced on any 
, subacribe to it in Philadelphia, was one of its 
• powerful defendants in the Virginia convention, al- 
though even there he frankly and energetically gave ex- 
— i . » 1 1 to his objections to it. 2 

mass of the particularists combined to wage a m 
i opposition,the moment the proposed conatitu- 

:. !,\ Lee, of Westmoreland, to Patrick Henry, and 
ig be addressed him, might have applied equally to all the 
of the Anti-Federalists; -Instead of proceeding to ; 

i the new plan of government, the worthy charac- 

: horrors which he felt, of apprehensions to his 

;. which made him tremblingly fearful of the fate of the common- 

M . < hairman, was it proper to appeal to the fears of this house ? 

■ as belongs to the judgment of this house. I trust 

te to judge and not to alarm." Elliott. Deb., III., p. 42. 

is with me the only question has ever been between previous and 

. :.t amendments [to the constitution], so I will express my 

that the postponement of this c invention to so late a day 

guiahed the probability of the former without inevitable ruin 

I aionisthe anchor of our political salvation." 



FIGHT OF THE PARTICULARISTS. 55 

tion was made public. All moderation, we might almost 
say all reason, seemed to forsake thein the instant they 
saw that the strengthening of the central government and 
the proportionate consolidation of the states were no long- 
er a theme of stimulating discussion, but that the machin- 
ery was already at work to effect the one and the other. 
The most fanatical assumed the lead; men for whom no 
weapon was too blunt or brutal so long as they could use 
it. Their arguments bordered on the extremest absurdity 
and their assumptions might have excited the loudest 
merriment, were it not that the question was one of life or 
death to the nation. All the bitter experience of the war, 
and all that followed on its close, was denied and ridiculed 
as an idle phantom. Out of the proposed constitution, on 
the other hand, its most harmless provisions not excepted, 
the same phantom was conjured up day after day; a vague, 
indefinable something, to which a name understood by 
everybody was applied, that of "consolidated government," 
which meant something horrible and to which all that 
had hitherto been dear to Americans must fall a prey. 
The same Patrick Henry who, at the outbreak of the 
Revolution, declared with so much emphasis that he was 
no longer a Virginian, but an American, asserted now 
with equal emphasis that under the articles of confedera- 
tion the people had enjoyed the greatest amount of secu- 
rity and contentment, and that by the resolution to alter 
the constitution this happy state of affairs had been dis- 
turbed and the continuance of the union endangered. 1 

1 " I consider myself as the servant of the people of this commonwealth, 
as a sentinel over their rights, liberty and happiness. I represent their 
feelings when I say that they are exceedingly uneasy at being brought 
from that state of full security, which they enjoyed, to the present delu- 
sive appearance of things. A year ago, the minds of our citizens were 
at perfect repose. Before the meeting of the late federal convention at 
Philadelphia, a general peace and universal tranquillity prevailed in this 
country, but since that period they are exceedingly uneasy and disqui- 



NTV AND SLAVERY. 

To , virt-.rv over Buch opponents, was no easy 

V, f the Btates,and in the most import- 
[iUU ^ particulariBtBCOiiBtitnted a majority in the conven- 
7 entnally had to decide od the adoption or 
■ ;„„ f the constitution. The prospects oi the Feder- 
,,,.,,.. therefore, gloomy in the highest degree. It is 
,,, in feet, to discover more than one reason why 
the latter did not in these states, immediately after the re- 
,na were known or after the. first debates 
on the BU ■ ?ive np all farther Btruggle as useless. The 
nature of their weapons was not such as to inspire them 
with the hope of overcoming theopposing majority. They 
fooght with the understanding and the negative results of 
Dnder ordinary circumstances, these are cer- 
tain] trongest of all weapons. But the edge was 
; off them here, for the particularists had not come to 
; . to examine and to judge, but to declaim and spi 
,.' There was no desire to be governed by the dictates 

en J wished tor an appointment of this convention, my mind 
rtremely agitated for the situation of public affairs. I con© 

, ime danger. If our situation be thus uneasy, 

federal jeopardy? Lt arises from this fat 

..,„ B proposal to change our government^-a proposal 

utter annihilation of the most solemn engagements of the 

feal Wishing nine states into a confederacy, to the 

ial exclusion offour Mates. It goes to the annihilation of those 

we have formed with other nations." Elliott, Deb., III., 

to sharply replied: " If the public mind was then [bc- 

Lhe federal convention] at ease, it did not result from 

: being in a happy and easy situation; it must have been 

an Inactive, unaccountable stupor." Ibid., III., p. 86. 

stance will illustrate the degree of insipidity which declama- 
tion had reached at the time. In the Massachusetts convention 

re vent to his feelings: -And here, sir, I beg the, 
in( p, this honorable body to permit me to make an apostrophe 

to liberty. Liberty! thougr odJ thou fairest property! with 

1 wish to die! Pardon me if I drop a tear 
on the peril to which she 1 ; I cannot, sir, Bee the brightest of 

L— a jewel worth ten thousand worlds; and shall we part 
with ! . Deo., II., p. 183. 



FEDERALIST TRIUMPH. 57 

of reason, no desire to learn from experience at the expense 
of the complete sovereignty of the states and of the theories 
which people had become accustomed to invest with the 
character of unimpeachable dogmas. 

This assertion seems to be in conflict with the fact that 
the constitution was finally adopted, although in several of 
the conventions theparticularists were in a majority. But 
the question was not one of will: necessity it was that de- 
cided it. It was this which prevented the Federalists from 
ever losing courage entirely, and which ultimately won 
over a sufficient number of the opposing majority. Madi- 
son and several other members of the Virginia convention 
say repeatedly, in their letters, that they were in the mi- 
nority and they complain yet more frequently that the ma- 
jority would not be persuaded. And yet they constantly 
returned to the attack, because they were rightly 1 convinced 
that necessity would in the end compel even Patrick Hen- 
ry to acknowledge that some change in the constitution 
was inevitable. But when this much was gained, it was to be 
expected that at least some of the particularists would further 
agree that, at that moment, there w T as no alternative but 
to renounce the idea of making any change whatever and 
leave things to take care of themselves, or to accept this 
constitution unconditionally, good or bad as it might be. 

This calculation of the Federalists turned out, on the 
whole, to be right. Rhode Island, indeed, refused to call 
a convention, and the convention of North Carolina dis- 
solved without giving its assent to the constitution, 2 al- 

1 Elliott, Deb., III., p. 399 and passim. 

a By 184 to 84 votes. Elliott, Deb., IV., p. 251. The constitution was 
not adopted by North Carolina until the end of 1789, or by Rhode Is- 
land until the middle of 1790. As an interesting instance of the length 
to which American political doctrinarians of the period extending from 
the time of the Missouri compromise to the outbreak of the civil war, 
have gone, we may quote the assertion of Brownson (The American Rep., 
p. 288) : " Hence, if nine states had ratified the constitution, and the 
other four had stood out and refused to do it, which was within their 



58 BTATE I N1V ANn SLAVKRY - 

. lt ]i;itl :lllH , l(] , been adopted by ten states and the 
rtionwasin the meantime dissolved. In Massa- 
chusetts, Virginia and New Fork, however, the reasons 
addnc B decided the issne in favor of the Fedendistej 

,l i:lt the seales wavered to the very Last 
Brea l in New York. 2 Hut fortum 
■ , Federalist party, it had here its most distin- 
guished advocate, Alexander Hamilton. 3 For a time, how- 
it seemed as if the obstinacy of the anti-Federalists 
wonld bid defiance to everything. Even when the news 
that tlu- ninth Btate had ratified the constitution and 
tne confederation was therefore dead, Smith and Lans- 
declared that their counsels should by no means be 
influenced by that feet 4 They felt that on account of the 
graphical situation of the state, it was scarcely less im- 

v. they would not have been independent sovereign states, 

the Union, but territories under the Union." The facts that 

the resolution of the convention made the constitution binding only 

on „. thai would ratify it, and that it never occurred to any 

ft upon North Carolina and Rhode Island as territories until 

houldadopt theconstitution.areof no consequence to him. The 

ma to him a logical conclusion of his general theory of 

fthe Btatesto the Union, and that is sufficient for him. 

ustitution was adopted in Massachusetts by 187 against 

La by 89 against 7!), and in New York by 30 against '27. 
- When Bamilton was asked what the probable decision of the con- 
tention wonld be, he answered: "God only knows: several votes have 
taken by which it appears that there arc two to one against it 
[the constitution]." Aiter a pause he added : "Tell them the conven- 
tion .hall never ri><- until the constitution is adopted." J. C. Hamilton, 
of the American Republic, III, pp. 522, 523. This work should be 
ion; butthere is no internal evidence m tic 
tgainsl the authenticity of this anecdote. 
.„. Hamilton's most determined opponent, bears him this 
Hamilton is really a colossus to the anti-Republican partyj 
without Dumber* he is a host in himself. In truth when he com. 
xv:ir obody hut yourself [Madison] that can meet him." Van 

Parties, p. 194. 
.884,825. 



POSITION OF XEW YORK. 59 

portant to the Union that New York should be a part of it, 
than it was to New York that she should be a part of the 
Union. This redoubled their efforts to push the opposi- 
tion to the extreme. 1 The territory of the Union would 
be divided into two unequal parts without any geographi- 
cal connection, unless Xew York became a part of it. And 
the broad, as yet unsettled, land behind it, reaching to the 
St. Lawrence and to the shores of Lake Ontario and Lake 
Erie, as well as the great commercial artery of the Hudson, 
inspired the state with a confidence in its importance and 
its strength, elements of power in the great future as well 
as in the present. True,- people were always somewhat afraid 
of a disruption of the Union, it mattered not how loud the 
rodomontades that freedom should be sacrificed at no price. 
But they considered themselves in duty bound to annex 
their own conditions to their concurrence, and imagined 
for a long time, that they would be not only justified in 
forcing them upon the Union, but that they would have 
the power to do so. 

The idea of calling another general convention was much 
discussed, both in the Philadelphia convention and later in 
all the states. But even the more thoughtful particular- 
ists did not attempt to bring this about, as it was plain 
what effect such a step would produce. As all the more 
important provisions of the constitution had been attacked 
in the Philadelphia convention, and from the most oppo- 
site points of view, it was certain that the same would 
have been the case, though to a greater extent, in a general 
convention, as it was now in the conventions of the several 
states. The confusion would have been far worse, and the 
discouraging feeling that the convention had proposed 
to itself an impossible task in the highest sense of the 
word, would soon have absorbed all minds, because the 
constituents of every fraction would have expected or de- 

1 Elliott, Deb., II., p. 211. 



00 ' 5LAVERT - 

be adoption of their owd views and 
principles.' The only effect would have been to inert 
evil which they were seeking to remove, perhaps to. 
,. bv familiarizing themselves gradually 
with the thought that it was incurable. 

knl ths were so obvious that the idea of a second 
Boon surrendered, and, as already 
d, another means of escape proposed. In A ir- 
ri n i a the particnlarists had already declared the 
'~, l( ] institution, provided certain amend- 

it were adopted beforehand. This had called 
forth . exhaustive debate. As the Federalists in- 

controvertibly proved, oofting would have been gained 
that a rejection of the constitution was, 
under such circumstances, to be preferred to its adoption.' 
York the same dews obtained. The proposition 
ered, and it was provided that the constitution 
should be ratified with the reservation that, in case the 
could notafterwards be won over to the amend- 
i be proposed, those which had approved it might 
e the Union. It seemed that this was as for as the 
to could be induced to go. Hamilton's powers 
were almost exhausted. In a moment of despondency he 
wrote to Madison and asked him whether, at last, it was 
mid agree to the hard conditions. Madi- 
■ 1 that Buch a ratification would, in reality, not 
make New York a member of the Union, and that the 
►uld not be admitted on such conditions. 1 

tii Carol! amendments to the constitution, M 

, Hampshire 12, Virginia 20, Rhode Island 21, North 

M idison to Stevenson, Nov. 27, 1880. 

[V.,p. 614. Th< w what a second general 

also Washington's Writings, 

1\ . p B19. 

,-. Detail] 18,174,194,803,804,687,691, 887- 

1 •• I that your situation obliges you to listen to propositions 



61 

Hamilton then bestirred himself once more, and return- 
ed to the conflict resolved to be satisfied with nothing 
short of a complete victory. He recognized even more 
than Madison the whole significance of a conditional rati- 
fication. The constitution would have lost thereby the 
character of a fundamental law under which the states 
placed themselves. But the leading idea of the Federalists 
in Philadelphia had been to make a binding law. To yield 
to the demands of the particularists would have been to 
concede that they considered the constitution a mere 
protocol, an agreement dependent upon certain definite 
conditions. This confession involved a principle by which 
the particularists could demonstrate at any time that they 
had the right to dissolve the contract, if those things were 
not done which they might afterwards consider to be further 
tacit conditions or provisions, arising out of given circum- 
stances. Had they succeeded in this, they would have won 
a complete victory. Xothing remained to the Federalists 
but to allow them to choose between unconditional adoption 
and unconditional rejection. This was the alternative pre- 
sented to the particularists. And when it became clear 
that this was the only alternative, it was found that there 
was enough discretion and patriotism left to cause a suffi- 
cient number to prefer the possible evils of the con- 

of the nature you describe. My opinion is that a reservation of the 
right to withdraw if amendments be not decided upon, under the 
forms of the constitution, within a certain time, is a conditional ratifi- 
cation ; that it does not make New York a member of the new Union, 
and consequently that she could not be received on that plan. Compacts 
must be reciprocal ; this principle would not in such a case be preserved. 
The constitution requires an adoption in toto and forever. It has been 
so adopted by the other states. An adoption for a limited time would 
be as defective as an adoption of some articles only. In short, any 
condition whatever must vitiate the ratification. . . . The idea of 
reserving a right to withdraw was started at Richmond, and considered 
as a conditional ratification, which was itself abandoned as worse than a 
rejection." Hamilton's Works, I., p. 465. 



i:i::..nty AND SLAVERY. 

Btitution to leaving the Union, as there was found in the 

, sufficient number who preferred these same 

to the certain dangers attendant on a Becond 

convention, or the certain ruin consequent upon a 

continuation of the old confederation. 

When we consider the situation of the thirteen colonies 
and their relations to one another; when we follow the de- 
iment which, in consequence of this situation and 
these relations, their political affairs and political theories 
ived during the revolutionary war and the following 
d endeavor to express the result in a few word-, we 
ai-,. compelled to Bay with justice Story, that we ought to 
wonder, not at tin- obstinacy of the struggle of 17^7 and 
1788, hiit at the fact that, despite everything, the constitu- 
tion was finally adopted. 1 The simple explanation of this 
i- that it was a struggle for existence, a struggle for the 
of the United State.-; 2 and that after the dissolu- 
tion of the Philadelphia convention it could be saved 3 only 
by the adoption of the proposed constitution, no matter 
how well grounded the objections that might be made to it. 
American people in their vanity and 
^appreciation are fond of forgetting the dread- 
ful struggle of 17^7 and 17 s >i, or of employing it only as a 
e for the "divine inspiration" which guided and en- 

- Washington writes to colonel Lee: " In our endeavors to establish 
• ml government, the contest, nationally considered, seems not 
- • much Tor glory as existence. It was for a long time 
doubtful whether we were to survive as an independent republic, or de- 
cline from our federal dignity into insignificant and wretched fragments 
M ,.dl. Life of Wash., II., p. 130. 
I will only • irther opinion, founded on the maturest de- 

tbat there is no alternative, no hope of alteration, no inter- 

esting place, between 'be adoption of this [constitution], and a 
m unqualified Btate of anarchy with all its deplorable 
Feb. 7, 1788. Writings, IX., p. 319. 



THE INSPIRATION THEORY. G3 

lightened the " fathers" at Philadelphia. 1 In Europe this 
view of the case has been generally accepted as correct. 
Much eloquence has been lavished in laudation of the " is- 
olated fact in history," that thirteen states, loosely bound 
together as one confederate body, did not see in the sword 
the only engine to weld together their political machinery, 
which was falling to pieces, but met in j>eacefal consulta- 
tion and agreed to transform a confederacy of states into a 
federal state of masterly construction. In America this is 
an inexhaustible theme for Fourth-of-July orations, and in 
Europe it is only too frequently used as a text for doctrin- 
arian politico-moral discussions. With history, however, 
it has nothing to do. The historical fact is that " the 
constitution had been extorted from the grinding necessity 
of a reluctant people." 

1 This is not a mere idle phrase ; it is one of the standing formulas in 
which the self-complacency and pride of a people who esteem themselves 
special objects of the care of the Ruler of the Universe, find expression 
We reproduce one illustration of this, out of a whole multitude: In the 
North American Review (1862, I., p. 160) we read : " Such a govern- 
ment we regard as more than the expression of calm wisdom and lofty 
patriotism. It has its distinctively providential element. It was God's 
saving gift to a distracted and imperiled people. It was his creative 
fiat over a weltering chaos : ' Let a nation be born in a day.' " 



64 MV AND BLAVBBY 



CHAPTER II. 
tp of tup: OoNsrmjnoK, and its Real Ciiar- 

ACTI.K. 

"Mr. Cobb the other night said it [the government of the 
Union] had proven a failure. A failure in what! . . . 
Why, we are the admiration of the civilized world, and 
snt the brightest hopes of mankind. 1 No, there is no 
failure of this government yet."- In these words Alexan- 
der II. Stephens expressed his judgment concerning the 
ititntion and the political history of the Union, on the 
ars' civil war. Four weeks later he accept- 
ed the position of vice-president of the Confederate St 
a position which he retained until the close of the war. A 
r the restoration of the Union, he published 
•mprehensive treatise, 1 which is at once an emphatic 
in and explication of that declaration, and a justi- 
ion of the rebellion, as well a< ^ his personal parti- 
cipation m it. 

1 By ment" is Dot here meant the administration of the time, 

but !i : _ rernment created and established by the 

ititution. 

3outb Carolina, one of the most distinguished 
: the nullification movement, said, after his nomination as 
ivention of ls:{-^ % which issued the celebrated nulli- 
rdinance: Lrcumstances are a commentary on 

institution. In other countries we should 
i targe of an attempt to disturb and 
ivernment Here all goes on with tran- 
quillity, ami with the harmony of th themselves." Nile? 
XLIIL,p . 
1 A Constitutional View of the late War between the States. 2 vols. 



CHANGE IX PARTY TACTICS. 65 

Only a thorough study of American history can solve 
the enigma how a man of so much acuteness as a thinker, 
and of so much intelligence, one who has spent his whole 
life in the study of political questions, could honestly say 
that his views and his actions were in complete harmony. 

Stephens is not an isolated example of this phenomenon. 
The whole American people, until late in the civil war, 
were entangled in the error which lies in this contradiction, 
and according to all appearances it will be a long time be- 
fore they will free themselves from it entirely. 

It devolved upon the Federalists, to whose efforts it is 
due that a constitution with the capacity to live was sub- 
stituted for the articles of confederation, to put this consti- 
tution in operation. Scarcely had they so far accomplished 
this as to make the people fully conscious of the good re- 
sults of the change, when the government passed out of their 
hands into those of their opponents, to continue in them 
unchallenged for many years. The anti-Federalists had 
changed their mode of warfare in a degree proportionate to 
the change for the better which had taken place in every 
department of practical life. With increasing vehemence 
thev accused the Federalists of having done violence to 
the constitution in order to accomplish their own ruinous 
designs. But their unmeasured denunciation of the consti- 
tution itself became gradually less frequent and less severe. 
It was not long before they directly accused the Federal- 
ists of traitorous attacks upon it. On the other hand, all 
the horrible shapes which they had conjured up during the 
debates of 1787 and 1788 had now disappeared. And 
even before they came into power they had ceased to find 
fault with the constitution. It became their chosen stand- 
ard in the battle thev were waging with all the energy of 
fanaticism against their opponents. 

It is possible for us to trace the earliest beginnings of 
the worship of the constitution. At first it was looked 
upon as the best possible constitution for the United States. 
5 



- I BEIGNTT AND SLAVERY. 

came to 1"' universally considered as a mas- 
terpiece, applicable to every country. This was preached 

with bo much unanimity and honest conviction, although 
internal quarrels were raging all the time, that the prop- 
idism of the new faith reached even to Europe. In 
United States this conviction grows steadily stronger, 
although parties not only differ concerning the advisability 
ertain practical provisions of the constitution, hut 
been from the first diametrically opposed to one an- 
other in their understanding of the principles on which it 
>undecL From the close of the century, that is, from 
the time when the opposing principles assumed a fixed 
form, the constitution ha- been the political Bible of the 
peop child sucked in with his mother's milk the 

conviction that this was the light in which he should re- 
gard it. The paternal sic credo, stat fides mea pro rati 
was a guaranty for the rightfulness of this conviction. 
What should be deduced from the constitution, in the fu- 
ture, was (piite another matter. The wilder the war ol 
. the louder the cry of the constitution was raised on 
v\y\-\ side, and the more energetically did every one swear 1 
not to deviate from it, even by a hair's breadth. For font 
►pie of the United States tore one another to 
the most frightful civil war recorded in history, 
each camp thinking, in the best of faith, that it was fol- 
lowing the Btandard of the constitution. The time will 
when it will bedifficult to conceive how even Europej 
which it did not concern, could, in view of the seventy- 
- of contest over it, have so universally and so em- 
phatically united in the non-critical laudations the consti- 
tution ha- received. 

'1 o rightly estimate the degree of unconditional admira- 
tion of which it was the object, and to what an extent this 
admira^on influenced the political thought of the country, 
it must he remembered that it was by no means confined to 
jses ofthe people. The constitution has found 



LACK OF CEITICmi. 67 

many learned and intelligent commentators; but they have 
all considered its excellence to he an undoubted and univer- 
sally admitted fact. What should have been only the re- 
sult of their investigation, they made the premises of their 
arguments. And these arguments have been confined to the 
interpretation and to the bearings of the separate provisions 
of the constitution. Much ingenuity has been spent in show- 
ing how its several provisions might be harmonized with 
one another and with the peculiar ideas of their authors on 
the nature and purpose of the general government. There 
has been no attempt as yet to consider the several provi- 
sions as parts of a whole, or to subject the whole to an objec- 
tive critical examination in the light of history. The abler 
commentators, like Story, have now and then been forced 
upon conclusions from which it is but one step to such a 
course of treatment. But they have never carried out 
their chain of thought to that extent. They always break 
off at the decisive point, and proceed to the next question. 1 

1 Still less has been accomplished in this direction by the strikingly 
small number of European writers who have treated of the United States. 
They content themselves as a rule with showing the excellence of the 
several constitutional provisions in an intelligent manner, and in a gen- 
eral way. Even De Tocqueville's much-esteemed book is of this char- 
acter, so far as it treats of the constitution at all. Through the whole 
work there runs a vein of doctrinarianism and vagueness which is ex- 
ceedingly misleading to superficial minds. The whole treatise proves 
that De Tocqueville had never thoroughly studied American history; 
and hence it is that it bears so very different a character from his mas- 
terly works on French history. It is apparent from every chapter of his 
book, that he built essentially upon what he saw, or thought he saw, 
during his comparatively short stay in America, and especially upon 
what Americans told him. Spite of this, however, his extraordinary 
endowments permitted him to cast many a profound glance into Amer- 
ican affairs and into the spirit of the people. But history has shown 
that many of the most important points escaped him altogether, and 
that in others his judgment was exceedingly erroneous. His work 
should therefore be perused with great caution. It is of no importance 
that the Americans are lavish in praise of it. It is cleverly written, and 
his judgment is on the whole so favorable, that it must seduce Ameri- 



BEXGBTT AM) SLAVERY. 

not the place to go into a thorough investigation 

- which led all classes of the people to a ven- 

on for the constitution, that bore at once thechan 

b em which did much good and of a most ruinous 

idolatry in which the idol worshiped was themselves. Wi 

must confine ourselves here to two points which contributed 

to this effect, for the reason that they seem nec< 
ry t<> the understanding of what follows. 
Tic origin of the constitution and the first years in which 

it did so much tor the g 1 of the people by producing a 

radical change in the unhappy situation of affairs after the 
war, atemporaneous with the adoption or invention 

•olitical or party principles. The political reasoning 
of the school which gave tone to the time started out with 
the assumption that the individual was a monad iloating 
lUgh the universe and governed by independent laws 
!• nt in himself, not a member of a given society into 
which he was born. The consequence was, that certain 
principles resulting from this mode of reasoning were sub- 
Btituted for actual fact.-, as a foundation for the social and 
• condition which it was sought to bring about. Af 
the basis of these principles was discovered in human na- 
ture, they were necessarily declared to he unchangeable and 
applicable to all time.- and to every people. Their tendency 

-. on the one hand, to destroy the existing - 

of things; for any title not in harmony with these principles 

B fraud and a usurpation and was denounced as a weak 

damnabli uerce with the injustice of a 

isand years. But on the other hand, to adopt this phi- 

phy wouL declare stagnation the natural condi- 

ng as they Lave so little of objectivity in judging tliem>elves. 
ih. in other and different view- arc sometimes heard. 
; clited weekly journal, says, Oct. 17. 

M1 : "> article - tie could not, and won! 

I iant, superficial [!J and attractive work liki 
Lmerica.' " 






CANONIZING THE CONSTITUTION. 69 

tion of all social and political order. If the principles were 
to be unchangeable, incapable of refinement and progress, 
there would be no possibility of development, for principles 
are only the quintessence of the aggregate intellectual and 
moral knowledge of a people or of the age, reduced to the 
simplest formula. 

"We have already seen that even in America, at the out- 
break of the Revolution, the soil was prepared for a sys- 
tem of politics based on absolute principles. The French 
Revolution caused the seed to germinate here more rapidly 
and luxuriantly than in any other part of the western civil- 
ized world. Men played now with systems as they had 
formerly with foot balls, said Chauncey Goodrich. 1 The 
desire to carry out these principles immediately with 
all their practical consequences — so far as such a desire 
was observable in the United States at all — was soon given 
up in many respects. But for this very reason the prin- 
ciples became more universal and assumed the shape of 
theoretical truths. They became the creed of the public 
which every lover of freedom, and especially every repub- 
lican, was obliged to profess. Hence it was obvious that 
the " fathers" must have been either their earliest advocates 
or their originators. That a great many of the founders 
of the republic, partly through their own experience and 
partly in consequence of the excesses of the French Revo- 
lution, recognized the deceptive and dangerous vagueness 
of these political dogmas 5 had no effect on the apriori con- 
victions of the masses of the people. Even the small mi- 
nority of the more intelligent could not completely free 
themselves from them. 

But it did not stop here. The more the war of the Rev- 
olution and the struggle to transform the Union so that it 
might live, became things of the past, the thinner the long 
line of able combatants in the internal and external strug- 

1 Gibbs, TVolcott, I., p. 130. 



STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND BLAYEBT. 

nal existence grew, the more dazzling became 

the light in which the people viewed that whole epoch and 

itivee. It mattered not how many or how 

mings which sober criticism or blind par- 

piril had discovered in all these personages — Washing- 

ko a certain extent excepted— the "fathers" of the 

republic wt re considered as an isolated historical phenom- 

of purity of motive and political wisdom. But they 

had embodied tin* sum total of their political thought and 

political experience in the constitution. The latter was, 

. tin- culmination of the " storm and Btress" period 

of the young republic, and these absolute political princi- 

w.if to be considered as its firmest foundation. Both 

causes co-operated toengrave the constitution on the minds 

of the people, and it gradually assumed there the character 

of perfection. 1 

The Becoud element which contributed to lift the consti- 
tution as a whole above the level of criticism is based ori 
sauses. Their effects have been farther reaching 
_• :• duration. 
It is impossible to even hastily turn over the pages of the 
ss without being .-truck by a very impor- 
tant circumstance, t<> be found in the history of no other 
titutional Btate. Up to the year 1861, there were bat 
important laws of a general character proposed which, 
while under discussion, were not attacked as u n const i ta- 
il by the minority. The arguments are scarcely « wr 
confined to the worth or worthlessness of the law itself. The 
sition in an extraordinarily large number of instances 
>tart> out with the question of constitutionality. Tin 
y or inexpediency of the law is a secondary q 

touched upon only as a confirmation of that 
lisive objection. 

\m Introduction to tin- Constitutional Law of the United 
14 Our fathers, by an almost divine ;>n> 
Struck the golden mean." 



CONSTITUTIONAL CONTRADICTIONS. 71 

\Ye need not here examine how honest these chronic 
constitutional scruples of the minority for the time being 
were. It is sufficient to mention the fact that for over 
seventy years all parties have followed these tactics when 
they found themselves on the side of the opposition. 1 The 
bearing, therefore, of all the general provisions of the con- 
stitution, and even of its separate terms, was, in the course 
of time, determined in the most opposite senses. There 
were a number of persons in every congress observant 
enough to notice this fact. But they never followed up 
the question far enough to ascertain whether this phenom- 
enon was not to be accounted for in part by a fundamental 
defect in the constitution itself. This would not have been 
the case, were it not that their thought on the matter was 
under some heavy pressure from without. 

As the country became more democratic, men distin- 
guished in politics became less and less the political lead- 
ers of the people. They, indeed, apparently claimed that 
position, but in fact they went along with the stream, 
concerned only to swim at the head. Men really inde- 
pendent in thought or action by degrees appeared more 
rarely in congress and among politicians outside of it. 2 

The idea of representation lost its original and only 

1 We read in an article in the Nation, Nov. 7th, 1872, (No. 384, p. 300) : 
"In spite of its supposed [!] precision, and its subjection to judicial 
construction, our constitution has always been indirectly made to serve 
the turn of that sort of legislation which its friends call progressive 
and its enemies call revolutionary, quite as effectively as though congress 
had the omnipotence of parliament. The theory of latent powers to 
carry out those granted has been found elastic enough to satisfy almost 
any party demands in time of peace, to say nothing of its enormous ex- 
tensions in time of war." Since the end of the civil war admissions 
of this nature are found more frequently, a happy sign of progress to- 
wards a clearer judgment among thinking people. 

2 Hamilton, as early as 1800, writes to King: "In the two houses of 
congress we have a decided majority. But the dread of unpopularity 
is likely to paralyze it." Hamilton, Works, VI., p. 416. 



/ 



NTY AND SLAVERY. 

prostituted to this, that rep- 
5hould be the mere mouthpi< their im- 

[ n particulars it wa> accessary to 

m sufficient room, but the unripe political notions, 

(ved opinions, the vague instincts, the arbi- 

and antipathies of the majority of these 

the sub-structure of their labors. From ' 

the beginning of Washington's administration, Jefferson's 

adher eached that the maxim wx popuM, vox dei 

a theoretical truth applicable under all circum 

became the actual rule, of politicians, until 
finally it would have been considered not only folly, but a 
crime against the spirit of republican institutions, to de- 
fend one's own dissenting opinion against the voxpopuli) 

it had pronounced with any degree of definitenew 
a given proposition. Idealistic doctrinarianism and dem- 
ism had begun the work; the moral cowardice and 
pusillanimous self-interest of politicians continued it, until 
finally it Beldom occurred that even morally strong and 
independent thinkers approached questions of the nature 
mentioned above in a skeptical spirit, or that they consid- 
them as questions at all. The tendency to thee 
of political dogmas kept pace with the development 
of democracy. 

the lead of all these dogmas — those of natural 

contract in part excepted — stood the 

Bupr f the constitution. Only a few, like Macon of 

arolina, whose independence savored of affectation, 

ventured to i tone in which they had spoken in 



iv evident, even in the debates of Nov., 1791, 

when the proportion of i was fixed. See especially thfl 

Virginia. Benton's Abridgment of the Debates of 

< said of the debate on the as- 

Uod by the Union of the debts contracted by the states during the 

Itlonary war. Beaton, I., passim. 



CHANGE IN FEDERALIST FEELING. 73 

1787 and 1788. 1 The opposition of the anti-Federalists, as 
already remarked, now took the form of a pretended strug- 
gle for the constitution. 2 ^, Experience soon taught the 
leaders that these tactics would insure them the readier 
and more energetic support of the masses of the people. 
When the opposition had assumed this tone it was difficult 
for the Federalists not to assume it also. At first, part of 
them took the position which Hamilton had taken, and 
saw in the constitution the best that could be accomplished 
under the circumstances of the time; and others professed 
themselves satisfied because it was free from the essential 
defects of the articles of confederation. They were far re- 
moved from unconditional admiration. Their entire strug- 
gle for its ratification bore the mark of a defense against 
unjust attacks. They lavished relatively little direct praise on 
the constitution; and when they did, it was most frequently 
in the shape of a comparison with the articles of confeder- 
ation. 3 Only with reluctance did the Federalists surrender 
this reserved attitude. But they could not entirely resist 
the pressure. Their adherents among the masses of the 
people were not able to understand how they could continue 
cool critics of the constitution they had planned, the 
adoption of which was due solely to their efforts, while 

1 Fisher Ames writes to Wolcott, Sept. 2, 1795 : " Some opinions are 
general and well established: admiration of our constitution and gov- 
ernment," etc. G-ibbs, Mem. of Wolcott, I., p. 229. 

2 The Virginia and Kentucky resolutions were the first official decla- 
ration of principles on which the doctrine of state rights was built. We 
quote from the Virginia resolutions: "Resolved, That the general as- 
sembly of Virginia doth unequivocally express a firm resolution to 
maintain and defend the constitution of the United States." And later: 
" That the good people of the commonwealth, having ever felt and con- 
tinuing to feel . . . the most scrupulous fidelity to that constitution, 
which is a pledge of mutual friendship and the instrument of mutual 
happiness." In like manner, the Kentucky resolutions declare that the 
state " is sincerely anxious for its [the constitution's] preservation." 

3 Wash's. Writ., IX., pp. 318, 319. 



71 STATE BOTXBEIQHTT AND 8I.AVI.KV. 

the anti-Federalists were preparing a Blirine for it on the 
altar of the temple of freedom. 
A problem of this kind was then, and would be to-day, 
of much greater practical significance in the United States 
than, for instance, In England or in Germany; because in 
Bom< the political thonght of Americans is much 

perficial and immature. In political questions of 
a concrete nature, the Americans are on an average more 
competent judges than any people on the continent of 
I j.c. 1 The political institutions of the country, its 
; and especially its economic relations, educate them 
from the cradle to independent thought on all questions 
involving material interests, and encourage them to Bum- 
mon their whole intellectual strength tor their solution. 
But in the wearing Btruggies of daily life new problems 
of this character continually arise, and almost exhaust their 
intellectual Btrength. Their energy of mind is not in 
great enough to give much depth to their 
thoughts on political problems of a general nature. The 
disposition towards generalization is sufficiently developed, 
but their observations are neither various, nor long, nor re- 
liable enough to warrant inductions of any real value. Halt- 
true and vague ideas are therefore raised by them to the 
dignity of unimpeachable principles. These are appealed to 
Dry occasion, BO tl at they rapidly rise to the dignity 
• ign laws. And the more they assume this charac- 
ter, the stronger does the conviction become rooted that 
the 81 irs by which the ship of state should be 
red. The further the idea of democracy was push- 
first in theory and then in practice, the more did 
of the equality of all men become perverted 

1 The mwooco of tin.' population in the southern states arc here excepted. 

is in this, as In all other respects, produced an abnormal state 

N Ither do we here include adopted citizens, although in 

i they ver} assunilated, so far as this mat- 

rned, to the native Americans. 



A NATIONAL FETISH. 75 

in the minds of the masses into the equal capacity of 
all men to decide on political questions of every kind. 
The principle of mere numbers steadily gained ground. 

The political philosophy of the masses was comprised in 
these vague maxims. They clung to them with all the 
self-complacent obstinacy of the lowest and most numerous 
body of the working classes. They were nowhere more 
sensitive than here. "Whoever desired their favor dared 
not touch this idol of theirs, and could scarcely ignore 
it unpunished. The fetish had been raised up for the 
worship of the masses by their leaders, and the masses in 
turn compelled their leaders to fall clown and adore it. 
Under no form of government is it so dangerous to erect a 
political idol as in a democratic republic; for once erected, 
it is the political sin against^the Holy Spirit to lay hands 
upon it. 

The history of the United States affords the strongest 
and most varied proof of these assertions. .Not only the 
quarrels of 1787 and 1788, but also the circumstances un- 
der which the constitution originated, would have inclined 
one to believe anything rather than that the constitution r 
would be chosen as the chief idol of the people. 

The brilliant contrast it presents to the articles of con- 
federation is not a sufficient explanation of this, not even 
if it were granted that the extraordinary economic pros- 
perity of the country was due to it to the unmeasured 
extent claimed by Americans themselves. 1 

The current view places the labors of the Philadelphia 
convention in a totally false light, but the difficulties that 
convention had to surmount were so great that they can 
scarcely be exaggerated. The conflict of views and of real or 

1 " It is to be feared we have grown giddy with good fortune ; attrib- 
uting the greatness of our prosperity to our wisdom rather than to a 
course of events and a guidance over which we had no influence." 
Quincy in the house of representatives, April 19, 1808. Benton's Deb. 
of Congress, III., p. 700. 



/ 



STATE BOVEBKrOKTT AM» BLAVEBY. 

at to permitof even anappar- 
•i them by any formnla consistent 
with of tlif time. A reconciliation wag, 

nd, a question of life or death to all section- of 

It therefore became imperative that mutual 
should be made at every step, and this not only 
in principles, but also in theories; that is. both sides 
compelled, by making concessions at variance with 
their principles, to be untrue to their ideal. The final 
i could not in consequence be a harmonious whole, 
in itself. The most that could be accomplished 
rtain amount of reconciliation, the effect of which 
the prevention of the dissolution of the Union and 
tion <'t'a federal power with the character of a fed- 
eral government to Buch an extent that by it the possibil- 
_ 'owth of the members of the federation into 
sistent whole was secured. 1 
A model constitution —so far as it is allowable at all to 
-would have done poor service for 
the United Stati rides it is very probable that it 

would nut have been ratiiied. But if it had been adopted, 
it would not have lasted long, for the reason that it was nut 
at all in harmony with the actual condition of affairs. 
It was y that the constitution should be highly 

[ta terras must be susceptibl< 

' Th Mi.' constitution were c mscious at the completion 

ir work that they bad accomplished no more. They say ill their 

lunicationl ss, which accompanied the constitution: "In all 

our deliberations on thia subject we kept steadily in our view that which 

real T every true American— in which is 

Involved our prosperity, felicity, safety, perhaps our national existence, 

important consideration, Beriously and deeply impressed on our 

minds, invention to be less rigid in points of in- 

aitude [? I] than might have been otherwise expected, and 

lUu< ' ution which we now present is the result of amity and of 

-Mon which the peculiarity of our 
-. • usable." Elliot, Deb., I., p. 806. 



POSSIBLE DISSOLUTION. 77 

great extension or contraction of meaning, according to 
the want of the moment. A more brittle bond would in- 
fallibly be broken. This is not a matter of speculation. 
The whole history of the United States, from 1789 to 1861, 
demonstrates it. 

Almost from the very day on which the new order of 
things was inaugurated, the conflict between the opposing 
tendencies broke out anew, and before the close of the 
century it attained a degree of violence which suggested 
very serious fears. The thought of the dissolution of the 
Union was current among both parties. In accordance 
with their whole political tendency the anti-Federalists 
permitted themselves to be urged on more frequently and 
more easily to conceive of taking such extreme steps. But 
even in the speculations of the Federalists on the future, 
this constituted an element which was taken into consid- 
eration with other contingencies. It is indeed true that 
it was frequently only by vain threats that the minority 
sought to exert a pressure on the majority. The view 
which afterwards became gradually more general, that 
during the first years of the existence of the republic 
the thought of separation was never seriously entertained, 
is a historical misrepresentation made in the interests of 
party. Until the first part of the nineteenth century, the 
dissolution of the Union was a standing element in politi- 
cal speculation; and both previous to and after that pe- 
riod, it was repeatedly considered possible and even prob- 
able in moments of excitement, by either party, that it 
would be necessary to resort to this radical remedy. 

"Were it not that the letter of the constitution permitted 
all parties to verge upon the actual dissolution of the 
Union, without feeling themselves responsible for a breach 
of the constitution, it is likely that long before 1861, a 
serious attempt in that direction would have been made. 
Thanks to this circumstance, however, the danger of ruin- 



;. JOY] m l-.MV AND BLAVERY. 

oni ] asiderably Lessened. Time was given to 

ion to abate it- Intensity, and with every day's d 

ability increased that all parties wonld become con- 
isof the preponderance of their common interests over 
which were divergent When the opposing party 
irticular, there Was always off! 
ility of a return to the right path before the de- 
taken. In the meantime, the prejudices 
aQ d . the diversity of which Nathan Strong had 

mated as the greatest obstacle in the way of a rational 
lation <»!' national affairs, 1 became assimilated to one 
another, at least in some respects. Commerce, social in- 
e and custom created new material, intellectual 
and moral bonds, which gradually rendered a breach more 
difficult. 

But contemporaneously with this, and from the very 
. the material and irreconcilable differences that existed 
more marked. Vet the constitution afforded such a 
field for a war of words, and the field was so readily 
II, that in the northern Mates, which were rapidly be- 
ing united in all their interests, the erroneous view 
obtain currency in the third decade of this cen- 
tury that all difficulty would end in a war of tongues, 
•mething of a correct instinct at the founda- 
tion of this disastrous and foolish notion. AVhile the u ir- 
of the conflict became clearer year after 
. the ambiguous nature of the constitution became 
a.rent in an equal degree. The field became gradually 
broader and more inviting to a tournament of words; 
traordinary dilatability of the boundaries post- 
of the breach. It became possible in 
e populous and wealthy half of the Union, which 
rally and intellectually, the more highly developed, 
up Mich a solidarity of interests and for the people 

Icott, I., p. -40. 



ORIGIN OF NULLIFICATION. 70 

to realize the existence of this solidarity of interests to such 
an extent that they were enabled, by an appeal to the 
sword, to decide the one great question as to the nature of 
the Union, — a question to which, from the terms of the 
constitution, no certain answer had ever before been given, — 
and to find a solution of it in harmony with the progress 
of civilization and the best good of the whole country. 

These views are, to a great extent, very different from 
those prevalent on the subject; but they must accord with 
historical truth, for only in such case is the political his- 
tory of the United States at all rational or intelligible. 

Calhoun and his disciples were not the authors of the 
doctrine of nullification and secession. That question is 
as old as the constitution itself, and has always been a 
living one, even when it has not been one of life and death. 
Its roots lay in the actual circumstances of the time, and 
the constitution was the living expression of these actual 
circumstances. 






80 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 



CHAPTER III. 
The Internal Struggles during "Washington's Two An- 

MTNI8TBATION8. ALEXANDER HaMLLTON. TlIE FlRST De- 
BATE ON' THE BlAVEBT QUESTION. INFLUENCE OF THE 

French Revolution. Consolidation of Parties and 
Gradual Intensification of Geographical Differ- 
ences. 

The constitution had gone into operation in 17S9, and 
as early as 1790 the consolidating influences of the firmer 
government seemed so bnrthensome and dangerous a load, 
that the anti-Federalists began to grow restless under the 
yoke, and to long for the loose management of affairs 
that had existed under the confederation. The more nearly 
the measures of the administration and of the majority of 
congress became parts of a system planned with a really 
statesmanlike mind, the firmer the organization of the 
opposition became and the more did its resistance assume 
the character of one based on principle. 

The Federalists had not expected this, although they must 
have been prepared for it after the struggle over the ratifi- 
cation of the constitution. 

Washington fell a victim to the illusion that it was pos- 
sible to bring about the harmonious co-operation of all the 
forces of the country. All that was needed, he thought, 
was to convince the opposition that the administration had 
nothing but the best interests of the country at heart and 
the desire to do full justice to them. This illusion caused 
him to take a Btep which was accompanied at first by 
good results, but which, in the course of time, contributed 



JEFFEKSON AND HAMILTON. 81 

a great deal to intensify the internal conflicts during his 
administration. 

The construction of the Union had undergone so radical 
a transformation that when the new order of things first 
went into operation, there were no organized opposing par- 
ties in the field. As a matter of course, future parties 
were necessarily divided on the same questions which in 
the struggle for the constitution had been looked upon as 
the principles at issue between its advocates and oppo- 
nents. By the adoption of the constitution the theoretical 
struggle was temporarily ended, but before it attained a 
fixed concrete form in practical politics, it was necessary 
that some time should elapse. In the first place, there were 
in congress and among the people only divergent political 
tendencies. How, when, and to what extent, these should 
grow into differences or become consolidated in party 
platforms was a matter necessarily dependent upon cir- 
cumstances. 

Washington's endeavor was not only to look upon the 
nation as the sole party, but also to exercise his influence, 
wherever he legitimately could, to cause the same feeling 
to prevail over the agitations of incipient party spirit. 
Whether he was guided by this desire, and to what extent, 
in the selection of the members of his cabinet, cannot be 
certainly determined. Jefferson had been in Paris when 
the question of the adoption or rejection of the constitu- 
tion was pending, and if he expressed any doubt concern- 
ing its value, he took no decided stand in reference to it 
when he entered the cabinet as secretary of state. This 
much, however, was certain, that he was a great deal more 
inclined to the views of the opponents of the constitution 
than to those of Hamilton, who was assigned to the 
secretaryship of the treasury. If, therefore, it cannot 
be claimed that "Washington purposely confided the two 
most important positions in his cabinet to men who 
were the political antipodes of one another, it is most 
6 



82 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

probable that it occurred to him, from the very first, that 
they would not he representatives of the same political 
views when the diverging tendencies should begin to de- 
velope themselves into definite party programmes. That 
this was not a reason in his mind against, but rather in 
favor of, their choice, is obvious from his almost anxious 
efforts to prevent the collapse of the cabinet when the gen- 
esis of parties was complete and the two secretaries had 
become political antipodes. The result of these efforts only 
proved that the hope with which he entered on his presi- 
dential career was an idealistic dream. In certain cases, 
Washington could, indeed, effect a compromise, but to 
reconcile contradictions by his own independence of party 
was as much beyond the domain of possibility as the pre- 
vention of parties themselves. 

"Washington was extraordinarily well fitted to play the 
part of a mediator. It is a matter of wonder that he was 
able to hold his heterogeneous cabinet together so long. 
But even he was able to do so only for a time and 
apparently. He himself was compelled more aud more 
to surrender his position in relation to parties. In a 
democratic state, the executive cannot long preserve sys- 
tematically and on principle the character of a mediator, 
when there is not at the same time a compromise party 
among the people. "Washington was convinced of the 
necessity of prosecuting a systematic policy, and the heads 
of his council were the chief representatives of different 
systems, whose differences events were daily making 
stronger and more marked. The anti-Federalists be- 
came the declared opponents of the internal and external 
policy of the president, and Jefferson their recognized 
leader. The attempts at mediation had no effect but to post- 
pone the formal declaration of the war which as a matter 
of fact had been waged since 1791 between the two secre- 
taries as openly as in congress. The prize was not worth 
the breaking of the staff which ought to be the most iin- 



83 

mediate and the absolutely reliable support of every 
president. 

The anti-Federalists did not permit the administration to 
remain a moment in doubt that they held fast to the maxim 
which declared mistrust of the government to be the cor- 
ner-stone of freedom. "Wherever they found the least 
positive ground of mistrust, there they, too, were to be 
found holding up the most sombre picture which their ex- 
cited imaginations could suggest, precisely as they had 
done in their efforts against the ratification of the consti- 
tution. The burthen of their speeches was no longer the 
danger to the liberty of the individual, but to the rights 
of the states, which were threatened on every side. 
Every question was treated with direct reference to state 
sovereignty. The more the legal consolidation of the 
Union became an accomplished fact, the greater was the 
reaction of particularistic tendencies against the increased 
pressure. The mere fact of the adoption of the constitu- 
tion could not at once change the real state of affairs or 
the modes of thought of the people. Nothing but time 
could operate any change in these two most essential fac- 
tors. To begin with, the preponderance of particularistic 
tendencies was still great enough to afford, from the very 
first, the strongest proof of Hamilton's assertion that this 
constitution was the least which, spite of the actual condi- 
tion of things and the mode of thought of the people, 
could hold the Union together. 1 

Hamilton had recognized, and rightly, that the govern- 
ment should, first of all, direct its attention to the question 
of finance. The Federalists shared his conviction that noth- 
ing would have so much influence in confirming the new 
order of things as his financial projects. There were some 
even who believed that the continued existence of the 

1 M I propose .... to discuss the necessity of a government at 
least equally energetic with the one proposed, to the attainment of this 
project [the preservation of the Union]." The Federalist, No. I. 



I- 



8-1 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

Onion depended upon their adoption. 1 This may have been 
going too far; but it is certain that no other measure of 
the federal government contributed in even an approximate 
degree to the actual consolidation of the Union. 

The unconcealed contempt with which the European 
powers looked down upon the United States was keenly 
felt by the American people. But the good opinion of 
foreign countries could be regained only on condition 
that the credit of the Union was restored. The only means by 
which the advantages of the new over the old constitution 
could be shown to any great extent, and in a tangible man- 
ner, was to take the comparison between them, in one most 
important matter, out of the domain of speculation. Trade 
and commerce, the depressed condition of which had most 
effectually opened the way for a recognition of the insuffi- 
ciency of the articles of confederation, would necessarily be 
greatly and favorably influenced thereby. By this means 
there would be created a real bond of interest between the 
government and the people which could not easily be dis- 
solved. All attempts to dissolve it must be in vain, so 
far as the creditors of the state were concerned, since their 
interests demanded still more unconditionally the greatest 
possible strengthening of the federal government. In case 
the creditors of the individual states were taught to look to 
the general government too, these reasons would apply 

1 The elder Wolcott writes, April 23, 1790 : " Your observations re- 
specting the public debts as essential to the existence of the national 
government are undoubtedly just— there certainly cannot at present 
exist any other cement. The assumption of the state debts is as neces- 
sary, and indeed more so, for the existence of the national government 
than those of any other description; if the state governments are to pro- 
vide for their payment, these creditors will forever oppose all national 
provisions as being inconsistent with their interest; which circum- 
sianees, together with the habits and pride of local jurisdictions, will 
render the states very refractory. A refusal to provide for the state 
debts, which it seems has been done by a committee of congress, if per- 
in, 1 consider as an overthrow of the national government." Gibbs, 
Mem. of Wolcott, I., p. 45. 



ASSUMPTION OF STATE DEBTS. 85 

equally to them. The funding of the debt of the Union and 
the assumption by the Union of the debts of the states 
were, therefore, the two principal pillars on which the new 
political structure could be made to rest. If the govern, 
ment could point to a steady and rapidly-increasing pros- 
perity, instead of the almost universal bankruptcy under 
the confederation; if the creditors of the Union and of 
the states alike would support it; it could stand even greater 
storms than the pusillanimous men of 1TS9 had prophesied. 
Violent storms did assail it, but it withstood them. 

The anti-Federalists did not ignore the bearing of the 
so-called Funding Act and Assumption Bill. The Assump- 
tion Bill was very unpopular in several of the states, be- 
cause the sordid designs which, during the last years of the 
confederation, had been asserted with so much shameless 
boldness were still pursued by many. The main cause, 
however, of the obstinate opposition to both bills was their 
political significance. Only when the material interests 
affected were very considerable, did political considerations 
have little weight. 1 

Even a part of those who, from 1785 to 1787, had been, 
because of impending anarchy, the warmest advocates ot 
a stronger general government, allowed themselves, at the 
first attempt to instil life into the letter of the constitution, 
the fruit of so much labor, to be carried off in a contrary 
direction by the particularistic instincts which had become 
a part of their very flesh and blood. Madison now took the 
first step on the path which soon completely separated him 
from his old associate Hamilton, and even from his own 
past. True, Jefferson brought about a compromise and 
effected the adoption of Hamilton's resolutions. 2 But he 

1 South Carolina agreed with Massachusetts on the question of the 
assumption of the state debts, because her debt was over five millions ot 
dollars. In New Hampshire and Pennsylvania, on the other hand, the 
opposition to the bill was great, and with many convincing. 

2 July 16, 1790. 



gg STATl. SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

, that he had been misled by Bamilton and 
that he regretted this mistake more than any otheroi his 

political 

Hamilton had, however, to pay a price for tins senna 

^nich afterwards proved to be of the highest impor- 

Qesaw himself compelled to do su because the 

Bin was by the house, incommittee 

pf the whole,and because party feeling had reached Buch a 

r that the action of congress had come to a complete 

Whit.- and Lee of Virginia finally concluded 

to change their \< 

Qsideration paid by Hamilton was that he induced 

,f his friends to vote lor the establishment pf the 

capital on the Potomac instead of on the Susquehanna, 

The whole compromise was a bargain between the north 

and the BOUth. True, there were decided Federalists in the 

b, and some of the members of congress from the 

hern Btates emulated the hot-headed anti-Federalisti 

the .-.nth. But the friends of Hamilton's finan ? 

policy were bo preponderantly from the northern states, 

and its opponents from the southern, that the " geographi- 

' and " Bectional" character of the parties was a matter 

of frequent mention and lament. 2 It is well to call special 

ntion to this, because the erroneous view largely pre- 

ed afterwards that the mischievous political divUion 

• Washington, September9, 1792: "The first and 
only instance of variance with the former part of my resolution (to in- 

nnt at all with the legislature) I was duped into by th< 
tsury ami made a tool for forwarding his Bchenn 
then Millicicntly understood by me: ami of all the errors of my politi- 
fe, thk has occasioned me the deepest regret" Jefferson, Works, 
111., p. 160. 
■ 1). bates of Congress, I . pp. 287, 292, 296. (When mention is made 
in this work of the Debates of Congress, Benton's Abridgment is always 

- made to BOme other. I pref( 
nxle i» is more readily accessible to readers.) Gibbs, 

cott, I., p. 



SECTIONAL SEPARATION. 87 

of the country by a geographical line dates back only to 
the Missouri compromise. 1 In the case before us, the 
geographical separation of parties was determined to some 
extent by the differences in the economic situation of the 
two sections, 2 and more especially by the purely financial 
side of the question. 3 Yet the principal reason was the 
difference of political thought in general, and the different 
interpretation of the nature and object of the Union. 4 In 
debate it was attempted not to permit this side to appear 

1 Certain letters of Jefferson especially are frequently adduced in sup- 
port of this view. Jefferson himself, however, writes to Washington, 
May 23, 1792 : "But the division of sentiment and interest happens un- 
fortunately to be so geographical that no mortal can say that what is 
most wise and temperate would prevail against what is most easy and 
obvious." Jefferson, Works, III., p. 363. The view referred to in the 
text, however, is well founded to this extent that by the Missouri com- 
promise a new and important element was introduced into the geograph- 
ical division, an element of which more will be said hereafter. 

8 The memorial of the Virginia legislature mentioned in the next par- 
agraph designates " the prostration of agriculture at the feet of com- 
merce," as one of the two consequences of Hamilton's financial policy. 
The " anti-Federalists . . . fearful that the interests of agriculture 
might be sacrificed to the protection of commerce and manufactures, 
etc." Hildreth, Hist, of the U. S., IV., p. 119. 

3 " The owners of the debt are in the southern and the holders of it in 
the northern division." Jefferson, Works, III., p. 363. Hildreth (Hist, 
of the U. 8., IV., pp. 137, 138) shows that this assertion was not wholly 
without foundation, although it was greatly exaggerated. 

4 Hildreth, Hist, of the U. S., IV., p. 119, says: "It may hence be 
concluded . . . that no question of fundamental principles as to the 
theory of government was really in debate between the Federalists and 
anti-Federalists, and that the different views they took of the new con- 
stitution grew much more out of difference of position and of local and 
personal interest than out of any differences of opinion as to what ought 
to be the ends and functions of government or the method of its admin- 
istration." This is not a wrong view, but it is easy to misunderstand it. 
In the application of the theory parties diverged from one another so 
widely that their agreement on the theory of "government" had only 
a negative practical value: both parties made use of that theory for 
their own justification when their interests impelled them to a change 
of position with their opponents. 



83 V AND SLAVERY. 

to an exasperating degree; bnt it was clearly in the back- 
ground of all the speeches that were made. When the con- 
ilidation of parties had been carried far enough, and they 
>od arrayed more determinedly against each other, they 
dropped the veil. Even Jefferson, who was by no means a 
friend of unmasked warfare, declared after two years that 
Hamilton's Bystem had its origin in principles inimical to 
liberty and would undermine the constitution. 1 The accu- 
sation was carried before Washington's tribunal, but indi- 
rectly it was aimed at himself also, as he had given thi 
tern his approbation. Inasmuch as Jefferson did not clothe 
it in milder words, he must have been urged very far; for he 
was always careful to appear to preserve the most respect- 
ful bearing towards Washington. 2 

Outside of congress and administration circles, the op- 
position immediately gave full rein to their anger. In 
North Carolina and Georgia the malcontents declaimed 
with special emphasis. In Maryland the question was 
agitated in the legislature. A resolution declaring the in- 
dependence of the state governments to be jeopardized by 
the assumption of the state debts by the Union was reject- 
ed only by the casting vote of the speaker. In Virginia 
the two houses of the legislature sent a joint memorial to 
congress. They expressed the hope that the Funding Act 

1 " His [Hamilton's] Bystem flowed from principles adverse to liberty, 
and was calculated to undermine and demolish the republic. . . . 
Thus the Object Of these plans, taken together, is to draw all the powers 
• •.eminent into the hands of tin- general legislature, to establish 
mean- for corrupting a sufficient corps in that legislature to divide the 
bote nd preponderate by their own the scale which suited, and 

to have the corps under the command of the secretary of the treasury, for 
tin- purpose of subverting, Btep by Btep, the principles of the con>titution, 
which he 1 to be a thing of nothing, which must be 

changed.' 1 Jefferson, Works, III., pp. 461, 462. 

selected with deliberation. When Jetler- 
1 tie iv was no danger that his words would be whispered in 
wider cir< ' . < lull vent to his secret animosity against Washing- 

y rehr to his notorious letter to Mazzei. 






ANTI-SLAVERY PETITIONS. 89 

would be reconsidered and that the law providing for the 
assumption of the state debts would be repealed. A change 
in the present form of the government of the Union, preg- 
nant with disaster, would, it was said, be the presumptive 
consequence of the last act named, which the house 
of delegates had formally declared to be in violation of 
the constitution of the United States. 

These resolutions of the house of representatives of 
Virginia drew from Hamilton the prophetic utterance: 
"This is the first symptom of a spirit which must either 
be killed or which will kill the constitution of the United 
States." 1 The spirit was not destroyed, and the symptoms 
rapidly increased in number, and soon became alarmingly 
noticeable. 

It was not mere chance that this spirit revealed itself in 
combination with the question which afterwards imparted 
such magnitude to it, that the two halves of the Union 
finally waged a four years' war on the two sides of the 
alternative prophesied by Hamilton. Considered in it- 
self it was a very insignificant incident, and one easily 
forgotten ; but the smouldering flame into which the small 
spark was fanned at the moment showed what a conflagra- 
tion might be kindled. 

In February, 1T90, the Quaker meeting in Philadelphia, 
and the Quakers in New York, sent addresses to congress, 
requesting it to abolish the African slave trade. In the 
same month a Pennsylvania society for the furtherance 
of the abolition of slavery asked congress to go to the full 
extent of its power to put an end to the traffic in human 
beings. The constitution did not leave the slightest doubt 
that congress had no authority whatever in the matter, 
except that it might impose a tax of not more than ten 
dollars per head on imported negroes. 2 Not a word, there- 

1 W. Jay, Life of J. Jay, II., p. 202. 
a Art. I., Sec. 9, §1. 



90 NTV AND BLAVBBY. 

i l( , nrg, esa to go beyond the letter of 

this provision. The only question was whether, and when, 
the petitions Bhonld bereferred to a commits port 

upon. This was sufficient, however, to excite many of 

southern deL i the most violent declamation, 

and to draw from them the most violent threats. The 

m* tangen was thrown hark at the north in torn 
emphatic and haughty as it was subsequently by Cal- 
houn or Toombs. Eere we have the whole struggle of 

nty years in a nutshell. All subsequent events were 
only the variations of the themes of these debates, the 

■•d development of the principles here laid down, and 
their practical application to concrete questions. 

mplote independence of thestates was the basis of 

argument in this question. Disputants spoke only of the 

rnment under the constitution as it actually 

ted. But for certain contingencies a modeof action 
was kept in view, and assumed to be legal, although it 
would not be revolution only in case that the assumption 
of the complete independence of the states and the 
impossibility of a constitutional change in the provisions 
relating to the powers of the federal government on that 
question were proven and recognized. In other words, the 
actual sovereignty of the >tate> was assumed, although it 
was Dot recognized as the premise from which every de- 
mand could be justified with inexorable logic. 

There was no inducement to subject the nature of the 
to the profound examination which the full rec- 

ition of the hearing of these premises demanded. The 
representatives of the slave >tates did not endeavor to 

ire anything practical and definite under the name of 

QBtitutional right. They touched the Concrete question 

with which the debates were formally concerned only 

lightly, and Lost themselves in abstract reasoning on slavery. 

. they adopted a course of procedure 

inch they ever afterwards adhered. Partly on account 



PRO-SLAVERY SENSITIVENESS. 91 

of the natural warmth of their temperament, and partly 
because excited by the fears which their evil consciences 
always kept awake, they widely overshot the mark. The 
dangers with which they saw the future pregnant became 
first the declared views of their opponents, whose 
wishes soon changed into demands and resolves. They 
were then attacked with such passionate argument, con- 
cluded witli threats of such a nature, that one might im- 
agine that the possible consequences of the alleged hostile 
plans of the north were already unbearable facts. All 
that had been done was to move a reference of the pe- 
titions to a committee. The representatives of the slave 
states immediately clothed their opposition in such a 
form as might have been expected if the motion meant 
that the petitions should be granted. All their arguments 
were directed against this assumed view. Tucker, of 
South Carolina, began with the declaration that "the com- 
mitment of it would be a very alarming circumstance to 
the southern states," because the request was unconsti- 
tutional. 1 Burke, of South Carolina, was certain that 
"the commitment would sound an alarm and blow the 
trumpet of sedition in the southern states." 2 Tucker for- 
got after a few moments that the only question before the 
house was the reference of the petition to a committee, 
and expatiated at length on the consequences of universal 
emancipation. He did not speak of rebellion, but declared 
that emancipation by law would infallibly lead to civil 
war. 3 Jackson, of Georgia, was decidedly of the same 
mind. 

Madison had rightly remarked that earnest opposition 
was the best means to excite alarm. 4 His warning re- 

1 Debates of Congress, I., p. 208. 

2 Ibid. 

3 " Do these men expect a general emancipation by law ? This would 
never be submitted to by the southern states without a civil war." Ibid. 

* Ibid, I., p. 202. 



.11. SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

mained anheeded. Onoe the debates Lad digressed to the 

question of emancipation, that question alone was dia- 

aud Madison's warning was examined from that 

standpoint only. The slaveholders, and afterwards their 

partisans in the northern states, endeavored to make the 
world believe — and for a long time net without success — 
that up t.» the time of the Ifissonri compromise, and even 
for half a generation after, slavery was so unanimously 
ami sincerely condemned in the slave-holding states, that 
ways ami means would infallibly have been found to get 
rid of the Bystem were it not that the uncalled-for inter- 
meddling of the abolitionists had produced a revolution in 
public opinion throughout the south. The expressions to 
which utterance was given in these debates are of great 
interest, for the reason that they afford a complete refuta- 
tion of this assertion. Smith of South Carolina demon- 
strated u the absurdity of liberating the post nati without 

uding it to all the slaves old and young, and the great 
absurdity and even impossibility of extending it to all." In 

opinion "nothing but evil would result from emanci- 
pation under the existing circumstances of the country." 1 
He did not, however, limit his assertion to the existing 
state of the country and left it at least undecided whether 
Blavery was an evil at all. 2 Great prominence was given 
by him to the assertion repeated over and over again until 
after the dose of the civil war, that the southern states 
could be cultivated only by .-laves. He based his argu- 
ment not only on '-climate and the nature of the soil." but 
► to the curse that rested upon slavery, to " the 



: Deb. of ( I., p. 228. 

■"The truth was, that the best-informed part of the citizens of the 

northern gtates knew thai Blavery was bo ingrafted into the policy of the 

southern Btates, that it COUld DOt he eradicated without tearing up hy the 

their happiness, tranquillity and prosperity; that if it were an evil, 

I bich there was no remedy." Ibid, L, p. 2:3:2. 



THREAT OF CIYIL WAR. 93 

old habits which forbid the whites from performing the 
labor." 1 

When the debates turned on a matter so remote from 
the subject under discussion, it was impossible not to pass 
judgment on the whole question of slavery from the stand- 
point of general ethics. The first impulse to this was 
given by the representatives from the north, who urged 
that the petitions of so respectable a body as that of the 
Quakers in relation to so great a moral evil, were deserving 
of special consideration. The representatives of the south- 
ern states replied to this with provoking irony. The Qua- 
kers were mercilessly lacerated, and many a thrust was 
aimed at the whole north, which, had suddenly conceived so 
much horror for slavery and pretended to monopolize all 
morality and virtue. The sting was keenly felt, and in 
returning the attack no forbearance was shown. Boudinot 
of Xew Jersey complained that Paley had been " branded 
with the charge of countenancing slavery." The Bible 
was drawn into the controversy on both sides; and the 
debate was made to turn from the standpoint of general 
morals to the basis of positive religion. 

In bold contrast to this was Jackson's declaration that 
the south would not stop short at anything if this question 
was seriously touched. He was not satisfied with prophe- 
sying discord and "civil war"; but distinctly enough held 
up to the zealots of emancipation, who should dare to beard 
the lion in his den, the picture of a court in which only 
lynch law was administered. 2 

This wrestling of minds on the question of slavery — the 
first since the adoption of the constitution — had no imme- 

1 Deb. of Congress, I., p. 233. 

2 " The gentleman [Scott of Pennsylvania] says, if lie was a federal 
judge, he does not know to what length he might go in emancipating 
these people ; but I believe his judgment would be of short duration in 
Georgia ; perhaps even the existence of such a judge might be in danger." 
Ibid, I., p. 209. 



BEIGNTT AND SLAVERY. 

diate practical result b. In the light of later events, it ap- 
pears already in these debates with remarkable clear' 
that the difference was in its nature one which could not 
tnoothed over. But it was Dot yet recognized as the 
rock on which the Union was to be broken to pi< 
Threatening and sodden as was its appearance on the ho- 
q, it attracted men's eves only for an instant. It re- 
mained yet tobe Been whether the ship was even seaworthy. 
The waves which tossed at that moment so violently about 
in to break over her deck, claimed the entire at- 
tention of statesmen. 

Hamilton's financial policy, which had led to the organ- 
ization of the opposition to the administration and to the 
Federal majority in congress, was also the first actual in- 
ducement to a revolt against the authority of the general 
rnment 

The colonists had brought with them from England a 
deep aversion to excise taxes, which perpetuated itself, un- 
abated, from generation to generation. The first congress, 
in it- add re-- of < October, 1774. to the inhabitants of Canada, 
laid particular stress on the imposition of excise as one of 
the evils accompanying subjection to England. 1 In the 
nullification convention of New York, it was proposed by 
Williams, and later by Smith with something more of re- 
striction, that the power to impose excise duties on any 
article which grew or was manufactured in America, 
should Ik- expressly denied to congress. 2 Neither motion 
LOWever, adopted, and the an ien< linen ts to the const it u- 

afterwards made contained no provision to that effect 

fou are subjected . . . to the imposition of excise, the horror of 
all free Btates ; thus wresting y<»ur property from you by the mostodioui 
ad laying open to tax-gatherers, houses, tin scenes of domeatio 
and comfort, and called castles of English subjects in the I 
: ' law." I \V ttern Insurrection. Contributions to American 
, 137. 
'Elli i , pp. 381, 411. 



THE FIRST EXCISE. 95 

Nevertheless, excise impositions and arbitrary tyrannical 
government remained in the minds of the people as kin- 
dred ideas. Hence the first excise bill which was intro- 
duced into congress was rejected, on the 21st of June, 1790. 1 
Yet Hamilton caused another bill to be introduced, and by 
the act of March 3, 1791, a tax was imposed on spirituous 
liquors distilled within the United States. 

The dissatisfaction produced by this measure was very 
widespread, and from the first found strongest expression 
in the western counties of Pennsylvania, at that time the 
least thickly settled. The 'first indignation meeting in 
western Pennsylvania was held July 27, l791,atEed Stone 
Old Fort. 2 Much plain talk was indulged in concerning 
the law; but its constitutionality was not then attacked. 
Passion had not yet reached such a state of violence as to 
permit this in face of the express provision of the constitu- 
tion. 3 But it was not long before it came to this. On the 
23d of August, the agitation committee of Washington 
county declared all who should accept any position under 
the law, or help to carry it out, enemies of the interests of 
the country, and put them under the ban of society. Four- 
teen days later the tax collector Robert Johnson was tarred 
and feathered, and robbed of his horse. It was not long 
before similar acts of violence were practiced upon other 
officials. 

At first the administration was powerless against the 
disturbers of the peace, for it had not yet the means to 
oppose force by force. Congress now made haste to 
remedy this state of things, and to prepare itself in time 
for every contingency. The act to provide for calling 
forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, sup- 
press insurrections, and repel invasions, became law on 

1 Gale and Seaton's Annals of Congress, I., p. 1644. 

2 Now Brownsville. 

3 ''• The congress shall have power to lay and collect . . . excises." 
Art. I., Sec.8,§l. 



96 MK SOVEREIGNTY AND BLAVEBT. 

the 2nd of ICay, 17m'. 1 Bnt while congress on the one 

band placed the administration in a condition to ensure 

enforcement of the law, it on the other made con- 

iona to the malcontents, ><> that as far as possible the 

employment of force might be avoided. The act of May 

;.'i\ lightened the tax a great deal, and guarantied to 

the distillers alterations in other essential respects. 2 The 

administration, too, considered the right policy to be not 
Bsort to force as long as it did not seem absolutely 
jsary But its forbearance served only to make the 
malcontents bolder. The rough backwoodsmen and Irish 
who would not be persuaded that they had to contribute 3 
to the support of the government and who considered un- 
ited distillation to be a "natural right," 4 had be- 
gun the movement. But in accordance with a resolve 
which was immediately made public, persons of a very 
different kind, some openly and others in secret, undertook 
to guide it. The measures of the patriots during the B 
olution were copied, and corresponding committees es- 
tablished to communicate with the malcontents in all the 
othei f the Union. At their meetings resolutions 

were passed which extended the opposition far beyond the 
limits of this unpalatable law. Even secession from the 
Onion was discussed. 1 

I .]■]>. 264, 365. 
I., pp. 267-271. 
■"Every circumstance indicates that we must contest with 
madmen .... The people absolutely refuse to pay one shil- 

ling towards the public service These men are so licentious 

ami vain of their consequence that they consider the blood and treasure 
oftheUn their property. They arrogantly demand the 

public protection, and at the Bame time refuse to perform any of their 
duti' i ). Wolcoti to F. Wolcott, Gibb<, Mem., I., p. 156. 

•Petition of Inhabitants of Westmoreland, 1790. Contributions to 
Amerl ■;. . 1858, j 

* " There was indeed a meeting to consult about a separation." Jeffer- 

, Works, IV., p. 111. See also J. C. 
I., p. 'JO. 



DEFIANCE OF LAW. 97 

As usual, men talked in an exaggerated way, but there 
was enough that was serious in these things. The simple 
fact that a few counties could successfully evade the enforce- 
ment of a law of congress for three years must have excited 
great solicitude for the future of the Union in the minds 
of those statesmen who were a little more far-seeing than 
the rest. But there was another and more important side 
to the question. The crowd who carried on this disturbance 
on the stage thought of nothing except drinking their 
whiskey without paying any taxes on it; but the directors 
of the play were pursuing very different aims. 

Hamilton's immediate object in the excise law was at 
first a purely financial one. But now he united another 
object to this. He recognized that the exercise of the 
powers expressly conferred by the constitution would meet 
with great opposition under all circumstances. He desired, 
therefore, to bring the struggle to a decision before the 
opposing elements should find time to consolidate their 
forces. The longer it was postponed the more difficult 
would be the victory; and the very non-exercise of these 
powers would be considered a tacit renunciation of them. 
Internal revenue (so-called) should not be monopolized by 
the states; for it was the element by which every individ- 
ual citizen could be soonest brought to a consciousness of 
the national character of the Union, even in internal af- 
fairs, since it immediately affected the every-day life of 
every citizen. 1 

1 " Other reasons co-operated in the minds of some able men to render 
an excise at an early period desirable. They thought it well to lay 
hold of so valuable a resource of revenue before it was generally pre- 
occupied by the state governments. They supposed it not amiss that 
the authority of the national government should be visible in some 
branch of internal revenue, lest a total non-exercise of it should beget 
an impression that it was never to be exercised, and next that a thing 
of the kind could not be introduced with a greater prospect of easy suc- 
cess than at a period when the government enjoyed the advantage 01 
first impressions, when state factions to resist its authority were not yet 

7 






6TAI1- WKRY. 

cape tin- opposition. It was not 
t(1 ^ ascribed to dissatisfaction with the excise imposition 
tli:it a majority of the sonthem and western members of 
oongress announced, even before the passage of the bill, 
itation to procure its repeal. 1 It was un- 
derstood in both sections of the country that the contest 
really centered in the great constitutional question which, 
Q p to the time of the civil war. constituted the legal basis 
of every important internal struggle. In the debates bear- 
ing immediately on the question of excise, little was said 
of Btate rights and state sovereignty, for the reason that it 
was impossible to escape the express provision of the con- 
Btitntion. The Btruggle centered, however, with full con- 
m the part of the contestants, on the actual 
,,, of a position, the great importance of which, ft* 
the conflict which followed between the sovereignty of 
the Onion and the independence of the several Btates, 
fully recognized. This was so obvious that it did n 
eape the observation even of foreigners. 1 

It was the profound significance of the strug 
much as the ever-increasing boldness of the insurg< 
which determined Hamilton, in the summer of 1794, U 
cause the administration to proceed at last with all the 
mid command. He considered that the time 

matured, when bo much aid was to be derived from the popularity and 

ftrmness of tin- actual chief magistrate." Hamilton, Works, IV.. p. *2-)\. 

■ \\ t, irton's Btate Trials, p. 102. Contributions to American History, 

ie French ambassa ; >r, Fauchet, said in his celebrated dispatch 

dated Oct. 81, 1794, which cost secretary Randolph his 

i name, that the whiskey rebellion was "indubitably con- 

I with a | explosion for sometime prepared in the publij 

mind; but which this local and precipitate eruption would cause to 

miscarry, or at least check for a longtime." The elements of thee^ 

- M the primitive divisions of opinion as to the 

political form of the state, and the limits of the sovereignty of the whole 

over each Btate individually sovereign." 1 1 am acquainted with the dis- 

b only in i. . translation.) Randolph's Vindication, p. 41. 



ENFORCING THE EXCISE BY BAYONETS. 99 

had come to try whether the new constitution had really 
created a government. 1 Only a few counties openly defied 
the officers of the general government. If force were 
used against them they would either be left to themselves, 
and then it would be easy to overcome them ; or the rest 
of the malcontents would make common cause with them, 
in which case the alternative of accepting anarchy or of 
giving immediate support to the government, would be 
placed before the people in such a manner that they could 
not fail to recognize it. If left to themselves much would 
be accomplished with little effort, and both the insurgents 
and their secret abettors would be struck at the same time. 
In any case the slow but deadly drifting towards anarchy 
would be brought to an end. 

Hamilton was certain that the opposition might be 
quickly broken if the government should take a decided 
attitude towards the insurgents. He advised, therefore, 
that so large a force should be put on foot as would compel 
the insurgent counties to give up all thought of a contest, 
unless they received support from without. In this way, 
the authority of the government might be re-established 
without burtheninff it with the odium which always attends 

CJ v 

the shedding of citizen blood. 2 Washington followed Ham- 
ilton's advice, which proved to be right. Thirteen thous- 
and militia were called for on the 7th of August, and their 
appearance sufficed to restore the insurgent districts to 
obedience. 

The vials of gall which were now poured out on Hamil- 
ton's head demonstrated how heavily the blow was felt by 
those who in secret had fanned the fire. In their wrath, 

1 In his letter of Aug. 2, 1794, lie says : " The very existence of gov- 
ernment demands this course [calling out the militia to suppress the 
insurrection]." 

7 In the letter referred to above we read: " The force ought, if attain- 
able, to be imposing, to deter from opposition, save the effusion of the 
blood of citizens, and secure the object to be accomplished." 



100 ;u: BO! i BEIGNTY and BLATEBY. 

lodged against him the most contradictory cha] 
At first, they prophesied that the militia would refuse to 
Then they foretold a civil war, the end o£ 
which would be the. annihilation of the usurpers who had 

til at power. Now they said that the secretary of 
the treasury had magnified a mouse into an elephant in 
order to Bnbserve his despotic aims. Next they ridiculed 
the foolish Btupidity which imagined that obedience could 

irced. And in the same breath they declared that the 
brutal compulsion of the insurgent counties had made 

r secession from the Union a certainty. 1 

Neither these prophecies nor charges would have been of 

any consequence, had they not contained a certain amount 

of truth. Washington did not ignore this any more than 

he allowed himself to be deceived as to the motives of their 

aators, or to be hoodwinked by their unbounded 

ration. This, as well as the position of the parties who 
endeavored to persuade him to choose a policy of inactive 
delay and even of concession, explains why he hesitati 

! to adopt a course which the government of any well- 

lated Btate would have recognized three years earlier 
a- the only right one. And this it is, too, which gave this 
tempest in a tea-pot bo great a significance. 

There was this much truth in the charges against Ham- 



1 "A separation which was perhaps a very distant and problematical 
is now near and certain, and determined in the mind of ereij 
Hi's Works, IV., p. 112. Jefferson himself feared that a vio- 
lent disruption of the Union might follow. In the >am<' l<r 
Madison we read : "The third and last [error] will he, to make it [the 
- law] the instrument of dismembering the Union, and setting ns 
all afloat to choose what part of it we will adhere to." It is 
nithant that simultaneously, among the adherents of the opposite 
party, it was said that the strife might end with the expulsion of the 

Wolcott writes, July 20, 1794: " I trust, ho* 
that they will he chastised or rejected from the Union. The latter 
will not. however, !»<■ allowed without a vigorous contest." Gibbs, Mem. 
I., p. 156. 



OUTCRY AG^IKST HAMILTON. 101 

ilton, that judging from the number of the insurgents, a 
call for 4,000 or 5,000 militia-men, instead of for 15,000, 
would have sufficed. 1 But Hamilton was not so short-sight- 
ed as to base his calculation on these elements alone. It is 
all the more singular that this should have been supposed 
of him, because the suspicions entertained by his accusers, 
and shared in part by himself, as to the reliability of the 
militia, were not entirely groundless. 2 A portion of the mili- 
tia of Pennsylvania had from the beginning taken part in 
the movement. When governor Mifflin was requested to 
call them out to suppress the insurrection, he refused to do 
so, on the ground that it was too bold a step. He expected 
that such a course would only strengthen the revolt, and 
questioned whether the militia would yield passive obedi- 
ence to the orders of the government. And when the mili- 
tia were in fact called out by the president, they obeyed 
the order in Pennsylvania with reluctance and hesitation. 
Mifflin himself was obliged to travel through the state and 
use his eloquence to secure its quota. 

Moreover, Hamilton's accusers had lost all right to com- 
plain of the number of militia called for, since from the 
very beginning of the disturbances they had preached the 
impossibility of suppressing them. Their charges against 
the secretary of the treasury recoiled, therefore, upon them- 
selves. Yet Hamilton's army was, according to them, the 
butt of the insurgents as well as the instrument of an in- 
supportable despotism. 3 

1 The number of 13,000 men called for was afterwards increased to 
15,000. The number of men able to bear arms in the insurgent counties 
was estimated at 16,000. 

2 Hamilton writes to Sedgwick, February 2, 1799 : " In the expedi- 
tion against the western insurgents, I trembled every moment lest a 
great part of the militia should take it into their heads to return home 
rather than go forward." J. C. Hamilton, History of the Republic of 
the United States of America, VII., p. 278. 

" The information of our militia returned from the westward is uni- 
form, that though the people there let them pass quietly, they were ob- 



ST.\ EtEIGOTT AND BLAYEBY. 

This mode <>t' argumentation again6t the distasteful 
jurea of a government is very usual among 
masses. What vrasmosf remarkable in the instance before 
that it was not used by the masses or by common 
demagogues and pot-house politicians, but by members of 
rnment. Jefferson did not first avail himself ol 
contradicting arguments after he had retired to private life; 
And Randolph, his successor in office, followed his exam- 
ple in this respect. Both were in part actuated by impure 
motives, and Jefferson at least was conscious that he had 
painted in colors altogether too dark, — a mistake into 
which tlit* advocates of a bad cause almost always fall. 
Jhit on the other hand, both were in great part really 
convinced that their fears were well-founded. And this 
3 characteristic of these two personages, as of the 
circumstances of the time. How far the bond which 
knit together the different parts of the Union was from be- 
ing an organic, that is, a really national bond is evident from 
the fact that two secretaries of state could doubt the ability 
of the genera] government to enforce a constitutional tax, 
although it was opposed by force only in a part of a single 
State 1 

These doubts were honest ones; but Jefferson and his 

liates were again guilty of self-contradiction in the 

manner in which they turned them to account. They had 

matically labored to educate the people in the faith 

of their laughter, not of their fear; that one thousand men could 

i nl off their whole force in a thousand places of the Alleghany." 

Works, IV., ].. 112. 

1 In Randolph's opinion on Hamilton's resolution to call out the 

militia we read: '-The moment is big with a eri>is which would con- 

the eldest government, and if it should burst on ours, i«s extent and 

dominion ean he but faintly conjectured." 1I<- comes to the conclusion 

that the Bituation of tin- United States " banishes every idea of calling 

the militia into immediate action." He even went so far as toes 

thai tin- insurgents might call the English to their aid, and that 
.and and the disruption of the Union niigut be the result 
of an attempt at coercion. 






A-ftTI-FEDERAEIST FEELING. 103 

that an impotent general government was a condition 
precedent of liberty. In so far as they succeeded in this, 
they had contributed to make the government of the Union 
impotent. If their apprehensions were well grounded, this 
was a fact which should have afforded them nothing but 
satisfaction. And to some extent they experienced this 
satisfaction and made no secret of it. But, at the same 
time, they made the weakn3ss of the government their ex- 
cuse and justification for the counsel they had given, that 
it should declare itself powerless against a handfulof in- 
surgents. 

And here also honest conviction, self-deception, and un- 
worthy motives were strangely intermixed. As partisans 
they rejoiced over the predicament in which the govern- 
ment was placed; as fanatical doctrinarians, they endeav- 
ored to argue away- from their own minds and those of the 
world, the bitterness of these fruits of their teachings, 
while with conscious sophistry they attributed to those 
teachings a brilliant excellence; and as Americans they 
were ashamed of the contemptible spectacle exhibited by 
this three years' struggle of the federal government with 
the four western counties of Pennsylvania. 

With some, as with governor Mifflin, the last feeling 
conquered, and ail finally accommodated themselves to the 
accomplished fact of the suppression of the insurrection. 
It would not have been so easy for them to do this if they 
had not for some time experienced, to their terror, that it 
is a much easier thing to provoke a storm than to control 
it. Yet this can be said only of Gallatin, Findley, and a 
few others, who had participated directly in the movement, 
although they belonged to the upper classes of society. 
The rest of the leaders of the anti-Federalists denied with 
undisguised provocation the accusation that they had con- 
jured up the storm and were responsible for having raised 
the question whether the government was able to cope with it. 
Hence they learned nothing from experience. They con- 



Mi: SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

tinned to justify and to defend the very thing which Hamil- 
ton regarded as ilif Bonl of the evil. The insurrection in it- 
was only of small significance. The real danger lay in 
the attitude of the rest of the people towards the question. 
If the remainder of the people were permeated with a - 
<»f tin- necessity of the absolute sovereignty of the law, it. 
not only would have been absurd to consider thesnco 
the insurrection possible, but the government would have 
been compelled to take immediate and energetic steps to sup- 
js it. even if it should itself have preferred a different 
course. This conviction, however, was not shared by more 
than halt* the people, and with a great portion of them it 
was altogether wanting, so far as the laws of the Union 
were concerned. This was the chain which hound the 
„ hands of the government BO long, and the anti-Feder- 
alists forged it. In a state in which the people rule, 
the sovereignly pf law Is possible only as long as the 
people wills it. And the will of the people in the United 
States, in its relation to the general government, must 
necessarily have been just as strong or as weak as the na- 
tional feeling and the recognition of the interest which 
the individual members of the Union had in national de- 
velopment. But the anti- Federalists had from the be- 
ginning striven against these two forces on principle and 
with all their power. Their way and Hamilton's, there- 
fore, necessarily took from the first a divergent course; 
for the leading thought of Hamilton's policy was the 
Creation of national interests. 

Eamilton's proposition t<« establish a national bank had 
source in the same great statesmanlike thought as the 
Assumption Bill, the Funding Act, and his tax laws, and 
met therefore with the same opposition. 1 

The opposition in this case, too, was based on the qties- 
titutionality. The Federalists argued from the 

1 1701. 



THF FIRST BAXK BILL. 105 

point of view of the statesman, and touched on the con- 
stitutional question only so far as it was necessary to re- 
fute their opponents. The anti-Federalists, on the other 
hand, touched the essential arguments in the case only 
lightly, and where they did they allowed themselves fre- 
quently to be involved in absurdities by their doctrinar- 
ianism. 1 The whole debate was conducted by them in a 
pettifogging manner. Even Madison, who delivered the 
most important opposition speech, scarcely rose to a high- 
er plane. It was not indeed an easy matter, under the cir- 
cumstances, to raise strong, statesmanlike objections; 
and the constitutional considerations had little weight, as 
they were of an exclusively negative character. The con- 
stitution did not expressly authorize the establishment of 
a bank; and the anti-Federalists now endeavored to prove 
that it was not " necessary" to the exercise of any of the 
powers expressly given. 2 

1 Thus, for instance, Jackson, of Georgia, opposed the establishment 
of a bank because it would facilitate the borrowing of money by the 
government. Deb. of Congress, I., p. 287. But Jackson had not by any 
means reached the height attained by Jefferson. The latter was of 
opinion that by a single amendment to the constitution "the administra- 
tion of the government" might be reduced " to the genuine principles 
of the constitution ;" that is, by an amendment withdrawing from the 
general government the power to make loans. Jefferson to Taylor, 
Nov. 26, 1798. Jeff., Works, IV., p. 260. Another objection of Jack- 
son's was that the bank would be of advantage only to the mercantile 
interests: he had never seen a bank-note in Georgia. (Deb. of Congress, 
I., p. 272). It is worthy of mention that he, as well as Madison, called 
attention on this occasion to the geographical separation of parties. 
Jackson closed his argument with the words : " Not a gentleman scarcely 
+ .o the eastward of a certain line is opposed to the bank, and where is the 
gentleman to the southward that is for it?" Ibid., I., p. 287. 

a In Art. 1'., Sec. 8, § 18, of the constitution, it is provided that congress 
shall have power " to make all laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers," etc. Com- 
pare Gerry's speech on the bank question, Deb. of Congress, I., p. 300; 
and Marshall, in McCulloch v. Maryland, Wheaton's Rep., IV., pp. 
414-422. 






10G ukk.ntv AMD BLAYKBY. 

3 felt the weakness of this position* 
and they anxiously tried to find other grounds. This only 
made their cause worse. The Btates,they .-aid, had author- 
ity to establish and to prohibit the establishment of hanks. 
But they could not maintain state banks in opposition to 
a United State- hank; hence the latter was unconstitution- 
al, as the rights of the states could not be curtailed except 
where the constitution expressly allowed it. 1 Moreover the 
constitution prohibited the favoring <>t* any particular place 1 
but the place where the hank was located would undoubt- 
edly have an advantage over all others! 

These and Bimilar objections bordered on the ridiculous, 
lint no reasoning was too absurd not to find credulous 
hearers, when the rights of the states were alleged to be in 
danger, and the services of the old phantom " consolidation" 
required. The politicians would not, in a matter of 
such importance, have dared to wage so strong a war of 
opposition, and could not have carried it on for ten years and 
have finally conquered if they had not had as a broad and 
firm foundation to work upon, the anti-national tenden- 
which prevailed among the people. 3 
It has already been frequently intimated that the pre- 
ponderance of anti-national tendencies in the Union had 
rigin in the political and social development of the 
. in their want of political connection before the ! 
olution, in the little intercourse, commercial and other, 
between them, and lastly in various differences in their nat- 
ural situation. A rapid intergrowth of the several states 

! . pp 875 

1 Sj •;. 

re must be taken not to be misled by Che apparent conflict between 
what i- here Baid ami the Federalist programme. The anti-national ten. 
dencies of the Federalists were much weaker than those of the am. 
enlists. Hut if the Fe lerali-t> Bupp >rted Hamilton's me isures, it by no 

- follows that th<- masses of them, or even all their leader-, adhered 
:i>. or that they had Tally understood his 

motives ( >r hi.- obje< 



THE FKENCH REVOLUTION. 107 

could not therefore take place, and continued violent col- 
lisions were unavoidable. But the purely American ques- 
tions of this period were not yet of such a nature, that 
they suffice to explain the morbid passion characteris- 
tic of its internal conflicts. The French Revolution intro- 
duced from abroad an element which, independent of the 
actual condition of affairs and partly in conflict with it, 
kept excitement during many years at the boiling point. 

The Revolution was at first hailed with delight by all 
parties in the United States. When, however, after Mi- 
rabeau's death, the impossibility of control and the mistakes 
of the helpless court transferred the preponderance of 
power to the radicals, and when the anarchical elements 
grew bolder daily, the Federalists began to turn away. The 
anti-Federalists, on the other hand, clung mure closely to 
it than ever. The farther France proceeded, by the adop- 
tion of brutal measures, on the way of political idealism, 
the more rank was the growth in the United States of the 
most radical doctrinarianism; the more attentively the 
legislators of France listened to Dan ton's voice of thunder 
and to Marat's fierce cry for blood, the more boldly did dem- 
agogism in its most repulsive form rage in the United 
States. 

In the autumn of 1791, Freneau established the National 
Gazette 1 in Philadelphia with the intention of neutraliz- 
ing the influence of Fenno's Federalist United States 
Gazette. In the beginning it was content with denouncing 
Hamilton's financial policy and scourging John Adams 
because he was the presumptive successor of Washington. 
But in course of time it attacked the president himself. 2 

1 The first number appeared Oct. 31. 

2 Washington writes, July 21, 1793, to Henry Lee : " But in what will 
this abuse terminate? For the result, as it respects myself, I care not. 
. . . The arrows of malevolence . . . however barbed and well 
pointed, never can reach the moat vulnerable part of me, though while I 
am up as a mark, they will be continually aimed. The publications in 



108 '■ "'• BOVBBEIGSTY and SLAVERY. 

[ta wit degenerated Into malice, and in lien of a sharp 
polemic against the expediency of certain measures, it 
made the most malignant charges at to the motives and 
objects of its opponents. The most distinguished Fed- 
eralists, it said, had always been a "corrupt squadron." 
Now the old calumny as to their " monarchical" tendencies 
was revived with increasing passion. 1 The "monarchical 
m" became a Bhibboleth. The course of events in 
France lent the anti-Federalists special strength. The 
more undoubted the overthrow of the monarchy there be- 
came, the more was the party here upbraided to whom the 
sacred word " republic" was assumed to be a thorn in the 
flesh. 

It was n<»t demagogism only that moved the anti-Federal- 
to grasp these near and efficient weapons. Their in- 
tellectual and moral drunkenness was not merely feigned. 
They had grown more intoxicated over the French Revo- 
lution than <>ver their own struggle for freedom. Therefore 
it was not only poet-politicians, likeFreneau, and ambitious 
crosses between statesmen and demagogues, like Jefferson, 
who never tired of holding up to the eyes of the people the 
frightful Bpectre of a crown. Even men like Madison scent- 
ed monarchy everywhere. 2 Nevertheless these fears were 
entirely ungrounded. 

Freneau's and Bache's papers arc outrages on common decency; and 
they progress in that style, in proportion as their piece- arc treated with 
contempt, and are passed by in Bilence, by those at whom they arc 
aimed." Wash., Works, X., p. 359. Compare Jeff., Works, IX., p. 
164. 

'The anti-FederaliBtB, and Jefferson more than any of them, treated it 
always :i- a demonstrated fact, that Hamilton was enabled to carry his 
financial measures only by the purchase of several representatives. But 
tin- only evidence of the truth of this accusation is the boldness with 
which it was advanced. The demands which were made to point out 
who had been bribed, or to establish the general accusations in any 
maii!i. r, were never met. 

1 In a letter dated August ::, 1793, lie writes to Randolph of the "doc- 
and discourses circulated in favor of monarchy and aristocracy." 






4 



REPUBLICAN SENTIMENT. 109 

Friedrich Kapp rightly remarks that the colonists at the 
outbreak of the Revolution were by no means opposed, on 
principle, to a monarchical form of government. 1 Spite of 
this, however, they were even then republican to the core. 
The question of monarchy or republic was not here one 
which could be decided at pleasure. The republic was the 
only form of government that could be adopted under the 
circumstances, and it alone, therefore, could subsist. A 
form of government out of harmony with the manners and 
customs of a people cannot be lasting, and the manners 
and customs of the Americans were eminently and thor- 
oughly republican. Their attachment to the royal house 
of England and to the English form of government, had 
become a habit the strength of which was in its age, and 
which, mistaking the real condition ot things, had its sup- 
port rather in the fancy than in the heart. It could pre- 
vail under the actual condition of things so long, only be- 
cause monarchy in England was already little more than a 
form, since the real government was that of an aristocratic 
republic; and because all that was especially monarchical 
in the colonies was of even less account there than in Eng- 
land. Once the passive monarchy to which they had been 
accustomed was rejected by the colonists, it was impossible 
to reinstate it. The foundation on which it had rested was 
utterly destroyed, and hence all monarchical tendencies 
necessarily floated in the air. 

The blind doctrinarianism of the anti-Federalists pre- 

Rives, Life and Times of Madison, III., p. 196. In the Virginia resolu- 
tions drawn up by him in 1798, it is objected to the government of the 
Union that its policy tended " to consolidate the states by degrees into 
one sovereignty, the obvious tendency and inevitable result of which 
would be to transform the present republican system of the United States 
into an absolute, or at best a mixed, monarchy." Elliot, Deb., IV.; p. 
528. Again in May, 1824, he spoke of the " monarchical spirit and par- 
tisanship of the British government which characterized Fenno's paper." 
Randall, Life of Thos. Jefferson, II., pp. 74, 75. 
1 Preussische Jahrbuecher, 1871. 



HO STA ri. BOVEBEIGNTT AND BLAVEEY. 

rented their recognizing this. They ransacked the whole 
of history for analogies to prove the existence and the 
magnitude of the danger. The so-called monarchist* 
the other hand, were satisfied that the examples adduced 
had no application to the given case. Their rational com- 
plaint wa< that the history of other peoples contained very 
little that could be used as an analogy at all. 1 And of all 
tin- analogies adduced, that seemed to them the most dis- 
torted which c<»ul<l Bee in monarchy the Bword of Damocles 
that threatened the life of the republic.' This view was 
not only brought forward in the tribune and in the press 
as a defense against the charges of their opponents, but it 
findfl frequent and emphatic expression in the confidential 
correspondence of the Leading federalists. Their crime 
was that they did not see the root of all political evil in 
the monarchical idea, and that they were convinced that, 
even under a republican form of government, a people 
might he politically, intellectually, and morally ruined. 
They, in many instances, painted things in too dark colors; 
hut their speculations were based on the actual condition 
of affairs, not on abstractions, and they well knew that men 
could not he treated like dead figures or logical formulae. 
If, therefore, they did not join in the thoughtless howl 
against monarchy in general, they recognized more clearly 
than did the anti-Federal is t8 that a monarchy was impos- 
sible in the United States, and that if one were established 
it w«»uld only increase the evils which inspired them with 
bo much Berious alarm for the future of the republic 1 

anomalous as ours, so unlike everything European 
in its Ingredients, its action, ami thus far in it< operation will baffle, fof 
a Long time, all the conjectures ami prognostics that arc drawn from 
other scenes." Fisher Ames, Works. I., p. 834. 

■ •• I tlo not know «,i' one man of BCnse and information who seriously 

apprehends any danger from monarchical opinions." Wolcott to Jed. 

Gtibl a, Mem. of Wolcott, I., p. 190. 

'Monarchy is no path to Liberty; offers no hopes. It could not 

stand ; and would, if tried, lead to more agitation and revolution than 



HAMILTON AS A MONARCHIST. 



Ill 



And even if they in theory preferred a constitutional 
monarchy to the republic, this unquestionable fact was so 
ever present to their minds that their acts and efforts were 
never in conflict with it. 

If any one conld rightly be called a monarchist in theory, 
it was Hamilton. In the Philadelphia convention he ex- 
pressed himself convinced " that the British government 
was the best in the world," and that he almost doubted 
whether a republican government conld be established over 
so extended a territory as that of the United States. He 
added, however, that he was sensible " it would be unwise 
to propose any other form of government." 1 This last 
conviction was not weakened by time, but grew stronger 
every day until the u unwise" became the unconditionally 
impossible. 2 His bitterest friend and most reckless ac- 
cuser, Jefferson, at length bore witness to this, long after 
he (Jefferson) had left the political arena, and after Ham- 
ilton had been twenty years in his grave. 3 



anything else." Fisher Ames, Works, I., p. 324. Compare Quincy, 
Life of J. Quincy, p. 88. 

1 Elliot, Deb., V.. p. 202. 

2 " It is past all doubt that he [Burr] has blamed me for not having 
improved the situation I once was in [as quartermaster-general of the 
army], to change the government. That when answered that this could 
not have been done without guilt, he replied : 'Les grandes times se souci- 
ent peu des petits moraux;' that when told the thing was never practic- 
able from the genius and situation of the country, he answered : ' That 
depends on the estimate we form of the human passions, and of the 
means of influencing them.' " Hamilton to Bayard. See the whole 
letter in Ham., Works, VI., pp. 419-424. By an oversight it is dated 
a year too early. In a letter of Sept, 18, 1803, on the plan of a 
constitution which he had laid before the Philadelphia convention, he 
says: "This plan was predicated upon these bases: 1. That the political 
principles of the people of this country would endure nothing but repub- 
lican government." Ham., Works, VI., p. 558. 

s Jefferson writes to Van Buren, June 29, 1824: "For Hamilton frank- 
ly avowed that he considered the British constitution, with all the cor- 
ruptions of its administration, as the most perfect model of government 
that had ever been devised by the wit of man ; professing, however, at 



112 STATE BOV] AOT SLAVERY. 

The tact tlmt do thought was farther removed from the 
minda of the Federalists than to engage in monarchical in- 
triguea was of no practical value, inasmuch as the anti- 
ralists would have recognized no proof of it ai 
sufficient. They appreciated too highly the important 
the charges to withdraw them under any circumstance. 
This is evident from the name of Republicans, which they 
gradually assumed; thus claiming to represent the prin- 
ciples of republicanism with their whole heart. Besides, 
not feeling at home under the constitution, it was impos- 
sible to reason with them; and they became gradually 
more and more the victim.- of a morbid fancy. Carried 
away at first by the intoxication and the idealism of the 
French Revolution, then dropped, after the over-exeite- 
ment. int<> a state in which apodictic impatience was mis- 
taken I'm- Oatonian severity of principle, they fell after the 
.-priii-- of 17:':) into the infinite depths of furious fanaticism. 
The arrival of the French ambassador, Genet, on the 9th 
of April, 1793, 1 at Charleston, was the signal for the out- 
break of the commotion which for four years had been 
progressing Becretly, only because an opportunity was 
wanting for a violent outburst 

Genet was an experienced diplomat, not destitute of 
talent, tilled even t<> fanaticism with the radical doctrines 
of the Revolution, his whole thought and being satiated 
with the characteristically ingenuous pride of his nation- 
ality. Ee acted with the address and careless assur 
which, in view of the feeling he found prevailing 
among the people, guarantied him at first the greatest 
success. He was received with enthusiasm in Charleston, 

me time, mat the spirit <>f this country was so fundamentally re- 
publican that it would be visionary to think of introducing monarchy 
ind that therefore it was the duty of its administrators to conduct 
it upon the principles their constituents had elected." Van Buren, 
Political Parties, p. 184 

1 ' April 8 as the date. 



AEEIVAL OF GENET. 113 

and his journey to Philadelphia resembled a triumphal 
march. The Republicans fell victims with astonishing 
rapidity to the power of high-sounding phrases. The il- 
lusion that they were called to be the apostles of liberty 
stole away their senses. The ocean which lay between 
them and the old world did not permit the thought of 
preaching the gospel of equality and fraternity from the 
cannon's mouth, hand in hand with the French, to the 
oppressed and enslaved in Europe, to occur to them, 1 and 
propitious fortune had given them no neighbors who were 
in need of it. But the French nation's bloody work of 
redemption at home and abroad was destined to find the 
greatest moral support in the United States. And could it 
have been done, France would have received help from them 
without any scrupulous questionings concerning the duties 
which treaties and the law of nations had imposed on them 
towards other powers. This was precisely what Genet 
desired. The United States were to be an ally of France, 
and follow her directions. From the first, Genet assumed 
the character of a master and treated every impediment 
placed in his way as treason to the cause of liberty, in op- 
position to which there were no rights and no duties. 

"Washington had feared that sympathy for France might 
find expression in a dangerous manner, and had endeavored 
to prevent it by his celebrated proclamation of neutrality, 2 

1 We read in the decree of the convention of Nov. 15, 1792 : " The 
French nation declares that it will consider that people an enemy which 
refuses or abandons liberty and equality or which desires to preserve 
its princes or privileged classes, or to effect any composition with them." 
And in the decree of Xov. 19, 1792, it declared that, it would lend its aid 
to any people who desired to regain their freedom. 

2 All the members of the cabinet agreed that a proclamation should be 
issued " for the purpose of preventing interferences of the citizens of 
the United States in the war between France and Great Britain." Jeff., 
Works, III., p. 591; Wash., Works, X., p. 534; Ham., Works, IV., p. 
360. The word "neutrality," however, was not used, on account of the ob- 
jection that a declaration of neutrality was beyond the powers of the ex- 



Ill btatk BOTOKEICprry and slavery. 

! April 22, IT:*:.. 1 The greater publicity was given to 
this measure because Genet's course threatened to involve 
the United States In tin* most serious complications with 

andrThe Republicans, however, continued to treat the 
proclamation a> ill-timed and unnecessary, 2 and as. it' there 
wen- Dot the slightest doubt on the matter. An acrimonious 
contest was thus begun, a contest in which, there would 
have been n<» need of an express declaration of hostilities) 
it' a large portion of the people had not been affected by a 
political vertigo. It would have been more than foolish to 
Look idly on, expecting a return of sobriety in due time. 
The Mind violence against the administration was the best 
evidence h<>w necessary it had been to take precautionary 
measures without delay. 3 The republican press rag< 
wildly and withal so successfully, that Hamilton himself 
considered it his duty to enter the lists for the administra- 
tion. The weight of his blows was always so heavily felt 
by the republicans that they allowed only their best com* 
batants t<» oppose him. And now Madison, under the 

ectltive, and that it was better to avoid a declaration of neutrality in order 
to obtain in exchange the " broadest privileges" of neutral powers. Jetf., 
Works, III., p. 591; IV., pp. 18, 29, 30. Jefferson, however, rightly re- 
mark- : M The public, however, soon took it up as a declaration of neu- 
trality, and it came to be considered at length as such." Washington 
himself uses the word repeatedly in his answers to the addresses which 
were directed to him on the question. 

1 Statesman's Manual, 1., p. 4G. Genet had not yet arrived in Phila- 
delphia. His arrival in Charleston was first known in Washington, on 
the day on which the proclamation was issued. The news of his intrigues 
followed close upon this announcement. 

- I., ttere of Paciflcos, No. VII. 

■ Madison writes to Jefferson, June 19, 17!):}; "Every gazette I 

th • United State*) exhibits the spirit of criticism on the 
fled complexion charged on the executive politics. . . . The 
proclamation was in truth a most unfortunate error. It wounds the 
national honor, u seeming to disregard the stipulated duties to France. 
It wound- th<- popular feelings by aseeniing indifference to the cause of 
liberty."' Rives, Life and Times of J. Madison, III., pp. ooi. o'oo. 



JEFFEKSON AND GENET. 115 

name of Helvidius, endeavored to neutralize the effects of 
Pacificus's seven letters. 1 

Jefferson, with the ingenuousness of a child, was caught in 
the clumsy snares of the French ambassador. The mag- 
nificent and high-sounding phrases in which Genet had 
tendered the hand of disinterested friendship to the sister 
republic in the name of the French nation, were wonder- 
fully seductive to Jefferson's ears. In a single sentence: 
" In short, he offers everything and asks nothing," Jeffer- 
son rapturously and correctly condensed the whole of 
Genet's declaration. 2 It is characteristic of Jefferson's 
statesmanship, that he could accept such declarations as of 
any real value. There were reasons enough why France, 
at that time, should have been very anxious to make use 
of the United States to the utmost extent, in her own inter- 
est. Men like Jefferson even could adduce only one reason 
for the assumption that France was actuated by a disinter- 
estedness never yet heard of in the history of diplomacy, 
namely, that she was a republic, and that so large-hearted a 
feeling was eminently becoming a republic. It was not to 
be assumed of a republic that it used only a meaningless 
phrase, insulting to the intelligence of those addressed, 
when it said: " We see in you the only person on earth 
who can love us sincerely and merit to be so loved." 3 Jef- 
ferson added, with a mixture of acrimony and proud pity 
for the shortsightedness and perversity of his opponents: 
" Yet I know the offers will be opposed, and suspect they 
will not be accepted." 

1 In Gideon's edition of the Federalist, 1818, the letters of Pacificus 
and Helvidius are given entire. The beginning of Madison's first let- 
ter is very characteristic : " Several pieces with the signature of Paci- 
ficus were lately published, which have been read with singular pleas- 
ure and applause by the foreigners and degenerate citizens among us, 
who hate our republican government and the French revolution." 

3 Jeff., Works, III., p. 563. 

8 Jeff., Works, 1. c. 



lir, 



STATE BOVBBKIGSTI AND SLAVERY. 



illuBtrated foe friendship of France ma manner 
which Boon opened the eyes of even the nnwilling Jeffer- 
bod to the character of her ambassador, it not of the sister 
republic herelf. Ee wrote to Monroe on the Htli of July: 
« ai fl conduct is indefensible by the most furious Jaco- 
n Bu1 be had himself too long occupied an ambigu- 
ousposition in regard to tins conduct of Genet, to per- 
mit hi m to repel as an absurd calumny that he was him- 
self a Jacobin. Genet informed the ministry oi foreign 
affairs that at first Jefferson had given him certain very 
ful hints, hints which, coming to the ambassador of a foreign 
power from the secretary of state, were evidence of more 
than a want of tart. 2 In more than one instance in which 
, , threatened most dangerously to compromise the 
United States, Jefferson hindered the action of the gov- 
eminent to an extent that justified the charge that he 
play ed a masked part, and valued the friendship of France 
e than the honor of his own country. 3 On the 5th ot 
July, that is, only nine days before the letter to 
Monroe above referred to, he indirectly, but with a knowl- 
Genet's plan, advocated that an uprising against 
Spanish rule in Louisiana with the aid of the Kentuckiani 
ild he provoked. 4 

> .TclV. Works, IV., p. 20. 

c im mencements, Jefferson, secretaire d'Etat,ma (lonnG 

actions utiles but 1- hommes en place et ne m'a point cacM que ft 

Korrig, et l, secretaire de le tresorerie Hamilton, attach^ au» 

erre, avaient hi plus grande influence sur l'espnt uu 

el que ce n'6tait qu'avec peine qu'il contrebalancait h-urs 

Dispatch of Oct. 7, L793. Documents histonques, No. \ n, 

. D.Witt.Th. Jefferson, p. 281. 

,8i notable case was that of the Little Democrat. Compart 

of Wash., II, PP. 270-273. Randall's exhaustive d 

of action on this occasion (Life of Jefferson, iu 

like the whole book, written in too partisan a spirit, a 

l\\ M that the condensed account in Marshall is not alto- 

. h of July 25, to be found in De Witt, Th. Jefferson, 



117 

If Jefferson and the greater part of the Kepublicans had 
their eyes opened it was due simply to Genet's folly. 

What Chauncey Goodrich said a few years later was true 
even now: The French did not rest until they had cured 
the Americans of their " love- sickness." 1 When the au- 
thorities were getting ready to take energetic measures in 
the matter of the " Little Democrat," Genet threatened 
to appeal to the people, and soon carried out his threat. 
Tin's was going too far. Even the Republicans, with few 
exceptions, had not yet fallen so low as to permit the French 
charge-d'aifaires to go unpunished, for formally calling on 
them to oppose the administration under his leadership, 
especially while Washington was at the head of it. The 
steps which his own government characterized as "punish- 
able" and "criminal" 2 they would willingly have connived 

p. 221. We there read: "M. Jefferson me parut sentir vivement l'utilit^ 
de ce projet; mais il me d^clara que les Etats-Unis avaient entame" les 
ne*gociations avec l'Espagne a ce sujet, qu'on lui demandait de dormer 
aux Am^ricains un entrepot audessus de la ISTouvelle-Orle'ans, et que tant 
quecette ne*gociation ne serait pas rompue, la delicatesse des Etats-Unis 
ne leur permettrait pas de prendre part a nos operations ; cependantil me 
fit entendre quil pensaitqu'une petite irruption spontanea des habitans de 
Kentucky dans la Nouvelle-Orle'ans pouvait avancer les choses ; il me mit 
en relation avec plusieurs de*pute*s du Kentucky, et notamment avec M. 
Brown." According to Jefferson's own account he warned Genet not to 
make formal enlistments in Kentucky or to issue commissions to officers, 
because by so doing he would be placing a rope about the people's necks. 
After which he continues: "That leaving out that article [in Genet's 
proposed address] I did not care what insurrections should be excited 
in Louisiana." He gave a letter of recommendation to Genet's agent, 
one Michaud — DeWitt gives the name Michaux — to governor Shelby. 
In this letter he spoke of him simply as " a person of botanical and 
natural pursuits;" but at Genet's request he changed the letter so that 
the governor would see something more in him. Ana., Jeff., Works, 
IX., pp. 150, 151. 

1 Goodrich writes to the elder Wolcott, Jan. 18, 1797 : " Our country 
must get over its love-sickness for France, and if one degree of suffering 
and insult won't answer that valuable purpose, they will have madness 
enough to administer sufficiency." Gibbs, Mem. of Wolcott, I., p. 436. 

8 " . . .la conduite puinissable .... les d-marches et les 



NlV AM) SLAVERY. 

at. Bat thej oould not quietly consent that a I 
should dare to menace, in the name of the people, a gov- 
ernment established by the free choice of the people. That 
W as not only tooppose the policy of the administration 
which they did not like, hut to deride republicanism it- 
self, aiM offer an insult to the whole country. The Re- 
publicans did not dare to blame the- administration tor de- 
manding Genet's recall, and did not desire to blame 
it ' although tin- reaction in public opinion in favor of the 
eminent, once begun, was not confined to this special 
:. They might, indeed, easily yield here; because 

from the first they entertained the right view, that the 
masses of their adherents would soon plunge again into 
the same old stream. 1 

In the new congress which met on the 2nd of Decei.il.er, 
the Republicans had a majority in the house of representa- 
tives Their candidate Muhlenberg was chosen speaker by 
a majority of ten votes. The administration therefore 
found itself from the start in a precarious position, the dif- 

manoenras criminelles dn citoyen Genet." Defargues, the then mials- 

ter f French foreign affairs, to G. Morris. Sparks, Life of W ashington, 

II p 358 France's answer to the expostulation of the United Bti 

would certainly have been very different if the Girondists had ^ been 

:it th( . helm,and had persevered in their policy. It is established 

by documentary evidence that Genet received express instrucUona to 

involve the United States in the war. The whole plan on which he 

operated waa prescribed to him in detail, and the responsibility, there- 

oot rest mainly on himself. Memoire pourservir cVmstruc- 

don au citoyen Genet; the advice of the conseil exeentit of Jan. 17, 

, jhe dispatches of tie- minister of foreign affairs to Genet, ot Ft* 

I March 10, 1798. De Witt, p. 218. 

tenet nowevcr, still found some defenders. Jefferson writ- 
ing Sept 1, 17:.::: « He has still some defenders in Freneao and 
aleafs paper, and who they are I know not; for even Hut* 
Dallas give him up." Jeff„ Works, IV., p. 58. 
Hutcheson says that Genet has totally overturned the republican in, 
in Philadelphia. However, the people going right themselvee,U 
publican advocates with them, an accidental 
, ith the moBOcralB will not be a coalescence." Jeff., T\ orks, l. c. 



MEETING OF CONGRESS. 119 

Acuities of which were greatly increased by the tactics of 
the opposition, which were as subtle as they were unpat- 
riotic. The principle which Jefferson wished to see made 
the leading one of the opposition : " to do nothing and to 
gain time," 1 had been already, to a great extent, adopted 
by them. The resolutions of the administration were met 
by counter-resolutions which it was known the administra- 
tion could not accept. When it was necessary that some- 
thing should be done, a compromise was effected — often only 
after a long debate — and then the government was held 
responsible for the half-measures adopted. Moreover, the 
dangerous necessity of adopting themselves clear and de- 
cisive measures was avoided with great skill. In short, 
the opposition was in the highest sense of the word an op- 
position and nothing more. Wolcott describes the action 
of congress during this session in the following words: 
" Nothing very wrong has yet been done, though much has 
been attempted ; on the whole, the session has reflected no 
honor upon the government of the country. Weakness, 
passion, and suspicion have been leading characteristics in 
the public proceedings." 2 

Jefferson's exit from the cabinet 3 was not a full compen- 
sation for this attitude of the house of representatives. 
Washington did not again try to realize an independent 

1 Jeff., Works, IV., p. 222. 

2 Gibbs, Mem. of Wol., I., 134. 

8 Jan. 1, 1794. Ch. Fr. Adams gives the reasons of Jefferson's retire- 
ment in the following words: "For Mr. Jefferson to continue longer 
in the cabinet in which his influence was sinking, was not only distaste- 
ful to himself, but was putting a restraint on the ardor of opposition 
and impairing the energies of his friends without any compensating 
prospect of good. He determined to withdraw; and his act became 
the signal for the consolidation of the party, which looked to him as its 
chief. Broad and general ground was now taken against the whole pol- 
icy of the administration, and the arrows, shut up within the quiver, so 
long as he remained liable to be hit, were now drawn forth and sharp- 
ened for use even against Washington himself." Life of J. Adams, II , 
p. 152. 



STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

administration by taking the leaders of both parties into 
bis counsel But the attorney -general, Randolph, who 
Baoceeded Jefferson, was by no means a change for the bet- 
ter. Efis position from the very first had been wavering 
and uncertain, although as a general rule he sided with 
Jefferson. The Republicans therefore did not look upon 
him as unconditionally theirs, much less their leader. 
Washington could no longer claim with the same force as 
before, that bo far as the constitution of his cabinet was 
concerned, be had done equal justice to both parties, and 
still he had by no means strengthened his cabinet, lie 
had in fact jumped out of the frying pan into the fire. The 
greatest reproach that could be made against Jefferson du- 
ring his course as secretary of state was his coquetry with 
France, a coquetry which bordered on intrigue. Randolph 
overstepped these limits. But before it came to light, a 
great revolution had taken place in public opinion. 

The French government had completely disavowed 
Genet, and the new embassador Fauchet began his admin- 
istration with moderation and tact. 1 Everybody was, there- 
fore, soon ready to excuse France entirely, and to hold 
Genet personally responsible for the wrong that had been 
done. 

England lent great aid to this revival of sympathy for 
France. Instead of furthering the change in the opinion 
of the American people by reciprocating it, and thus util- 
izing it for her own ends, she allowed herself to proceed 
still more recklessly in her mad and excited policy. The 
English order in council of the 6th of November, 1793, 
which forbade the commerce of foreign nations with the 
French colonies, was looked upon in the United States as a 
token of an unfriendly disposition, to such an extent that 
serious thoughts of the possibility of a war began to be 
rtained. On the 20th of March, 1794, congress voted 

■wash., Works, X^ p. 401. 



THE FIEST EMBARGO. 121 

an embargo of thirty days, which was afterwards prolonged 
for thirty days more. Other measures, partly to place the 
country in a state of defense, and partly to provide for suf- 
ficient reprisals for any damage which might accrue to 
American citizens, were taken under consideration. 1 The 
news of the modification which the order in council of No- 
vember 6 had received by the new one of January 8, 
1794, allayed the excitement to some small extent. Clark 
of New Jersey proposed on the 7th of April, 1794, in the 
house of representatives, that the purchase of British man- 
ufactured goods and raw material should be forbidden 
until the western posts were surrendered and full com- 
pensation made for the losses which the Americans had 
sustained in consequence of the violation of their neutral 
rights. The house adopted 2 the resolution on the 21st 
of April in an amended form, and it seemed not impro- 
bable that it would be adopted by the senate also. 3 War 
would thus have been almost inevitable. Washington, 
therefore, resolved to send a minister extraordinary to Eng- 
land to make a last effort to bring about a peaceable solu- 
tion of the differences between the two countries. 4 His 

1 Even here motives not the best came into play. John Adams writes 
to his wife on the 10th of May : " The senators from Virginia moved, 
in consequence of an instruction from their constituents, that the execu- 
tion of the fourth article of the treaty of peace, relative to bona fide debts, 
should be suspended until Britain should fulfill the seventh article. When 
the question was put, fourteen voted against it, two only, the Virginia 
delegates, for it; and all the rest but one ran out of the room to avoid 
YOting at all, and that one excused himself. This is the first instance 
of the kind. The motion disclosed all the real object of the wild pro- 
jects and mad motions which have been made during the whole session." 
Life of J. Adams, II., p. 177. It is well known how since then the prac- 
tice has increased of avoiding the responsibility of a vote by absence. 

a By 58 against 38 votes. See the resolution, Deb. of Congress, I., p. 498. 

3 The vote in the senate at the third reading stood 13 to 13; the vote 
of the vice-president decided it in the negative. Life of J. Adams, 
II., p. 154. 

4 Wash., Works, X., pp. 403, 404. Life of J. Adams, II., p. 153. 



122 \TK BOVEBEIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

choice It'll apoo chief-justice Jay, whose nomination was 
confirmed by the senate after some opposition. 1 

inks to the Btatesmanlike moderation with which Jay 
went to work, his mission was successful. On the 19th ol 
mber, 17i»4. he drew up the treaty 2 of reconciliation, 
and <»n the 9th of March it readied Washington's hands, 
The senate ratified it by the constitutional majority of two- 
thirds, except Art. 12, which related to the commerce 
with the West Indies. 3 Washington, however, delayed to 
Bigo it because some of the provisions did not meet his 
approbation. This was highly acceptable to the extreme 
Republicans. They had begun their agitations against it 
even before its contents were known. 4 They were indis- 

d t»» come to any understanding whatsoever with Eng- 
land, because they thought it would have the effect of cur- 
tailing the mural and other support which they desired to 
guarantied to France. When, therefore, the indiscre- 
tion of a senator 5 had made the contents of the treaty pub- 
lic, a storm of opposition was immediately raised against 
it. 

The American democracy here exhibited a phase of its 
character which has since been frequently observed. Fisher 
Ame> rebuked the people for allowing themselves to be 

much commanded.' The position which they had 
hitherto assumed in relation to France justified the re- 
proach. But in proportion as they yielded too much to 
France they paid too little attention to England. In the 

of the former their fancies led them to adopt an im- 

1 Three days before the adoption of Clark's resolution by the house, 
luit after it bad beeo adopted in committee of the whole. 
VIII., pi). 116-139. 
•June 24, 171 
4 Wash., Writings, XI., p. 513. 

rhompson Bf aeon of Virginia. 

pie, arc in truth more kickable than I could have con- 
: " To Wolcott, April 34, 1797. Gibbs, Mem. of Wolcott, I., 



PREJUDICE AGAINST ENGLAND. 123 

wise policy, which blunted their feelings for the honor and 
dignity of the state; in the case of the latter they yielded to 
their caprice even to the point of total forgetfulness of every 
political consideration. The question what kind of treaty 
the United States ought to have expected under the cir- 
cumstances was one which the Republicans did not at all 
propose to themselves. While in internal affairs political 
wisdom had, in the course of years, degenerated into moral 
cowardice, here, where a treaty could, in the nature of 
things, be only a compromise between opposing claims, 
the very thought of a compromise was branded as a shame- 
ful barter of the national honor. The possibilities, with 
their various probabilities, were not weighed against one 
another, and no effort was made to ascertain whether the 
enforcement of the claims made by the United States 
was, under the circumstances, to be reckoned among the 
possibilities. The feeling of national honor, and the 
calm confidence in the national power, were distorted into 
sensitive haughtiness and presumptuous declaration. 
"Where there should have been only sober examination, the 
irritated feelings of the people were artfully excited, even 
to the blindness of passion, and the dignity of statesman- 
like judgment was claimed for the vague feelings of the 
masses, now degenerated to the level of mere instincts. 
Assemblies of the people without any legal existence 
spoke as the " people," and deduced from the principle 
of the people's sovereignty their right to make recom- 
mendations 1 to the lawful authorities in the form of ex- 
pressions of opinion, which often assumed a mandatory 
and even threatening tone. Moreover, the people delighted 
in demonstrations, which, besides being indecorous and out 



1 " Such errors are unavoidable where the people, in crowds out of doors, 
undertake to receive ambassadors, and to dictate to their supreme execu- 
tive." J. Adams, on the 19th of December, 1793, to his wife. Life of 
J. Adams, II., p. 158. 



134 IlKIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

of taste, must have been the occasion of great offense to 
England. 1 

nil first broke out in Boston, New York and 
Philadelphia. Prom the time that the blessings of the 
constitution began to be felt, the lower strata of the popu- 
lation of the Larger cities commenced to swell the rank- of 
the anti-Federalists. Sounding phrases and all the arts of the 
demagogue could here be made use of with greatest suc- 
The plebfl of the large cities have always furnished 
the best field for doctrinarianism. "\V« find, therefore, that 
in the Qui ted States as elsewhere they had formed a coali- 
tion with the aristocratic south, before it had become pecu- 
liarly a slavucracy and before the masses, sunk in a degree 
to the level of the proletariat, had made themselves over to 
it entirely. The south was from the start the leading 
spirit of this alliance, and the only party that reaped any 
advantage from it. 

The smith also, was now the real home of the movement, 
although it first broke out in the large cities of the north, 
and was there apparently most violent. 2 

The reception given to the treaty cannot, be fully ex- 
plained by the existing relations between the United States 
and England. It was only in consequence of its Franco- 
mania that the opposition assumed the character of blind 
This Francomania, however, was not so much one of 
the grounds of the separation of parties as one of the 
<'iits which caused that separation to find exprcs- 
in a manner pregnant with great consequences. Such 

1 The treaty was burned in Philadelphia in front of the house of the 
ish ambassador, Hammond, ami in Charleston the people dr 
: ; r i lt 1 i - 1 i flag through the mud in the streets. Gibbs, Mem. of "\Vol- 
- 890. 
5 "The treaty has received a most violent opposition from a certain 
In moat of the greal towns, but in the southern states the opposi- 
tion U aeral." Wolcott, to his father, Aug. 10, 1795. Gibbs, 
tt. I., i). 884. 



THE ALMIGHTY DOLLAK. 125 

was their antipathy against England that the majority of 
even the Federalists would, spite of the excesses of the 
French Revolution, have continued to lean more towards 
France, if their material interests had not bound them 
more firmly to England. In the southern states, either 
this was not the case, or they ignored that it was. Their 
policy in this question they looked upon, therefore, simply 
as a matter of sympathy or antipathy. In the commercial 
north, the dollar turned the wavering scales. Its interest 
saved it from swallowing the poison of the doctrinarians 
in quantities large enough to affect its vision where the 
national honor was concerned. "When during the presi- 
dency of John Adams, the disagreement between France 
and the United States led to an interruption of diplomatic 
relations, a small part of the Federalists were in favor of 
war. From a war with France they expected, and not 
without some reason, that there would be no great injury 
to American commerce. By an increase of difficulty with 
England, on the other hand, the United States would gain 
very little at the best, while the eastern states would nec- 
essarily suffer a great deal therefrom. 1 There was little 
more needed to carry the struggle to the extent of a war; 2 
and a war with England meant the ruin of the commerce 
of the eastern states. As early as 1793, when peace with 
England was endangered by Genet's machinations and 
their consequences, there were those in the New England 
states who, in no covert language, urged that a dissolution 



1 The exports to France and her colonies amounted in 1797 to $12,449,- 
076; in 1798, to $6,968,996; in 1799, to $2,780,504; in 1800, to $5,163,- 
833. The exports to Great Britain and her colonies in 1797 amounted to 
$9,212,235; in 1798, to $17,184,347; in 1799, to $26,546,987 and in 1800 to 
$27,310,289. Pitkin, A Statistical Yiew of the Commerce of the United 
States of America, p. 216. 

2 Washington writes to Hamilton, Aug. 31, 1795 : " It would seem next 
to impossible to keep peace between the United States and Great Britain." 
Ham., Works, VI., p. 33. 



1 •_> . ; LTB BOY] B BIG KT v A N I ) B L A V B BY. 

of the Union waa preferable to a war with England. 1 
Eence th< iphical grouping of the friends and ene- 

lnit a of the treaty did not efecape them, spite of appearan- 

\liich were at first deceptive. Stepping beyond the 
limits of the question immediately before them, they 
pointed to the division of the republic into two "great 

ions" and declared an understanding between them to 

condition precedent of the continuance of the Union.* 
In the north the reaction soon set in. The mercantile 
community, which had been induced to join the opposition, 
had been either duped or terrorized. The farmers did not 
change their mind. When they finally gave expression to 
it. after all the questions pertaining to the treaty had been 
examined, they were decidedly in favor of it. In the 
south, on the contrary, there was little change of opinion, 

i it among the merchants, and only among a part of 
them. Among the masses of the people the intensi 
citement was followed by a kind of lassitude, while the 
Leaders became daily more violent in their attacks on the 
treaty and its supporters. Madison branded the Federal- 

1 'A war with Great Britain, we, at least in New England, will not 
inter into. Sooner would ninety-nine out of a hundred of our inhabit- 
ant- Beparate from the Union than plunge themselves into an air. 
misery." Th. Dwight toWolcott. Gibbs, Mem. of Wol., I., p. 107. 

■ Wblcotl writes to Noah Webster, Aug. 1-t, 17!>~) : "We have every. 

thing to Lope from the virtue and reason of one part of the community, 

and everything to fear from the vice and turbulence of another. It is. 

how* \<r. certain that the great sections of the United States will not long 

Continue to be agitated a- they have been. We -must and shall come to 

sou).- explanation with each other.'' Gibbs, Mem. of Wolcott, L,p, 99A 

t the keenness of his insight that on this occasion he 

characterized Blavery as the essential cause of the division, although it 

had no direct Connection with the treaty. He writes on the 10th of 

at, 17W5, to his father: l, l am, however, almost discouraged with 

ct to the southern states ; the effect of the slave system has 

Bach that I fear oar government will never operate with efficacy. . . 

mOBt of necessity Boon come to a sober explanation with that 

• and know upon what we are to depend. It is impossible to 

Continue long in our present state/' Ibid, I., p. 224. 



127 

ists as the "British party," and charged them with having 
sacrificed " the most sacred dictates of national honor.'' 1 
Jefferson was not ashamed to reproach Jay, the well-tried 
patriot and chief -justice of the United States, with being 
a " rogne." 2 

The contest in the press was conducted with an acrimony 
and an expenditure of energy such as has not been wit- 
nessed a second time since the adoption of the constitu- 
tion. Hamilton again entered the lists with all the weight 
of his superior mind, and once more it was seen that no 
one could withstand his blows. The thirty-eight numbers 
of " Camillus" 3 were so forcible that even his bitterest 
enemy and his most jealous rival bore the highest testi- 
mony which he ever received to his intellectual greatness. 
Jefferson entreated Madison in the most imploring man- 
ner to accept the contest against the " colossus" of the 

1 Madison, Aug. 10,1795, to chancellor Livingston, of New York: 
11 Indeed, the treaty from one end to the other, must be regarded as a 
demonstration that the party to which the envoy belongs, and of which 
he has been more the organ than the United States, is a British party, 
systematically aiming at an exclusive connection with the British gov- 
ernment, and ready to sacrifice to that object as well the dearest inter- 
ests of our commerce as "the most sacred dictates of national honor." 
Rives, Life and Times of J. Madison, III., p. 511. 

2 Jeff., Works, IV., p. 120. In his own cautious way he uses the word 
only in a figure of rhetoric. His blindly-attached biographer therefore 
questions whether he really desired to apply the epithet to Jay in 
"any personal sense." Randall, Life of Jeff., II., p. 267. 

3 Hamilton, Works, VII., pp. 172-528. " The defense by Camillus 
was written in concert .between Hamilton, King, and Jay. The writ- 
ings on the first ten articles of the treaty were written by Hamilton, 
the rest by King, till they come to the question of the constitutionality 
of the treaty, which was discussed by Hamilton. . . . This I have 
from King's own mouth. It is to pass, however, for Hamilton's." J. 
Adams to his wife, Jan. 31, 1796. Life of J. Adams, II., p. 195. Ac- 
cording to J. C. Hamilton, however, Hist, of the Rep. of the XL S. of 
Am., VI., p. 273, the original outline of the first twenty-two articles, 
and six others, are in Hamilton's handwriting; numbers 23 to 30, and 
34 and 35 are by another hand, " with frequent alterations, interlinea- 
tions, and additions by Hamilton." 



L28 LTl BOVEREIOlfTY AJTD SLAVERY. 

Federalists, because all the written attacks of the Republi- 
cans fell to the ground before Hamilton's defense. 1 This 
concession was a three-fold compliment to Hamilton, Binoe 
as well as Washington 1 and the other must prominent 

.lav himself included/ were by no means 
: with the treaty, but only thought that, considering 
every thing, and spite of its many unpalatable provisions 
and its many delects, its adoption was less of an evil than 
its rejection. 

The Federalists were the victors, hut the struggle was a 
hard one. Washington considered it the most difficult and 
serious crisis of his administration. 5 

The crisis was at an end the moment this decision was 
made, so far, at least, as the principal question — the rela- 
tions of the United States to Great Britain — was concern- 
ed. The questions not immediately involved continued 
still for a long time to keep the country in a state of ex- 
tent, and exercised no small influence on the internal 
political contests of the succeeding years. 

It was Fiance which again appeared as an evil spirit be- 
tween the parties, and was the cause, first of their greater 

1 Jefferson, Works, IV. pp. 131, 122. 

3 Hamilton, Works, V., p. 10G; VI., pp. 35, etc. Compare Gibbs., Mem. 
of Wolcott,I.,pp. 22:]. 824. 

■Washington writes to Randolph, July 22, 1795 : "My opinion re- 
specting tin- treaty i> the same now that it was, namely, not favorable 
to it. but that it is better to ratify it in the manner the senate have ad- 
vised, and with the reservation already mentioned, than to sutler mat- 
ters to remain as they are, unsettled." Washington, Writings, XI., 

4 Washington, WritingB, XL, pp. 481,482, App.; Life and Writings 
of J. .lay. IV.. pp. 857-350. 

* "To Bum the whole up in a few words: I have never, since I have 

in the administration of the government, seen a crisi- which, in 

my judgment, has been -<> pregnant with interesting events, nor one 

which more i- to he apprehended, whether viewed on' the one side 

or. -n the other." Washington, Writings, XI., p. 48. Compare Gibbs, 

Wolcott, I. p. :J27. 



THE POLICY OF NEUTRALITY. 129 

mutual opposition, and then of the permanent supremacy 
of the Republicans. 

Washington remained true to his broad and conciliatory 
policy towards France, and looked upon the preservation 
or re-establishment of amicable relations as the main object 
to be secured, so far as other and higher considerations 
permitted it. When Gouverneur Morris gave offense to 
the committee of safety by the tenacity with which he 
adhered to Washington's policy of neutrality, and his re- 
call was demanded, Washington yielded to the demand, 
although he was completely satisfied with the conduct ot 
his ambassador. James Monroe was nominated as his 
successor, in order that not even the slightest doubt might 
be left that the administration still remembered the ser- 
vices of France during the Revolution, and would be 
ready to respect the lively sympathy which the people still 
entertained for it. 

The convention announced its approval of these efforts 
towards conciliation by voting a public reception to Mon- 
roe, at which the latter and the president, Merlin deDouai, 
expatiated in extravagant and high-scundiug phrases on 
the alliance of friendship and freedom between the two 
countries. Washington was, however, by no means satis- 
fied with these procceedings. The answer of the secre- 
tary of state to the report of the ambassador was couched 
in reproving terms, because he had exceeded his instruc- 
tions and made use of language not at all in keeping with 
the neutral attitude of the United States. 1 

The French authorities took the reserved conduct of the 
administration all the harder because Monroe's subsequent 
course was in complete harmony with the expectations 
awakened by his first appearance. He acted as if the ad- 
ministration had made him complete master of its discre- 

1 Washington, Works, XI., p. 110; Monroe, Yiew of the Conduct of 
the Executive, p. 23. 
9 



! n. BOVEBEIGNTl and slavkky. 

ti d recklessly used it to support the position 

BUme d l.v the Republicans towards Franc- and England. 
Hi. want of tact at length assumed so serious a character 
foal Washington was forced to recall him. 1 Although 
|£onroe,ai the time that, bis successor, Ch. C. Pincki 

,.,! France, was no longer in favor to the same extent 
.. ^e directory invested the ceremonies attending 
his departure with a character very flattering to him per. 
Bonally But the president's answer to Monroe's no 
of his recall was only formally addressed to the ainba 
dor [1 waa really directed partly to the administration 
and partly to the American people. Presumptl 

. and sound were carried in the address to an extreme. 
Nor did the matter stop with insulting words. Pinckney 
was advised that France would not receive another Amen- 
can ambassador until her grievances were removed. 3 

' W96. . . „ . , 

• We may here quote a passage to show what insults tbe anti-Federal- 
ists quietly permitted to be offered to them. Although the American, 
are certainly republican in more than the name, they have always 
.,1, as the French, and more than any other European peopl< 
led to me vertigo of republicanism. They would never have accepted 
each Language fromFrance if she hadnotbeen arepublic. We give here 
th , passage from the English translation, as the French original is not 
at i, :l nd: "France, rich in her liberty, surrounded by a tram ot vic- 
Bg in tie- esteem of her allies, will not abase herself by calcu- 
, quenccsof the condescension of the American e 
to the BUggestion 3 of hei former tyrant. Moreover, the French 
republic hopes thai the successors of Columbus, Raleigh, and ot Penn, 
,,,,.,,,1 (lt - their liberty, will never forget that they owe it to 1 
They will weigh, in their wisdom, the magnanimous benevolence oi ttafl 
!b people with the crafty caresses of certain perfidious person* 
who meditate bringing them back to their former slavery. Assure the 
rican people, sir, that like them, Ave adore liberty; that they 
always have our esteem; and that they will find in the 1 
le republican generosity which knows how to .-rant pea. 

:uy to be protected." Elliot, Diplomatic C -de, 

• President's! -.May 16,1797. Statesman s Mia. 



FRENCH INTRIGUES. 131 

Among the grievances of France, Jay's treaty played the 
principal part. Monroe had done all in his power, but in 
vain, to procure a copy of it for the French government, 
before its fate was yet decided. 1 The manner in which 
France would have used so early a knowledge of the treaty 
may be inferred from the violence with which it was de- 
nounced, after its publication in Paris, both by her and by 
her ambassador in Washington. 

Adet, who was made acquainted with the treaty before it 
had been made public, would perhaps have effected more 
by his remonstrances, had not the reports of the former 
French ambassador, Fauchet, which so gravely compro- 
mised Randolph, come to light. 2 But Adet was not dis- 
couraged by his first failure. If the ratification of the 
treaty which had taken place in the meantime could not 
be recalled, it might be used to influence the people in 
a manner favorable to the French. Adet, however, took 
Genet as his pattern, and like him, overshot the mark. 
It was now accepted with no better grace than formerly, 
that the ambassador published his official communications 
to the administration in the Republican newspapers at the 
same time that he made them, 3 for now as then it was 
looked upon as an appeal from the administration to the 
people. If, when the democratic societies were still in their 
bloom, and the blind enthusiasm for French license was 
little past its culminating point, the people were unwilling 

ual, I., p. 108 ; State Papers, II., pp. 383-390, 397; Elliot, Diplomatic 
Code, II., p. 523. 

I Wash., Writings, XI., pp. 508, 511; Monroe, p. 28; Monroe's letter 
to Jay, Jan. 17, 1795. Life of Jay, I., pp. 335, 336. 

2 The plan of this work does not permit us to enter more fully into 
this interesting question. The extent of Eandolph's faults and the 
main motives of his action have never been fully ascertained. Gibbs, 
in his Memoirs of Wolcott, treats the question exhaustively, but with 
partiality. Randolph's written defense is a weak document and throws 
little light on the subject. 

3 Hildreth, Hist., of the U. S., IV., pp. 681-685. 



STATE B0VE1UHGHTY AND BLATEBT. 

to Buffer such interference on the part of foreigners, they 
e naturally still lees disposed todo so now. 1 
The principal reason for this unwise proceeding on the 
partofAdet, a proceeding which his former cou 
no reason to expect, was evidently the desire to influence 
Impending presidential election. 
How deep the roots of the differences between parties 
evident from the fact that Washington was com- 
pelled to remain the chief target of the republican pree 

; was not vet known to the public at large whether 
he would decide to appear as a candidate for a third time 
or not. When by his farewell address 2 all doubt on this 
point wa> removed, the prospect was immediately chan< 
The result of the election was now exceedingly doubtful. 
There was no second man to whom the whole of the nation 
Could be won over. The Federalists, in whose hands the 
guidance of the Btate had hitherto remained, although they 

eatedly hada minority in the house of reprc 

tatives, could not bring forward a single candidate who 

could calculate on the unanimous and cheerful support of 

entire party. 

There still prevailed at the time a feeling among the 

pie that the vice-president hada sort of claim to the 

>n to the presidency. But even apart from this, 

us would have been one of the most prominent candi- 

the Federalists. The great majority of them SOOB 

him a decided preference over all other possible can- 

On the other hand, some of the most distin- 

ied and influential of the Federalists feared serious 

- to the party and the country from the vanity 

and violence a- well as from the egotism and irresolution 

"i Adams vm 12, 171)0 : "Adet's note has had - 

ft ansylvania and proved a terror to some Quakers, and that is 
all the ill effect it has had. Even the southern states seem to resent it." 
ma, I] 

I 



ELECTION OF JOHN ADAMS. 133 

with which he was charged. But to put him aside entirely 
was not possible, nor was it their wish. They thought, 
however, to secure a greater number of electoral votes for 
Th.Pinckney, the Federal candidate for the vice-presiden- 
cy, which, as the constitution then stood, would have made 
him president and Adams vice-president. Although this 
plan was anxiously concealed from the people, it caused 
the campaign to be conducted by the party with less en- 
ergy than if the leaders haSlbeen entirely unanimous. 

France was naturally desirous of Jefferson's success. 
This desire had its origin to a great extent in Adet's altered 
attitude since October. \Volcoit asserted that Adet had 
publicly declared that France's future policy towards the 
United States would depend on the result of the election. 1 
Some did not hesitate to say that, on this account, Jeffer- 
son should have the preference, 2 but on the more thoughtful 
Federalists it exerted the very opposite influence. 3 

There is no reason for the assumption that the issue of 
the election would have been different, had Adet behaved 
more discreetly. But his indiscretion certainly contributed 
to make the small majority expected for Adams completely 
certain, while Hamilton's flank movement in favor of Pinck- 
ney helped Jefferson to the vice-presidency. 

The possibility that the president and vice-president 

1 " I have been informed in a most direct, and as I conceive authen- 
tic, manner, that M. Adet has said that the future conduct of France to- 
wards this country would be influenced by the result of our election." 
Wolcott to his father, Nov. 27, 1796. Gibbs, Mem. of Wolcott, I., p. 401. 

2 G. Cabot informs Wolcott of a conversation with Cutting in which 
the latter said that the Federalists had come to the conviction that "we 
must soothe France by making their favorite Jefferson president, or we 
must take a war with them." Gibbs, Ibid, I., p. 492. 

s The elder Wolcott, one of the extremest and most influential of the 
New England Federalists, declared that if Jefferson was elected, which 
could be brought about only by French intrigue, the northern states 
would separate from the southern, and never again form a union with 
them, unless for military purposes. Gibbs, Ibid, I., p. 409. 



i 



134 mam: BOTEBEIGNTT and SLAVERY. 

might be found in "opposite boxes" had inspired Adams 
with serious alarms. 1 Whether these were well-founded, the 
future alone could tell. Tin- result of the election, how- 
. left the country in a very serious condition. Wash- 
ington's withdrawal removed tin- last restraint from party 
passion. Party lines were now closely drawn, and while 
the air was thick with events, it seemed as if a hair were 
sufficient, on tla- very first occasion, to turn the 6caL 

the other Bide. 

The Federalists had separated farther from the Republi- 

. but had not formed themselves into a sufficiently 

consolidated body. The more moderate and the extremists 

diverged from one another more and more. The former 

constituted the great majority of the party, but the latter 

numbered the men of the best talent among their members. 

i sidering the small majority by which they had gai 

the election- it could not seem doubtful to them that the 

control of the country would be snatched from them if 

their internal differences were to grow in strength. And 

it was by no means improbable that this would take p 

Hamilton, who. spite of his retirement, had remained 

leading spirit of Washington's cabinet, was nncondi- 

illy recognized by the extremists as their leader, and 

character was not such as made compromise easy. He 

was enough of a statesman not to seek blindly after the 

desirable. He was content to endeavor to obtain tip 

tainable. What the attainable was, however, he did not 

wish any one to inform him. Like all statesmen of the 

rank, he could, once he had accepted the leadership, 

if) nothing but lead; and could never in matters of impor- 

be governed by a majority. But his genius alone 



' Adams to his mfe, Jan. 7. 1796: " It will he a dangerous eri>i> in 
public affaire, if the president and vice-president should be in opposite 
Life of J. Adams, II.. p. 193. 
' A .< 1 7i electoral votes, one more than was necessary to 

ice. 



FEDERALIST FEUDS. 135 

could no longer assure him the leadership. It was neces- 
sary that a favorable revolution should take place in the 
condition of things to continue him in it. He had now 
to struggle not only against the hate of the Republicans 
and the little popularity he enjoyed among the masses of 
his own party. The official head of the party, with whom 
it was necessary to reckon on every question, was by no 
means well disposed towards him. Adams was jealous of 
Hamilton's influence, and owed him a grudge not entirely 
without reason, on account of the Pinckney intrigue. He 
was, besides, an uncertain character, strongly inclined to 
act according to the impulse of the moment, one whose 
natural firmness was excited by his vanity, arising from 
his power over other minds, to an almost stubborn egotism. 
Besides, the danger that, on this account, the dissensions 
in the party might produce an open rupture was greatly 
increased by the fact that Adams retained Washington's 
cabinet, which had been used to consider Hamilton their 
leader. 

The feuds of the leaders were not, however, the only 
thing that seriously endangered the rule of the Federalists. 
Party changes had taken place among the masses which 
were not favorable to them, and which threatened to be of 
a lasting nature. New York, where anti-Federalist ten- 
dencies had hitherto predominated, was indeed won over 
to the Federalists; but this victory was due only to acci- 
dental and temporary causes. The number of their ad- 
herents in the southern states had been, on the other hand, 
noticeably diminished, and a great part of those who had 
thus far followed them began to waver. The two votes in 
Yirginia and North Carolina which determined the result 
ultimately in Adams's favor were due only to the high 
esteem in which he was personally held, and to the mem- 
ory of his services during the war of the Revolution. 
South Carolina had, it is true, given all her electoral votes 
to Pinckney, but had with equal unanimity voted foj 



AND SLAVERY. 

Jefferson. Yet it wbb in Pennsylvania, which had always 
gone with New England, bnt which now, with one excep- 
tion, voted for Jefferson and Burr, that the Federalists 
1 the liardest blow. It conld not be claimed her 
w York, that it was only momentary and accidental 
causes which had produced this result. .V great revolu- 
tion in opinion had begun among the rural population of 
the northern Btates, and in Pennsylvania the change was 
completed, in consequence of various local causes, sooner 
than anywhere else. The impression produced by the meet- 
ing of the Philadelphia convention had disappeared by 
degrees, while the angry hate excited against England, and 
the opposition to commercial interests, had for a consider- 
able time been preparing the way for the approximation 
of the small land-owners of the northern to the planters 
of the Bouthern states. 

All these elements combined suggested the thought that 
the victory of the Federalists was only a victory like that of 
Pyrrhus. The Republicans had good reason to congratn- 

themselves, and to look upon their partial sue 
happy omen of an early and complete triumph. In pro- 
portion as they worked out of the position of a party of 
opposition to the policy of the Federalists and lost their 
and ignorant enthusiasm for the French Revolu- 
tion, they became ■ consolidated organization. The rhet- 
oric of the doctrinarians did not exert over them any 
Longer the same charm as in former years; but simultane- 
ously with the abatement of their aimless enthusiasm, their 
and vague theories began to assume a positive 
form. 1 Both their relative moderation and the gradual 

1 \W may here cite one example to illustrate the strange manner in 
which it was Bometimes attempted to apply the theories of the doctrinal 
riana to practical politics. Tennessee had of her own accord separated! 
If from the territorial govern ment^projec ted a state constitution with- 
out the authority of congress, ami then pretended to be ipso facto a state. 
irieh writ*-, in relation thereto, to the elder Wolcott: 



BISE OF THE REPUBLICANS. 137 

transition from mere negation to a positive policy, had 
strengthened them internally and made proselytes to them. 
The instincts of the great body of the people had been in 
sympathy with them from the first, and they remained in 
the minority only because by their fervor of denial they 
recklessly abandoned all restraint, in consequence of which 
the conflict between the material interests of the country 
and the negative ends of their ideal policy appeared in too 
bold a light. 

It may be that the Republicans would have even now 
obtained the upper hand if they had not been so unwise as 
to allow the questions of external politics to occupy the 
foreground to such an extent that they might be considered 
the main point of their policy. It did not escape the ob- 
servation of those who saw deeper, that these questions 
were in reality but the points of support accidentally af- 
forded for the gradual evolution of the essential differences, 
founded in the internal state of affairs. It has been already 
frequently remarked with what energy, even now and on 
the most various occasions, it was pointed out, that 
these differences divided the country into two geographi- 
cal sections. It was reserved, however, for questions of 
foreign politics, to give rise to the occasion which should 
bring this fact out in such bold relief, that the abyss which 
yawned under the Union might be discerned for a moment. 

" One of their spurious senators has arrived, and a few days since went 
into the senate and claimed his seat by virtue of his credentials from our 
new sister Tennessee, as she is called, and the rights of man." Gibbs, 
Mem, of WoL, I., p. 338. 



\ PI AND BLAVBBT. 



OHAPTEE IV. 

NULLIFICATION. Tin: Vii:uma and KENTUCKY ResOLU- 



TION8. 

a 



Washington's presence made Adams's inauguration 

moving spectacle. Adams remarked that it was difficult 

to say why tears flowed bo abundantly. 1 An ill-defined 

feeling filled all minds that severer storms would have to 

let, now that the one man was no longer at the head of 

the Btate, who, spite of all oppositions, was known to hold a 

in the la-arts of the entire people. The Federalists 

ofthe Hamilton faction gave very decided expression to 

fears, 2 and Adams himself was fully conscious that 

bifi l"t had fallen on evil days. 3 

Jt wa> natural that the complications with France should 
for the moment inspire the greatest concern. The suspi- 
cion that France was the quarter from which the new ad- 
ministration was threatened with greatest danger was 3 
verified by events. 

1 Gibbs, Mem. ofWolcott, I., pp 4G1, 4&. 

e elder Wolcott writes: "Mr. Adams will judge right if he con- 

re the present calm no other than what precedes an earthquake. 

II, can only contemplate, as far a- respects himself, whether he will 

■in which will blow strong from one point or be involved in a 

tornado, which will throw him into the limbo of vanity. That he lias 

to oppose more severe strokes than as yet it has been attempted to in- 

flicton any one, I am very sure of, in case our affairs continue in their 

nt situation, or shall progress to a greater extreme." Ibid, I„ pi 

the account of the inauguration which he sem his 

|[,. [Washil med to me to enjoy a triumph over me. 

eard him say: 'Ay! 1 am fairly out, and you fairly in; 

is will be the happiest'" Life of J. Adams, II., p. 2» 



RUPTURE WITH FRANCE. 139 

The inaugural address touched on the relations between 
France and the United States only lightly. Adams had 
contented himself with speaking of his high esteem for 
the French people, and with wishing that the friend- 
ship of the two nations might continue. The message of 
May 16, 1797, on the other hand, addressed to an extraor- 
dinary session of congress, treated this question exclusive- 
sively. 1 The president informed congress that the direc- 
tory had not only refused to receive Pinckney, but had 
even ordered him to leave France, and that diplomatic re- 
lations between the two powers had entirely ceased. In 
strong but temperate language he counseled them to una- 
nimity, and recommended that " effectual measures of de- 
fense" should be adopted without delay. It is necessary 
"to convince France and the world that we are not a de- 
graded people, humiliated under a colonial spirit of fear 
and sense of inferiority, fitted to be miserable instruments 
of foreign influence, and regardless of national honor, 
character and interest." At the same time, however, he 
promised to make another effort at negotiation. 

Pinckney, Marshall, and Gerry were chosen to make an 
effort to bring about the resumption of diplomatic rela- 
tions, and the friendly settlement of the pending difficul- 
ties. Their efforts were completely fruitless. The direc- 
tory did not indeed treat them with open discourtesy, but 
met them in such a manner that only new and greater in- 
sults were added to the older. Gerry, for whom Adams 
entertained a feeling of personal friendship, was most ac- 
ceptable to the directory, because he was an anti-Federal- 
ist. Talleyrand endeavored to persuade him to act alone. 
There can be no doubt whatever that Gerry had no author- 
ity to do so. Partly from vanity, and partly from fear of 
the consequences of a complete breach, he went just far 

1 American State Papers, II., p. 387, etc. ; Statesman's Man., I., p. 
107, etc. 



140 BEIOHTT AM) BLAVEBT. 

enough into tin* adroitly-laid snares of Talleyrand to great- 
lv compromise himself, his fellow-ambassadors, and the 
administration. 1 The want of tact was so much the great- 
Tallejrand, by three different mediators,* gave the 
ambassador to understand that the payment of a I 
Mini of money was a condition precedentof a settlement 

In the early part of April, 17!>S ? the president laid be- 
the house of representatives all the documents bear- 
ing on this procedure. 1 If. even before his administration 
had begun, the general feeling of the country had I 
constantly turning against France. 4 now a real tornado of 
ill-will l»r<»kc forth. 

The anti-Federalists would willingly have given curre 
to the view that the ambassadors had been deceived by 

1 Charles F.Adams Bays in his biography of his grandfather: "Mr. 
Gerry, though he permitted the directory to create invidious and in- 
Bulting distinctions, gave them no opening for advantage over himself." 
Life of J. Adam-. II.. ]>. 232. The facts do not justify this assertion. 
The president was himself very much offended by Gerry's conduct. 
And even the persona] explanations afterwards made could only weaken, 
hut nol efface, the unfavorable impression which the president pad re- 
ceived. It was not until Adams had begun to waver in his position on 
the French question, and had thus enlarged the differences between 
himself and his cabinet into a breach, that he found nothing to reproach 
Qerry with, [nthis case, as in many others, the judgment of Charles 
lams has been influenced by the desire to make his grand* 
r appear in the most favorable light possible. As, besides, his 
e almost never given, and the reader must be satisfied with 
the general assurance that they have been used conscientiously and ex- 
haustively, this biography, on the whole a most excellent one, must he 
it care, especially in what relates to the actions and 
motive- of Hamilton. Gerry appears in a somewhat too unfavorable 
lG is, Memoirs of Wolcott. 

• The secretary of state, Pickering, suppressed their names in his 
communication to congress, and designated them as X., Y.Z.; the whole 

was, th< n fore, called the " X. Y. Z. correspondence." 
Am. State Pap.-r-. III., pp. 169-218. 

* Gibbs, M. m. of Wolcott, I., pp. 498, -107, 400, 588, 542. 



PREPARATIONS FOR WAR. 141 

common cheats. 1 But their ranks grew so thin that they 
were obliged to proceed with great caution. 2 

"While Jefferson had called the president's message of 
March 19 3 mad, he now declared: " It is still our duty to 
endeavor to avoid war; but if it shall actually take place, 
no matter by whom brought on, we must defend ourselves. 
If our house be on fire, without inquiring if it was fired 
from within or from without, we must try to extinguish 
it. In that, I have no doubt, we shall act as one man." 4 
That such would have been the case will be scarcely ques- 
tioned now. But although the anti-Federalists did not 
think of playing the part of traitors, and although they 
gave expression to their sympathy for France only in a 
suppressed tone, Jefferson was right when he said that 
" party passions were indeed high." 5 The visionaries be- 
came sober, and those who had been sober intoxicated. 
Hence the discord grew worse than ever. 

A small number of the Federalists were anxious for war, 
and the rest of them considered it at least as probable as the 

1 Even Randall acknowledges that there could be scarcely any doubt 
that " X., Y., Z." were the authorized agents of Talleyrand. Life of 
Jeff., I., 387. Jefferson acted as if he were fully convinced of Talleyrand'3 
innocence. Jeff., Works, IX., pp. 265, 271, 274, 367,436. See the proof 
of the contrary, Tucker, History of the U. S., II., p. 71. 

2 "The Republicans were instantly reduced to a more feeble minority 
throughout the nation than they had been any day before since their 
first organization as a party." Randall, 1. c. It was especially the 
small landed proprietors of the low country who flocked to the support 
of the administration. Washington writes to Lafayette, Dec. 25, 1798: 
" No sooner did the yeomanry of this country come to a right under 
standing of the nature of the dispute, than they rose as one man, 
with the tender of their services, their lives, their fortunes, to support 
the government of their choice, and to defend their country." Wash., 
Works, XL, p. 380. 

3 Am. State Papers, III., p. 168; Statesman's Manual, I., p. 116. 

4 Jeff., Works, IV., p. 241. See also the address to the people of 
Virginia which accompanied the resolutions of Dec. 24, 1798. Elliot, 
Deb., IV., p. 532. 

6 Jeff., Works, 1. c. 



\.\-2 i:l I..NTV AM) SLAVERY. 

rvation of peace. Warlike preparations were there- 
fore pushed forward with energy. But it was not consid- 
ered Bofficient to get ready to receive the foreign enemy; 
it was necessary to fetter the enemy at home. The ai 
aliens were to be gotten rid of while it was not yet too late, 
and the extreme anti-Federalists were to be deterred froiri 
throwing too great obstacles, at this serious time, in the 
way of the administration. In the desire to effect both of 
these things, the so-called alien and sedition laws, 1 which 
Bealed the fate of the Federal party and gave rise to the 
doctrine of nullification, had their origin. 

The plan of this work does not permit us to dwell on 
the contents of these laws. Suffice it to say, that, for along 
time, they have been considered in the United Stat 
unquestionably unconstitutional. At the time, however, 
there was no doubt among all the most prominent Federal- 
of their constitutionality. Hamilton even questioned 
it as little as he did their expediency. ]>nt he did not 
conceal from himself that their adoption was the establish- 
ment of a dangerous precedent. Lloyd of Maryland had, 
on June 26, introduced a hill more accurately to define 
the crime of treason and to punish the crime of sedition, 
which hill was intended for the suppression of all exhibi- 
tions of friendship for France, and for the better pr< 
tioti of the government. Hamilton wrote to Wolcott in 
relation to this hill that it endangered the internal peace "t" 
the country, and would "give to faction body and solid* 

ity. 

'Alien laws, Jane 25, and July (i. 17!)S; sedition law, July 14, 

I., pp. 570672, 577, 578, 596, 597. 
• 'There are provisions in this bill, which, according to a cursory view, 
.r t<> me highly exceptionable, and such as more than anything 
may endanger civil war. I have not time to point out my objec- 
tions by this post, but I will do it to-morrow. I hope sincerely the thing 
may not be hurried through. Let us not establish a tyranny. Energg 
is a very different thing from violence. If we make no false step, wi 
Shall he essentially united; but if we push things to an extreme, wc 



ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS. 143 

Lloyd's bill did not come up to be voted upon in its orig- 
inal form ; but the alien and sedition laws were of them- 
selves sufficient to realize Hamilton's fears. The suprem- 
acy of Massachusetts and Connecticut had become so un- 
bearable to the south, that the idea of separation arose 
again in May. The influential John Taylor of Virginia 
thought " that it was not unwise now to estimate the sep- 
arate mass of Virginia and North Carolina with a view to 
their separate existence." Jefferson wrote him in relation 
to this advice on the 1st of June, 1798, 1 " that it would 
not be wise to proceed immediately to a disruption of the 
Union when party passion was at such a height. If we 
now reduce our Union to Virginia and ]S"orth Carolina, 
immediately the conflict will be established between those 
two states, and they will end by breaking into their simple 
units." 

As it was necessary that there should be some party to 
oppose, it was best to keep the New England states for this 
purpose. He had nothing to say against the rightfulness 
of the step. He contented himself with dissuading from 
it on grounds of expediency. He counseled patience until 
fortune should change, and the " lost principles" might be 
regained, " for this is a game in which principles are the 
stake." 

Considering these views, it is not to be wondered at, that 
in consequence of the alien and sedition laws, Jefferson 
began to see the question in a different light. We shall 
have something to say later on the question whether, and 
to what extent, he considered it timely to discuss the se- 
cession of Virginia from the Union. But he was soon 
satisfied that his opponents had bent the bow too nearly to 
the point of breaking, to permit him to look upon further 



shall then give to faction body and solidity." Ham., Works, VI., p. 307; 
Gibbs, Men! of Wolcott, II., p. 68. 
1 Jeff., Works, IV., pp. 245-248. 



l-{ I ii. B01 i i:i I'.m v and BLATEBT. 

:it waiting for better fortune as the right policy. It 
was ii«» Longer time to stop at the exchange of private opin- 
ion, and the declarations of individuals. The moment had 
now come when the " principles" should he distinctly for- 
mulated, and officially proclaimed and recognized. Not to 
do this, would be t«> run the risk of being carried away by 
the cnrrenl «»t' tact- t<> such a distance that it would be dif- 
ficult and perhaps impossible to get hold of the principles 
again. But if, on the other hand, this were dour, every- 
thing further might be calmly waited for, and the policy of 

ediency again brought into the foreground. The pro- 
test was officially recorded, and so long as it was not, either 
willingly or under compulsion, as officially recalled, or at 
Least withdrawn, it was to be considered as part of the rec- 
ord which might be taken advantage of at any stage of the 
Herein lies the immense significance of the Vir- 
ginia and Kentucky resolutions. 

Their importance is enhanced by the fact that Madie 
wh«> had merited well of the country, on account of his 
share in the drawing up and adoption of the constitution, 
and whose exposition of it is therefore of the gret 

g>ht, was the author of the Virginia resolutions ot 
smber 24, 1798, 1 and by the further fact that Jeffer- 
son, the oracle of the anti-Federalists, had written* 2 the or- 

1 Tiny were adopted by the house on the 21st, but by the senate not 
until the '24th. 

me light on the character of Jefferson that he ga 1 

Nicholas, who was to introduce the resolutions into the legislature oi 

icky, the "solemn assurance" that "it should not be known from 

what quarter they came." He himself gives this further information on 

the point: lt I drew and delivered them to him, and in keeping their 

pel he fulfilled his pledge of honor. Some years after this 

\ cholas asked me if I would have any objection to its being 

known that I had drawn them. I pointedly enjoined that it should not. 1 ' 

(Jeff; Works, VII., p. 299.) It was in December, 1821, that in answej 

mfldentially put by Nicholas's son, he first aeknowledged 

that they originated with him. 



, 



VIRGINIA AND KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS. 145 

iginal draft of the Kentucky resolutions of November 10, 
1798. 1 

Although not in accord with chronological order, it is 
advisable to consider the "Virginia resolutions first, for the 
reason that they do not go as far as the Kentucky resolu- 
tions. According to the testimony of their authors, the 
resolutions of both legislatures had the same source, 2 and 
there were special reasons why it was necessary to' make 
the Virginia resolutions of a milder character. 3 Although 
a violation of chronological order, it seems, therefore, proper 

1 Randall, Life of Jefferson, II., p. 452, erroneously dates them Nov. 
14. The house passed them on Nov. 10 ; the senate agreed to them on 
the 13th, and the Governor approved them on the 19th. Elliot, Deb., 
IV., p. 544. Randall relies principally on the erroneous date to support 
the assumption that Jefferson's assent to the modifying provisions of 
his draft was obtained. 

2 Jefferson says that the conference on the Kentucky resolutions took 
place between him and the two brothers Nicholas; and he adds: "I 
think Mr. Madison was either with us or consulted, but my memory is 
uncertain as to minute details." Jeff., Works, VII., p. 230 ; J. C. Ham- 
ilton, Hist, of the Rep. of the U. S. of America, VII., p. 264. 

3 Madison himself had well-founded doubts of the constitutionality 
of the contemplated procedure, and remarked, that on that account he 
had been induced to make use of " general terms" in the Virginia reso- 
lutions. He writes to Jefferson on Dec. 29 : " Have you ever considered 
thoroughly the distinction between the power of the state and that of 
the legislature on questions relating to the federal pact ? On the sup- 
position that the former is clearly the ultimate judge of infractions, it 
does not follow that the latter is the legitimate organ by which the com- 
pact was made." J. C. Hamilton, Hist, of the Rep. of the U, S. of 
America, VII., p. 275. As a matter of course, Madison's constitutional 
doubts should have been applied also to the Kentucky resolutions. But 
Jefferson, in a letter to J. Taylor, of Nov. 26, Works, IV., p. 259, men- 
tions a very important ground why it was necessary, especially in Vir- 
ginia, to proceed with great caution. He writes : " There are many 
considerations dehors of the state which will occur to you without 
enumeration. I should not apprehend them if all was sound within. 
But there is a most respectable part of our state who have been envel- 
oped in the X. Y. Z. delusion, and who destroy our unanimity for the 
present moment." 

10 



i 



j.j,; STATE BOTEBJEIGHT*. AND SLAVERY. 

to consider fcese as the basis of the Kentucky resoluti. 
Dr patter as a lower ronnd of the same ladder. 

The paragraph of the Virginia resolutions of most im- 
mce for the history of the constitution, is the follow- 

i 1 1 IT • 

"Resolved, That this assembly doth emphatically and 

mptorily declare, that it views the powers of the fed- 
era] government as resulting from the compact to which 
the Btates are parties, as limited by the plain sense and 
intention of the instrument constituting that compact, as 
BO further valid than they are authorized by the grants 
enumerated in that compact; and that in case of a delib- 
erate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of other pou 
not granted by the said compact, the states who are parties 
thereto, have the right, and are in duty bound, to inter- 
pose for arresting the progress of the evil and for main- 
taining within their respective limits the authorities, rights 
and liberties, appertaining to them." 

The legislature of Kentucky disdained to use a mode of 
expression so vague and feeble or to employ language from 
which much or little might be gathered as occasion de- 
manded. In the first paragraph of the resolutions of the 
10th of November, 1T9S, weread: " Resolved, . . that 
whenever the general government assumes undeleg 
powers, its acts are unauthoritative, void, and of no forcej 
that to this compact each state acceded as a state, and is 
an integral party; that this government, created by this 
compact, was not made the exclusive or final judge of the 
at of the powers delegated to itself, since that would 
nave made its discretion, and not the constitution, the 
meafi its powers; but that, as in all other cae 

ipact among parties having no common judge, eachpai^ 
iv has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of infrac- 
tion^ as of die mode and measure of redress." 

Thus were the " principles" established. But in order 
that they might not remain a thing fioating in the air, it 



i 



NULLIFICATION." 147 

was necessary to provide another formula, by which the 
states might be empowered to enforce the rights claimed, 
or at least to find a word which would presumably embody 
that formula; and which was sufficient so long as they lim- 
ited themselves to the theoretical discussion of the ques- 
tion. The legislature of Kentucky, in its resolutions of 
November 14, 1799, gave the advocates of state rights the 
term demanded, in the sentence: 

" Resolved, That . . . the several states who formed 
that instrument being sovereign and independent, have the 
unquestionable right to judge of the infraction; and that a 
nullification by those sovereignties, of all unauthorized acts 
done under color of that instrument, is the rightful remedy." 
In later times the admirers of Madison and Jefferson 
who were true to the Union have endeavored to confine 
the meaning of N these resolutions within so narrow limits, 
that every rational interpretation of their contents has been 
represented by them as arbitrary and slanderous. When 
about the end of the third and the beginning of the fourth 
decade of this century, the opposition to the federal gov- 
ernment in Georgia, and especially in South Carolina, be- 
gan to assume an alarming form, the aged Madison ex- 
pressly protested that Virginia did not wish to ascribe to 
a single state the constitutional right to hinder by force 
the execution of a law of the United States. " The resolu- 
tion," he wrote, March 27, 1831, "was expressly declara- 
tory, and proceeding from the legislature only, which was 
not even a party to the constitution, could be declaratory 
of opinion only." In one sense, this cannot be questioned. 
In the report of the committee of the Virginia legislature 
on the answers of the other states to the resolutions of 
1798, we read as follows : " The declarations are . . . 
expressions of opinion unaccompanied by any other effort 
than what they may produce on opinion, by exciting re- 
flection." 1 But to concede that this was the sole intention 

1 Elliot, Deb., IV., p. 578. 



148 STATE SOVEKEIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

of the resolutions of the 2-ith of December, is to deprive 
the words, according to which the states had the right and 
were in duty bound to " interpose" in case the general 
government had in their opinion permitted itself to assume 
ungranted power, of all meaning. 

But it has never yet been denied that these few words 
express the pith of all the resolutions. More was claimed 
than the right to express opinions — a right which had never 
been questioned. If expression was not clearly and distinctly 
given to what was claimed, it was to leave all possible ways 
open to the other states to come to an agreement in all 
essential matters. 1 

Jefferson was in this instance less cautious than Madison, 
and his vision was more acute. He thought that the crisis 
of the constitution had come, 2 and therefore assumed a 
standpoint from which he could not be forced back to the 
worthless position adopted by Madison in his celebrated re- 
port of 1800. 3 Jefferson allowed it to depend on the further 
course of events whether force should be used, or whether 
only the right to employ force should be expressly and for- 
mally claimed. At first lie was anxious that a middle posi- 
tion should be assumed, but a middle position which afforded 
a secure foothold. The legislature of Kentucky had done 
this, inasmuch as it had adopted that passage in his 
draft in which it was claimed that the general government 
and the states were equal parties, and in which it was 
recognized that the latter had " an equal right to judge" 
when there was a violation of the constitution, as well as 
to determine the ways and means of redress. 

Madison, 4 and later, Benton, 5 as well as all the other ad- 

1 Madison in Hie letter to Jefferson, referred to above. 

2 Randall, Life of Jefferson, II., p. 451. 
8 Elliot, Deb., V., pp. 54G-5S0. 

4 Madison to Cabell, May 31, 1830. See Jefferson's Correspondence* 
III., p. 429, Randolph's Ed., and Madison's Correspondence, edited by 
Maguire, p. 286. 

6 Thirty Years' View, I., p. 148. 



RESPONSIBILITY OF JEFFERSON. 149 

rnirers of the " sage of Monticello," who were opposed to 
the later school of secessionists, have laid great weight on 
the fact that the word nullification, or anything of a like 
import, is to be found only in the Kentucky resolutions of 
1799, which did not originate with Jefferson. This tech- 
nical plea in Jefferson's behalf has been answered by the 
publication of his works. Among his papers two copies 
of the original draft of the Kentucky resolutions of 1798 
have been discovered in his own handwriting. In them 
we find the following: Resolved, That when the general 
government assumes powers " which have not been dele- 
gated, a nullification of the act is the rightful remedy: 
that every state has a natural right, in cases not within 
the compact, [casus non foederis] to nullify of their own 
authority all assumptions of power by others within their 
limits." 1 

That Jefferson was not only an advocate, but the father, 
of the doctrine of nullification is thus well established. It 
may be that Nicholas secured his assent to the striking out 
of these sentences, but no fact has as yet been discovered 
in support of this assumption. Still less is there any 
positive ground for the allegation that Jefferson had be- 
gun to doubt the position he had assumed. Various pas- 
sages in his later letters point decidedly to the very oppo- 
site conclusion. 

But all this is of interest only in so far as it corrects 
a misrepresentation of historical facts. It has no impor- 
tant bearing on the question itself. If, in fact, Jefferson 
had not employed the term nullification, it would be only 
a negative merit of the same significance as the negative 
merit of Madison that he used the indefinite expression 
" to interpose," instead of the definite expressions of the 
Kentucky resolutions. It was not the part of Madison to 
play the advocate for Jefferson in a case in which he had 

1 Jeff., Works, IX., p. 469. 



150 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

to speak for himself as well. The "principles" presented 
and established by the three resolutions were the same in 
every respect; they differed only in their form, and each 
succeeding one was more in keeping with the nature of the 
matter than the preceding. The stone has been cast roll- 
ing on an inclined plane, and it rolls on. 

If the practical measures proposed were not in harmony 
with the principles adopted, that fact might be, for the time 
being, of the greatest importance. But what assurance was 
there that they would never be in accord with them ? The 
button on the sword's point is a protection as long as it 
covers it; but it maybe removed at any moment, and the 
sword become as dangerous as if it had never been there. 
Besides, the three resolutions were also completely similar 
in this, that the proposed practical measures were in no 
case such as the principles advocated suggested. While 
the legislature of Kentucky employed the ominous word 
" nullification," it solemnly protested that it did not wish 
to offer resistance except in a " constitutional manner." 
The year before, it had even declared, that it desired only 
to urge the other states to " unite with this state to pro- 
cure at the next session of congress a repeal of the uncon- 
stitutional and obnoxious acts." 1 Virginia, which had been 
so over-cautious, or rather so over-crafty, in the language 
employed in her resolutions, did not permit herself to make 
a similar declaration until 1800, and after the other states 2 
had unambiguously condemned her course, while the legis- 
lature of Kentucky declared that it desired to request con- 
gress to repeal these laws, it "resolved" they were com- 
pletely void and without force, and it asked the other states 

1 This paragraph is wanting in Jefferson's draft. It was substituted 
for the sentence erased in the 8th paragraph of the draft. The rest of it 
is the 0th paragraph of the resolutions adopted by the legislature. 

2 Delaware, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New York, Connecticut, 
New Hampshire and Vermont Massachusetts answered the resolu- 
tions with an exhaustive refutation. Elliot, Deb., IV., pp. 533-537. 



EFFECT OF NULLIFICATION. 151 

to pass similar resolutions. And did not the legislature 
of Virginia make essentially the same demand when it 
declared it the duty of the states " to interpose" and added: 
" Resolved, that the general assembly doth solemnly ap- 
peal to the like dispositions in the other states, in confi- 
dence that they will concur with this commonwealth in 
declaring that the acts aforesaid are unconstitutional, and 
that the necessary and proper measures will be taken by 
each for co-operating with this state in maintaining, unim- 
paired, the authorities, rights, and liberties reserved to the 
states respectively, or to the people"? And finally, was 
not nullification expressly declared by the legislature of 
Kentucky to be a constitutional remedy in 1799? In a 
word, as the " principles" advanced in the resolutions 
were the same, they led to the same logical conclusions, 
which were clearly expressed in the Kentucky resolutions, 
namely, the right of the states, through the organ of their 
legislatures, to " resolve" that laws of congress were un- 
constitutional, and therefore void and of no effect. 

If the claim to this right were well founded, the consti- 
tution was, indeed, different from the articles of con- 
federation in particulars; but the political character of the 
Union was essentially unchanged, and it was now, as then, 
a confederation of the loosest structure. If the ri^ht were 
acknowledged, the people were placed at the very point at 
which they had stood when Washington wrote: "We are 
to-day one nation, and to-morrow thirteen." 1 To the ex- 

1 Washington now again declared : " The constitution according to 
their [the anti-Federalists'] interpretation of it, would be a mere cipher." 
Washington, Dec. 25, 1798, to Lafayette. Works, XI., p. 378. Three 
weeks later he wrote to P. Henry : " Measures are systematically and 
pertinaciously pursued which must eventually dissolve the Union or 
produce coercion." Works, XI., p. 398. Very shortly afterwards the 
ultimate consequences of this interpretation of the constitution were 
boldly drawn. Tucker, whose edition of Blackstone's Commentaries 
appeared in 1803, writes, Vol. I., App., p. 175 : " The federal government, 
then, appears to be the organ through which the united republics com- 



152 LTl BOVEBEHHTTY AND SLAVKRY. 

tent that practice was in accord with theory, a mere mechan- 
ical motion would have again taken the place of organic 
life. Sooner or later even that must have ceased, for the 
state la an organism, not a machine. 

Ajb certainly as thistles spring from the seed of the 
thistle when it falls on the proper soil, bo certainly must 
the consequences mentioned above follow under the given 
circumstances, from Madison's "to interpose. 1 ' 1 
ridiculous to observe, how, in the United States, the use of 
this expression is declared to have been harmless, or even 
meritorious, while the word " nullification" is looked up- 
on as the Bource of the whole evil. The apprentice in 
magic upbraids the spirits that they do not change their 
form and turn back into brooms when he pronounces 
the wrong charm. Here the spirits are conjured up, but 
their conjurors turn their backs upon them, after the airy 
beings have prepared for them the bath they prayed for, 
and reproach heaven and earth, but not themselves, when 
the flood rushes in thick volumes from their homes into 
the highway. As if the spirits ever, of their own accord, 
turn into brooms again when they have performed what 
they have been commanded. 

It was reserved for a later time and another man to 
elaborate in detail the doctrine of nullification. John C. 
Calhoun solved the riddle on paper in such a way that the 
right of nullification appeared not only compatible with 
the existence of the Onion, but as the condition of its free 
development, and nf its strength. There was no time as 



nranicate with foreign nations and with each other. Their submu 
to it.-, operation i?, voluntary; its councils, its engagements, its authority, 
are theirs, modified ami united. Its sovereignty is an emanation from 
theirs, not a flame in which they have been consumed, nor a vortex in 

which they have been -wallowed up. Each is still a perfect state 

-till independent, and -till capable, should the oceasiou re- 
quire, to resume tin- exercise of its functions, in the most unlimited 
extern. J. etc. 



THEORY OF NULLIFICATION. 153 

yet to attempt to strangle the healthy human mind in a 
net of logical deductions. The "X. Y. Z. fever," as 
Jefferson expressed it, had made the anti-Federalists fear 
that the vehicle would roll over them. This fear drove 
them, after a little hesitation, to resolve to throw them- 
selves between the spokes of the wheels. Perhaps they 
might succeed in bringing it to a stand, and might even 
cause it to move backwards. But they did not conceal from 
themselves that they might be prostrated in the attempt, 
or that the spokes- might possibly be broken. If this be- 
came probable, and the choice were left with them, they 
were disposed to allow the vehicle to go to pieces. In 
other words, they had yet to offer an exhaustive constitu- 
tional defense of nullification; but they conceived its last 
practical result as one of various- contingencies. 

If a minority of the states should insist on the exercise 
of the alleged right of nullification, and if the majority 
should claim with equal decision the unconstitutionality of 
that right, the minority could consider secession only as a 
question of expediency. The general government would 
either be obliged to concede that every law of congress 
should receive the tacit approval of each state before hav- 
ing any force there, or it would be compelled to enforce such 
laws under all circumstances, and to employ force for that 
end if necessary. But if the general government should 
attempt to enforce a nullified law, such action on its part 
would, according to the doctrine of nullification, be a 
breach of the pact which held the states together. The 
state in question was no longer legally bound by the pact. 
It would depend entirely on its judgment in any given case 
to accept the breach of the treaty under protest, or if the 
general government was willing, to agree to a compromise 
with a reservation as to the ultimate decision of the legal 
question, or, remaining for the time being in the Union, to 
repel force by force, or finally, to announce its withdrawal 
from the Union, dissolved by the breach of the contract. 



154: STATE BOYEREHttffTY AND SLAVERY. 

A part of the anti-Federalists were of the opinion that 
in the ease before us, it might well beexpedient to employ 
. Of this there Is ample documentary evidence. But 
under what circumstances they intended to have recoi 
to force, and whether in such a contingency they thought 
of immediate secession, cannot be determined with any 
certainty on account of the vagueness of the language they 
employed. 

Jefferson, as was his wont, wrote in terms chosen with 
the greatest caution. But they are unambiguous enough 
itablish this much, that lie considered an appeal to the 
sword or secession justifiable under the circumstances men- 
tioned above; and that he thought it possible that, sooner 
or later, he would declare the one or the other of these 
- to be advisable or necessary. He writes to Madison, 
November 17, 17!*S: " I enclose you a draft of the Ken- 
tucky resolutions. I think we shall distinctly affirm all 
the important principles they contain, so as to hold to that 
ground in future, and leave the matter in such a train as 
that we may not be committed absolutely to push the mat- 
ter to extremities, and yet maybe free to push as far as 
event- will render prudent." 1 Nine days later he writes 
to -I. Taylor: " For the present I should be for resol 
the alien and sedition laws to be against the constitution, 
and merely void; and I would not do anything at this mo- 
ment which would commit us further, but reserve ours* 
to shape <>ur future measures or no measures by the events 
which may happen. "- 

lit- assumed precisely the same position a year later. 
Henowchose even fewer expressions of indefinite mean- 
ing. It was in hit; opinion "essentially necessary" that 
the legislatures of Kentucky and Virginia should issue a 
reply to the states whose legislatures had declared against 

. Worka, IV., p. 85. 

'>'., i>. 800. 



DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE AGAINST JEFFERSON. 155 

the resolutions of 1798 and 1799, " in order to avoid the 
inference of acquiescence." On the 5th of September, 
1799, he sent "Wilson C. Nicholas a draft of such a reply. 
The second paragraph reads as follows: "Making firm 
protestation against the precedent and principle and re- 
serving the right to make this palpable violation of the 
federal compact the ground of doing in future whatever we 
might now rightfully do, should repetitions of these and 
other violations of the compact render it expedient." He 
also insisted that expression of warm attachment to the 
Union should be made, and added: " we are willing to sac- 
rifice to this everything but the right of self-government 
in those important points which we have never yielded, 
and in which alone we see liberty, safety and happiness ; 
that not at all disposed to make every measure of error or 
of wrong a cause of secession, we are willing to look on 
with indulgence, and to wait with patience, till those pas- 
sions and delusions shall have passed over," etc. 

Madison did not wish that the reservation in the second 
clause should be adopted in the answer. Jefferson wrote 
on this subject to Nicholas: " From this I recede readily, 
not only in deference to his [Madison's] judgment, but be- 
cause as we should never think of separation but for re- 
peated and enormous violations, so these when, they occur, 
will be cause enough of themselves." How it can be 
claimed, in view of all these utterances, that Jefferson did 
not recognize secession and, as the inevitable and logical 
consequence thereof, a resort to the sword as a constitu- 
tional right, in the interpretation of the constitution, it is 
difficult to understand. 1 



1 John Quincy Adams says in his eulogy on Madison : " Concurring 
in the doctrines that the separate states have a right to interpose in 
cases of palpable infractions of the constitution by the government of 
the United States, and that the alien and sedition acts presented a case 
of such infraction, Mr. Jefferson considered them as absolutely null and 
void, and thought the state legislatures competent, not only to declare, 



156 ERXIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

•thing more can be granted to Jefferson's defenders than 
that he wras sincere when he declared that lie would r< 

erne measures" only with great reluctance. The 
same may be said of the other leaders of tin anti-Federa- 
lists, almost without exception. But it is a falsification 
of the truth of history to pretend that they were now 
thinking exclusively of the establishment of "principles." 
Washington was of opinion that the peace of Virginiaand 
of the Union was, " hastening" towards "a dreadful cri- 
So deeply was he penetrated by this conviction that 
he wrote a long letter to Patrick Henry imploring him to 
appear as a candidate for the legislature, in order to - 
the current which was threatening ruin, by the whole 

E lit of his experience and popularity. 2 The anti-Fe 
alists, and their successors, the Republicans and the I)« 
crats, have always asserted that he was ensnared by Hamil- 
ton and his associates, and terrified by phantoms conjured 
up only by their fancy and their inordinate desire to rule. 
This excuse is a poor compliment to pay; for although 
Washington was now on the brink of the grave, his per- 
ception was clear enough not to allow that to be ar_ 
away which was transpiring under his eyes. It was a fact 
that Virginia had not only dug the mine which she in- 
tended at some indefinite future time to use. She took 
thought for the morrow, and with busy hands carried the 
powder to it, even although she did not yet light the fuse. 
Hamilton Bays in his very full letter to colonel Dayton, 
speaker of the house of representatives, on the situation 
of the Union generally, and especially on the Virginia and 
Kentucky resolutions: " The late attempt of Virginia and 
Kentucky to unite the state legislatures in a direct r< 



■ make them s<», to re>ist their execution wit). in their respective 
3 physical force, and to secede from the Union rather than sub- 
mit to them, it' attempted to be carried into execution by force." 
Wash., Works, XI.. p. 391, 
■Ibid, XL, p. 887, etc 



VIRGINIA PREPARES TO USE FORCE. 157 

ance to certain laws of the Union, can be considered in no 
other light than as an attempt to change the government. 
It is stated, in addition, that the opposition party in Vir- 
ginia, the headquarters of the faction, have followed up 
the hostile declarations which are to be found in the reso- 
lutions of their general assembly, by an actual preparation 
of the means of supporting them by force ; that they have 
taken means to put their militia on a more efficient foot- 
ing; are prejjaring considerable arsenals and magazines, 
and (which is an unequivocal proof of how much they are 
in earnest) have gone so far as to lay new taxes on their 
citizens." 1 He attaches full faith to these reports, and 
again, in January, 1800, declares it his conviction that the 
leaders in Virginia were ready to possess themselves of 
the government by force. 3 Randall, Jefferson's biographer, 
passes over these charges in silence, although he publishes 
the letter to Dayton and discusses it minutely. It must 
remain undecided whether this silence is to be regarded as 
a confession, or whether it means that the person of the 
complainant makes all refutation superfluous. The reader 
must be satisfied with the declaration that from Hamil- 
ton's " programme" for the session of congress he will 
discover " whether it was Jefferson or his opponents who 
attempted to misstate them [party aims] to posterity." 3 

When the state-rights party had long been in sure 
possession of power, a distinguished member of it from 
Virginia took care to let "posterity" know whether Ham- 

1 Ham., Works, VI., p. 384. 

2 " The spirit of faction is abated nowhere. In Virginia it is more 
violent than ever. It seems demonstrated that the leaders there, who 
possess completely all the powers of the local government, are resolved 
to possess those of the national by the most dangerous combinations; 
and if they cannot effect this, to resort to the employment of physical 
force. The want of disposition in the people to second them will be 
the only preventive. It is believed that it will be an effectual one." 
Ham., Works, VI., p. 416. 

3 Randall, Life of Jefferson, II., p. 458. 



[58 ii'. BovwanoHTY and slavery. 

ilton's charges were calumnies and phantoms of his brain, 
which, according to the anti-Federalists, always burned 
•with the fever of monarchy. It was a well-known fact 
that at the time that Washington sawa " dreadful crisis 

establishment for the manufacture 
arms was set up in Richmond, in which, however, work was 
not commenced until some years later. John Randolph 
thought it due to the reputation of his state to remove 
every donbt as to the object of the erection of this estab- 
lishment He declared in 1817 in the house of repret 
tatives: "There was no longer any cause for concealing 
the fact that the great armory at Richmond was built to 
enable the state of Virginia to resist by force the encroach- 
ments of the then administration upon her indisputable 
rights, upon the plainest and clearest provisions of the 
constitution — in case they should persevere in their out- 
rage* >us proceedings." 1 

It is not possible to say whether, or to what extent, these 
preparations were directly incited by Jefferson and Mad- 
ison. The suspicion resting on Jefferson is obviously the 
greater, as Madison was from first to last more cautious in 
steps. Nor can any definite answer be given to the 
question how far Madison recommended more moderate 
measures, or how far a different interpretation of the con- 
stitution lay at the foundation of these recommendations. 
\ move of hi8 was made with anxious deliberation, and 
his native cautiousness, which sometimes degenerated into 
weakness and indecision, contributed beyond doubt to cause 
him to advise a milder and more tentative procedure. 
it may be that the internal struggle between his 
and national patriotism, in both of which he was 
equally honest, hindered him from explaining to him- 
selt the "interpose.'' Perhaps he desired to leave open to 

\l miniscencea of J. A. Hamilton, p. :J9, according to the National Irir 
Lclliycncer. 



CHARACTER OF JEFFERSON. 159 

himself as well as to the legislatures of the other states all 
possible ways of coming to a substantial agreement. It 
may be, too, that he entertained some real doubt whether 
the letter and spirit of the constitution quite justified the 
last conclusion in the Kentucky resolutions of 1799, drawn 
from the correct principles — correct in his opinion — which 
were the common basis of the Virginia and Kentucky res- 
olutions. Whatever estimate of the relative weight of 
these two motives may be made, the role played by Madi- 
son in the constitutional conflict which culminated in 1798 
and 1799 throws much light on the real character of the 
constitution itself and on the history of the development 
of the national spirit during the last decade. Much weight 
is not to be attached to the fact that Jefferson read the con- 
stitution in such a way, that the union of the states was in 
principle, perhaps a looser, and certainly not a firmer, one, 
than it had been under the articles of confederation. 1 It was 
not a difficult matter for Jefferson to act in opposition to his 
own theories; and it was still easier for him to reconcile 
himself to a contradiction between his words and his deeds. 
Ambition was the sovereign trait in his character. He was 
always ready to sacrifice much of his favorite theories to 
his feverish thirst for power and distinction, the more 
especially as his eminently practical instinct caused him 

1 Article 13 of the articles of confederation says : c * Every state shall 
abide by the determination of the United States in congress assembled, 
on all questions which, by this confederation, are submitted to them." 
The opponents of the doctrine of nullification have interpreted this pro- 
vision to mean that the laws of congress are absolutely binding on the 
states. In the constitution there are provisions which establish the 
supremacy of the laws of congress in a still more undoubted manner. 
If, spite of this, the doctrine of nullification could possibly and logical- 
ly be deduced from it, it must have been much easier to deduce it from 
the articles of confederation, for several of the most important links in 
the proof are here expressly mentioned, whereas, in the latter, they can 
only be inferred from other provisions or words. Hence the indirect 
proof in opposition to the theory of nullification, from the 13th article 
of confederation, has no value. 



B0V1 EfcEIGHTI AND SLAVEBY. 

often to doubt the tenableness of his ideal systems. More- 
over, as be, partly from interest and partly because misled 
by his idealistic reveries, concealed his ambition under the 
mask of the greatest simplicity, stoical indifference, and even 
of disinclination to accept any political honor or dignity, 
bo, too, his conscience was not precisely what would 'be 
calK-d tender in the weighing and measuring of words, 
whether hie own or those of others. Such a character could 
scarcely always resist the temptation to make ink and pa- 
iv what in his opinion they ought to Bay. His mode 
of thought, which was a mixture of about equal parts of dia- 
lectical aeuteness and of the fanaticism of Buperficiali tyyas 
shortsighted as it was daring, made this a matter of no 
difficulty. Hence it is thatnotthe slightest weight should 
be attached a priori to his interpretation of the constitution. 
The direct contrary of this is true of Madison. His 
was not a character so thoroughly and harmoniously con- 
stituted and developed as Washington's. lie, too, con- 
cealed the depth of his ambition under at>lain and m< 
exterior. AVhen it or his over->ensitiveness was wounded, 
he. too, could he unjust to his opponents. The violence 
with which the party struggle was conducted by de_ 
carried him, also, so far away that he played a more covert 
game than can he entirely justified by the excuse of politi- 
cal necessity. And when it was a question of opposing a 
measure in too great conflict with his own party programme, 
he could descend to the letter, and to petty quibbling, if 
>uld not give his attack the necessary energy from the 
higher standpoint of the statesman. Spite of this, how- 
e\ ri\ there was nothing of the demagogue about him. He 
purely constituted character, spite of the fact that his 
ft] principles did not SO unconditionally govern him as 
his judgment entirely uninfluenced by his de- 
It cannot be charged that he ever consciously approached 
the constitution with the intention of discovering in it a 
word which he might make to serve his purposes by di- 



POSITION OF MADISON. 161 

alec^ictrHtegerdemain. Great weight must therefore be 
given to his exposition of the constitution; for he played 
a leading part in the Philadelphia convention; was after- 
wards the most conspicuous defender of the draft of the 
constitution in the Virginia convention; in conjunction 
with Hamilton and Jay wrote the Federalist; had a 
precise knowledge of the constitution and had familiar- 
ized his thought with the minutest details of its provis- 
ions. But it can be shown that he now read the con- 
stitution in such a way as to find in it something essen- 
tially different from what he had advocated in Philadelphia, 
and from what he thought he saw in the completed draft 
of it. If it be conceded that he did not read the constitu- 
tion now so as to introduce anything new into it — and this 
will scarcely be denied to-day — these different interpre- 
tations can be explained only on two assumptions, that, 
leaving all sophistry aside, the terms of the constitution 
must admit of essentially different meanings, and that 
Madison's political proclivities and judgment had expe- 
rienced a radical change since 1787 and 1788. This last 
point is important for the understanding of the history of 
the constitution, since the causes of the change in Madi- 
son's political tendency were not of a personal, but of a 
general, nature. Madison is in this respect only the most 
distinguished representative of a large fraction of the 
whole peoj^le. 

Madison did not agree in 17S7 with the opinion that had 
become current throughout the country, that the states were 
sovereign in the proper sense of the word. Said he on 
the 29th of June, in the Philadelphia convention: " Their 
[the states'] laws in relation to the paramount law of the 
confederacy were analogous to that of by-laws to the su- 
preme law within a state." 1 And he added that the powers 
of the states, under the proposed form of government, 

1 Compare the preceding note. 
11 



-j, :l ) i n; BOVBREIGKTY and BLAYKBY. 

would be Btill more hampered. 1 This language is very char- 
. irtr| , bifl position. All his efforts at the time had 

tlu-ir basis in this fundamental thought, and he folio 
out ;. ; conclusions with as much aouteness as i 

tica] insight II*' repeatedly and urgently warned 
country against the disastrous consequences of stopping 
half-way. ' He would not change the legal basis of th« 
]. ltl(1I1 f , the Union, because it was not n« 

30 f rom his conception of the nature of the 
art i c ] sonfederation. II- desired only to make the 

theory of the articles of confederation a living fad 
means of the constitution. He would have the constitu- 
te,,, general government an express and definite 
which every attempt of the states to cur- 
and actual supremacy of the Onion could he 

nipped in the hud. 

Even before the meeting of the constitutional convention 
he writes to Edmund Randolph:' 2 " Let it have a negative ilj 
all cases what -.ever, on the legislative acts of the st 
Lng <»f Great Britain heretofore had. This 1 
tial, and the least possible abridgnu 
th e ereignties. Without such a defensive powe$ 

■i- that can be given on paper will be 

unavailing." 

During the course of the convention he returns a£ 
and again to this point, insisting upon it as " absoluteij 
necessary to a perfect system, 1 ' and from first to last 
not deviate by a hair's breadth from his original demand. 
He declares, on I f June: u But in order to give the 

a Ltive this efficacy, it must extend to all c 

ination would be only a fresh source of conti 
between the two authorities. In a word, to recur to the 
illue - borrowed from the planetary system, this 



1 Bill 

•April 8, L787. Elliot, Deb V.. p. 103. 



MADISON IN THE CONVENTION. 163 

prerogative of the general government is the great pervad- 
ing principle that must control the centrifugal tendency of 
the states, which without it will continually fly out of 
their proper orbits, and destroy the order and harmony of 
the political system." 1 And when the convention finally 
adopted the draft without any provision of this kind, he 
again declared that it " alone could meet all the shapes 
which these [the injurious acts of the states] should as- 
sume." 2 We must measure the change in his personal 
views on the conditions precedent of a powerful common- 
wealth, with a capacity for life and built on a federative 
foundation, by these expressions. But this is not say- 
ing that the change in his personal views influenced his 
interpretation of the constitution, or, if so, to what ex- 
tent. Our judgment on this point must depend upon how 
far he considered his main object to be attained in 1787 
and 1788, spite of the fact that he was not able to secure 
an unlimited negative to the government of the Union. 
The later school of Calhoun repeatedly appealed to a 
word used by Madison in the constitutional convention, 
to prove that even those who most strongly advocated a 
" consolidation" of the states did not intend to give the 
federal government the power to use force in order to com- 
pel obedience on the part of a state. 

During the debates on the clause authorizing the use of 
the power of the whole nation against a delinquent state, he 
remarked: "The use of force against a state would look 
more like a declaration of war than an infliction of pun- 
ishment, and would probably be considered by the party 
attacked as a dissolution of all previous compacts by which 
it might be bound." 3 

But this passage must not be separated from the context 
if its meaning would be rightly understood. Madison in- 

1 Elliot, Deb., V., p. 171. 

2 Ibid, V., p. 539. 

3 Ibid, V., p. 140. 



£04 STATE B0TEBETGST1 AND SLAVERY. 

trodnoed his remarks with the declaration that "the mure 

• ( ,1 on the use of force the more he doubted tlie 

practicability, the justice, and the efficacy of it," and at 

the close he expressed the hope that -such a system wouW 

ie das would render this resource unnecessary.'! 

issue of the question, it seemed to him, should b< 

termined by its expediency. He did not contest the right 

of the federal government to defend not only its existenc 

but its rights with force; hut he doubted the advisability 

of making the use of this extreme remedy necessary, and 

the possibility of applying it with success. Hence he 

iired that the general government should have the 
lute veto, for he could discover no third means; and that 
congress should have power to " control" the states was a 
question of which he entertained no doubt. Indeed, he 
saw the only danger in the usurpation of the states, tor 
even if " a tendency of the general government to absorb 
the states" should appear, it could, in his opinion, be at- 
tended by no fatal consequence. 1 The veto was, the 
the mildest means which could be discovered to prevent 
the evil which had grown out of the unconstitutional pre- 
tensions of the state governments. " The existence of such 
a cluck would prevent attempts to commit them. Should 
no such precaution he engrafted, the only remedy would be 
an appeal to coercion. Was such a remedy eligible? A\ 
it practicable? Could the national resources, if exerted 
the utmost, enforce a national decree against Massachl^ 
abetted, perhaps, by several of her neighbors? It 
would not be possible." 2 

Madison may have been right in thinking that the em- 
ployment of force against a state would he impossible at 
time, and that hence it would be necessary to give the 
leral government a peaceable means to check any a 

i Elliot, V. p. 823. 
• [bid, V., p. 171. 



PROPOSED VETO OVER STATE ACTS. 165 

tempt at revolt before the agitation should become so 
intense, and extend to a circle so large, that the authority 
of the federal government would be seriously endangered. 
But it is surprising that he, and with him all the distin- 
guished members of the convention, should have been so 
obstinate in declaring the veto to be the only means by 
which this end could be attained. The debate had pro- 
gressed a great way before he gave his decisive reasons for 
this and at the same time clearly declared to what constitu- 
tional means congress would be limited without such a pro- 
vision. Said he on the 17th of July: " They [the states] 
will pass laws which will accomplish their injurious ob- 
jects before they can be repealed by the general legislature, 
or set aside by the national tribunals." 1 With the excep- 
tion of the unambiguous prescription of the legal means, 
the only essential difference between the absolute veto and 
the power of resistance against the encroachments of the 
states at the command of the federal government, accord- 
ing to the form of constitution favored by the convention, 
is the element of time. The extension of the veto power 
over the states, which he proposed, would always at once 
prevent, in cases of urgent need, a law which violated the 
constitutional prerogatives of the federal government from 
coming into force. But if the veto were withheld, delay 
would be inevitable, and delay could only mean giving the 
seed of an insignificant disagreement time to ripen into 
open rebellion. 

In the Federalist he advocated the same view. He says, 
however: " But ambitious encroachments of the federal 
government, on the authority of the state governments 
. . . . would be signals of general alarm. Every state 
government would espouse the common cause. A corres- 
pondence would be opened. Plans of resistance would be 
concerted. One spirit would animate and conduct the 

1 Elliot, Deb., V., p. 321, 



h vl -i; \i v ami blavkbt; 

whole. The smic combination in short would result from 
an apprehension of the federal, as was produced bythedread 

i gn poke; and unless the projected innoval 
should be voluntarily renounced, the same appeal to a trial 

,,,uld be made in the one case as was made in 
other." 1 But he does not speak here of a right of the 
3j but only mentions the probability of a fact. This 
[dent from the comparison drawn. The forcible 

to the general government might he 

as justifiable as the forcible resistance of the colonies 

and; but in Law, it would be, in this case as in tli 

tttioo and not a mode of procedure warranted by the 

stitution. In the one case as in the other, there woul<| 

en but a naked fact presented, the fact, namely, that 

the question had been taken out of the domain of law and 

brought before the tribunal which is the uUima ratio oi 

v people and every age. Madison leaves no don 

to what, in contrast with these actual remedies, were the 

legal remedies belonging to the states. "In the first in- 

,./' he says," the success of the usurpation will depend 

on the executive and judiciary departments which are to 

give effect to the legislative acts: and in the 

last resort a remedy must be obtained from the people, who 

can by the election of more faithful representatives annul 

of the usurpers." 2 Here there is nothing said of 

duty of the states " to interpose." It is concede! that 

ernment lias the exclusive right of decision^ 

and the only way to reverse thisdecision is to labor to the 

end that, at the time appointed by law, other persons with 

different views may be entrusted with it. And how. indeed 

Id a constitution which accorded to the states othei 

m ea • be advocated by the man who cond< 

mowledge he had learned from history into these words: 



ralist,XLVI. 

« Ibid, XLIV. 



madison's eaeliee views. 167 

" The important truth which it unequivocally pronounces 
in the present case is, that a sovereignty over sovereigns, a 
government over governments, a legislation for communi- 
ties, as contradistinguished from individuals, as it is a sole- 
cism in theory, so in practice it is subversive of- the order 
and ends of civil policy, by sustaining violence in place of 
law, or the destructive coercion of the sword in place of the 
mild and salutary coercion of the magistracy"? 1 The say- 
ing of John Quincy Adams already quoted, " that the con- 
stitution itself had been extorted from the grinding neces- 
sity of a reluctant people," will now be better understood. 

1 Federalist. XX. 



168 i: BOVKREIGHTY AND SLAVERY. 



CHAPTER V. 

The Pbbsidential Election of 1801. The Fall of the 
Federalist Party. Jefferson and the Purchase of 
Louisiana The Burb and Federalist [ntrig 

The Virginia and Kentucky resolutions produced no 
further immediate consequences. The recognized leaden 
of tlir anti-Federalists or Republican- had given their in- 
terpretation of the constitution and of the Union created 
by it. Their declarations remained a long time unused, 
but also nnrecalled and unforgotten. The internal con- 
tests continued and their character remained the same 
The revolution in the situation of parties now necessitated 
a change of front on both sides, and for a time also the 
battles between them were waged over other points and in 
part in another way. 

The next collision was an actual struggle for supreme 
An inadequate provision of the constitution alone made 
this battle a possibility to the Federalists; but the struggle 
over the question of the constitution was after all consid- 
ered only as a mere accidental collateral circumstance. 

The Republicans had won the presidential election by a 
majority of eight or nine electoral votes. Their two can- 
didates, Jefferson and Aaron Burr, had each received sev- 
enty-three votes. They intended that Jefferson should be 
president and Burr vice-president. Spite of this, how< 
they gave botll the same number of votes, either not to en- 
danger Burr's election, or because he became a candidate 
only on that condition. 1 This was, considering Burr's want 

1 Wolcott asserted that Burr proposed this condition and that it was 
pted bj prominent Republicans. Gibbs, Mem. of Wolcott, II., p. 



TIE-YOTE FOE THE PRESIDENCY. 169 

of principle, and the boldness of his character, a dangerous 
experiment. Judge "Woodwortli charged that Burr had won 
over one of the electors of New York to withhold his vote 
from Jefferson, and that this was prevented only by the fact 
that the other electors of the state had discovered it in time. 1 
If this charge be well-founded, it was by mere accident that 
the country escaped electing a man president whose name 
had never yet been connected with the presidency by any 
party. But be this as it may, the danger that the bank- 
rupt, foolish voluptuary, for whom no means was too low to 
carry out the adventurous plans of his daring and mad am- 
bition, should be made chief of the republic, was by no 
means removed. 

If an equal number of electoral votes should be cast for 
two or more candidates, the house of representatives would 
have to elect one of them to the presidency. In this case, 
the votes would be cast by states, and it would be neces- 
sary that a majority of all the states should vote for one of 
the candidates in order to have a valid election. The Fed- 
eralists had a majority in the house of representatives, but 
voting by states they could control only one-half the votes. 
This was just sufficient to prevent an election. 

No one denied that the majority of the people, as well 
as the republican electors, desired to make Jefferson presi- 
dent. But party passion had reached such a feverish 
height that the Federalists resolved, spite of this 5 to plant 
themselves on the letter of the constitution, and to hinder 

488. Randall, Life of Jefferson, II., p. 573, calls this an absurd state- 
ment, but produces no proof therefor, except a letter of Jefferson's dated 
Dec. 15, 1800, to Burr, in which he intimates that he expects to receive a 
larger number of votes. J. C. Hamilton, Hist, of the Rep. of the United 
States, VII., p. 425, gives, ■ however, good grounds for the assumption 
that Jefferson at this time was aware of the equality of the vote. A let- 
ter (Ibid, VII., p. 424) from Madison to Monroe, quoted by Hamil- 
ton, tends rather to prove than to disprove that such a promise had bee a 
made in favor of Burr. 
1 J. C. Hamilton, VII., pp. 424, 425. 



[70 . u: SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY, 

:,. The possibility of electing their own 
idate8 l was completely excluded bythe constitution. 
They could therefore do nothing except to obtain for Burr 
B majority of the votes of the states, or prevent an i 
ti on . in case M-- president was elected by the Btates, they 
thought of casting the election on the senate. The senate 
was to electa provisional president— from among the 6ena-J 
who then might be declared president of the 
United State-. Such a proceeding could not be justified 
v provision of the constitution; the case had not been 
provided for at all. 1 It is impossible to say whether thil 
i> the reason why the plan was soon dropped; certain it is, 
ever, that Gibbs's statement that such a plan never 
ted is incorrect. 4 
After some hesitation they resolved to try to elect Burr. 
Only Bix Btates, it is true, v«»te<l for him, but it was 1. 
sary to win over only four votes 5 in order to guaranty 
him the legal majority of nine states. 

1 Adam- and Pinckney, 

1 They thought; for instance; of chief-justice Marshall. 
I is impossible to understand how,spite of this, Adams could write: 
" I know no more danger of a political convulsion, if a president pro 
iempon of the Benate, or a secretary of state, or speaker of the house, 
should be made president by than if Mr. Jefferson or Mr. 

Burr is declared such. The president would be as legal [!] in on 
a> in either of the others, in my opinion, and the people as well 
lied." Adams, Work-, IX.. p. 98. 

1 IfeUL Ol VVole Itt, II., ; 

•ley and Livingston, of New York, Lynn, of New Jersey, and 
Dent, Of Maryland. 3cy and Maryland gave him an equally 

dividi l.\ mi inclined toward- the Federalists, and Dent was a de- 

cided Federalist. The two representatives from .New York name/; 
were not considered very particular friends of Jefferson. The assump- 
tion that, under certain circumstances, a majority might he obtained 
mi to l"- quite as absurd as Randall represents it in 
his lit;- of Jefferson. Life of Jeff., II., p. 605. Its probability is in- 
directly increased hy the fact that the Federalists, who alone decided the 
issue in favorof Jefferson, drew upon themselves the suspicion of cot 
nipt influence. Bee J. C. Hamilton, Hist, of the Rep. of the I 



THREAT OF FORCIBLE RESISTANCE. 171 

The prospect of the success of both plans was at least 
great enough to inspire the Republicans with serious 
fear. Jefferson had written on the 15th of December to 
Burr that " decency" compelled him to remain " com- 
pletely passive" during the campaign. 1 But now he con- 
sidered the situation so serious that he thought himself no 
longer bound by "decency." He personally requested 
Adams to interfere by his veto, if the Federalists should 
attempt to turn over the government, during an interreg- 
num, to a president pro tern. Although he declared that 
such a measure would probably excite forcible resistance, 
Adams refused to be guided by his advice. 2 

Madison proposed another means of escape. He thought 
that an interregnum until the meeting of congress in De- 
cember, 1801, would be too dangerous; Jefferson and Burr 
should therefore call congress together by a common proc- 
lamation or recommendation. This step could no more 
be justified by >any provision of the constitution than an 
interregnum under a provisional president. Madison 
himself conceded that it would not be " strictly regular." 3 
But the literal interpretation was presumably the alpha 
and omega of the political creed of the Republicans. 
Spite of this the notion met with Jefferson's approbation. 4 

Between the two parties, or rather above them, stood the 
founder of the Federalist party himself. Even Hamilton. 



Am., VII., pp. 464, 465, 467, 468. Benton, in his Abridgment of the 
Debates of Congress, omits the passage cited by Hamilton from Bay- 
ard's speech. 
'Jeff., Works, IV., p. 340. 

2 The Anas., Jeff.'s Works, IX., p. 210. 

3 Madison to Jefferson, Jan. 10, 1801 : " And if, in reference to the con- 
stitution, the proceeding be not strictly regular, the irregularity will be 
less in form than any other adequate to the emergency, and will be in 
form only, rather than in substance." J. C. Hamilton, Hist, of the Rep. 
of the U. S. of Am., VII., pp. 431, 433. Compare Ham., Works, VI., 
p. 509. 

4 Jeff., Works, IV., p. 355. Edition of 1854. 



172 STATE SOVKKLIuNTY AND SLAVERY. 

advised that aconcession should be made to the inter* 
of political expediency. 1 The possibilities which the equal 
electoral vote placed in the hands of the Federalists in the 
house of representatives were to be used wherever possible, 
to force certain promises from Jefferson. But Hamilton 
did not wish to go any farther. He declared the project of 
the interregnum to be "dangerous and unbecoming," and 
thought that it could not possibly succeed. 2 Jefferson or 
Burr was theonly question. When his party a 
also seemed to have adopted this view, lie used his whole 
influence to dissuade them from smuggling Burr into the 
White House, He had written to Wolcott on the 16th of 
December, that he expected that at least New England 
would not bo far lose her senses as to fall into this snare. 
When he was mistaken in these expectations he wrote let- 
ter after letter to the most prominent Federalists who 
might exert an influence directly or indirectly on the elec- 
tion. "If there he a man in. the world," he wrote to 
Morris, " I ought to hate, it is Jefferson." 3 Spite of this, 
however, he pleaded for Jefferson's election harder than any 

i It cannot be denied that this concession was greater than is to be 

desired for Hamilton's political fame. He writes to Wolcott, Dec. 16: 

, may be well enough to throw out a lure for him [Burr] in order 

ip thim to start for the plate, and to lay the foundations of disses, 

Bion between the two chiefs" Ham., Works, VI., p. 486. It is charac 

teristic of the book written by Hamilton's son and often here referred to, 

thai he does not print this passage, although he gives a literal reproduce 

fion of a large portion of the letter. Hist, of the Rep. of the I . B. of 

Am.. VII., pp. 434, 435. Besides, this is not by any means the only m- 

, in which Hamilton's political morality Buffered in the violence 

of party strife. 

[thas occurred to me that perhaps the Federalists may bedisp 
i,, play the game of preventing an election, and leaving the executive 

•' Ul the hands of a future president of the senate. This if it could 
eed, w.uld he, for obvious reasons, a most dangerous and unbecom- 
ing policy. Bui it is well it should be understood that it cannot sue- 
• Ham., Works. VI., p. 
' Ham., Works, VI., p. 409. 



ELECTION OF JEFFERSON. 173 

Republican: "for in a case like this," he added, "it would 
be base to listen to personal considerations." 1 Besides, he 
always dwelt with emphasis on the folly, the baseness, the 
corruption and impolicy of the Burr intrigue. In all these 
letters, some of which are very lengthy, he shows himself 
the far-seeing statesman, and examines everything with 
calmness and incision ; but at times he rises to a solemn 
pathos. With the greatest firmness, but at the same time 
with a certain amount of regret, he writes to Bayard: " If 
the party shall, by supporting Mr. Burr as president, adopt 
him for their official chief, I shall be obliged to consider 
myself as an isolated man. It will be impossible for me to 
reconcile with my motives of honor or policy the contin- 
uing to be of a party which, according to my apprehension, 
will have degraded itself and the country." 2 

Hamilton's intellectual superiority was still recognized 
by the Federalists, but spite of this he stood almost isola- 
ted from every one. The repulsive virulence with which 
the party war had been waged during all these years, and 
the consciousness that their defeat was in a great measure 
due to the bitter and exasperating contentions among them- 
selves, had dulled the political judgment and political mor- 
als of most of the other leaders. Hamilton's admonitions 
were not without effect, but he was not able to bring about 
a complete surrender of the plan wdiich was as impolitic as 
it was corrupt. The electoral contest in the house of rep- 
resentatives continued from the 11th to the 17th of Feb- 
ruary. Not until the thirty-sixth ballot did so many of the 
Federalists use blank ballots that Jefferson received the 
votes of ten states and w T as declared the legally elected 
president. According to the testimony of the Federalist 
representatives themselves, the field would not even yet 
have been cleared were it not that Burr had surrendered 



1 Ibid, VI., p. 501. 

3 Ibid, VI., p. 419. This letter is erroneously dated Jan. 16, 1801. 



j- i H ■■ 1:1 .i..n IV and BLAVBBT. 

mbignoiia position. Ele could not completely and 
ally renounce his Republican friends, and hence the 
ceived from him only vague and meaning 
assurances. Under these circumstances, it would 
bordered on insanity to have plied every art to secure Burr's 
election, for, Bpite of his brilliant gifts, he was looked 
npon as a thoroughly contemptible man. 1 All the dang 
to the party and the country which would have been the 
of the Buccessof their intrigues, they would 
knowingly entailed in order to place an unworthy 
character at the head of the government, one who would 
have turned hie back on them the moment they had helped 
him into power. They would haw been throwing die 
determine the future of the Union, simply for the >ar ; - 
tion of venting their hatred on Jefferson. 2 

Every one was fully conscious of the magnitude of the 

3 , ' Bayard wrote to Hamilton on the 8th of March 

•eming the last "caucus" of the Federalists: "All 

acknowledged that nothing but desperate measures 

mained, which several were disposed to adopt, and but few 

willing openly to disapprove. We broke up each 

in confusion and discord, and the manner of the last 

ballot was arranged hut a few minutes before the ballot was 

me years later he repeated the assertion under 

oath, that then- were some who thought it Letter to abide 

by their vote, and to remain without a president, rather 

fc h ai] - m * But reason and patriotism at 

gwick to Hamilton: "As to the other candidate [Burr], there is 

no disagreement as to his character. He is ambitious, selfish, profligate, 

L mbition is of the worst kind; ii is a mere love of power, ivirardlyss 

of fame, but as its instrument ; his selfishness excludes all social afteo 

and bis profligacy unrestrained by any mural sentiment, and ue- 

fying all decency. This is agreed." Ibid, VI., pp. 512, 513. 

ie political campaign of 1872 offer* many analogies to this, 
the admirable article in the Kation of October 17, 1872, pp. 244,245. 
Ham., Works, VI., p. 52 

tdall, Lir LI., p. 008 



L 



THE REPUBLICAN ULTIMATUM. 175 

length obtained the mastery. Bayard seems to have been 
the instrument of this decision. 1 

How much Hamilton contributed to the defeat of the 
advocates of the va banque/ it is not easy to estimate. 
Randolph, at the time a member of the house of represen- 
tatives, often expressed his conviction that the safety of the 
republic was due to Hamilton. 2 There was no difference 
of opinion in the two parties on this, that the victory of 
the stubborn Federalists would have seriously endangered 
the republic. 

One month before the balloting be^an we find the con- 
viction prevalent among the Federalists that the Republi- 
cans would, under no circumstances, be satisfied with 
an interregnum, or with the election of Burr. James 
Gunn, a federal senator from Georgia, wrote to Hamilton 
on the 9th of January: "On the subject of choosing a 
president some revolutionary opinions are gaining ground, 
and the Jacobins 1 are determined to resist the election of 
Burr at every hazard. ... I am persuaded that the 
Democrats have taken their ground with the fixed resolu- 
tion to destroy the government rather than yield their 
point." 3 

The Republicans did not oppose this conviction, but de- 
clared it to be well-founded with all the emphasis with 
which such declarations have always been made in America. 
Jefferson wrote to Monroe on the 15th of February, two 
days before the election: "If they [the Federalists] had 
been permitted to pass a law for putting the government 
into the hands of an officer, they would certainly have pre- 
vented an election. But we thought it best to declare 
openly and firmly, one and all, that the day such an act 

1 John Adams to Jefferson, June 14, 1813 : " You and Mr. Madison are 
indebted to Bayard for an evasion of the contest." Adams, Works, X., p. 
43. 

2 Garland, Life of Randolph, I., p. 187. 

3 Ham., Works, VI., p. 509. 



176 n: » )Yi:i:i:i..XTY axi> BLATBRT. 

was passed the middle Btates would arm, and that no such 
usurpation, even for a Bingle day, Bhould be submitted t«>. 
This first Bhook them, and they were completely alarmed 
at tin- resource for which we declared, to wit, a convention 
to re-organize the government and t<> amend it." 1 Armed 
•me,', followed bya peaceful revolution; 3 such was the 

word of the Republicans. The Federalists rightly 
considered this ultimatum to be no vain threat. In a let- 
ter written the day after the election to Madison, Jefferson 
Bpeak8 of the "certainty" that legislative usurpation 
wonld have met with armed resistance. And Jefferson's 
testimony is by no means the only evidence. 3 Even the 

3 began to treat the subject of " bella, horrida bell 
.More than this: In Virginia, where the excitement was 
greatest, establishments had already been erected to supply 
the necessary arms, and even troops. John Randolph, in 
the Bpeech already mentioned, had completely lifted the 
curtain that hung over this subject. Reliance was to be 
placed on Dark's brigade, which had promised to take pos- 

n of the arms in the United States armory at Harper's 
Ferry.* 

» Jeff., Works, IV., p. 854 

'The word revolution seems to be justified, because it is not to I 
Burned that Jefferson here meant to speak of the eallingof a convention 
in tin- manner prescribed by the constitution. 

the letter of St. George Tucker to Monroe (Jan. 7, 1801), in J. IX 
Hamilton,! I Ut. of the Rep. of the U. S. of America, VII., p. 432, and that 
oi'Th. Mann Randolph, Jefferson's son-in-law, to Monroe, Feb. 14. 180L 

4 S<c an interesting extract from Porcupine's [Cobbet'sJ Gazette, in 
Randall, Lit'.- of Jeff, II., p. G03. 

We did notthen rely upon the Richmond armory, not yet in opera- 
tion, but on the United States armory at Harper's Ferry. At that time, 
when the constitution itself was put at hazard, rather than relinquish 
the Long-enjoyed sweets of power, when the sun rose upon the house 
balloting— balloting through the night, and through successive days 
for a chief magistrate— had we not the promise of Dark's brigade, and 
of tie- arms at Harper's Ferry, which he engaged to secure in e 
an attempt to bet up a pageant under color of law to supersede the pub- 



PRESIDENTIAL POLICY OF JEFFEKSON. 177 

The idea of waging war on the Union with its own 
weapons is very old; the secessionists did nothing more 
than carry out the plan which the " fathers" of the re- 
public had considered as embodying the proper course un- 
der certain contingencies. 

The victory of the Republicans did not by any means 
produce the revolution in internal politics which was to be 
expected. When the electoral vote had been made known, 
Jefferson, in the first transports of his joy over the victory, 
blew with all his might the trumpet of the opposition. 
He tendered chancellor Livingston a place in his cabinet, 
that he might be of some service in the " new establish- 
ment of republicanism ; I say for its new establishment, 
for hitherto we have only seen its travestie." 1 The stub- 
born resistance of the Federalists, which wounded his 
vanity not a little, increased his angry feeling against 
them. On the 18th of February he furnished Madison 
with an account of die election. He lays particular stress 
on the fact that the Federalists did not finally vote for 
him, but that there was an election only because a part of 
them abstained from voting, or only used blank ballots. 
"We consider this, therefore," he says, "a declaration of 
war on the part of this band." 2 

These utterances are thoroughly in keeping with Jeffer- 
son's preceding course, and with his words and actions 
towards the Federalists and their policy. Sj^ite of this, 
however, his own future policy is not to be inferred from 
them. Hamilton did not fall into this error, because he 
was well acquainted with the main traits of Jefferson- s char- 



He will, after defeating the election by the pertinacious abuse, under the 
pretense of the exercise, of constitutional right to support one of the 
persons returned by artifice, whom they professed to abhor. General 
Hamilton had frowned indignantly upon this unworthy procedure, for 
which he had paid the forfeit of his life." 

1 Jeff., Works, IV., p. 339. 

1 Ibid, IV., p. 355. 
12 



178 STATE E MV and SLAVERY. 

ttcter, and estimated their relative value correctly, although 
his judgment on the whole may have been somewhat too 
Bevere. He therefore Baw and foretold tlie charactei 
Jefferson's policy better than Jefferson himself could have 
done while under the influence of the excitement of the 
political campaign. Hamilton writes to Bayard, Jan. LB, 
L801: "Nor is it true that Jefferson is zealot enough to 
do anything in pursuance of his principles which will con- 
travene his popularity or his interest. He is as likely as 
any man I know to temporize, to calculate what will be 
likely to promote his own reputation and advantage; and 
the probable result of such a temper is the preservation of 
Bystems, though originally opposed, which being once 
established could not be overturned without danger to the 
person who did it. To my mind, a true estimate of Mr. 
Jefferson's character warrants the expectation of a tempo- 
rizing rather than of a violent system." 1 

This judgment of Hamilton found its confirmation in 
the inaugural address of the new president. In it • 
ferson counsels that the rights of the minority should be 
held sacred, that a union in heart and soul should be 
brought about, and that an effort should be made to do 
away with despotic political intolerance as religious intoler- 
ance had already been done away with. " We have called 
by different names brothers of the same principle. W< 
all Republicans — we are all Federalists." 1 

Jefferson could not only use such language without dan- 

but it was unquestionably the best key in which he 

could have spoken, although the extreme Republicans would 

much preferred to listen to a vae victls! Lie had 

ted as early as the spring of 1790, that " the whole 

landed interest," 5 and therefore a large majority of the peo« 

1 Earn, Works, VI., p. 420. 

■ ipers, IV.. p. ii>: Statesman's Manual, I., p. 150. 
hi Buren, Political Parties, rightly remark- that this cxpr 
embraces the owners of the land as well as its cultivators. 



DOWNFALL OF HAMILTON. 179 

pie, belonged to the Kepublican party. 1 There is now little 
difference of opinion on the point that Jefferson would im- 
mediately haye followed Washington in the presidential 
chair, if the electors had been nothing but the men of straw 
into which they afterwards degenerated. But even if this 
could be rightly questioned, it would not yet follow that 
the majority of the people were then really inclined to the 
Federal party. The Republicans were far inferior to the 
Federalists in the numbers and the ability of their leaders; 
and, moreover, the great monied interests of the northern 
states were the corner-stone of the Federal party. These 
were two elements which might very well keep them in 
power a while longer, even if the majority of the people 
were in reality more attached to the principles of their 
antagonists. But they were not a support on which they 
could establish lasting rule. In a democratic republic,the po- 
litical influence of the monied interests, when they have not 
attained the immense proportions they have in the Amer- 
ica of to-day, is, as a rule, very limited, and that of talent 
is very frequently still smaller. Hamilton's lead was fol- 
lowed as long as the pressure of necessity was felt. But as 
soon as the most difficult labor of organization was done, 
his superiority became one of the greatest obstacles which 
stood in the way of his public activity. Not only did the 
Federalists put him aside hv degrees, but their fault-find- 
ing with his actions and omissions began here and there to 
partake of the tone of the most odious attacks made by 
the Republicans on his policy. 2 This was a sign of the 
time which deserved the most earnest consideration. When 
in a political party in a popular state a breach occurs be- 
tween its founders and the masses that compose it, its 
days are as a rule numbered. If the breach takes place 

1 Jeff., Works, IV., p. 139. 

2 " Hamilton is obnoxious and persecuted by popular clamors, in 
which Federalists to their shame join." Fisher Ames, Works, I., p. 
289. 



180 6TATE >.i\ l.Ul.h.MV AND SLAVERY. 

after the essentia] idea on which the party was founded has 
realized, it will Dot and cannot be long survived. 
This one essential idea, which constituted the real spark 
of vitality in the Federalist party, hud been realized be- 
fore the end of Washington's second term as president, and 
tin- existence of the work as well secured as was possible 
under the circumstances. The force which moved the 
pendulum in its forward motion was exhausted. And il 
it did not begin its backward course immediately, hut 

stand for a moment in suspense, it was b 
an ^dental force acted upon it from without. The pro- 
longation of the supremacy of the Federal party was due 
mainly to the unhealthy attitude assumed by the anti- 
Federalists towards France. When the fruits of this 
„, m to he reaped in the transactions under the governm. 
of the directory the power of the Federalists, which v. 
then declining, at once mounted to its zenith. 1 The con- 
gressional elections of 1799 were very favorable to them. 
The value of this success, however, must not be over-esti- 
mated, as it was owing to a question of external pohti 
Only in case foreign polities, by the outbreak ol war, 
Bhould he kept most prominently in the foreground could 
they hope that their success would obtain a more asting 
character. But the quarrel between France and the! m ted 
..-had reached its height with the X. T. Z. affair ani 
with Gerry's return. When Adam,, contrary to a form* 
,nn assurance, resolved to send a new embassy to I ranee, 
the Republican, soon regained the ground they bad lotf 
for the attitude of the people towards questions of home 
politics remained essentially unaltered. 

Chen they were very strong." P. Ames, 1. o. 

■ The change in th uthcrn staL pccially was very great. U 

G gia two Federalists wen <»' «he six reprm-n tat. « 

f Carolina, five were Federalists, of the ten from Nor h UroUM 
, „ d of Virginia's nineteen, eight. In the New England 
'o^antf-FXalist was elected. Only in the middle states cool, 
the Federalists boast of do great buoo 



GROWTH OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY. 181 

The position of the Federalists in the presidential elec- 
tion of 1801 had been a desperate one. The hopelessness, oi 
their situation drove them to the rash and despicable game 
in the house of representatives. They would have been 
deterred from it if they could have ascribed their defeat to 
accidental and transitory causes. The correspondence ot 
their leaders, however, shows plainly that their faint hope 
of better success after four years was only a hope against 
their better judgment. The reaction had fairly set in. 
The Republicans did not dare to touch the essential things 
which had been accomplished during the twelve years' vic- 
tory of the Federalists over them, and did not even desire 
to do so; for the same matter is seen very differently from 
the point of view of the administration and of the oppo- 
sition. It might not be expected of them that they would 
intentionally increase the heritage left them, but if they 
would not immediately squander it, the capital would bear 
interest and increase. More was not to be expected. The 
defeat of the Federalists was a decisive one, for even the 
citadel of their strength was undermined. While in the 
southern states a more temperate feeling prevailed, the 
Republicans in the New England states began to celebrate 
triumphs. 1 The decisive point, however, was that they 
obtained a firm footing in the rural districts, whereas, 
hitherto they had found adherents only among the more 
mercurial population of the large towns. 2 The choice 
troops of the Federalists began to waver on every side, and 
the intrigues of the leaders in the house of representatives 

"While the eastern states have grown worse, I verily believe the 
southern have grown better." F. Ames, Works, I., p. 288. 

8 "Jacobinism is certainly spreading from towns and cities into the 
country places. It is less watched and less warmly resisted in the latter 
than in the former. It is therefore getting to be much at home in the 
country, and will remain till the convulsion of some great internal 
events shall change the whole political and moral order of our nation." 
F. Ames to Wolcott, Jan. 12, 1800. Gibbs, Mem. of Wolcott, II., p. 
321. 



182 lTB SOVEREIGNTY and SLAVERY. 

gave the impulse to the complete dissolution of their 
ranks. Fet neither the sense of honor, nor the healthy 
judgment which drew from Hamilton the declaration that 
he must renounce a party which had thus soiled its name, 
was wanting among the masses. It was seen at the moment 
how great was the mistake made. Even during the bal- 
loting in the house of representatives, the Federalist! 
went over iii swarms to the enemy; every vote tor I Jurr 

another nail in the coffin of the party. 1 This sudden 
and violent tall of the Federal party explains the security 
which the continuance of the Union enjoyed during the 
two following decades. The party which represented partic- 
ularistic tendencies was in po»e.->sion of power, and had an 
overwhelming majority. In the next presidential elec 
Jefferson and Clinton received each one hundred and >ixty- 
two electoral votes, while Charles C. Pinckney and Rufua 
King received only fourteen each, 2 and in 1805 there were 
only seven Federalists in the senate. But even if theproha- 
bility of a disruption was therefore very small, the character 
<>f the internal struggle remained the same. This chan 
was even placed in a clearer light by the fact that the parts 
played by each were changed, so far as the question of right 
was concerned, and that the opposition, spite of it> weal. 

uot satisfied with wishes and threats of separation, but 
began in earnest t«> devise plans of dissolution. 

According as it became evident in what manner Jei 
son thought of carrying out in detail the abstract pro] 

- of his inaugural address, the broken ranks of the 
Federalists began to rally again. A large number had 

fterson writes to Madison the day after the election: " But their 
conduct seems to have brought over to us the whole body of Feilei 
who, being alarmed with the danger of a dissolution of the govern- 
ment, had been male most anxiously to wish the very administration 
had opposed, and to view it, when obtained, as a child of their 
own." Jeff., Works, iv., pp. 855, 856. 

'The Republicans had obtained victories even in New Hampshire 
and Massachusetts. 



THE MISSISSIPPI QUESTION. 183 

gone over permanently to trie Republican party, but tlie 
leaders resumed the struggle with redoubled energy and 
acrimony. A division in the Republican camp, which had 
been gradually broadened by Burr's ambitious plans, gave 
them new hope that they would sooner or later obtain con- 
trol of the helm once more. 

Even Hamilton again drew near to his former associates. 
He could not renounce politics and naturally sided with 
the opposition, although he defended Jefferson against the 
exaggerated charges of the rest of the Federalists, and fore- 
told that his administration would be comparatively con- 
servative. Neither a reconciliation, nor even a momenta- 
ry suspension of the animosity between the ancient rivals, 
was possible. Hamilton subjected the very first message 
of the president to an exhaustive criticism which had a 
strong admixture of trenchant irony. 1 Still more energet- 
ically did he oppose the attacks on the then system of 
taxation and on the federal courts. On these questions his 
attitude was the same as that of the rest of the Federalists, 
and they were therefore gratified to see him at his former 
post as their representative. But in the most important 
questions which called for a .solution during Jefferson's 
first presidential term, he deviated as far from them as in 
the election of 1801. 

The Mississippi question, which had played so impor- 
tant a part in the times of the confederation, had arisen 
again and demanded a solution, as Spain had on the 1st of 
October, 1800, ceded the whole of Louisiana to France. 
The United States had had experience enough already of 
how dangerous and how great an obstacle in the way of 
the commercial development of the country it might be- 
come, if the mouth of the Mississippi were in the posses- 
sion of a foreign power, even if it were no stronger than 
Spain. Jefferson had not shared in this experience in vain. 

1 The articles were signed Lucius Crassus. 



L84 BTATK >«)VJ.Ki;i(,NTY AM) SLAVERY. 

This was one of the instances in which he gave evidence of 
b realty statesmanlike insight. I If wrote on the 18th of 
April, L802, to hie embassador Livingston in Paris: Thia 
ion "oompletelj reverses all the political relations of 
the United States, and will form a new epoch in our politic 
cal course. . . . There, .is on the globe one single spofc 
the p ■ of which is onr natural and habitual enem jr." 1 

Livingston was instructed to enter into negotiations im- 
mediately for the cession of New Orleans and the Flor- 
ida-, in case Prance should consider the possession of 
Louisiana indispensably necessary. As Bonaparte at this 
time entertained the idea of resuming the old French 
colonial policy, the negotiations remained long without 
re>ult. The n prising of the negroes in San Domingo and 
the warlike turn which the affairs of Europe began again 
t<> assume, disposed him more favorably towards the Amer- 
ican offer. On the 30th of April, 1803, the treaty, ceding 
the whole of Louisiana to the United States for $15^060,000, 
was concluded in Paris. 2 Hamilton shared Jefferson's view, 
that the purchase of Louisiana was a question of the great- 
est, and even of vital, importance for the Union. 3 His 
opposition on other occasions to the policy of the adminis- 
tration, and his personal enmity to the president, did net 

Urn". Works, IV., pp. 4:51. 433. 

-Stat at Large, VIII., p. 200. 

3 He writes. Dec. 29, 1803, to Charles U. Pinckney: "You know my 
general theory as to our western affairs. I have always held that the 
unity ofthe empire and the best interests of our nation require that we 
should annex to the United States all the territory east of the Mississip- 
pi, New Orleans included." Ham., Works, VI., pp.541, 552. Randall, 
Lifeof Jeff., VII., p. v 7, says thai nothing is known of Hamilton's at- 
titude on this question. Wherever there is a point in Hamilton's policy 
to which he cannot refuse his recognition he shows himself so ignorant 
of it that design is the only explanation of the fact. Hamilton wrote 
also in an artle in the Evening Post, signed Pericles: "Two o 
only present [themselves] : First, to negotiate and endeavor to purchase, 
and if this fails, to go to war. Secondly, to seize at once on the Flori- 
I Means and then negotia;* 



PURCHASE OF LOUISIANA. 185 

prevent Ins lending Lira a helping hand in this matter 
when an opportunity offered. 1 

The great majority of the Federalists opposed this in- 
crease of the territory of the Union with as much decision 
as Hamilton advocated it. They showed in their attitude 
towards this question a shortsightedness which would have 
"been astonishing even among the doctrinarians of the 
opposite party. The great extent of the southern states, 
and their dominant position in politics, afforded ground for 
the belief that their internal development would be more 
rapid than that of the northern states, and that they would 
be the governing power of the Union in all future times. 2 
The purchase of such enormous tracts of land was therefore 
a matter of the deepest concern to E"ew England, as it seemed 
to give the southern states a preponderance for all time. 
Little was thought on this occasion of the extension of the 
slave territory, the only evil, in fact, connected with the 
purchase of Louisiana. This point was not entirely un- 
noticed, even now; but it did not become very prominent 

1 See J. C. Hamilton, Hist, of the Eep. of the U. S. of Am., VII., p. 
604. 

2 "The balance of power under the present government is decidedly 
in favor of the southern states, nor can that balance he changed or de- 
stro}*ed. The extent and increasing population of those states must for- 
ever secure to them the preponderance which they now possess. What- 
ever changes, therefore, take place, they cannot permanently restore to 
the northern states their influence in the government, and a temporary 
relief can be of no importance." The very interesting letter from 
which this passage is taken is printed in full in J. C. Hamilton, Hist., 
VII., p. 781-786. Its author, according to the last-named writer, was a 
leading member of congress, and it was directed to a member of Wash- 
ington's cabinet, probably Pickering. Alexander Hamilton here again 
gives a proof of his intellectual keenness and penetration. Major 
Hoops relates that Hamilton said to him in a conversation in February, 
1804: '* The bare attempt to carry such a disunion into effect would 
necessarily throw the people of the United States into two great parties, 
geographically denned; that the northern division must prevail in the 
struggle that must ensue," etc. J. C. Hamilton, Hist, of the Rep. of the 
U.S. of Am., VII., p. 779. 



1S6 REIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

Tin t i 1 Beveral years later, when the disastrous influence of 
Blavery on the whole life of the people began to be better 
understood. In the later struggles of party on the slavery 
question this was overlooked, or intentionally covered up. 
The first phase of the conflict over the Louisiana question 
has been thus placed in an altogether false light. The 
Federalists have been represented as the vanguard of free- 
dom; whereas, in fact, tliey represented only a short-sighted, 
ungenerous, particularistic policy. 

The territory covered by the name Louisiana embra 
several of the present central and northwestern sta 
And this (A' itself shows that the charge so often mad 
later times, against Jefferson and his party, that they 
made this purchase mainly or only in the in teres 
slavery, is wholly unfounded. The truth is, that the Xew 
England states opposed the acquisition of this western ter- 
ritory more than that which lay in the south. Gouverneur 
Morris, indeed, declared it the "peculiar heritage" of the 
ern states. 2 But most of the Federalists still assumed 
the same standpoint which the New England states had 
taken under the confederation on the Mississippi question. 
They anticipated that the incorporation of the western 
territory into the Union, and its economical development, 

1 It stretched from the mouth of the Mississippi over Iowa. Minne- 
sota, Dakota, and Kansas, ami reached westward to the Rocky Moun- 
tain-. 

- •• To the eastern stale-, when separately considered, this [the remain- 
Ing <>t' Louisiana in p >ssession of aforeign power] may appear a matter 
of Less moment than to the other great divisions of our country. 
they will perceive in it the loss of their navigation; they will see tie- 
theater of their industrious exertion- contracted; they will feel tie 
of the productions ot that western world in the mass of their commer- 
cial operations; and, above all, they will feel the loss of an ample re* 
Bource for their children. . . . The exuberant population of the eastern 
Iowa in a Steady stream to the western world, and if that be ren- 
dered useless, or pass under the dominion 01 a foreign power, the fair- 
est hope of posterity i- destroyed." Speech in the senate, Feb. 34, 
ol <.. Morris, III., pp. 418, 419. 



new England's threats of secession. 1ST 

would prove injurious to their commerce, and they feared 
a disturbance of the political equilibrium from this quar- 
ter as much as from the south. 1 The two elements to- 
gether had weight enough with them to draw from them 
the declaration that they would be thus forced to a separa- 
tion from the Union. 2 

In the debate on this side of the question, the Federalists 

1 Eleven years later the judgment of the New England Federalists 
was no better. In the resolutions of the Hartford convention, of which 
more will be said below, it was declared necessary that there should be 
an amendment to the constitution, limiting still farther the right of con- 
gress to admit new states into the Union. The grounds of the demand 
are as follows: "At the adoption of the constitution a certain balance 
of power among the original parties was considered to exist, and there 
was at that time, and yet is, among those parties a strong affinity between 
their great and general interests. By the admission of these states that 
balance has been materially affected, and unless the practice is modified, 
must ultimately be destroyed. The southern states will first avail 
themselves of their new confederates to govern the east, and finally, the 
western states, multiplied in number, and augmented in population, 
will control the interests of the whole. Thus, for the sake of present 
power, the southern states will be common sufferers with the east in 
the loss of permanent advantages. None of the old states can find an 
interest in creating prematurely an overwhelming western influence, 
which may hereafter discern (as it has heretofore) benefits to be derived 
to them by wars and commercial restrictions." Dwight, History of the 
Hartford Convention, p. 871. At the same time, a New England paper 
wrote : " The western states beyond the mountains are not taken into 
view in this connection for any other purpose than to show that they 
do not, ought not, and never can belong to the Union. Let the western 
states go off and take care of themselves." Ingersoll, Second War be- 
tween the U. S. of America and Great Britain, II., p. 225. 

2 Plumer, of New Hampshire, declared in the senate: "Admit this 
western world into the Union, and you destroy at once the weight and 
importance of the eastern states, and compel them to establish a separ- 
ate, independent empire." And thus Griswold, of Connecticut, who 
was looked upon as the leader of the Federalists, said in the house, 
Oct. 25, 1803: " The vast, unmanageable extent; which the accession of 
Louisiana will give to the United States, the consequent dispersion of 
our population, and the distribution of the balance which it is so im- 
portant to maintain between the eastern and western states, threatens, 
at no xery distant clay, the subversion of our Union." 



188 STATE BOYEBEXGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

saw themselves, in consequence of the nature of the thing, 
Limited to a weak defense. They helped themselves now, 
as the south had helped itself from the beginning in the 
slavery question. As they could not refute the arguments 
of their adversaries, but could only oppose assertion 
them, they played their best card,— made threats Bupply 
the place of reason. There was another side, however, in 
which their position was so strong that their opponents 
even considered it in parts unassailable. The pnrchas 
Louisiana was a question which should have been judged 
and decided only on statesmanlike principles. And in 
truth, the position of both parties was determined by these 
principles, but the constitution was destined again to serve 
as sword and shield to the minority. 

The Federalists claimed that the constitution did not 
authorize congress to undertake such a transaction; and 
that it should not be completed before the authority thereto 
had been obtained by an amendment. To which Nicholson 
of Maryland replied, that if he had been asked anywhere 
whether a sovereign nation had the right to acquire 
new territory, he would have considered the question an 
absurd one; that the right in question appeared bo obvious 
and undeniable that it scarcely needed to be proved. It 
could not certainly he questioned that the idea of sover- 
eignty embraces this right. But it might well be, that the 
right belonged to the "sovereign nation" and not t<» con- 
-. ( '.ingress, according to the theory of the Republi- 
cans, possessed only such power as was expressly given it 
by the constitution, and the right in question was not given 
by it. The only provision which could be produced in 

Support of the right is Article J \ ., Sec. 3, §2: "The con- 
gress shall have power to dispose of, and make all needful 
rules and regulations respecting, the territory or other 
property belonging to the United States." But here evi- 
dently the only territory meant is such as the United States 
! at the time, or which was claimed by them as 






THE POWER OF ANNEXATION. 189 

their property. 1 The Republicans could not question this. 2 
Their demonstration of its constitutionality was therefore 
only a deduction from the general principles of political 
science, a mode of interpreting the constitution which they 
had always declared to be absolutely untenable. 

The Federalists did not all view the constitutional ques- 
tion from the same standpoint. The most important of all 
the objections urged was based on the fundamental ques- 
tion of the nature of the Union. Th. Pickering; of Massa- 
chusetts declared in the senate that it was not in the power 
of the president, or of congress, to incorporate the territo- 
ry into the Union, as the treaty demanded: " He believed 
that our administration admitted that this incorporation 
should not be effected without an amendment of the con- 
stitution; and he conceived that this necessary amendment 
could not be made in the ordinary mode by the concurrence 
of two-thirds of both houses of congress and the ratifica- 
tion by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several 
states. He believed the assent of each individual state 
to be necessary for the admission of a foreign country as an 
associate in the Union; in like manner as in a commercial 
house the consent of each member would be necessary to 
admit a new partner into the company." 3 If the constitu- 
tion were a contract between sovereign states, this argu- 
ment could not be assailed. But how did the Federalists 
come to ascribe this character to it now, after they had for 
twelve years governed the country on the assumption that 
the constitution had transformed the confederation into a 
nation? The Republicans repeated the Federal creed with 

1 Scott vs. Sanford, Howard's Reports, XIX., p. 615. The supreme 
court did not base the constitutionality of the acquisition of foreign ter- 
ritory on these provisions of the constitution, but on the authority of 
the president and the senate to make treaties. American Insurance 
Company vs. Canter, Peter's Reports, I., p. 542. 

2 Jeff., Works, IY., pp. 505, 506. 

3 Deb. of Cong., III., p. 13. 



190 ri: SOVEREIGNTY and slavery. 

the ntmosl fervor; and the Federalists with equal energy 
>hed the Republican go6peL 

Under these circumstances a great deal might be said 
about tlir constitutional question, and yet nothing accom- 
plished. John Quincy Adams saw this. Hethought that 
constitutional considerations Bhould not stand in the way, 
even if well grounded; for he was certain that all the leg- 
islatures would adopt an amendment " amply sufficient for 
the accomplishment of every thing for which they had 
contracted." 1 Tin's was not only a new way of securing 
indemnity, l»ut it was seeking indemnification in a case in 
which there was no right to ^ive it. If Pickering's view 
was right, even the ratification of all the legislatures could 
not make such an amendment valid. The constitution 
would, on this supposition, be a contract between the states 
and not between the legislatures of the states, and an alter- 
ation Dot provided for by the contract could be considered 
only by the Btates, the legal organ of which was not in this 
_ '-latures, since the constitution did not give 
them this right, and the state constitutions contained pro- 
visions by which it was directly or indirectly withheld from 
them. 2 

The solution, therefore, proposed by Adams was, viewed 
from Pickering's point of view, also a violation of the c<»n- 
stitution, and consequently nothing could be gained by it. 
It" Pickering's demand, with all the logical conseqm 
to be deduced from it, were conceded, it would be n< 

1 Deb. of Cong., III., p. 19. 

2 The matter must be presented in this way, because it is a universally 

prized principle of American constitutional Law that congress hai 
m r except Buch as is expressly granted it, and that on the other 
hand the powers of the state legislatures arc limited only by th< 
vations of the constitution of the Union and of the state constitutions! 
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, pp.87, 88, 169, IT:!, in which work 
the judicial decisions on this point arc collected: Jameson, The Coii- 
Btitutional Convention, pp. 86,87; Tiffany, Government and Constitu- 
Law, pp, 81, 170. 



JEFFERSON VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTION. 191 

sarv that the amendment in question should be ratified by 
all the states; that is, by state conventions or by the legis- 
latures after they had been authorized thereto in one of the 
various constitutional ways prescribed. An inevitable con- 
sequence of this was, that it would be optional with any 
state, which refused to join the ratification, to secede from 
the Union; or that its refusal should, eo ipso, operate as a 
nullification of the contract of purchase. Obviously the 
federal government could accept this alternative under no 
circumstances. There remained to it therefore — speaking 
from the point of view of the opposing Federalists — only a 
choice between a violation of the constitution and a sur- 
render of the purchase which it rightly considered was of 
the highest interest, and even necessary, to the nation. It 
decided on a conclusion of the purchase, and accomplished 
it in fact in such a way, that the government itself was 
obliged to concede that it had been guilty of a breach of 
the constitution. 

Jefferson himself unconditionally granted that the con- 
stitution did not warrant the acquisition of foreign terri- 
tory, still less its incorporation into the Union. 1 And 
even the objections of some of his friends could not 
change his view of the constitutional question. Spite of 
this, however, he declared himself ready to attach no fur- 
ther weight to it if his friends thought differently from 

1 He writes to senator Breckenridge, of Kentucky, Aug. 12, 1803 : 
" But I suppose they [both houses of congress] must then appeal to the 
nation for an additional article to the constitution, approving and con- 
firming an act which the nation had not previously authorized. The 
constitution has made no provision for our holding foreign territory, 
still less for incorporating foreign nations into our Union. The ex- 
ecutive, in seizing the fugitive occurrence which so much advances 
the good of their country, have done an act beyond the constitution. 
The legislature, in casting behind them metaphysical subtleties, and risk- 
ing themselves like faithful servants, must ratify and pay for it, and throw 
themselves on their country for doing for them unauthorized what we 
know they would have done for themselves had they been in a situation 
to do it." Jeff., Works, IV., p. 500. 



199 HEIGHT? AM) BLATEBT. 

himself. The inference of authority by "construction,'' 
whicb \va> the sole legal basis of his intemperate attacks 
on Hamilton's policy, was now to be put a Btop to " when'* 
it Bhould produce any evil effect. 1 There was no mort 
Baid about the amendment. 

This manner of playing with his own convictions con- 
cerning the legality of a political step was not the onty 
characteristic of the man. Long before the evil v< 
qnences which the purchase of Louisiana had in extending 
the slave territory were fully developed, this hold contempt 
for the constitution proved exceedingly disastrous. An 
invaluable precedent was afforded to the " country, and 
especially to the south," inasmuch as it "made a violation 
of the constitution dependent on the will of the majority, 
subordinated principle to interest, and as a consequence 
left no obstacle in the way of the interests and wishes of 
the smith." 2 

There was one danger to which the violators of the con- 
stitution did not expose themselves, because, as they 
claimed, the majority of the people favored the purchase 
of Louisiana. Right, therefore, as the Federalists might 
he. according to the letter of the constitution, every effort 
to stir up the people against the reigning majority would 
remain fruitless. Xor did they ignore this. Fisher Ames 
wrote. Feb. 24, 1S03: "They are lazy, or in despair, and 
they urge, with wonderful eagerness, the futility of all ex- 
ertions to retrieve the public mind from its errors, or to 
prevent their consequences.-' 3 This applied not only to 
the Louisiana question, hut to the entire policy of the 

1 " I confess, then, I think it important in the present case to - 
example a^rainst broad construction by appealing tor new power to the 
people. It*, however, our friends shall think differently, certainly I 
shall acquiesce with satisfaction, confiding that th use of our 

country will correct the evil of construction when it -hall produce ill 
To W. c. Nicholas, Bept 7, 1803. Ibid, IV., p. 507. 
i>. Geechichtoe der Bklaverei, pp. 08, 00. 
1 P. Ames, Works, I., p. :jis. 



L 



FORMAL PLANS OF SECESSION. 193 

country, Lome as well as foreign. " The Federalists know 
that eo nomine they are gone forever." 1 There were now 
only three Federalist state legislatures. " Connecticut,'* 
says Fisher Ames, " stands, but its good men should say 
incessantly 'take heed lest we fall.' Massachusetts, on the 
other hand," he complained, had only a " show of federal- 
ism. It may last a year longer." 2 Spite of this, however, 
the radical wing of the Federalists did not give up all 
hope. The undeniable ruin of the party caused them to 
change their base of operations, but in all other respects 
it only urged them on to the adoption of measures which 
grew more extreme every day. 

An effort has often since been made to represent it as 
one of many malicious and entirely ungrounded calumnies, 
that there was at this time any serious thought of a dis- 
ruption of the Union. This is only one instance of the 
" white-washing" tendencies and decorative coloring char- 
acteristic of the greater number of American historical 
works. 3 In the letters of the Federalists we find not only 
that wishes to this end were expressed, but that formal 
plans were devised. True, these had no prospect of success. 
Even among the leaders the greatest want of unanimity 
prevailed. Some of them, especially Hamilton, were very 
decidedly opposed to the project, and the majority either 
held that its time was not yet come, or they were wanting 
in courage, or in the energy to act. 4 In consequence of 

1 Jeff., Works, IV., p. 542. 

* Fisher Ames, Works, L, pp. 320, 321. 

3 In the same proportion as their friends are painted in too glowing 
colors, their enemies are drawn in colors altogether too dark. 

* We read in the letter of a "leading member of congress" to a mem- 
ber of Washington's cabinet from Massachusetts, already referred to : 
u We have endeavored during this session to rouse our friends in New 
England to make some bold exertions in that quarter. They generally 
tell us that they are sensible of the danger, that the northern states must 

unite, but they think the time has not yet arrived It appears 

impossible to induce our Iriends to make any decisive exertions." 

13 



10-t i:i:i(.MV AND SLAVERY. 

this all open agitation among the people was nipped in 
the bud, and had it been attempted on a larger scale, it 
Would doubtless have found a pitiable and speedy end. 
But tin- intrigue which was to introduce the realization of 
the Bcheme was so nicely planned that in case it succeed- 
ed there would have been room for very serious fears. 

Hamilton was not wont to see phantoms in broad day- 
light, nor will he be accused of uttering malicious calum- 
nies against the Federalists; and vet lie declared the plan 
of secession to be a fact, and consideredit necessary to give 
a thorough exposition of his fears. He read on the luth 
of February, I s "!, before an informal meeting of distin- 
guished Federalists, gathered to discuss the pending gu- 
bernatorial election in ]S T ew York, a paper on the reas 
which made it desirable that Mr. Lansing should be sue 
fill rather than colonel Burr. In the sixth paragraph of 
this paper he says: "These causes are leading to an opinion, 
that a dismemberment of the Union is expedient. It would 
probably suit Mr. Burr's views to promote this result, to be 
the chief of the northern portion; and, placed at the head of 
the state <>f New York, no man would be more likely t<- 
ceed." 1 This was, in a few words, the aim and end of the 
intrigues of the Burrites and radical Federalists combined* 
Burr was to be made governor of New York, and to use 
the position as a stepping-stone to the White II 
Burr's organ communicated this much very frankly to the 
public. 8 Whether this plan was devised by Burr or by his 

1 J. C. Hamilton. Hist, of Hie Repub. of the U. S. of Amer., VII., p. 
771. 

■ Burr was nominated governor in the city of New York, Fel 
1804 Two days later the Morning ChronicU wrote: " They offer Bait 
as a man who must be supported, or the weight of the northern stal 
the scale of the Union is irrevocably lost. If the southern, and partic- 
ularly the Virginia, interests are allowed to de-troy this man. we may 
give up all hope of ever furnishing a president to the United Si 
The influence of the northern states in the affairs of the Union and their 
future prosperity imperiously demand, therefore, that we sustain Aaron 



FEDERALIST INTRIGUES WITH BURR. 195 

Federal supporters, and whether Burr was advised by 
these of their ultimate designs, it is not possible to dis- 
cover. 

The fact that these Federalists thought of using Burr, is 
alone a judgment on themselves and their cause, and shows 
satisfactorily how poor were their prospects of success. 
The contempt with which Burr's moral character inspired 
them remained as strong as ever, and they gave uncon- 
cealed expression to it in their letters. Besides, they feared 
that he might deceive them, because the field offered to 
him by their plans might not seem broad enough for his 
ambition. Yet, notwithstanding this, they inquired what 
else they could do. To remain inactive, they said, was 
certain ruin to them: their friends alone would make no 
endeavors. As supporters of Mr. Burr, they would receive 
some assistance, although even that was of a doubtful nature, 
and they had reason enough to be jealous of it. This 
was good reasoning. If they could realize their plans at 
all, it could be done only with the aid of the Burrites. 
And if Bnrr were made governor of "New York, by the aid 
of the Federalists, such a union was perhaps possible, for, as 
Hamilton remarked, the leaders ol the Kepublicans in "New 
England were Burrites, and Burr enjoyed no small popu- 
larity among the masses of the New England Federalists. 
If the union could be effected, what was essential was at- 
tained. The Federalists did not at all desire to see Bun- 
elevated to the presidency. The real importance of the 
whole project was in the thought of a fusion, and the prac- 
tical consequences which its Federal advocates hoped to 
draw from it were in keeping with the reasons which had 
led to the adoption and prosecution of that idea. 

When in 1796 it seemed possible that Jefferson would 
be the next president, there appeared some articles in the 

Burr from sinking in the fury of this contest. We can only do this by 
making him our governor." Cited by J. C. Hamilton, VII., J). 777. 



]'.'•; RATE BOVEBEIGNTY AND BLANKET. 

Connecticut Oourant which endeavored to incline the 
northern Btatee, in such a case, to ji division of the Union. 
We quote: " The northern states can subsist as a nation, 
republic, without any connection with the southern. . . 
I -hall in future papers consider some of the grave events 
which will lead to a separation of the United States. . . 
endeavor to prove the impossibility of our union for any 
long period in the future, both fiomthe moral and politi- 
cal habits of the citizens of the United States, and finally 
examine carefully to see whether we have not already ap- 
proached the era when they must be divided. vn This idea, 
which then could lincl no support, was now again taken up 
by the Federalists. The parties had from the beginning 
corresponded, to a great extent, with the geographical 
tions; but henceforth the name of Federalist was to be 
dropped and the war-cry to be expressly and exclusively "-the 
North!" and " the South!" There were interests enough 
to recommend such a project. If there was no dan-' 
its realization at the present time, the conditions might 
Booner or later be different. And if it should ever happen 
that specifically sectional parties should take the pla 
national parties in the country, the continued existenc 
the Union would depend entirely on the nature of the fun- 
damental question on which they should divide. Jiut, 
even assuming that no question should ever arise to make 
the sectional division the only natural, that is, the only 
possible, one, and therefore the existence of the Union 
after the old fashion impossible, it was still imperative 
that the mere plan should be promptly and ener< 
cally checked in the beginning. If this were not done, it 
might frequently lead to the greatest embarrassment, i 
if never carried into execution. 

The project of fusion was not confined to the ultra I 
eral agitators. The article- of "New Englander" in the 

1 Randall, Jefferson, III., pp. 634, 635. 



NORTHERN SECESSION SYMPATHY. 197 

Connecticut Courant demanded only an intimate coalition 
of the northern states to get rid of the " tyranny of the 
south," and to establish a just "balance of power." 1 The 
ultras did not consider this possible. They based their 
judgment on the diversity of material interests, and the 
alleged assiduity with which the south and the middle 
states so nurtured this that a reconciliation could never 
take place. 2 Hence the northern party was to be consti- 
tuted of men ready to go to the utmost extreme, that is, 
even to division of the Union. 3 The three Federal E"ew 
England states, and first of all Massachusetts, were to take 
the initiative in the building up of the northern party. If 
they could succeed in securing Burr's election in [New 
York, it might be possible to carry out the whole plan. 4 
The plan of the ultras was only an extension of the 

1 " Are we to submit to tlie guidance and the tyranny of the south ? 
. . . The purchase of Louisiana at the expense of fifteen millions of 
dollars for the augmentation of the southern interest, must finally con- 
vince the states north of the Chesapeake, that they must unite in the 
common northern interest. Let, therefore, the disinterested among our 
Federal and Democratic "Republicans lay aside their fatal dissensions, 
which serve to no purpose, but to the purpose of their enemies. We 
shall then be able to fix a just balance of power in the United States." 

8 We quote from the letter already cited to a member of Washington's 
cabinet: "Their [the southern states'] enmity of commerce, on which 
our prosperity depends, is riveted and unyielding. Besides, there is an 
inveterate enmity and jealousy of the northern states, which pervades 
every part of the southern and middle states. This spirit is evidently 
increasing. Since they have obtained the power, they have become arro- 
gant and appear determined to carry this spirit into all classes of socie- 
ty, with a view of riveting the prejudices so strongly as to prevent a 
union of views between north and south under all future circum- 
stances." 

* " In forming the northern party, it is important to consider what the 
ultimate views of that party ought to be, and to avoid as much as possi- 
ble, embarrassing the party with men who will oppose the accomplish- 
ment of those ultimate objects. I have no hesitation myself in saying, 
that there can be no safety to the northern states, without a separation 
from the confederacy." 1. c. 

4 I.e. 



Mi; SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

J consequences of "New Englander's;" for, as Jeffer- 

aaid: "The idea of forming seven eastern statei 
moreover, clearly to form the basis of a separation of the 
Union." 1 Be was right also in the expectation thai 
project would fail. Jefferson owed it again to lii.sl.itr- 
enemy that its development did not extend so far as to 
cause any embarrassment. 2 Hamilton frustrated Burr*! 
election as governor of New York, which was looked up- 
on by both Burrites and Federalists as a condition pi 
dent of the fusion. It was, indeed, more than question- 
able whether it could have been honorably accomplished, 
even if Burr had been elected; because there wen 

• differences between the Burrite and Jeffersonian 
wings of the Republicans. The northern Republican! 
were jealous of the southern, and their leaders were ben| 
on obtaining the seats at the head of the table. Since 

. as representatives of the minority, had no proe 
Of being invited there by the majority of their own party, 
they were prepared to lean on the opposite party which 

ed them Bupport. If the leaders of both sides had been 
won over to the plan by its originators, they would pe?< 
hap- have had enough influence on the masses to make the 
position of those Republicans led by Virginia a rather 
hard one in a presidential election. But the ultimate ob- 

1 Jeff., AVork>, I V.. p. .-,1-2. 

2 The assertion made later by Plumer, of New Hampshire, to which 

rsoll (Hist Sketch of the Second War between the U. 8. <>1* Amer- 
adGreal Britain, II., p. 221, etc.) attaches so much weight, that 
lilton desired to attend the proposed meeting of the conspiral 
,n, is evidenUy entirely valueless. Even if no historical credit is to 
,,n to the message said to have been sent to Boston, and mentioned 
U Hamilton's Bon (J. C. Hamilton, VII., p. 382) the memorial read m 
mv is Bufflcienl proof that Hamilton was opposed to the project. 
If, therefore, he wished to go to Boston, it could only he with the inten- 
tion «.t hindering the further prosecution of the plan. It is sc 

toaddthal the insinuation to the contrary is not warrant*^ 
- Plumer expected forgiveness for his participation in the m- 
trigue, by accusing his accompli 



L 



ABSOLUTE POWER OF THE REPUBLICANS. 199 

ject of the Federalists could never be attained in this way. 
The motives of the Burrites were just sufficient to operate a 
momentary fusion, but not to found a political party that 
could live, and certainly not a party with such extreme ten- 
dencies as the Federalists wished. The whole matter in- 
volved not a political principle, but only a corrupt political 
intrigue. Its significance lies entirely in this, that it serves 
as a measure by which to estimate how far, up to that time, 
the national feeling had been developed, and in this also, 
that it assumed as its basis an idea which, in the course 
of years, grew, through another question, to be one of ter- 
rible vitality. 

The only immediate consequence of the intrigue was a 
still greater diminution of the political credit of the Burr- 
ites and Federalists. In New York the feuds between the 
Republicans still continued, and in Pennsylvania violent 
dissensions broke out among them. But, looked at from 
a national point of view, the malcontents were still only a 
faction, which might indeed be injurious, but not danger- 
ous, while the Federalists, by their abandonment of sound 
political morals, had clipped their own wings. The pre- 
ponderance of the administration party was so great that it 
seemed to depend entirely on their tact and moderation 
whether the country should at last be secured some years 
of internal quiet. Its foreign politics alone threatened 
fresh embarrassment. The character which the struggle 
between England and France began to assume placed the 
United States in a situation from which they could not easily 
escape uninjured. But it would have been readily possible, 
by a firm, rational, and practical policy, to turn the exter- 
nal dangers into a means of internal strength. But Jef- 
ferson was not the man for such a policy, when his an- 
tipathy to England and his sympathy for France came into 
play, and when economical questions constituted an essen- 
tial factor in the problem to be solved. 



STATE SuYKKKR.NTY AND SLAVERY. 



CHAPTER VL 

The Embargo. 1 Madison and the Second War with Eng- 
land. The Hartford Convention. 

Jay'a treaty had not removed all the well-grounded 
grievances of the United States against England, and by 
degrees new ones were added to the old. The prosper 
a friendly understanding were few; partly because Jeffer- 
son rode a very high horse, and would accept nothing un- 
less he could obtain everything, and partly because Eng- 
land's attitude, notwithstanding occasional advances, grew 
mure disregarded every day. Napoleon found herein a 
convenient pretence to assert "might before right" in a still 
more brutal manner, and it was not long before England 
and France formally emulated one another in wilful al- 
terations in the hitherto recognized laws of neutrality. 
England's blockade declaration of May 10, 1806, and the 
order in council of Nov. 11, 1807, on the one hand, and 
Napoleon's Berlin decree of Nov. 21, 1806, and his Milan 
decree of Dec. 17, 1807, on the other, were a Scylla and 
Charybdis, between which the neutral seafaring nations 
could not possibly sail uninjured. Neither interest nor 
self-respect could allow the United States quietly to acqui- 
inthis violence. The Federalists desired to see the 
knot cut in two. Their programme was to assume a bold 

3 a Hildretb (Hist, of the U. S.) for the history of the diplomatic 
manoeuvres precedent to the struggle which began with the embarg 
end ed in the war of 1812. In Dwight's History of the Hartford Con- 
vention, many of the most important documents arc given, some in mil 
and some by extracts. The only worth of that verbose and badly-writ- 
ten book consists Ln these reprints. 



L 



LAYING AN EMBARGO. 201 

front towards France, and thus induce England to adopt a 
more favorable policy, provided it were found impossible 
to make a formal treaty with the latter. Such was, doubt- 
less, the best " political policy" that could be followed. 
The administration party, on the other hand, would hear 
nothing of war; it did not want one with France, and it 
feared one with England. Hence there remained only one 
thing for it to do: to make reprisals, or to surrender the 
ocean commerce of the United States until it pleased the 
two great European powers to conclude peace. 

As early as 1806 an attempt was made, by putting ob- 
stacles in the way of the importation of British goods, to 
exert some influence on England. The provisions in ques- 
tion were to go into force in November, but in December 
the time was extended until the following July. The 
measures were not sufficient of themselves to obtain the 
desired object, and by this vacillation the little impression 
which they had made on England was still farther weaken- 
ed. Jefferson and the congressional majority, therefore, 
soon came to the conclusion that it was necessary to take 
a very decided stand. They resolved, as they supposed, on 
making extensive reprisals, but as a matter of fact they 
sacrificed their maritime commerce. 

On the 18th of December the president recommended 
an embargo. 1 Congress immediately took the message 
under advisement with closed doors. "Without taking the 
least time for deliberation the senate adopted a bill in har- 
mony with the message. 2 In the house of representatives 
the opposition were not allowed more time, and as the de- 

1 Amer. State Papers, V., p. 258. Statesman's Manual, I., p. 204. 

2 There was a touch of the ridiculous in the over-haste of the senate. 
John Quincy Adams exclaimed : " The president has recommended this 
measure on his high responsibility. I would not consider, I would 
not deliberate, I would act. Doubtless the president possesses further 
information as will justify the measure." Hildreth, Hist, of the U. S.| 
VI., p. 37. 



n: BOVEBEIGNTT AND slavkry. 

bates were there also carried on witli closed doors, thej 
uviv completely kept from the people until an accomplish- 
ed fact was before it. The bill was passe 1 with a few 
changes, to which the senate immediately agreed, on the 
21st of I tecember. 1 

The law was Bilently received by the population of the 
commercial Btates. Since the time of the Revolution the 
people had alwavs entertained the opinion that the inter- 
ruption of commercial relations was a very Bimple and in- 
fallible mean 8 of defense again>t any injustice on the part 
of the European powers. 2 The National Iivtellige* 
which mi<dit be considered the semi-official organ of the 
administration, threatened two years before, in high sound- 
ing phrases, the resumption of this policy. The embargo 
could not, therefore, be a complete surprise, and the tradi- 
tion concerning its wonderful power was still so prevalent 
in the commercial states that it was accepted with resigna- 
tion. It was, however, soon otherwise. The people felt 
it- weight, and before long began to murmur and to mur- 
mur the louder, the more apparent it became that the 
promised effects were not produced, and the more cogently 
it was demonstrated in congress that they never could be 
produced, by its means. The demonstration was so incon- 
trovertible, that, after a long struggle, it could not fail to 
be recognized as conclusive. Jefferson and his uncondi- 
tional Mipporters took this all the more to heart, because 
their opponents thrust sharp thorns into the we;. 
parts of their policy, which more than once had exp 

country to serious danger. Herein lies the importance 
of the embargo struggle for the history of the democ 
and of the internal conflict of the United States. The Re- 
publicans presented on this occasion a striking example of 

; r.v 82 against 41 votes. 1Kb. of Congress, III., p. Gtl. 

j Lncy in the house of representatives, Deb. of Congress, IV., p. 

also John Adams' interesting letter to C^uincy, D 
\ Quincy, Lite of J. Quincy, p. 162. 



CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE EMBARGO. 203 

the frivolity and incapacity with which economical ques- 
tions of national significance have as a rule been treated in 
congress. The half-educated mediocrity, which has always 
a broad field of action in the political life of all pure de- 
mocracies, has probably nowhere shown itself more reck- 
less or more presumptuous. The Federalists rightly 
claimed that history afforded no other instance in which a 
government had thus laid violent hands on the economical 
existence of hundreds of thousands of its citizens. Great 
blame would therefore have attached to the Republicans, 
even if their senseless policy had not made the breach be- 
tween the north and the south greater, after there seemed 
to be some prospect that it was about to begin to close. 

The opposition, to which some Republicans also, like 
John Randolph, belonged, raised the constitutional ques- 
tion on this occasion. In the debates of the Philadelphia 
convention the question of the right to lay an embargo was 
only incidentally touched upon. Madison understood the 
clause prohibiting the taxation of exports to be a reserva- 
tion of that right to the general government. Ellsworth 
opposed this view and the convention clearly agreed with 
him. 1 No express provision on this subject was incorpo- 
rated into the constitution. The right claimed by congress 
was, therefore, to be deduced from its authority to regulate 
commerce. 2 The opposition acknowledged the, correctness 
of this construction. 3 They did not question the right of 

1 Elliot, Deb., V., p. 455. 

2 Art. I., Sec. 8, § 3. " Mr. McHenry conceived that power to be in- 
cluded in the power of war." Elliot, Deb., V., p. 455. 

3 An attempt was made later to confine the scope of this clause within 
very narrow limits ; but the supreme court favored the most liberal con- 
struction which the terms of the constitution would admit of. " Com- 
merce . . . is intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse 
between nations and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regula- 
ted by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse. ... It is the 
power to regulate ; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to 
be governed. This power, like all others vested in congress, is com- 



904 ll BOTOREIGMTY AND SLAVERY. 

congress to lay an embargo, which had already been done 
in L794. They insisted only that the embargo of l s( >7 was 
nnoon8titutional for the reason that, unlike that of 17J*4, it 
wae not Limited to a definite time; that an unlimited em- 
bargo was not a regulation, hut an annihilation, of com- 
merce, which the constitution did not authorize. 1 Much 
was advanced in favor of this theory which sounded very 
plausibly, but which was for all that mere declamation. 
The only thing in the whole debate on the constitutional 
question which is worthy of mention is the characteristic 
inconsistency of which the majority were guilty. The 
Republicans did not hesitate to rely on the introductory 
words of the constitution, although the orthodox mode 
of interpretation set up by them declared it to be an ab- 
surdity to endeavor to deduce from these any authority 
whatever.- There was scarcely any occasion for such a 
denial of their old confession of faith. The constitutional 
question was at least so doubtful that they would have had 
little to tear from the opposition if the latter had not had 
other arguments to advance against the embargo. The ma- 
jority. therefore, liked to expatiate on the constitutional 
question, while the opposition avoided it almost entirely 

pi< te in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowl 
DO limitations other than are prescribed in the constitution. . . . 
The wisdom and the discretion of coup-ess, their identity with the peo- 
ple and the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are 
in this, as in many other instances . . . the sole restraints on which 
they have relied to secure them from its abuses." Marshall, in Gibbons 
vs. Ogden, Wheaton's Rep., IX., pp. 190, 196. 

'Ibid. p. 192. Story, the learned commentator on the constitution, 
Who at the time belonged to the Republican party, says: " I ha\, 
considered the embargo a measure which went to the utmost limit of 
constructive power under the constitution. It stands upon the extreme 
verge of the constitution, being in its very form and terms an unlimited 
prohibition <>r suspension of foreign commerce." Life ami Letter.- of. I. 
Story, I., pp. 185, L86. 

■ Deb. of Congress, III., p. 07!). Compare Madison's letter of Nov. 
renson, Niles' Keg., supplement to vol. XLIII., p. 29. 



THE PEOS AND CONS. 205 

and dwelt on the political and economic side of the ques- 
tion, because here they felt the solid ground under their 
feet. 

The majority urged that the United States could not go 
to war with England and France at the same time. But 
the nation's honor and the nation's rights had been ignored 
by both in the same way; and honor and interest therefore 
demanded that the same redress should be had for the 
wrong committed by both powers. As it was not possible 
to obtain this redress with the sword, it was possible and 
could be made efficacious, only by the laying of the em- 
bargo. 

The opposition charged that this mode of reasoning was 
not only fallacious, but sordid. They claimed that the 
administration party did not measure the two aggressive 
powers with the same rule and did not wish so to measure 
them. The whole world knew what the consequences of 
the long war with England were to the navy and mer- 
chant marine of France, and every child could infer that 
all the weight of the embargo was intended to rest on Eng- 
land alone. It helped France against England, and it was 
intended to do so. 

This reproach was a blow with a two-edged sword. The 
old shibboleth of the French and English taction was ban- 
died about once more, and was taken up with eagerness. 
But it could no longer be represented as self-evident that 
sympathy with France in opposition to the rest of Europe 
was synonymous with sympathy for freedom against con- 
spiring tyrants. Napoleon was, as became more evident 
every day, striving after the supremacy of the world, and 
England appeared to be the only insurmountable obstacle 
in the way of the realization of his dream. But too many 
requisitions had been made on the services of rhetoric to 
permit them to have their old enchanting power over the 
American people in the mouth of the emperor. Jefferson 
and his associates took great care, therefore, not to orna- 



BTATE BOVIBEIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

incut their policy as openly a> they had been wont with the 
French cockade. But they had by no means com])! 
broken with this part of their past. Whether their devo- 
tion to Prance was still bo great that they wished to afford 
her indirect support in her war with England, has not yet 
been Bettled with certainty, and it is doubtful if it ever 
can be settled. But they were certainly aware that the 
embargo would not operate to make reprisals on France, 
and Napoleon did not consider that it did so operate. 1 This 
nough to throw a Bhadow over the political morality 
of the administration and of the majority of c >ngr !3S, M 
well as to refute their above-mentioned argument for the 
embargo. They could not at least clear themselves of the 
suspicion of a partiality which could be justified on no 
political or moral grounds, nor could they justly claim that 
they hid thrown dust in the eyes of even one of the offend- 
ing powers. 

And even England had relatively very little to suffer 
from the embargo. At first it was scarcely heeded, more 
important events claiming the attention of the country. 1 

1 General Armstrong, the American ambassador to France, wrote, 

;<>, 1808: " We have somewhat overrated our means of coercion of 
the two great belligerents to a course of justice. The embargo 
measure calculated, ab >ve any other, to keep us whole, and keep us in 

: but beyond this you must not count upon it." (Dwight, Hist 
o( the Hartford Convention, p. 96.) Jefferson himself wrote, Oct 15, 
L808, i" Rob. L. Livingston, (Jeff, Works, V. p. :!7t>): " He [Napoleon] 
concludes, therefore, as every rational man must tllilt 'I 1 '' embargo, tin* 
only remaining alternative, was a wise measure." The duke de Cadore 

still stronger expression to this fact. He writes to general Arm- 
Btrong, A.ug, "i, 1810: "The emperor had applauded the general ernbar- 
Dwight, p. Hi:'.. Compare also Deb. of Cong., IV., p.9. Fisk 
• •i' Vermont, an ardent defender of the embarg >, admitted in the ! 
of representatives in April, 1808, that n- regards France the measure 
had no effect. In tie- debates on the suspension of the embargo he 
inquired: "What do gentlemen now ask? That we should open 
our p<»rt- to Great Britain alone: for that would be the effect of raising 

abargo." Deb. of Congress, III., p. 891. 

- : "In England (in the midst of the more im< 



1XEFFICACY OF THE E^IBAEGO. 



207 



Besides, it was soon shown that the injuries which England 
was made to suffer by the embargo were compensated for 
by many advantages. 1 Moreover, the injury was much 
smaller than had been expected, even in England. Hill- 
house, in the senate, and Quincy and Key, in the house of 
representatives, did not weary of showing that it was im- 
possible, on account of the great extent of sea-coast, to en- 
force a strict observance of the embargo. 2 They reaped 
no advantage, however, from the abundance of actual 
proof of the assertion that only the conscientious had any- 
thing to suffer, while the unscrupulous grew rich, and that 
England could with little difficulty obtain any desired 
quantity of American goods. The misfortune was, it was 
answered to this, that the embargo was not conscientiously 
observed; that were it only so observed, it would be in- 
fallibly attended by the promised results. When it was 
objected that, in politics, all calculations should be based 
on what is, and not upon what should be, the declaimers 
answered that if the people had sunk so low that for the 



Ing events of the clay) it is forgotten." Foreign Relations, III., p. 256. 
Annals of Cong., 2, X., p. 16S4. 

1 " The British ministry also became acquainted about this time 
[June] with the unexpected and unexampled prosperity of their col- 
onies of Canada and Nova Scotia. It was perceived that one year of an 
American embargo was worth to them twenty years of peace or war 
under any other circumstances ; that the usual order of things was re- 
versed; that in lieu of American merchants making estates from the 
use of British merchandise and British capital, the Canadian merchants 
were making fortunes of from ten to thirty or forty thousand pounds in 
a year from the use of American merchandise and American capital." 
Lloyd, of Massachusetts, in the house of representatives, Nov. 21. Deb. 
of Congress, IV., p. 9. "I consider the embargo as a premium to the com- 
merce of Great Britain." Key, of Maryland, in the same place, Dec 8, 
1803, Ibid, IV., p. 66. 

2 Even John Qnincy Adams, who had just separated himself from 
the Federalists and joined the administration party, says, in a letter 
dated Dec. 21, 1808 : " The law will not be executed. It will be resisted 
under the organized sanction of state authority." Niles' Register, 
XXXV., p. 220. 



BOVEBEIGNTY and BLATXBT. 

love of filthy lucre they would not endure such ;i sacrifice 
in order to preserve the national honor, they no longer de- 
served to be free and independent, and that it were tx 
they should return to and he again under English rule. 

This much was now granted: that the United States had 
imposed a sacrifice upon themselves by the embargo. Jef- 
erson, in his message of December is, 1807, had claim- 
ed that Its object was the protection of American com- 
merce. The debates in congress, however, leave no doubt 
that, in reality, the leading thought was the making of re- 
prisals. It was only after experience had shown that as 
Buch it was a mistaken measure, that greater stress was laid 
on the words of the president. But little was gained by the 
change. Quincy chastised the doctrinarians with his in- 
cisive irony, and with equal severity under both subter- 
fuges, bo that they were obliged to shield themselves bv 
having recourse now to one and now to the other. He 
had called the embargo a doubtful, uncertain, difficult, and 
exceedingly costly measure, but as a protection to Amer- 
ican commerce he remarked it was saving the golden 
by killing the goose that laid it. 1 

Quincy's argument could not be refuted. The choir 
the shield with which it was now attempted to receive his 
arrows and those of his associates worthily closed the cir- 
cle of contradictory absurdities. The representatives of 
the planters and of the agricultural interests did not wish 
to concede that the commercial portion of the population 
had Buffered most from the embargo. Such was the 
with which all parties strove for the honor of being the 

1 " When all the property of a multitude is at hazard, the simplest and 
Barest way of securing the greatest portion is not to limit individual 
exertion, hut to stimulate it; not to conceal the nature of the exposure, 
hut, by giving a full knowledge of the state of things, to leave the wit 
of every proprietor nee to workout the salvation of his property ac- 
cording to the opportunities he may discern/' Dehates of Con . 
111., p 



INDUSTRIAL RUIN OF NEW ENGLAND. 209 

greatest martyr, that one might believe the embargo had 
been laid for no other purpose but to test the various de- 
grees of patriotic devotion. 

The question, what interests bore the burthen of the em- 
bargo, and which the heaviest share of it, was, indeed, 
important enough. And it became all the more important 
when it was discovered that it grew more difficult every 
day to find a satisfactory solution of the question of what 
was intended by the pursuit of the senseless policy. Only 
enough was established by this peculiar controversy to 
show that all interests had suffered severely from the em- 
bargo. In order to rescue the ships and their cargoes 
which the United States would have lost by the unjust 
procedure of England and France, all their ships must rot 
in the docks, a large portion of their exports perish entire- 
ly, and the rest remain for a long time unrealized upon. 
The calculation was so simple that even financial artists 
like Jefferson could not have failed to reach the right result 
if they had not permitted themselves to be ruled by the 
idea of making reprisals. 

It was quite as easy to discover the proportion in which 
the different interests had to suffer. The planters' staple 
articles, principally tobacco and cotton, remained unsold, 
but the planters themselves suffered relatively but little 
damage. They were sure of finding; a market again as soon 
as the harbors were open. The farmers sold a considerable 
portion of their products in the country itself; the rest was 
for the most part a total loss. The productive industry of 
the Xew England fishermen, ship-builders, ship-owners, im- 
porters and exporters and all who depended on them, ceased 
almost entirely. 1 % 

In this dispute also it is impossible not to recognize a 
division of parties arising from different interests produced 
by geographical position, and every struggle in which this 

1 See Deb. of Congress, III., p. 692; IV., p. 64. 
14 



210 STATE SOVKi:i:l..-MV AND SI.AVKRY. 

played any part became in consequence doubly bitter. The 

L.u'.l,. which held the balance of power in the reigning 

rtv :u „i WM primarily responsible, would have .,4 

t„ guffer, if the expectation of a moderate duration ot_ the 

embai were realized. The powerless minority of the 

New England Btates, the consideration of whose inter- 
eate, as it was pretended, dictated the measures of the 
administration, had greatest cause for complaint. The mid- 
die Btates occupied a medium position; their interests un- 
questionably inclined them more towards the north, but 
they wavered from one side to the other. 

The manner in which the majority exercised their 
premacy only added oil to the flames. The administration 
permitted itself to adopt a mysterious course, proper in a 
democratic state only when the interests of the country 
indubitably demand it. This could not be pretended here 
and in no case was it allowable towards the minority in 
congress. The majority virtually adopted the standpoint 
of John Quincy Adams, although it did not announce it as 
frankly. The president must have reasons for his recom- 
mendation, hence,-such was the essence of the defense with 
which the partv, to whom, when in the opposition, no lim- 
its to the powers of the government seemed too narro 
gratified their brutal policy. When the minority rose up 
in righteous indignation against this, the old, worn-out cry 
of « want of patriotism" and " British faction" was raised 
again And when at last the choleric Gardinier ol New 
Fork, a man of small school education, but possessed d 
excellent judgment, could no longer control his anger, and 
spoke the unadorned truth to the house of represent. 
tiros, 1 hi> boldness involved him in a duel in which he » 

■ »A11 our surplus produce shall ro, on our hands. God^w-w" 
all this means; I cannot understand ... lam ^ff: 1 ^j 
maved 1 see effects, but I run trace them to no cause I fear < 

; l -;„, kll . m „ han d guiding us to the mos, dreadful ~»»H 
can* n cannot endure me light. Darkness and mystery overshadow 



t 



TYRANNY OF MAJORITIES. 211 

severely wounded. The whole conflict, as carried on by 
the administration, was an unworthy spectacle, and a co- 
gent proof that the tyranny of majorities, in a popular state, 
may often be placed on a footing with the tyranny of abso- 
lute sovereigns. If, in the former case, the means of de- 
fense are far greater than here, the dangers, on the other 
hand, are more serious, because tyranny comes clothed in 
the garb of free institutions. In the instance before us, 
these dangers were all the greater because threatened by a 
party which in theory placed no limit to freedom but the 
widest, and honestly believed itself to be the sole possessor 
of free tendencies. 

But tyranny was bound to come to an end, no matter 
how great the majority of the administration party. The 
pock3ts of the people were made to feel daily that the 
views advocated by the opposition were the right ones, 
and this is an argument which no people can long resist. 
It is exceedingly strange that it took more than a year to 
prevail. The only explanation is that a majority of the 
people as well as the president and the majority in con- 
gress still adhered to the perverse faith of revolutionary 
times in the effects which the interruption of commercial 
relations with European countries would necessarily pro- 
duce. The embargo controversy is one of the best illus- 
trations of the tenacity with which this practical people 
hold in the face of experience to political theories, once 
they have accepted them as true. 

house, and the whole nation. We know nothing, we are permitted to 
know nothing. We sit here as mere automata. We legislate without 
knowing, yea without wishing to know, why or wherefore. We are 
told what to do and we do it. We are put in motion ; but how, I for 
one cannot tell. . . . We are treated as enemies of our country. We 
are permitted to know nothing and are execrated because we do not ap- 
prove of measures, the origin and tendency of which are carefully con- 
cealed from us. We are denounced because we have no confidence in 
an executive that refuses to discover to us or to the nation its actual po- 
sition." Hildreth, Hist, of the U. S., VI., pp. 54, 55. 



._>!•_> STATE SOVEREIGNTY AM) SLAVERY. 

Nearly all the state legislatures formally approved the 
embargo. Even New England was represented by 
Hampshire, and the legislatures of Massachusetts, Vermont 
and Rhode bland expressed a desire that Jefferson should 
beacandidate for the presidency a third time. But th« 
majority over-estimated the value of these manifestations. 
[nthe north, the greater part of the population bitterly op- 
M . tl fc he embargo, even when they supported the admin- 
istration in everything else. In the middle states also, the 
contrary current gained rapidly in strength. In the * 
York legislature, a resolution favorable to the embargo wag 
carried only by the overpowering influence of Clinton, who 
had changed his position on the question from personal 
motives. Its opponents in Maryland by a happy combS 
nation obtained the upper hand in the house of repr. 
tatives for a while. The number of the malcontents in 
Pennsylvania was considerably increased. And while the 
president was in receipt of a large number of approvi 
addresses, congress was stormed with petitions, which grew 
more violent every day, for the raising of the embargo. 1 In 
short, it became continually more evident in what direc- 
tion the current of public opinion was setting. 

The administration and its supporters in congress did 
not learn anything better from all this, but, on the con- 
trary, grew more obstinate in their courses. Act after act 
was passed to enforce the observance of the embargo, and 
providing means to enforce it which grew to be more and 
more coercive. 2 This was the best means which could have 

'isk a warm defender of the embargo, said in the hous. 

Lives, April 13, 1809: -The table of the house has been loaded with 
petitions againsl the embargo." Deb. of Congress, III., p. 0<JO 

- The administration party adduced as their principal .-round »1 jus- 
tfficatioD that an experiment should be made to ascertain whether il. 

r ( i authorities had the power to enforce the observance of the IvM 
f the Union. Quincy, in his journal, gives an account of a convert* 
tion ueld bv him W ith (Hie. „f Virginia: "As to removing the emhar- 

,. n M in favor of adhering to it at all hazard,. He was in iavor ot 



L 



FORCIBLE RESISTANCE TO THE EMBARGO. 213 

been found to cause the opposition so to increase in extent 
and intensity that it would have been the utmost folly to 
resist it. When the president recommended that the 
militia should be called out to enforce the law, the smug- 
glers crossed over the Canadian border in armed bands; 
when he removed a reluctant tax-collector, juries ac- 
quitted the violators of the law; 1 when he dispatched gun- 
boats to the eastern harbors, the opposition press struck 
with increased energy the same threatening key in which 
it had spoken in 1801, 1803, and 1804. 2 It mattered not 
how emphatically congress and the administration protest- 
ed that they had only the best interests of the New Eng- 
land states in view, these were at last firmly resolved not 
to permit themselves to be economically ruined without 
offering any resistance, and all for the sake of the theories 
of those in power. And whence could the administration 
draw the resolution which would enable it to run the risk 
of violent resistance on a greater scale, when it was already 
convinced that war would soon be preferable to the em- 
bargo ? 
Jefferson acknowledges this in his private correspon- 

putting f o trial what the strength of the federal arm was; and if it was 
not sufficient to enforce its own laws, it might as well be known now as 
hereafter." Quincy, Life of J. Quincy, p. 143. Compare Ibid, p. 151. 
The Union has had to pay dearly for the failure to make this trial more 
frequently. The claim was in poor keeping with the conduct of the 
party during the administrations of Washington and Adams. 

1 An article authorized by J. Q. Adams, in the National Intelligencer. 
says: "The people were constantly instigated to forcible resistance 
against it [the embargo], and juries after juries acquitted the violators of 
it upon the ground that it was unconstitutional, assumed in the face of 
a solemn decision of the district court of the United States." Niles' 
Register, XXXV., p. 138. In a precisely similar manner Adams, in a let- 
ter dated Dec. 21, 1808, describes the course of the opposition in Massa- 
chusetts. Ibid, XXXV, p. 220. 

2 See a number of characteristic examples in Randall, Life of Jeff., 
III., pp. 282, 283. 



o 14: 11: B0V3 1:1 KGHTY and si.avkuy. 

denoe,inJune, L808. 1 Spite of this, however, the opp 
til(ll WM obliged to hear for half a year more, with undi- 
miniBhed bitterness, that it had wished, Judas-like, to bar- 
gain away the honor and independence of the country. In 
January, L809,Nicholas, of Virginia, the leader ol the 
ministration party in the house and the special mouthpiece 
f the president, made public uyow.i1 of the change of front 
He introduced a resolution which deserves to be cited 
verbatim. It reads: "Resolved, as the opinion of tins 
house, that the United States ought not to delay beyond 

t \ [V _ day of to repeal the embargo laws, and I 

Bume, maintain, and defend the navigation of the high 
against any nation or nations having in force edicts, or- 
ders or decrees violating the lawful commerce and neutral 
richts of the United States." He desired that the first 
June should be fixed as the date of the repeal of the law. 

Translated into the plain language of every-day life, 
resolution meant: -England and France have alb 
themselves to violate the rights which are ours by the law 
of nations. To protect ourselves and punish these pow 
we have, for thirteen months, renounced completely the 
exercise of the right which they had in part violated. W I 
now inform them that we shall persevere in this p 
four months longer. If by that time they do not promiM 
to deal more equitably with us, we shall be compelled to 
surrender this policy, because we suffer too much from it 
We .hall, at the end of that time, resume the exerc 

■ He writes to Dr. Leib, June 23: » It is true the time will c 
we must abandon it. But it this is before the repeal of the o, 

QC il, we must abandon it only for a state of war. Hi 
distant wlnn that will be preferable to a longer continuance 

Pg Bat we ran never remove that, and let our vessels go O* 
ken Qn der these orders without making reprisals. let this is UM 
very state of things which these federal monarchists [!] are end, . 
to bring about, and in this it is but too possible they may su< 
Jeff., Works, V., p. 304. 



i. 



CHANGE OF FRONT. 215 

our rights, and, if necessary, defend them." Was it pos- 
sible in a few words to give a more destructive criticism 
of the policy of the administration than the administration 
party had itself here given expression to? 

The opposition would, of course, not listen to this "con- 
ditional declaration of war," as Dana, of Massachusetts, 
called the resolution. The administration party had vir- 
tually lost its cause, and the opposition did not wish to 
come to an agreement with it on terms thus easy. In a 
democratic republic a policy in direct conflict with the in- 
terests of the country can be prosecuted only so long as 
the majority of the people remain ignorant of its true 
character and consequences, and the government contin- 
ues consistent in its error. When the people awake to a 
correct understanding, and the government concedes its 
error conditionally, or in part, the opposition must be very 
badly led if it does not in a short time achieve a complete 
victory. 

In the opposition states, the administration was allowed 
to know the minds and feelings of the people more unre- 
servedly than ever. 1 In congress the opposition continued 
its attacks with redoubled energy and the hitherto serried 
ranks of the administration began to show marks of de- 
moralization with astounding rapidity. From among 
themselves they were destined to hear a voice, recalling to 
their memory the principle which is the kernel of the idea 
of the republican state, viz. : that it is the spirit and the 
duty of republican governments to make laws agreeable to 
the people, and not to endeavor to accommodate the people 

1 Thus the Massachusetts senate declared : " The people of New Eng- 
land perfectly understand the distinction between the constitution and 
the administration. . . . On such occasions passive obedience would, 
on the part of the people, be a breach of their allegiance, and on our 
part, treachery and perjury. The people have not sent us here to sur- 
render their rights, but to maintain and defend them ; and we have no 
authority to dispense with the duties thus solemnly imposed." Hildreth, 
Hist, of the U. S., V., p. 116. 



Bid STATE SOVEREIGNTY AM) SLAVERY. 

to the laws. Their charge that the opposition was fed only 
by the British and "monarchical faction" was of no avail, 
for their staunchest supporters declared now with solemn 
earnestness, that the whole north was of one opinion on 
this question. 1 The fate of Nicholas's resolution was proof 
enough of this. No time was allowed to those who had 
remained true to the administration to collect their 
thoughts. The deserters from the party went so tar even, 
offer their aid to hoodwink them by a parliamentary 
stroke. Nicholas had so amended his resolution on the 
30th of January, that letters of marque and reprisal were 
to be issued in case the objectionable orders of the power! 
were not recalled at the date to be determined on. The 
Opposition moved for a division of the question, and ob- 
tained it. because the majority were completely surprised 
by the motion. The motion supported by the administra- 
tion, to fix the 1st of June as the date of the raisii 
the embargo, was rejected, and the 4th of March fixed in- 
stead.- After the first part of the resolution was thus 
adopted with this amendment by seventy-six votes, the 
Becond part was rejected by fifty-seven against thirty-nine 
votes. 

Jefferson was very much surprised by this defeat just 
before his retirement to private life. 3 He could not 

1 Cook, a Republican member of the Massachusetts house of repn 
tatives, said: u The south say embargo or war; the north ami east 
no embargo, no war. . . . To comply with the general wish of the 
north, the embargo acts must be repealed at an early day.'' Ilildreth, YJ., 
p. 127. Story writes. Jan 4, 180!h "The southern states are all tor a con- 
tinuance; the middle and western are all ready to unite in any measure. 
But with very tew exceptions, the Republicans from New England re- 
ceive almost daily Utters which urge a repeal." Life and Letters of •)• 
Story. I., p. 174. 

1 The number of those voting " aye" was seventy; the number \< 
"no" is not given. Annals of Congress, 1808-9, p. 1334. Ilildreth er- 
roneously gives the 1st of March as the date. 

■ Quiney writes to John Adams, Dec. 18, 1808: "Fear of responsibility 



EEPEAL OF THE EMBARGO. 217 

plain tins sudden revolution of opinion. 1 Xotwithstanding 
his confession to Dr. Leib, seven months before, he tiow 
said that the "psendo-Eepnblican" Story was responsible 
for the whole misfortune, and that the removal of the em- 
bargo had inflicted an incurable wound on the interests of 
the country. 2 

and love of popularity are now master passions and regulate all the 
movements. The policy is to keep things as they are, and wait for 
European events. . . . The presidential term will have expired, and 
then away to Monticello, and let the take the hindmost. I do be- 
lieve that not a whit deeper project than this fills the august mind of your 
successor.'' Quincy. Life of J. Quincy, p. 146. Jefferson's character and 
his personal attitude towards the embargo question during the last 
months of his administration are described in these few words with 
masterly skill. 

1 " I thought congress had taken their ground firmly for continuing 
the embargo till June, and then war. But a sudden and unaccountable 
revolution of opinion took place the last week, chiefly among the Xew 
England and XewYork members, and in a kind of panic they voted the 
4th of March for removing the embargo, and by such a majority as gave 
all reason to believe they would not agree either to war or non-inter- 
course." Jefferson to Th. M. Randolph, Feb. 7, 1809. Jeff., Works, V., 
p. 424. 

2 July 16, 1810, he writes to Dearborn : "The Federalists, during their 
short-lived ascendency, have, nevertheless, by forcing us from the em- 
bargo, inflicted a wound on our interests which can never be cured, 
and on our affections which will require time to cicatrize. 1 ascribe 
all this to one pseudo- Republican, Story. He came on . . . and 
staid only a few days; long enough, however, to get complete hold of 
Bacon, who, giving in to his representations, became panic-struck, and, 
communicated his panic to his colleagues, and the}- to a majority of the 
sound members of congress. They believed in the alternative of repeal 
or civil war, and produced this fatal measure of repeal." Jeff., Works, 
V., p. 529. On the other hand, he writes to W. B. Giles, Dec. 25, 1825 : 
14 He [John Quincy Adams] assured me that there was eminent danger 
that the convention [of the New England states] would take place ; 
and that to enable its [the Union's] friends to make head against it the 
repeal of the embargo was absolutely necessary. I expressed a just sense 
of the merit of this information, and of the importance of the disclosure 
to the safety and even the salvation of our country ; and however reluctant 
I was to abandon the measure (a measure which, persevered in a little 
longer, we had subsequent and satisfactory assurance, would have effect- 






01$ LTl BOTBBEIOHTT AND SLAVKUY. 

There waa an element of truth in this view of Jefferson. 
The terror which bad taken hold of the majority wsb in- 
deed exaggerated. Heavy as the embargo weighed on 
northern states, it might have been continued some time 
longer without any danger of entailing civil war. The 
majority Boon perceived that they had too hastily dropped 
their arms, and the partial resumption of the policy 
hitherto pursned by them was far from leading to an immedi- 
ate crisis. The more moderate agreed, before the adjourn- 
ment of congress, on the Non-intercourse Act, 1 which 
postponed the raising of the embargo to the 15th of March, 
and allowed it to remain in force so far as France and 
England were concerned to the end of the next sessio 
congress. Even this partial success of the opposition was 
ficient to operate powerfully as an appeasement of the ex- 
citement The masses had not as yet formed such anidea of 

ed its object completely) from that moment, and influenced by that in- 
formation, 1 saw llie necessity of abandoning it, and instead of effecting 
onr purpose by this peaceable weapon we must fight it out, or break the 
Union. I then recommended to yield to the necessity of a repeal of the 
embargo, and to endeavor to supply its place by the best substitute in 
which they could procure a general concurrence." Jeff., Works, \ II., 
pp. 425, 426. There is no reason to ascribe this evident contradiction to 
an impure motive. Jefferson was then 83 years old, and his memory 
may therefore have proved treacherous. Story writes in his aut< 
raphy: " Mr. Jefferson has honored me by attributing to my intiuenee 
the repeal of the embargo. I freely admit that I did all I could to ac- 
complish it, though I returned home before the act passed. The very 
eagerness with which the repeal was supported by a majority of the Re- 
publican party ought to have taught Mr. Jefferson that it was already 
considered by them a. a miserable and mischievous failure. . . The 
truth is, thai if the measure had not been abandoned when it was, it 
would have overturned the administration itself, and the Republican 
party would have been driven from power by the indignation of the 
people, goaded ^n to madness by their sufferings." Story, Lif< 
Letters of J. Story, I., p. 185. In a letter to Everett he says: "The 
cedil of it [the repeal of the embargo] is due to the firmness and m- 
tegrity of Mr. Bacon." Ibid, I., p. 187. Quincy agrees in this opin- 
ion. Life of ,1. Quincy, i>. i v ">. 
1 Annate of Cong.. 2, X., 1834; Stat, at L., II., p. 528. 



, 



THE FEDERALISTS LACK LEADERS. 219 

the ruinousness of the policy of the administration as to 
seriously threaten the power of the Republicans. They 
could again go back immediately, slowly but surely, over 
the road which naturally ended in an unnecessary and not 
very honorable war; a war which, it is true, was not fruitless, 
but which left all the questions for which it was waged un- 
solved. They could with impunity venture to introduce 
their policy anew, by a second embargo of ninety days, 
and during its continuance to lay a third one. At last, 
indeed, the Federalists enjoyed a great moral triumph, fur 
the president himself recommended its recall; but Jeffer- 
son's unfortunate policy had already borne fruit in abun- 
dance. 

The haste which characterized the course of the Feder- 
alists when the dismay of the northern Republicans afforded 
them the opportunity of a partial victory in February, 1809, 
was therefore, a great political mistake. Since Hamilton's 
death they were wanting in a leader with the coolness of 
judgment absolutely necessary to turn the errors of their 
opponents completely to account. They wasted their ammu- 
nition in useless demonstrations and petty skirmishes, and 
could therefore never engage in a decisive battle. Had 
they had to deal with statesmanlike talent of a higher or- 
der, they might perhaps have been schooled by the contest 
to pursue their endeavors towards the realization of their 
more correct political ideas in a more efficient manner. 

The ultimate cause of their mistake was, as on so many 
former occasions, that they had not discovered the right 
political point of view. They over-estimated the momen- 
tary excitement of the masses, and under-estimated their 
loyalty to the federal authorities and their fidelity to the 
Union. The Republicans had repeatedly fallen into the 
same mistake when they were in the opposition, and they 
now committed the very same errors in their calculations. 
Hence the " panic terror" on their part, and on the part of 
the Federalists the haste to take advantage of it. The 



220 STATE -'YIKIHiVlY AM) SLAVERY. 

majority of American historians have made use of this cir- 
cumstance to paint the tendencies of the opposing party 
towards resistance or separation in individual cases in too 
glaring colors, or to deny that disloyal plans had been de- 
vised or the thought of secession seriously entertained by 
their own party. Judged from an impartial standpoint, 
the fact that the possibility of a civil war or of a division 
of the Union was so frequently, and on relatively insigni- 
ficant occasions, thought of on both sides, may betaken as 
a measure of the degree of consolidation the Union had at- 
tained at the time. ' The leaders undervalued the solidari- 
tv of material interests which already obtained, and the 
instincts of the people were therefore juster than the well- 
pondered judgments of the leaders. On the one hand, the 
conflict of interests and the particularistic tendencies of the 
masses were yet so great that the leaders were always 
goaded into a policy disloyal and particularistic in its ten- 
dencies, and they found so much sympathy with the mi 
that what at first were only thoughts soon ripened into 
plans. On the other hand, the solidarity of interests, and 
the national feeling which it fed, were already so strong that 
the masses refused their services even before the plans had 
gone BO far as to find expression in an attempt at action. 1 

i -It is a melancholy reflection— a subject that excites our best and 
■ inm ,, vJ feeling — that projects or speculations, as to a dissolution ofthia 
Union, have been so frequently indulged. That leading men in Vir- 
ginia Looked to a dismemberment in 1798-9, when the armory was built, 
etc.,— that Burr and his confederates had an eye to the establishment of 
a western government, in 1805-6,— that many contemplated a building. 
up of the 'nation of New England' from 1808 to 1815,~and that now [1828] 
some in tin- BOUth are ealeulatin.ir a division at the Potomac, seems to 111 
undoubted; but the lengthsto which either party proceeded or will pro- 

ry much on conjecture or depends on opinion. 
These are fearful things to think of. But whatever have been, or may 
be, the designs of individuals, we have always believed, and yet torn* 
that the vast body of tin- people ever have been, and are. warmly at- 
tached to the Union; and that it never perhaps was really more strong 
thanwhenil seemed mosl enda ngered , even during the darkest period 
Of the late war." Niles' Keg., XXXV., p. 210. 



AN ENGLISH SPY. 221 

It mattered not how often the laboring mountain had given 
birth to nothing greater than a mouse, the labor itself and the 
political judgment of American statesmen are not on that 
account to be lightly estimated. The actual condition of 
affairs presented so unusual a complication of positive and 
negative factors so peculiarly grouped that it was, indeed, 
no easy matter to discover their sum-total. 

European statesmen, who observed from the nearest 
point, fell into the same error. In February, 1809, Sir James 
Craig, governor of Canada, sent a secret agent, Henry by 
name, to Boston. His main task was to form an opinion 
as to how great or how small the prospects of the Federal- 
ists were to obtain control of the country, and how far they 
would feel inclined in case of a disruption of the Union to 
look for support to England. 1 In very general terms, but 
in such as were easily intelligible, his instructions further 
directed him to find out from the leaders of the Federalists, 
whether England, in case of a war with the United States, 
could, to a certain extent, rely on them, and in what man- 
ner indirect support was to be expected from them. Jef- 
ferson asserts that John Quincy Adams said at the time 
that this was to be done, according to Craig's plan, by a 
declaration of neutrality. 2 

1 Sir James Craig to Henry, Feb. 6, 1809: "It has been supposed that 
if the Federalists of the eastern states should be successful in obtaining 

"that decided influence which may enable them to direct the public 
opinion, it is not improbable that rather than submit to a contin- 
uance of the difficulties and distress to which they are now subject, they 
will exert that influence to bring about a separation of the general union. 
The earliest information on this subject may be of great importance to 
our government, as it may also be, that it should be informed, how far 
in such an event they would look up to England for assistance, or be 
disposed to enter into a connection with us." Dwight, Hist, of the 
Hartford Convention, p. 200. 

2 Jefferson to John Adams, April 20, 1812 : " He [J. Q. Adams] stated a 
particular which Henry has not distinctly brought forward, which was, 
that the eastern states were not to be required to make a formal act of 
separation from the Union, and to take a part in the war against it, a 



m; 80YBBEIGHTT AND SLAVERY. 

Benry himself became convinced after a short time that 
hie mission wonld remain fruitless. 1 The Federalists, La 
relying on this declaration, represented the whole plan as 
an absurdity ab initio. Eenry's disclosures were certainly 
not worth the 150,000 which Madison paid fur th.-ni, hut 
the plan cannot he looked upon as the clumsy mystifica- 
tion of a common cheat, simply because it remained with- 
out results. Benry had come to Boston at an unfortunate 
moment After the partial removal of the embargo and 
the acceptance of the friendly proposals of Great Britain 
through Mr. Madison, he could expect no advances from 
the extreme Federalists. 2 But it does not follow from this 
that he would have met the same reception if the adminis- 
tration party had not yielded, as up to February see 
probable. One of the most distinguished sons of whom 
Massachusetts can boast was of opinion that Henry would 
have found support enough for his operations, if the policy 
hitherto pursued had been persevered in. As early as No- 
vember, 1S08, John Quincy Adams expressed the fear that 
thismight lead to civil war.' Later he claimed to have "une- 
quivocal evidence" tending to show that there was a 

measure deemed much too strong for their people: but to declare them. 
3 io a state of neutrality, in consideration of which they were to 
have peace and free commerce, the lure most likely to ensure popular 
acquiescence." Jeff., Works VI., P- 50. 
i H, writes, May 25, 1809: " 1 begleave to suggest that in the present 
»f things in this country, my presence can contribute very little to 
the interests of Great Britain/' Niles' Reg., II, p. 25. The whole cor- 
respondence bearing on this subject is to be found in Ann. ot Con 
1. XII., p. ll'i^etc; Foreign Relations, III., p. 645, etc.; Nitea 
II.. p. 19, etc. 
■ - e Benry'a letters of the 5th and 25th of May. 

»« Between the embargo and the non-intercourse system, under my 
pre*. f information, I should strongly incline to the last It 

would, indeed, incur new hazard of eventual war abroad, but I think it 
would remove the ri^k of war at home for the present." Nov. I i 

X XXV., p. 290. Compare also the letters from Desausuw, 
i Jan. 81, 1809, and from Crafts Jan. 30, 1809, to Quincy. 
Quincy, pp. 189-198. 



PEOJECT FOE SECESSION OF THE EAST. 223 

tematic attempt making to dissolve the Union. In his 
opinion Xew England would have undoubtedly made sure 
of the assistance of Great Britain if the administration 
had made civil war inevitable by an effort to overcome the 
resistance to the embargo bv force. 1 

The Federalists, on whom in particular the suspicion 
would rest, declared Adams's disclosures to be malicious 
calumnies, wanting foundation in fact. How far Adams's 
works and correspondence, the publication of which is 
going on, will contain proofs of his assertion, it is impos- 
sible to conjecture. The accuser and the accused were 
both honorable men, whose words had equal weight, but 
of course the burden of proof is on the former. As long 
as this has not been produced, equity demands that the 
peculiar position in which Adams was placed at the time 
should be considered in favor of the party accused. He 

1 In an article in the National Intelligencer of Oct. 21, 1828, author- 
ized by Adams, we read : " A separation of the Union was openly stim- 
ulated in the public prints, and a convention of delegates of the New 
England states to meet at New Haven was intended and proposed. . . 
He [Adams] urged that a continuance of the embargo much longer 
would certainly be met by forcible resistance, supported by the legisla- 
ture, and probably by the judiciary of the state. That to quell that re- 
sistance, if force should be resorted to by the government, it would pro- 
duce a civil war ; and that in that event, he had no doubt the leaders of 
the party would secure the co-operation with them of Great Britain. 
That their object was, and had been for several years, a dissolution of 
the Union and the establishment of a separate confederation, he knew 
from unequivocal evidence, although not provable in a court of law ; 
and that in case of a civil war the aid of Great Britain to effect that 
purpose would be as surely resorted to as it would be indispensably 
necessary to the design." Mies' Register, XXXV., p. 138. Story writes 
Jan. 4, 1S09: " If I may judge from the letters I have seen from the 
various districts of Massachusetts, it is a prevalent opinion there, and 
in truth, many friends from the Xew England states write us that there 
is great danger of resistance to the laws, and great probability that the 
E-<ex junto have resolved to attempt a separation of the eastern states 
from the Union; and if the embargo continues that their plan may re- 
ceive support from our yeomanry." Life and Letters of J. Story, I., 
p. 17-1. Compare also Ibid, p. 182. 



224 lTI bovjbrbigntt and blaybb 

had juat Beparated from the Federalists, and was a warm 
advocate of the most essential points of the policy of the 
administration, although he did not go over formally and 
entirely to the Republican camp. The odium which he 
thereby drew down upon himself might, indeed, have in- 
fluenced him bo far as to cause him to see more than there 
really , be Been. This assumption gains in probabil- 

it v from the fact that he was not free from(the morbid dis- 
trust and the consequent easy credulity which were the 
most prominent features in his father's character. On 
the other hand, his whole political life is a sufficient guar- 
anty that he would not have made the charges if he had 
not been perfectly satisfied of their truth, and he was in 
B position to obtain complete and reliable information in 
regard to them. The final decision of history must tl. 
fore remain suspended. To the more important quesl 
however, what prospect there was of the probable sue 
of Craig's and Henry's plan, if the reigning party had 
not in part retraced their steps, the history of the folio w- 
ing years gives a satisfactory answer. 

( me of the principal arguments by which the adminis- 
tration had, from the beginning, defended the emb 
was that the only choice lay between the embargo and 
war, and that war should be avoided as long as possible. 1 
The ultra-Federalists censured this view as one of im- 
potent cowardice. In the winter of 1S05-6, the most im- 
tant commercial towns of the northern and middle 
states Bent memorials to congress, in which they urged it 
to an energetic defense of the rights granted to neutrals by 
international law. in the interest of American commerces 
The memorials were couched throughout in the most de- 

> « If we had put the question to every man in the nation, the head 
a family, whether we Bhould go to war or lay an embargo, (the only 
choice wehad) nineteen out of twenty would have voted for an e^ 
, • Williams, Of S >uth Carolina, Dec. 9, 1808, in the house ot rep- 
re* 1Kb. of Cong., IV., p. 70. Ibid, pp. 13, 14, 41, o,. 



L 



HENRY CLAY APPEARS IX POLITICS. 225 

cided terms, and some of them declared that war might per- 
haps be necessary for the protection of the rights and honor 
of the country. 1 Later the administration party was oblig- 
ed to hear that it was impossible to "kick" it into a war. But 
the more the damage which commerce had sustained from 
the violation of the neutrality laws and the irrational 
policy of the administration was felt, the less loud grew 
the warlike tone of the Federalists. At first they denied 
that the choice really lay only between subjection, embar- 
go, and war; then they reproached the majority that by 
their shyness of war they made war inevitable, and be- 
sides, that they did not seem to see that if there should or 
must be war, it were better it should be begun before the 
strength of the country had been weakened by the embar- 
go; and lastly, they adopted as their battle-cry against the 
Republicans unconditional opposition to a war with Eng- 
land. 

The administration party took at the same time a still 
more radical turn and in the opposite direction. The de- 
termining influence was exercised here by the extreme 
Republicans of the south and the representatives of the 
young western states. Williams of South Carolina was 
still of opinion in December, 180S, that by a war they had 
nothing to gain and everything to lose. 2 And yet if 
the embargo was not removed, he declared himself rejoiced 
at the opportunity afforded by Jackson's motion of regis- 
tering his vote for the war. 3 One year later, Clay, who 
already carried great weight, spite of his youth, made an 
equally frank declaration in the senate. With the profuse 
rhetoric of youth, and genuine American self-admiration, 
he avowed most candidly that, in case of a war, it would 

1 See the extracts from a number of these memorials in Niles' Reg., 
VII., pp. 327-329. 

" The people have nothing to gain by war, nothing by bloodshed; 
but they have everything to lose." Deb. of Congress, IV., p. 76. 
3 Hildreth, Hist, of the U. S., VI., p. 136. 
15 



BEIGHTT AM» BLAYSKT. 

to look to the defense of the county 

bnt that the conquest of Canada should beta 

da member of the house of rep. 
tin. the following n d was chosen s, 

fce disproportionately great influence of h.s position with 
ma6t erly skill and astounding reckless, reahze 

idea pl0 posed in the above programme He appm 
Calhoun, who had been elected to congress for thefirst I 
the second member of the important committee ot 

dTaire, and he(Calhoun) soon became its actual head m 

first month « '- 1 not • Vl ' t T 1r '", e 

two young zealots had brought it to such a pass that t 
( .„ u ,;i proclaim as a fixed resolution,what a year and a half 
befo had given expression to as an eventual 

On the 29th of November. 1-11. the committee on I 
affair, made their report, and laid a mass of resolutto, 
fore the honse.' The report recited: " Forbearance he* 
ceased to be a virtue. . . • The period has arrived when 

. •• Your whole circle of commercial restricts **»* 

eaeefu, resistance of .he .aw. When Uus,s — 

1 : „n forresistance by the sword. . . . It a said. B 
v l:,.n.,.. l ,H,a is attainably, war with Great Britain^ In Us 
lortu n" we are to estimate no. only the benefit to be derived 
the injury to be done the enemy. The conquest of Can, 
a power I mist I shall ..... be deemed presumptuous when 

rf«M Montreal and Upper Canada at your feet . . . lsiuerei 

,„„,« enervated bythe spirit of avarice ««"««* 
lliltt . . • A certain portion of military ardor <„ 

- Tr Tee of he, 

I wan, the md living example o. anew r o, 

v their [the heme, of the revolutionary war] places, and 

Lu-pm uhey have achieved." Deb. of Congres 

, lo wever. haunted the heads of. he youn S 

i;lo Qnincrsspeechofthe^thofJan 

I ) lincv n 176. C >mp» 1' ' "' 

L house has been rightly styled the second, 
age in the republic. 



ADOPTION OF WAE MEASrEES. 22 1 

in the opinion of your committee it is the sacred duty of 
congress to call forth the patriotism and resources of the 
country.*' The resolutions among other things asked for 
an increase of the regular army by the addition of ten 
thousand men. and that the president should be authorized 
to call volunteers to the number of fifty thousand under 
arms. Randolph said during the debates on the report 
that the question lay between peace and war, and that war, 
a war of conquest against England. 1 Wright of Maryland 
claimed, on the other hand, that there was no longer any 
question of peace; that there was no choice but subjugation 
or war. 2 The committee itself left no doubt as to what was 
intended by the resolutions. Calhoun expressly declared 
that the proposed measures had a meaning only when they 
were looked upon as a preparation for war and that war 
could not be be declared at once, only because the country 
was not ready for it. 3 The house adopted both the resolu- 
tions, one by one hundred and ten to twenty-two and the 
other by one hundred and thirteen to sixteen votes. 4 By an 
overpowering majority, it resolved also that the war should 
begin as soon as the necessary preparations were made; for 
this is the legitimate interpretation, which, according to 
Calhoun's declaration, is to be put on the vote. 

Randolph had said in his great speech of the 10th of 
December, that the committee had gone farther than the 
president. Madison was, indeed, far from being able to 
master the situation. Endowed by nature with a clearer 
insight into matters of state and with a much finer moral 



1 Deb. of Congress, IV., pp. 436, 435. 
1 Ibid. IV., p. 445. 

3 '• I certainly understand that the committee recommended the meas- 
ures now before the house as a preparation for war; and such in fact 
was its express resolve, agreed to, I believe, by every member, except 
that gentleman [Randolph]. . . . Indeed the report could mean 
nothing but war or empty menace." Calhoun's Works, II., p. 2. 

4 Deb. of Congress, VI., p. 465. 



aTK SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

constitution than Jefferson, he became like wax in hi* 
hands, once tin* Republican party had permanently obtained 
the mastery in Virginia. The gift of persuasion which he 
ssed in an eminent degree, and which made him an 
invaluable ally, became almost ruinous to him. When 
were obstacles placed in the way of Ids ambition, 
which his moral sense would not permit him to evade, his 
judgment was wont to be misled by his sharp and flatte 

The impulse in this direction he always received 
From ethers, lln was deficient in the independence and 
_y of will which are the necessary requisites of a great 
political leader. Hence, while he always remained a polit- 
ical attorney of extraordinary ability, he never rose to the 
height of the statesman. These were qualities which emi- 
nently qualified him to serve as the right-hand man of his 
predecessor in the presidency. But when he was hi: 
placed at the head of the state, he found himself entail 
in a terrible net, which he had wrought with his own 
hands. lie was not the man to tear it to pieces with 
quick resolution. And his participation in the ruii 
work was so great that he could not see that the net con Id 
be unraveled with success only on condition that the work 
was begun without delay and prosecuted in accordance 
with a well-matured plan. But even if he had seen it, he 
would scarcely have taken such a resolution, for, in d« 
so, he would have been passing judgment not only on Jef- 
ferson, but on himself. Besides, now that the decision 
rested with him, his real nature got the better of him. 
Moderate in his thought and judgment, he had alwayi 
cautiously felt his way towards a middle course, in which 
lie followed only his own mind and inclinations. Under 
the burthen of responsibility, this commendable modera- 
tion was now transformed into a painful uncertainty. 
Whatever was positive in the programme devised by Jeffer- 
son crumbled away like baked sand in his hands. The 
state of the country demanded more imperatively c 



CHARACTER OF MADISON. 229 

day, that a decided initiative should be taken, but the man 
whose duty it was to take it was wanting not only in the 
necessary qualities of character, but his whole programme 
was,like that of the opposition, a purely negative one. 1 

Under such conditions, the field belongs, in a popular 
state, to those possessed of the courage to resolve and do. 
The homines novi in congress had this courage, and Madi- 
son therefore became their tool. Their un satiated ambition 
expected to earn in war, in rich abundance, the laurels 
which the contest over questions of internal politics offered 
them little prospect of winning in the near future, because 
the Democrats 2 were possessed of an overwhelming prepon- 
derance. 

That there had been for years sufficient cause for war, 
cannot be questioned, but it was, notwithstanding, the 
work of a small ambitious party in congress. The country 
was drawn into it, although the opposition party condemned 
it in a manner and to an extent which excited fear of for- 
cible resistance and of treason; although the bearer of the 
executive authority and the head of the party did not de- 
sire it; and spite of the fact that only a small minority 
considered it really inevitable and wished for it with un- 
affected enthusiasm. This is a remarkable instance how 
little, under certain circumstances, even among peoples 
who rejoice in the most unlimited self-government, there 
is, in truth, any self-government, and how often facts give 
the lie to the principle of the sovereignty of the majority. 

The war party obtained control in congress because 
vanity and the party interests of the majority prevented 
their acknowledging their former mistakes. They had 
imposed every kind of restriction on commerce, and all 
that they had accomplished was to seriously damage their 

1 Compare Quincy's opinion. Life of Quincy, p. 204. 

2 The names Republicans and Democrats were for a long time used 
indifferently. From the 9th congress, the latter designation began to 
encroach upon the other. 



.11! BOYEREIGNTT AND SLAVERY. 

owd interests. 1 So long as it would not be conceded that 
the i<le:i which lay at the foundation of these restrictions 
was a false one, it was necessary to hold that there was no 
choice except between them and war, and that policy and 
good morals had operated for a decision in favor of the 
r evil, so long as by this means the attainment of the 
wished-for end still seemed possible. From this it dii 
lv followed not only that war was justifiable, but that it 
should be declared necessary. 

The same burden of logical consequences, drawn from 
premises which lie had made himself, weighed heavily i^i 
Madison. The enthusiasts in favor of war were in a con- 
dition to give importance to another element, and thia 
cided the issue. The presidential election was impending, 
and the war party made the unconditional adoption (A 
their policy a sine qua non of his renomination. 2 That 

1 It has already been remarked that the planters had least to suffer 
from the embargo. But it is evident that the grounds above adduced 
could produce the effects mentioned only during a short time. When 
the restrictions on commerce had lasted for years, the planters' - 
po<>r in capital and in manufactures and obliged to obtain the gi 
part of the necessaries of life from the west, suffered most from it 
Randolph says in his speech of Dec. 10, 1811: u By a series of mod 
impolitic and ruinous measures, utterly incomprehensible to every 
rational, sober-minded man, the southern planters, by their own \ 
had succeeded in knocking down the price of cotton to seven c 
and of tobacco (a few choice crops excepted) to nothing, and in ra 
the price of blankets, coarse woolens, and every article of first :. 
sity, three or four hundred per cent." Deb. of Cong., IV., p. 4:W. Th. 
Pinckney, of South Carolina, wrote May 25, 1803: u We are 
smarting under the effect of the embargo." Quincy, Life of .J. Quincy, 
p. 140. Quincy writes in his diary, Nov. 8, 1808: "In the evening 
Lewis, of Virginia, called on us. He represented the sufferin 
state under the embargo as extreme;" and on Nov. H>, " Con versa 
with J. Randolph. He said the embargo was ruining Virginia." Ibid, 
p. 143. 

•The fact was so notorious that it was mentioned in the most direct 
way in congress. Said Quincy, on the 5th of January, 1813, in the 

of representatives: "Thegrea: mistake of all those wh 
concerning the war and the invasion of Canada, and concluded that it 



THE THIED EMBARGO. 231 

the threat could be carried into effect was to be looked up- 
on as certain, for Monroe and Clinton were already pre- 
pared to accept the nomination from the war party, and 
this party could not, therefore, be at a loss for candidates. 
Madison was not a man of such rigid moral firmness 
that his convictions could have withstood such a tempta- 
tion. He fell a victim, like others before him, and like 
men of the greatest political talents after him, to the 
presidential fever. Clay and Calhoun, who had mainly 
abetted him in this bargain, which was made at the expense 
of the country, afterwards wasted away under the influence 
of the same incurable malady. 

Madison was forced farther step by step. At first he 
was compelled to write a confidential message which recom- 
mended an embargo of sixty days. 1 Grundy, of Tennes- 
see, replied, on inquiry, in the name of the committee on 
foreign relations, that it was to be looked upon as the 
immediate precursor of war. 2 Clay and Smilie agreed in 
this view, and expressed their great satisfaction that the 
matter had progressed so far. 3 

Randolph had called attention to the fact that the em- 
bargo had not in reality originated with Madison. 4 True, 
Calhoun and Grundy contested his assertion; but it was 

was impossible that either should be seriously intended, resulted from 
this that they never took into consideration the connection of both these 
events with the great election for the chief magistracy, which was then 
pending. It never was sufficiently considered by them that plunging 
into war with Great Britain was among the conditions on which the 
support for the presidency was made dependent." Deb. of Cong., IV., 
pp. 629, 630. 

1 April 1, 1812. Statesman's Man., I., p. 292. 

2 " Mr. Grundy said . . . that he understands it as a war measure, 
and it is meant that it shall lead directly to it ; that with any other 
view there was no propriety in it; as a peace measure he had no idea 
that the president would have recommended it, nor would the committee 
have agreed to it." Deb. of Cong., IV., p. 544. 

3 Ibid, IV., pp. 545, 546. 

4 Ibid, IV., p. 546. 



STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

their well-settled policy to make the president the month- 
piece by which they made known their resolutions. Mad- 
ison had already given evidence of his willingness to 
:i declaration of war. But this did not satisfy the war 
party. They wanted him not only to join them, bnt to 
completely identify himself with them. He was informed 
that he would have either to do without their supporl 
t«> prevail on congress to make the declaration of war. 
He yielded, and sent congress another confidential i 

. in which he laid before it at length the wrongs which 
had been inflicted. England, he said, was already practi- 
cally at war with the United States, and it was now incum- 
bent on congress to decide whether force should be opp 
to force. 1 

This virtually decided the triumph of the war party; but 
they nevertheless followed up their victory with such im- 
petuosity, that it seemed they were not completely sur 
it until it was an accomplished fact. On the 30th of June, 
Calhoun, in the name of the committee on foreign affairs, 
presented a report on the message to the house in which he 
recommended "an immediate appeal to arms." 2 lie mo 
at the same time that a formal declaration of war against 
Great Britain should be made, and it was passed to a 

IU We behold, in tine, on the side of Great Britain a state of war 
againsl ihe United States, and on the side of the United Stal 
of peace toward Great Britain. Whether the United States shall con- 
tinue passive under the progressive usurpations and these accumulating 
wrongs, or, opposing force to force in defense of their national rights, 
Bhall commit a just cause into the hands of the Almighty di9poe 
events . . . is a solemn question which the constitution wiselj 

• the legislative department of the government. In recommend- 
ing it to their early deliberations I am happy in the assurance that the 
decision will be worthy the enlightened and patriotic councils of a vir- 
tuous. Ire.-, and powerful nation." State Papers, VIII., p. 13'2. S 
man's Manual, I., pp. 'J'.iT ! 

• Deb. of Congri 98, IV., pp. oo4-o58. 



DECLARATION OF WAE. 233 

third reading on the following day by a vote of seventy- 
nine to forty-nine. 1 

The senate did not show the same zeal. !Now that the 
last bridge was to be cut down, a part of the Democrats 
be^an to waver to such an extent that the motion made 

c 

by Gregg of Pennsylvania, to recommit the bill pro- 
viding for the declaration of war, was adopted on the 11th 
of June, by seventeen votes to thirteen. 2 !S"ot until the 
17th of June, did a sufficient number of reluctant Demo- 
crats yield, to allow the amended bill to be passed to a 
third reading by a vote of nineteen to thirteen. 3 The 
house agreed to the amendments on the following day. 

The majority had repeatedly recognized that the Feder- 
alists had carried on their opposition during the whole 
session of this congress in a most worthy manner. The 
war party rewarded this course of theirs by the most reck- 
less uses of its power. The transactions of the house 
were carried on in a manner which suggested rather a con- 
clave of tyrants than the legislative body of a free people. 
Since the bes-innin^ of the new difficulties with England, 
the most important papers were kept from congress by the 
executive authority; and the minority might deem them- 
selves happy when their demands for the suppressed doc- 
uments were received with an observance of at least exter- 
nal decorum. And the majority of the people said amen 
to it, when with blind-folded eyes they were carried on 

1 Deb. of Congress, IV., p. 559. The declaration of war thus received a 
majority of only thirty votes, although the democratic majority in the 
full house (one hundred and forty-two members) was seventy 

2 Ibid, IV., p. 416. 

3 Six Democrats voted to the last with the Federalists. Bayard de- 
clared on the 16th of June: "When the bill before us was first brought 
up from the other house, it was the opinion of very few that it would 
obtain the support of a majority of the body ; and even now it was like- 
ly to pass, not because it was approved by a majority, but of the differ- 
cnces of opinion which existed among gentlemen as to other courses 
which had been proposed." Deb. of Congress, IV, p. 419. 



ukio.nty and SLAVERY. 

from one folly to another, till finally they were drag 
into war. The high-sounding hymns to Freedom, the I 
pie a nd Self-government directed their eyes away from the 
unworthy game which their delegates were playing with 

them. The principle of the necessity that the majority 
Should rule was carried to the greatest extreme, and the 
principle no less true, that the conscientious respect of the 
rights of the minority is the condition precedent of a ra- 
tional republic, was forgotten, nay, not even as much as 
oonceived. Time was not left to the opposition to develop 
their views on the most important questions, nor was an 
opportunity offered them to bring them before thepeopk 
at the right time. The debates on the embargo recom- 
mended by Madison on the 1st of April, 1812, were car- 
ried on with closed doors, and after the committee had 
made its report, the war party desired to have it carried 
through in a single day. Nelson wanted time for consid- 
eration. Quincy requested the house to accord one day 
more for debate, in order that he might take part in it. 
Widgery answered that the responsibility rested on the 
majority, and Quincy's motion was defeated by a vo 
fifty-seven to fifty-four. 1 The debates on the declaration 
of war, also, were carried on in the same manner. Rapj 
dolph'e motion to open the doors was rejected by a \. 
seventy-seven to forty-live. Milnor renewed the motion 
on the next day. but it met with the samefate. And when 
the third reading of the bill was resolved upon, Stow asked 
lhat it should be postponed to the following day, hut this 
motion also received only forty-eight ayes to seventy-eight 

nays- 2 „,, 

"in this way a surprise was prepared for the people. They 
learned on the L8th of June that they were at war with the 
greatest naval power in the world. There was no effort 



1 Del), of Congress, IV., p. 541 

2 Ibid, IV., pp. 008, 55 ( J. 



PROTEST OF THE MINORITY. 235 

made to justify this except in the ingenuous manner 
adopted by Widgery. 

Thirty-four representatives of the minority published a 
vigorous protest, in the form of an address to their constit- 
uents, both against the war and the manner in. which the 
declaration of war was brought about. 1 They would have 
no share in the misfortunes which would grow out of the 
war. When they were refused the privilege of public de- 
bates, they had refrained from all participation in the dis- 
cussion, for the reason that it would have been useless to 
have taken part in it and that they did not wish in any 
way to help to give " implied validity to so flagrant an 
abuse of power." 

The discussion of the history of the diplomacy anteced- 
ent to this war, which was treated exhaustively in this ad- 
dress as it had been in nearly all the speeches delivered, is 
not within the province of this work. It is necessary to 
mention particularly only one point of the protest, because 
it embraces in a few words all that is of importance in the 
war of 1812 for the constitutional history of the United 
States and in part also for the history of American democ- 
racy. 

Those who protested against the war insisted that any war 
was pregnant with great danger to the United States, because 
of the peculiar nature of their union. The " moral bond" 
which united " the powerful and independent sovereign- 
ties" should not have been subjected to such a strain, so 
long as its new institutions were not more mature. In this 
instance, it was doubly foolish to light, because the people 
entered upon the war a divided people, on account of im- 
portant " moral and political objections." 2 

1 Niks' Reg., II., pp. 309-315. 

2 " In addition to the many moral and prudential considerations which 
should deter thoughtful men from hastening into the perils of such a 
war, there were some peculiar to the United States, resulting from the 
texture of the government in no small degree experimental, composed 



STATE SOYERETGOTY AND SLAVERY. 

The ground last named was considered by the protesl 
as of the greatest weight. The presidential election : 
these words a special emphasis. The war was the great 
question in the presidential campaign, and the result 
showed the geographical separation of parties more clearly 
than it had been seen for years. With the exception of 
Vermont, all the NTew England states, and [New Y<>rk. 
Jersey, and Delaware gave their solid electoral vote for 
DeWitt Clinton. Maryland was divided, and Pennsyl- 
vania, with all the western and southern states, \ 
unanimously for Madison. 

But even if the division had not been to so great an 
tent of a geographical kind, an element of the highest im- 
portance remained. Only the young men of the war party 
were ready to say that it operated as a spur rather than as 
a damper upon their blind war feeling. It was not re- 
served for Webster to be the first, after the country had, for 
a year and a half, tormented itself with the rashest experi- 
ments, to lay hare the truth that a party war of such di- 
mensions could not be bioughttoa successful issue in a 
popular state, especially in a popular state of such 
peculiar structure. 1 Indeed, six months before the decla- 

of powerful and independent sovereignties associated in relations, some 
of which arc critical as well as novel; should not be hastily precipi- 
tated into situations calculated to put to trial the strength ot' the moral 
bond by which they are united. Of all states that of war 19 most likely 
to call into activity the passions which are hostile and dangerous to 
Buch a form of government Time is yet important to our country to 
settle and mature its recent institutions. Above all, it appeared to the 
undersigned from signs not to he mistaken, that it* we entered upon this 
Mar. we did it as a divided people; not only from a sense of the inade- 
quacy of our mean- to success, but from moral and political objections 
of great weight and very genera] influence." 

Tin' truth is, sir, that party support is not the kind of support 

wary to sustain the country through a long, expensive and bloody 

conic. t : and this should have been considered before the war was 

(dared. The cause, to be successful, must be upheld by other sentiment! 

and higher motives. It mu^t draw to itself the sober approbation of 



A PAKTY, NOT NATIONAL, WAE. 237 

ration of war, it was emphatically declared by one of 
themselves, and a very distinguished personage, that the 
end for which they contended could be attained only by a 
really national war. 1 

That the war from the beginning bore the character of a 
mere party war was a fact so patent that not even the bold- 
est advocates of the war party dared to deny it. This did 
•not by any means prove that it might not become a na- 
tional war; but the hope that such would be the case was 
based solely on the experience that in war the feeling of 
nationality as a rule silences all others. The war party 
had expected with so much certainty that this would be 
the case, that they declared the mere existence of the war 
made it a positive duty to abandon all further opposition, 
of no matter what form. The Federalists and their Dem- 
ocratic allies replied that if it was impolitic and unjust to 
begin the war, it could not be politic and just to continue 
it, only because it was begun. It did not follow that be- 
cause they had not been able to prevent the war, they were 
obliged to lend their aid to magnify the evil indefinitely. 
It was incumbent on them, as men and citizens, to use all 
lawful means in their power to put an end, as soon as 
possible, to a course which, in their opinion, was simply 
criminal. The war party, on the other hand, harped on 



the great mass of the people. It must enlist, not their temporary or 
party feelings, but their steady patriotism and their constant zeal. Un- 
like the old nations of Europe, there are, in this country, no dregs of 
population, fit only to supply the constant waste of war, and out of 
which an army can be raised for hire at any time, and for any pur- 
pose. Armies of any magnitude can here be nothing but the people em- 
bodied; and if the object be one for which the people will not embody 
there can be no armies." Deb. of Cong., V., p. 139. 

1 Macon, of North Carolina, said : " And here, sir, permit me to say 
that I hope this is to be no party war, but a national war. . . . Such 
a war, if war we shall have, can alone, in my judgment, obtain the end 
for which we mean to contend, without any disgrace." Ibid, IV., 
p. 452. 



li; BOVEBKtONTY AND SLAVERY. 

the honor of theconntry which was involved in the isf 
and branded these views as k ' moral high treason." 

Looked at from an absolute standpoint, much might 
said in favor of both views; but it is the political phil 
pherandnot the practical statesman who Bhonld judge such 
questions from an absolute standpoint. This the war party 
had overlooked. Webster demonstrated to them, in a mas- 
terly oration, that the given circumstances made this change 
of this party war into a national one materially more diffi- 
cult, and that they had. besides, done, and were doing, 
in their power to make it impossible. Their fundamental 
error was that they had treated the whole question 
legal one. True, it was necessary to make it appear that 
there were sufficient reasons to declare war, but that was 
not enough; its wisdom and expediency should also have 
been proven. The strength of the government was b 
on the united conviction of the people, and a rational 
eminent would not therefore have taken so important a 
step without ascertaining whether such a united convic- 
tion existed. Especially should the public opinion of those 
states whose interests were mainly to be protected by the 
war have been taken into consideration. But even all this 
would not have been enough. "The nature and strnc- 
tare of the government, the general habits and pur- 
Buite of the community, . . . the variety of impor- 
tant local interests," should have been kept in view. In 
a word, -reasons of a general nature, considerations winch 
go hack to the origin of our institutions," Bhould have 
been taken into account, lie had heard no justification ot 
the war on Buch grounds. 1 If its advocates, he had said a 
few days before, could show that it was undertaken on 
grounds manifestly just, that it was necessary and una 
able, and Btrictly an American war, it would then change 
its character, and grow as energetic as it was now weak 

' Deb. of Cong.. V., pp. 137,138. 



L 



POSITION OF THE FEDEK AUSTS. 239 

and feeble. It would then become the affair of the people 
and no longer remain that of a party. 1 

This " if" could never be met to the satisfaction of the 
Federalists, which is only another way of saying that they 
would never look upon the war as a national one. The 
year and a half which had passed since its beginning 
ought to have been enough to lead them to this conclusion, 
if that were at all possible. The probability of such an 
event was all the smaller, because the elements on which 
the war party had calculated so strongly were not with- 
out influence from the first. Even Monroe acknowledged, 
iii September, 1812, that success as well as defeat had con- 
tributed to bring the opposition nearer to the war party. 
But he took the erroneous view that this influence would 
suffice to soon make the war a national one. 2 

This error of the war party, so pregnant with results, had 
a very good foundation, which was pointed out in the pro- 
test already mentioned, and by Webster. Wherever a vital 
national feeling exists, it will always, with the vast majority 
of the people, cast every other consideration into the shade, 
when once a war has been begun for reasons as important as 

1 Curtis, Life of Webster, I., pp. 117, 118. 

2 Monroe to Clay, Sept. 12, 1812: " From the northern army we have 
nothing which inspires a confident hope of any brilliant success. The 
disaffection in that quarter has paralyzed every effort of the government, 
and rendered inoperative every law of congress. I speak comparatively 
with what might have been expected. On the public mind, however, 
a salutary effect is produced even there by the events which have oc- 
curred. Misfortune and success have alike diminished the influence of for- 
eign attachments and party animosities, and contributed to draw the peo- 
ple closer together. The surrender of our army excited a general grief, 
and the naval victory a general joy. Inveterate toryism itself was com- 
pelled in both instances to disguise its character and hide its feelings, 
by appearing to sympathize with those of the nation. If Great Britain 
does not come forth soon and propose honorable conditions, I am con- 
vinced that the war will become a national one, and will terminate in 
the expulsion of her force and power from the continent." Private 
Correspondence of H. Clay, pp. 23, 24. 



o^i i:i I'.NTV AM) SLAYKBT. 

in tin- cum- before as, and even when a very large portion 
of the people are decidedly opposed to the declaration of 
war. because of doubts as to the possibility of bringing it 
to a successful issue, or because of theinjury.it ma; 
calculated to entail upon certain special interests. But ft 
live national feeling can obviously he found only anion- a 
people who constitute a nation in the real sense of the 
word. The people of the United States, however, were yet 
far removed from being a nation in this sense, although 
they had anion- them the conditions precedent of a rapid 
national intergrowth, and although these conditions had be- 
come vastly more favorable since the revolutionary war. The 
war party had calculated on a national feeling which did 
not yet exist, although the war might contribute to ; 
it. The national feeling that existed was not even W 
Btrong that it could he credited exclusively or mainly 
with die approximation of the opposition to the majority, 
which Monroe conceded had taken place. The conscious- 
ness of duty and a recognition of the interests which had 
their root in the political unity of the states, had a much 
greater influence in producing this result. 
3 The leaders of the opposition declared from the first, in 
express terms, that they would take this ground. They 
were loyal, but they coldly and exactly calculated what the 
laws made it their duty to do, and peremptorily refused to 
do more. 1 Even in January, 1S12, during the debafo 

' Neumann, in his " Geschichte der Vereinigten Staaten," speak 
the "lawless conduct" of Connecticut and Massachusetts (LI., p. LG 
the "baseness" of the opposing Federalists (II., p. 176), and o( the - Ion* 
exploded objections" of Hit- Federalist opponents of the administration 
Neumann baa scarcely the most superficial knowledge of American con. 
Btitutional law, and without a thorough knowledge of it, it is simply 
impossible to write a history of the United States. The Commentaries 
Of K.nt and Storv, the Federalist, Curtis on the History of the Constit* 
linn. Whiting OD the War Powers of the President, etc., and one ot Lu- 
ther's essays, are the only works relating to the constitution named in 
hi* three Volumes, but even these the author his evidently not once 



i 



INTEREST THE ONLY BOND OF UNION. 241 

the increase of the marine, Quincy remarked, that the 
interests of the states should be the " polar lights" 
of every American statesman in the decision of every ques- 
tion of vital importance. This was predicated on the 
sovereignty of the states. The " artificial ties of parch- 
ment compact" would be found to be too weak the moment 
the interests of the states ceased to hold them together. 1 

really studied. He has not even made any use of the decisions of 
the supreme court or of the opinions of the attorneys-general. And 
the other numerous sources which the author has used, he has worked 
only very superficially. It is impossible to account on any other hy- 
pothesis for the fact that he has been able to overlook or completely to 
misunderstand the most essential matters in the documents which he 
quotes. This last is accounted for in part by the fact that he had no 
personal knowledge of the United States, and his idealistic republican 
doctrines are the thread of Ariadne by which he guides himself through 
the labyrinth of their history. He was not satisfied, however, with writ- 
ing their history " for better or worse" but, as he says himself in the pre- 
face (III., p. IX) for " a text book for all other nations." Yet the book is 
not without its good points. He deserves credit especially for having, 
during the darkest hours of the republic, with an enthusiasm which was 
always honest if not critical, lauded its good and healthy parts, and 
preached with the deepest conviction, that without any manner of doubt 
the north, with its free labor and free political institutions, would win the 
victory over the south, based on slavery and on slavery in the form most 
antagonistic to morals and civilization. As a historical work, however, 
I consider it of so little value, that I simply take occasion to refer to it 
to point out some of the most flagrant errors. And here I wish to espec- 
ially say that it is no place to look for information on constitutional 
questions. 

1 " I confess to you, Mr. Speaker, I never can look — indeed in my opin- 
ion no American statesman ought ever to look — on any question touch- 
ing the vital interests of this nation, or any of its component parts, with- 
out keeping at all times in distinct view the nature of our political asso- 
ciation and the character of the independent sovereignties which com- 
pose it. Among states the only sure and permanent bond of union is inter- 
est. And the vital interests of states, although they may be sometimes 
obscured, can never for a very long time be misapprehended. . . . 
And need I tell statesmen that when great local discontent is combined 
in those sections [the states] with great physical power, and with ac- 
knowledged portions of sovereignty, the ties of nature will be too strong 
for the artificial ties of parchment compact ? Hence it results that the 
16 



Oj._> ST ATI: BOVEEBIGHTY AND SLAVERY. 

The anti-Federalists had not, even in the times of the 
greatesl excitement during the administrations of Wash- 
ington and Mams, insisted more strongly on theconfi 
ate nature of the LTnion. Quincy not only looked upon it 
as an unquestionable tact that the Union was not a nal 
in his opinion it was also undeniable that there was 
present national feeling or national interests which could 
in a lasting and far-reaching struggle prevail over the 
arate interests of the individual Btates, 

Webster gave more prominence to the other side of the 
question. Apart from general political and moral consid- 
erations, it was his conviction that the war could not and 
should not become a national one, because the interests 
of the northern and eastern states were especially in- 
jured. He also charged the reigning party with endan- 
gering the continued existence of the Union, for it could 
not be preserved by law alone. 1 - But at the same tunc he 
assured them that the demands of the government would 
be yielded to, to the precise extent of constitutional liahtl- 
ity, because the war was the law of the land. 2 

essential interests of the great component parts of our association oagf 
to be the polar lights of all our statesmen-by them they shoal. 
their coarse . . No political connection among free slates caa M 

luting, or ought to be, which systematically refuses to protect the v.tal 
interests of any of the sovereignties which compose it." Deb. i 
gress, IV., pp. 499, 500 ; Ann. of Cong., 2, XII., p. 208. 

i In the Rockingham Memorial. Curtis, Life of D. TVebster, I., pp. 

10 ? In a'speech delivered July 4, 1812, before the Washington & 
lent Society of Portsmouth, he said : " With respect to the war in wh.ch 
we are now involved, the course which our principles require us to pal 
B ne cannot be doubtful. It is now the law of the land and as such Wj 
are bound to regard it. Resistance and insurrection form no : 
cur creed. The disciples of Washington are neither tyrants in : 
nor reb els out. If we are taxed to carry on the war we shall d.s 
certain distinguished examples, and shall pay. If our personal service 
are required, we shall yield them to. he precise extent of our const! 
tional liability." Ibid, II.. p. l>»5. Compare also his speech ol Jan. H, 
1814 in the house of representatives. Deb. of Congress, \ , p. W». 



SLANDER AND LIBEL. 243 

The exaggerated and insulting charges of the majority 
against the opposition were little calculated to move them 
to a change of attitude. Even in Massachusetts the ad- 
ministration party used its momentary supremacy in the 
senate, notwithstanding the undoubted feeling of a major- 
ity of the people, to issue an address which had the tone of 
a common libel against the leaders of the opposition. 1 
They were not only branded as " enemies of republics" 
who had acknowledged themselves as monarchists and did 
not conceal their intention to attempt a revolution, but it 
was also declared with assurance that they had formed " a 
deep and deadly design against our happy Union." This 
was the tone assumed by the majority everywhere and not 
least of all in congress. 2 Unmeasured praise and blame 
have not become characteristics of the political life of the 
United States only in recent times: they are as old as the 
republic, and it is easy to show that democratic republics 
have always to suffer more from this cause than states of a 
different constitution. 

The minority of the house of representatives of the 
Massachusetts legislature expressed themselves, from pru- 
dential motives, in more temperate terms in their memo- 
rial to congress, but they endeavored to confine legitimate 
opposition within much narrower limits. When, during 
Adams's presidency, the Yirginia resolutions were decided- 
ly discountenanced by Massachusetts and other states, 
Madison met their objections with the declaration that the 
legislature had only given expression to its own view, and 
wished to incite the other legislatures to similar expres- 
sions of opinion. At that time, even the most extreme Fed- 

1 Niles' Reg., II., pp. 308, 309. 

2 Thus, for instance, Henry Clay said : " His [Jefferson's] own beloved 
Monticello is not more moved by the storms that beat against its sides, 
than is this illustrious man by the bowlings of the whole British pack, 
set loose from the Essex kennel!" Life and Speeches of II. Clay, I., 
p. 38. 



04.4 BTATE SOYBBEKHTTY AND SLAVERY. 

enlist* had not questioned that the legislature of Vir- 
riniahad not trespassed its constitutional authority, if it 
were granted that this was all its resolutions implied. It 
was reserved for the Democratic representatives of V 
chusetts to question the "expediency, as well as the c 
stitutionality" of their Federalist colleagues, in "ad. 
inor congress ou the subject of peace or war in their capa 
ityof legislators." 1 The Federalist majority in the Mass 
chusetts house of representatives proposed in their add n 
to the people of the state precisely the same programme 
proposed by Webster in his speech of July -L 2 He said 
that the war was "an instance of inconceivable folly and 
desperation," but at the same time advised the people "to 
discourage all attempts to obtain redress of grievances by 
any acts of violence or combinations to oppose the la 
for it was the duty of every citizen " to support all consti- 
tutional laws/' How far, in this case, it was the opinion of 
the legislature that their support should go, was pointed out 
with "sufficient clearness. It was the duty of the citizen 
to defend the country against invasion without any refer- 
ence to the necessity or justice of the war, and not to op- 
pose the conscription; but, on the other hand, volunteers 
should resort to arms only in a defensive war. The choioi 
of other men to fill the executive and legislative offi 
the Union and the organization of a peace party were pro- 
posed as the only legitimate means of redress. 

The other New England states, with the exception of 
Vermont, assumed the same position as Massachusetts, m 
which they were joined by New Jersey. 3 The two leading 
states of the northeast, Massachusetts and Connecticut, as 
well as the small state of Rhode Island, immediately 
a practical illustration to their declarations. Ge 
Dearborn demanded that the governors should call out a 

'Niles' Register, II.. p. 274. 
•Ibid, II., pp. 417-419. 

s See the " Declaration" of the legislature. Ibid, III., p. W* 



MILITIA-AID EEFUSED BY NEW ENGLAND. 245 

certain quota of the state militia and muster them into 
the service of the United States. The governors refused 
to acquiesce and raised the question of constitutionality. 1 
The legislatures approved their decision. In Rhode Island 
a council of war, called by the governor, decided that the 
governor alone could determine whether a case had arisen 
in which the constitution warranted such a demand on the 
part of the federal executive. 2 The supreme court of 
Massachusetts expressed the same opinion in answer to a 
question put to it oy the governor. 3 The president com- 
plained in his message of Nov. 4, 1812, that under this 
interpretation of the constitutional provision in question, 
" they [the United States] are not one nation for the pur- 
pose most of all requiring it." 4 The complaint was only 
too well founded; but what party was it that for twelve 
years had industriously labored to unravel, and even to 
sever, the national bonds which the constitution was in- 
tended to create? By what right did the anti-Federalists 
think they could assume that the old proverb, that he who 
sows the wind shall reap the whirlwind, should not be true 
as applied to them? Had not Madison, ten years before, 
stood in the first rank of those who labored and inveighed 
against the further strengthening of the nation with so 

1 Niles' Register, III , pp. 24, 117, 179. 

2 Official Documents of the State of Connecticut, Aug., 1812. Niles' 
Reg., III., p. 180. 

8 Dwight, Hist, of the Hartford Convention, p. 256. The supreme 
court of the United States in the case of Martin vs. Mott. 1827, decided: 
"We are all of opinion that the authority to decide whether the exigency 
[of calling forth the militia] has arisen belongs exclusively to the presid- 
ent, and that his decision is conclusive upon all other persons." Wheat- 
on's Reports, XII., p. 30; Curtis, Decisions of the Supreme Court, VII., p. 
12. See also Kent, Comm., I., pp. 278, 279; Story, Comm, §§ 1210-1215. 
Compare also the act of congress of March 3, 1863. Statutes at Large, 
XII., p. 731, etc. The constitutionality of this law has been variously 
decided in the different states. See Paschal, Constitution of the U. S., 
p. 136. 

4 Amer. State Papers, VIII., p. 317. Statesman's Manual, I., p. 300. 



BTATE BOVBBKIGNTT AND SLAVERY. 

much ardor that the original national party now dared, in 
the most important of ail respects, to lay hands on the 
vci'v roots of the national character of the state. 

The course of the New England states on the militia 
question must have satisfied the administration that the 
opponents of the war had not uttered mere idle tin 
when they declared that, in their support of the war. 
would go only to the limits of their legal liability, so long 
as there was no necessity of defending their own soil 
The New England states soon came, indeed, to a comJ 
promise on the question ; but the following elections 
that the party which offered aid only for a d 
war increased in strength. In the especially important 
Btate of New York, a coalition of the war party propel 
with those who assumed on the war question a national 
attitude, in harmony with that of the war party, eh 
its candidate for governor. Tompkins, however, 
ceived a majority of only 350G votes over his opponent, 
Yan Rennselaer, and in the house of representatives the 
Federalists had a majority of eight votes. 1 Delawan 
represented in both houses of congress by peace men. 
and the opponents of the war had a majority in the 
latnre of .Maryland. 2 In the house of representative 
tin- thirteenth congress, in which the number of members 
had been increased from U2 to 182, the Democratic majo|( 
ity of 70 in the twelfth congress shrunk to 40. 

No change took place in the position of the minority in 
congress. They urged peace. They were ready to 
the means necessary to carry on a defensive war, but s 
ily refused to agree to the demands made by tin 
ment for men and money, because they considered that it 
was proposed to carry on an aggressive war. The majority 



1 Niles 1 Register, IV.. i». 432. 

- Ingersoll, Second War between the United States and Greatrttntain, 

II.. p. '.'0. 



GEOGRAPHICAL DIVISION OF PARTIES. 247 

did not concede this and defended their protest on the prin- 
ciple that attack was often the best means of defense. As 
an abstract truth this conld not be questioned; and looked 
at from a military point of view, it might have been correct 
in this particular instance. But it was now too late to 
represent the conquest of Canada only as a means to the 
end, and still less was it politic to refrain from holding it 
out to the people as the most brilliant fruit of the war. To 
this allurement was due, in a great measure, the popularity 
of the contest in the west and even in the south; and 
there was now double need of it because the great prom- 
ises of the first year had shamefully and disgracefully 
failed of realization. The Federalists were guilty of ridic- 
ulous exaggeration when they represented that the princi- 
pal cause of the conflict was a longing to take possession of 
Canada. But when the wrongs inflicted by England had 
become so intolerable that there was just ground for a dec- 
laration of war, the hope of its acquisition silenced many 
considerations which otherwise might easily have decided 
the issue in favor of the peace party. That the love of 
conquest had its home now as later in the aristocratic south 
and in the west — from the very first the seat of American 
ambition — was not a mere accident. The northeast, to 
which the acquisition of Canada would have been of the 
greatest advantage, and which would have been benefited 
by it soonest, could not be won over to the project, 1 partly 
on account of the narrow view, so disastrous to its own in- 
terests, which had governed its policy in the question of 
the Louisiana purchase and the admission of new states 
into the Union. 

The sectiorial separation of parties came to light not only 
as to the question of war in general, but also as to the mode 



1 On the alleged gain of Goodrich to the plans of the war party see 
Ingersoll, Second War between the U. S. and Great Britain, II., pp. 236, 
237. 



24S STATE SOVEKKhiN'l Y AN!) SLAVERY. 

of conducting it, 1 and as to one of the principal objects 

1 This contest turned mainly on the question whether the decision of 

the straggle should DC made on land or on the water. The south and 
as est lien- gave evidence of the same shortsightedness and want ol 
eroslty which the north had shown in relation to the points men- 
tioned in the text. The course of events quickly decided the question 

in favor of the policy advocated by the north. Little as was done fof 
the tleet, it accomplished most of what the Americans had to boast of. 
If the south and west had surrendered their irrational prejudices in the 
first year of the war. its course might perhaps have been more favorable. 
On this condition Webster promised even the strong support of the 
Neiv England states. He closed his speech of Jan. 14, 1814, with 
these words; "If, then, the war must be continued, go to the ocean. 
If you are >eriou>ly contending for maritime rights, go to the theatre 
where alone those rights can be defended. Thither every indication of 
your fortune points you. There the united wishes and exertions of the 
nation will go with you. Even our party divisions, acrimonious as they 
are, cease at the water's edge. They are lost in attachment to national 
character on the element where that character is made respectable. In 
protecting naval interests by naval means, you will arm yourselves with 
the whole power of national sentiment and may command the whole 
abundance of the national resources. In time you may enable your- 
selves to redress injuries in the place where they maybe offered, and if 
need be, accompany your own flag throughout the world, with the pro- 
tection of your own cannon." Deb. of Congress,*V., pp. 140, 141. To 
the honor of Henry Clay, it must be said that he did not adopt the nar- 
row views of the majority of his party allies. He said in January 
" It appears a little extraordinary that so much unreasonable jealous? 
should exist against the naval establishment." Life and Speeches o4 
II. Clay, I., j). 23. But he remained far behind the broader and really 
statesmanlike views of Webster. In the same speech he says: " Indeed, 
I should consider it as madness in the extreme in this government to 
attempt to provide a navy able to cope with the fleets of Great Britain." 
Ibid, ]). 25. He contented himself with demanding a fleet sufficient for 
COasI defense, but was of opinion that it would require ten years to pro- 
cure this. For the present he stated that he was satisfied with a naval 
force sufficient successfully to repel the attacks of individual ship-. Ai 
far back as the 23d of December, 1807, John Adams had written : "The 
resources of the country ought at present to be appropriated to tie 
Quincy, Life of Quincy, p. 162. See also the declarations of Ch. (X 
Pinckney, in 1788, in the convention of South Carolina. Elliot, Deb, 
F\'., p. 284 What was done immediately before the war and during it for 
the tl.et is to be found in Stat, at Larie, II., pp. GOD, 788, 821; III-, PP- 
101, 144. 



POSITION OF THE SEVERAL STATES. 249 

sought to be attained by it. The ruinous consequences of 
this separation made themselves felt more and more every 
day; but the majority cast all considerations of political 
wisdom to the wind. Infinite variations were playecron 
the old theme, that the fact of the war sufficed to make it 
the duty of every citizen to support it by all means in his 
power. The opposition answered that it was time that the 
majority should really place itself on the ground of facts. 
Now it was a fact that the Union was made up of different 
sections, and congress in its legislation should consider this 
fact, for better or worse. 1 The majority were warned that 
they undermined the assumption on which the Union was 
built in not yielding to the justice of this demand; but the 
this time not from a Xew Englander, but 

It was the policy of the majority to pour all the vials of 
their wrath upon the Xew England states, as if there alone 
the opposition was to be found. By this means the false 
appearance was created that the sectional division of par- 
ties was much more clearly defined than it was in reality. 
The so-called middle states took a medium course, as they 
had done on so many previous occasions. Pennsylvania, 
by a large majority, remained faithful to her close alliance 
with the south. In New Jersey, parties were so nearly 
equally divided, that first one and then the other had the 
preponderance. In !Xew York the peace party was so 
powerful that it was only with great difficulty that gov- 
ernor Tompkins could keep it under to such an extent that 
the majority could count the state among the " patriotic." 
Delaware and Maryland could not be unconditionally 
claimed by any party, but at times their peace tendencies 

1 See the speech by Bleeker of New York, Deb. of Congress, IV., p. 
645. Randolph shows, in a letter dated Dec. 15, 1814, how sectionalism 
and particularism were fed by ignorance of the situation and condition 
of affairs in other states. Niles' Reg., YII., p. 260. 

3 See Sheffey's speech. Deb. of Congress, IY., p. 666. 



250 state sovereignty and SLAVERY. 

greatly preponderated; and finally there was even in Vir- 
ginia a considerable minority against the administration. 
We need only to examine the vote in the house of n 
Bentatives on Borne of the most important laws to be con- 
vinced of the injustice there was in casting the whole odi- 
um of the opposition on the New England states. 1 Ik 
notwithstanding the fair estimate of the actual situation of 
things during this period, which all democratic writer! 
have made, the New England states must be reproac 
with having soiled their name by their opposition, the re- 
proach must, more or less extenuated it is true, be exten- 
ded to a large portion of the population of the other ati 
lr is not equitable in this case to speak only of the si 
instead of the population of the states. The simple repe- 
tition of the untruth has, because of the admixtui 
truth it contained, been sufficient to falsify historical jud# 
ment for several decades. 

The democratic press endeavored to show that the in- 
terests «.f the New England states had Buffered least from 
the war, and even that they had been benefited by it; that 
therefore their opposition was all the more inexcusable. 1 
In this assertion, too, there was a certain amount of truth, 
although the proofs adduced might be attacked on more 
than "ne ground. 1 In view of the urgent questioi 

1 Of the forty-two members who voted on the Hth of January. 
against the increase Of the army, there were two from Maryland, one 
from Delaware, six from New York and eight from Virginia. 1 1 
Congress IV p. 703. In the vote on the bill providing for farther en- 
listments, of tin- fifty^eight who voted againsl it, there were two fro* 
Delaware, four from New Jersey, four from Virginia and fifteen fro* 
New York, [bid, V., p. 147. On the 3d of March, 1-1 h fifty-five mem- 
bers voted against the authorization of a loan of $25,000,000; o* the* 
from Virginia and fifteen from New York. Ibid, \ ., p. 
VIL, pp. 19S-197. 
La characteristic of the politicc-economical ignorance of the tunc 
that lh( . pi n i 01I ^ very prevalent among the Democrats that the Losf 
of New England's carrying trade would be of no consequence to the 
restof the Union, and might even be advantageous to it. 



THE SECOND MASSACHUSETTS MEMOEIAL. 251 

political expediency, which grew out of their dissatisfac- 
tion, it was a matter of complete indifference whether, and 
to what extent, their charges were exaggerated. The ad- 
vantages which they enjoyed at the beginning of the war 
were not, in large part, lasting. England had at first 
treated them with great consideration. Bat when she was 
satisfied that there was little prospect of their rising up 
against the federal government, or of her coming to a 
separate understanding with them, their ports also were 
subjected to a strict blockade. 1 Dissension, in consequence 
of this, and of the increasing losses of human life, and 
of the other misfortunes always attendant upon war, 
as well as of the want of success of the war in general, 
steadily increased. The legislature of Massachusetts voted 
on the 12th of June, 1813, another memorial to congress, 
couched in terms much more decided and excited than that 
of the preceding year. 2 The declaration of war was called 
"premature," audits prosecution after the publication of 
the English orders in council " improper, impolitic, and 
unjust." All the other grievances, both earlier and later, 

1 The Democratic press of the time, and many later historians of the 
same political complexion, have adduced a correspondence of the Bos- 
ton Daily Advertiser as one of the most damaging pieces of evidence to 
prove the treasonable plans which were devised in the New England 
states. The truth is, however, that the correspondence has no signifi- 
cance further than as an illustration of the ingenuousness with which 
the lack of national feeling and the view of the confederate nature of the 
Union found occasional expression. The correspondent recommended 
that the New England states should conclude a separate treaty with 
England. He did not in this contemplate an unconstitutional measure, 
for he said that the permission of congress to this end should first be 
obtained. The constitution only forbade the states to make treaties 
with foreign powers without the consent of congress. The Netherlands 
and Germany were cited to prove that such separate treaties and wars 
were not at variance with the idea of a federated state. But if congress 
should " unreasonably refuse" this just, reasonable, and constitutional 
etFort, it would "then remain for the wise and prudent to decide" what 
should be done. Niles' Reg., V., pp. 199, 200. 

2 Niles' Reg., IV., pp. 297-301. 



252 \TE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVE!: 

wore also brought forward again. A solemn protest was 
raised against the creation <>f new states out of the terri- 
tory which lav without the limits of the original union. 
The address concluded with an urgent prayer that every 
effort Bhould be made to bring about a just and honorable 
peace. These and similar demonstrations in the other 
England states met with as little success as the former 
ones. Instead of endeavoring to effect a reconciliation, 
the irritation was increased by insulting insinuation-; in- 
stead of thinking of removing well-founded grievai 
the thorn was pressed still deeper into their sides by ex- 
rated mistrust and open injustice. The minority of 
the Massachusetts legislature issued a protest against the 
memorial of the majority, in which they declared that only 
those who were "altogether and exclusively British" could 
read this " humiliating remonstrance'' without the deep- 
est indignation. 2 The administration made the New I 
land states keenly feel that, on account of their behavior, 
they deserved only the treatment accorded to step-children. 
Viewed from a purely military standpoint, the administra- 
tion might be justified in employing all its strength to 
carry out its plan for the conquest of Canada, and leaving 
the defense of the coast to the militia of the Atlantic 
states. But such a mode of warfare is always dangeroni 
in a state of loose structure, and hazardous when the parts 
most exposed share in the war only with reluctance. It 

1 Story, himself a Republican, but not of the Jefferson school, ass 
that Jefferson had extended this mistrust even to the Republic*) 
New England. He writes: " One thing, however, I did learn . . . 
while I WEB a member <>f congress: and that was that New England 
i far as the Republicans were concerned, t<> do every- 
thing and to have nothing. They were to obey, but not to be trusted. 
This, in my humble judgment, was the steady policy of Mr. Jeffersoa 
at all times. We were to lie kept divided, and thus used to neutralize 
each oilnr. So it will always be unless we learn wisdom for our- 
and our own interests." Life and Letters of J. Story, I., p. 1ST. 

■Niles' Keg., IV., p. 301. 



THE LAST EMBARGO. 253 

can be politically justified only on the ground that power, 
when compact and centralized, deals blows of the greatest 
weight. The Madisonian mode of warfare was characterized 
by bold plans, to be carried oat at a distance and slowly and 
weakly prosecuted. But even apart from this, the course 
of the administration can not be justified. It not only 
left New England to itself, bat refused Massachusetts the 
arms she needed for her protection, and to which she was en- 
titled. This was not only a contemptible piece of perse- 
cution, but it showed also that, under certain circum- 
stances, the administration, as well as the New England 
states, was wanting in the national feeling. But it was 
wanting still more in political judgment. The rich ex- 
perience which had already been gained was of no avail 
to it. It stuck fast in the swamp into which the head 
master of the Democratic party had guided the commerce 
and policy of the country. On the 9th of December, 1813, 
Madison, in a confidential message to congress, recom- 
mended a new embargo and greater restrictions on impor- 
tation. 1 As ground for this he adduced the extensive 
smuggling trade carried on with the enemy, the introduc- 
tion of British products and manufactured articles, and 
other illegal importations. 

Mason of New Hampshire exposed the folly and the 
danger of the measure in a short, clear speech in the senate. 2 
That body was compelled to hear again that it danced in 
the dark to the president's music. If, as was asserted in the 
message, the enemy obtained provisions from the United 
States, the president must have evidence of that fact in his 
possession, and if he had such proofs it was his duty to lay 
them before congress. And, besides, what sense was there 
in prohibiting all exportation in order that the enemy 
might be prevented from obtaining provisions? 

1 Amer. State Papers, VIII., p. 503 ; Statesman's Manual, I., p. 317. 

2 Deb. of Congress, V., p. 79. 



25^ .,; BOVEBEIOHT7 -VXD SLAVERY. 

Mason had not expected to make any impression; lie said 
that he desired only to registerhie - solemn protee The 
opposition had grown used to have their remonstrai 
looked upon onlyas an exercise in declamation. Theero- 
, was resolved on by both houses in secret session, and a 
bill passed which imposed the most unbearable restrictions 
on commerce on inland waters. 1 The administration and the 
majority acted as if they were testing how far they might 
go with impunity, in imposing on the patience of the com- 
mercial Btates. They did not accomplish what they had 
intended; but they were fully enlightened as to the feeling 
of the New England states. 

Numerous petitions praying for relief from a state of things 
which grew worse daily poured in upon the Massachusetts 
legislature. On the 18th of February, 2 the joint committee 
ofthe two houses reported on them. 3 The committee, in ac- 
cord with the petitioners, declared the embargo unconsti- 
tutional: " A power to regulate commerce is abused when 
employed to destroy it; and a manifest and voluntary a 
of power sanctions the spirit of resistance, as much 
direct and palpable usurpation. The sovereignty 
to the states was reserved to protect tin citizens from 
of violence by the United States, as well as for purpo 
domestic regulation. We spurn the idea that the free, 
sovereign and independent state of Massachusetts is reduce^ 
to a mere municipal corporation, without power to pro- 
tect its people and defend them from oppression, from 
whatever quarter it comes. When the national compi 
violated, and the citizens ofthe state are oppressed by cruel 
and unauthorized law, this legislature is bound to inter 
its power and wrest from the oppressor his victim." 

Thus the point of the sword was turned against those 

' Stut. at Large, III., pp. 88-93. 

■ Bildreth, Hist, of the U. S , VI., p. 470, erroneously gives Feb. 10 as 

the date. 
- Niles' Reg., VL,pp.*-& 



THE MASSACHUSETTS EEPORT OF 1814. 255 

who had forged it. The "bound to interpose" is a ver- 
batim transcript from the Virginia resolutions, and the 
Massachusetts legislature was well aware of the fact. The 
report went on to say that this was "the spirit of our 
Union," and that it had been so declared by the very man 
who now bade defiance to all the principles of his earlier 
political life. It asserted that the question was not one 
of might or right, but of time and expediency. 1 

The " sage of Monticello" could not remember exactly 
where the last significant words were first used. The whole 
report was in fact but a second edition of the Virginia and 
Kentucky resolutions. Political parties never more com- 
pletely changed places. The originators of the disintegra- 
ting doctrine cried out now, with one voice, Treason! and 
the Federalists who at its first appearance had branded it 
as treasonable, now saw in it " the spirit of the Union;" 
but both parties claimed in 1798 and 1799, as in 1814, that 
they and they alone stood on the platform of the constitu- 
tion ! 

The report went a step, and not an unimportant one, 
farther than the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions. The 
petitioners, among many measures recommended for the 
removal of all grounds of complaint, introduced a resolu- 
tion providing that a convention of the commercial states 
should be called to propose the necessary amendments to 
the constitution and to labor for their adoption. The re- 
port stated that such a course was perfectly warranted and 
cited Madison as a witness. Only on various grounds of ex- 
pediency was the advice given to leave the decision whether 
this course should be adopted to the next legislature. 

1 Even in congress itself the right of resistance was now claimed. 
Webster wrote, Feb. 5, 1814, to his brother: " I do not know how it 
happened, but one thing led to another, till Mr. King came out in plump 
terms on the right of remonstrance and of resistance. He said it was 
a question of mere prudence how far any state would bear the present 
state of things, etc., etc." Private Correspondence of Daniel Webster, 
L, p. 241. 



2oC> STATE SOVEIiKK.MV AND SLAVERY. 

The " Jacobins," as, by a Btrange perversion of the lan- 
guage employed during the lust decade of the preceding 
century, the Federalists were now called, were content with 

mere oratory. That this consoling conviction was won, 
was the only fruit which the new experiment with embargo 
policy brought to the administration. Its situation, how- 
ever, was by no means an enviable one. Its credit was 
the best, and it became continually harder for it to obtain 
the necessary troops. There could be no question of an 
exhaustion of the country in either respect. Besides, this 
was the last gronnd which the war party would have con- 
ceded. But neither would they grant that the war did not 
enjoy the popularity which they had claimed for it from 
the first. The harder it became to carry it on, the more 
firmly was it asserted that nearly the whole people sup- 
ported it with enthusiasm, and that only the barren quar- 
rels of a few malcontents created the semblance of a pow- 
erful opposition; and yet the opposition was blamed for 
every failure. Webster strikingly demonstrated the con- 
tradiction in this mode of reasoning, and between it and 
the actual demands which they saw themselves com- 
pelled to make. 1 

1 "Gentlemen, sir, fall into strange inconsistencies on this subject. They 
tell us that the war is popular; that the invasion of Canada is popular; 
that it would have succeeded before this time had it not been tor the 
force of opposition in this country. Sir, what gives force to opposition 
in this country V Certainly nothing but the popularity of the cam 
opposition, and the members who espouse it. Upon this argument, then, 
in what an unprecedented condition are the people of these states'- We 
have on our hands a most popular war; we have also a most popular 
opposition to that war. We cannot push the measure, the opposition is 
so popular. We cannot retract it. the measure itself is so popular. We 
can neither go forward nor backward. We are at the very centre of 
gravity — the point of perpetual rest. . . . Look to the bill before 
you ; does not thai Bpeak a language exceeding everything I have saidl 
You last year gave a bounty of sixteen dollars, and now propose to girfl 
a bounty of one hundred and twenty-four dollars, and you say you have 
no hope of obtaining men at a lower rate. This is sufficient to convince 



STRUGGLES TO CAREY ON THE WAR. 257 

The message which the president sent to congress on the 
20th of September, 1814, was also written in the same pe- 
culiar double tone. Madison assured the country that the 
direct and indirect taxes had been paid with the utmost 
promptness and alacrity, and that the citizens had rushed 
with enthusiasm to the scenes where danger and duty 
called them. 1 The enemy, he said, had little cause to con- 
template his last feats of arms with pride. At the same 
time, however, he acknowledged that the situation of the 
country made the greatest efforts necessary. The secreta- 
ry of war gave a fuller explanation of what was to be un- 
derstood by the vague innuendoes which the president had 
made in his message. After the confidence with which it 
was represented that Canada was the easy and certain prize 
of the war, it was strange now to hear that the United 
States were fighting for their " independence" and even 
for their life. 2 The defense of the coast and the further 
prosecution of the plan in relation to Canada demanded, 
according to Monroe, that the regular army should be in- 
creased to one hundred thousand men. How impossible 
he considered it to obtain so great a force by the enlist- 
ment of volunteers is evident from the plan which he rec- 
ommended to congress. 3 The whole free male population 
from eighteen to forty-five years of age was to be divided 
into classes of one hundred, and each class was to be re- 
quired to furnish a definite number of recruits. If any 
class failed to meet the demands made upon it, the recruits 
were to be drawn by lot. The bounty hitherto paid by the 
United States was to be furnished by each class to its own 

me, it will be sufficient to convince the enemy and the whole world, 
yourselves only excepted, what progress your Canada w r ar is making in 
the affections of the people." Deb. of Congress, V., p. 139. 

1 Amer. State Papers, VIII., p. 537. 

2 Dwight, History of the Hartford Convention, p. 313. The docu- 
ments bearing on the question are also to be found in Niles' Reg., VII., 
pp. 137-141. 

8 Dwight, pp.* 318-322. 

17 



258 LTE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

recruits. It' Dot paid within a definite time, it was to lie 
jsed and levied on all the property of the members of 
the class. A Bimilar classification of tlie sea-faring popu- 
lation was proposed to procure recruits for the navy. hut 
the demands made on the services of the latter were much 
greater than those made on the former. 1 At the same 
time that the secretary of war submitted this plan to con- 
. a hill was introduced into the senate providing 
among other things for the conscription of minors without 
the written consent of their parents, guardians <>r tu 

All these projected measures excited dissatisfaction and 
consternation in many parts of the country. Naturally the 
discontent was again greatest in the Xew England b1 
The legislature of Massachusetts once more took up the 
idea, from the immediate carrying out of which the report 
of the committee, February 18, had dissuaded it. The 
prospect of the co-operation of the other New England 
state- seemed good. The legislature of Rhode Island had 
in its previous session authorized the governor to enter 
into communication with the governors of the other si 
to bring about a co-operation to this end. 2 

The programme recommended in the report made by 
Otis in the Massachusetts house of representatives was 
cautious and vague. 3 The remaining Xew England si 
were to be requested to nominate delegates to a convention 
to propose such measures in relation to the grievances and 
other matters affecting them all as should seem to them 
appropriate, 4 and if they considered it desirable, to adopt 
measures to have a convention of all the states called for 
the purpose of revising the constitution. 

1 Dwigbt, p. 333. 

■M . 711., p. 181. 

'Oct. B, 1814 Nil.- Reg., VII.. pp. 149-152. 

'Otis had already proposed the holding of such a convention at 
Hartford in Dec., 1808. The claim to the paternity of the thoughts 
to belong to him. Beetiis letter of Dec. lo, l^US, to Quincy. Lite of 
Q'lincy, p. 165. 



MASSACHUSETTS ARMS HEESELF. 259 

These resolutions were preceded by others which afford 
a deeper insight into the spirit which dictated the calling 
of the convention. Governor Strong had already informed 
the secretary of war that he had considered it necessary, 
in the interest of the state, not to place the militia, who 
had been called out to defend the coast, under the com- 
mand of an officer of the federal army. At the same 
time he inquired whether the general government Would 
be willing to make good the expenses which had been in- 
curred by the state in the adoption of measures necessary 
to its protection. 1 Monroe answered that this could not 
be when the state acted of its own accord, and maintained 
itself the command of the militia who had hitherto been 
called out. Strong laid the correspondence before the leg- 
islature, which approved his course. It resolved, more- 
over, in accordance with the proposals made in the report 
above named, to organize an army of not more than ten 
thousand men for the defense of the state, by enlistments 
for one year, or for the war, who should remain under the 
command of the governor. The governor was, besides, 
authorized to borrow, from time to time, a sum of not more 
than a million of dollars. 

It was not necessary to put the worst of interpretations 
on these resolutions to consider them of a very serious 
nature. If Madison had rightly claimed that the national 
character of the Union was destroyed in that which was 
most essential to it, in case the governors had the right to 
decide when the president was authorized to call the mili- 
tia into the service of the CJnion, it might be said with 
much more truth that a still more severe attack would be 
made on the national character of the Union if troops 
might be conscripted by the states and kept in their ex- 
clusive service. True the constitution only provided: "No 

1 Niles' Reg., VII., p. 143. 



STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

Bhall, without the consent of congress, keep tr 

in time of peace." 1 At the very beginning 
of hostilities Connecticut, too, had made known her be* 
lief that this right belonged to the states in time of war.* 
The wording of the clause seems to fully justify this 
interpretation, and it' the question should ever be brought 
•e the supreme court of the United States 8 this view 
of the case will probably he sustained. But it should 
not be inferred from the constitutionality of the p 
that its exercise might not, under certain circumsta 
be dangerous to the internal peace of the Union. Much 
■lues its constitutionality show that Connecticut ami 
Massachusetts, by exerting it in this particular case, did 
not manifest a significant increase of the particularistic 
spirit. 

At the time the possible consequences of this resoh 
the legislature of Massachusetts were not overlooked. 
Greater attention was directed, however, to the invitation 
to the Hartford convention, since Massachusetts, if she 
were left to stand alone, could not, in the gloomi* 
of the case, be looked upon as really dangerous. 

In a time of calm judgment the reception given the in- 
vitation would have necessarily quieted the exa« i 
fears which part of the Republicans cherished. In \ 
mont the committee to which the request had been reft 
for consideration reported unanimously in favor of declin- 
ing it. Yet the majority of the committee were Kederal- 
The house of representatives unanimously adopted 

1 Art. I., Sec. 10, § 3. 

- Nile,' Reg, V.. p. 199. 
A- far as I know, this has not yet happened. In Luther vs. B 
tin- supreme court declined to discuss in detail the powers belongi 
lie Malts in this respect. It simply decided that " the governiw 
a state by its legislature has the power to protect itself fromdeslru 
by armed rebellion by declaring martial law." Howard, Rep., \ II -i 
pp. :;:J, 4-1; Curtis, XVII., pp. 2, 13. Compare Story, Coinni., ^ ? HU1- 



THE HARTFORD CONTENTION. 261 

the report. 1 Xo delegates were named from New Hamp- 
shire, because the legislature was not in session, and in 
the council, which had to authorize its convocation, the 
Democrats had the majority. Rhode Island 2 and Connec- 
ticut 3 accepted the invitation. Yet both states, like Massa- 
chusetts, denied their delegates all powers except that of 
making proposals, and especially charged them that their 
proposals must be in harmony with the duties owed to the 
Union. 

The ultra-Democrats saw in these declarations a bold 
political trick, designed to win the support of the waver- 
ing elements which would have declared decidedly against 
the Federalists, if the latter had made known their true 
aim — the destruction of the Union. Only party passion 
could so greatly misjudge the true state of the case. There 
were certainly only a few Federalists — if there were any at 
all — who would have unconditionally preferred a league of 
the Xew England states to the relations that then existed. 
If it is to be inferred from single utterances of the most 
extreme Federalist journals 4 that this idea was widespread, 
yet this would not prove the existence of a plan of separa- 
tion, for there is a great difference between a wish and a 
belief in the possibility of its realization. Moreover, the 
possibility of executing such a plan was evidently still less 
now than in 1S04. Taken all in all, the war had not weak- 
ened, but strengthened, the bands of the Union. This 
was, in fact, its best result. Although it gave the Xew 
England states more reason for complaint, they would have 
been much more ready to receive such a project in 1S08, 
when the embargo paralyzed their trade, than they were 
now. Among the masses of a vigorous people, there al- 
ways lives a strong feeling of honor, and in democracies 

1 Xiles 1 Reg., VII., p. 167. 

2 Ibid, VII., p. 1.81; in the house of representatives by 39 to 23 votes. 

3 Ibid, VII., p. 158; in the house of representatives by 153 to 36 votes. 

4 Compare Randall, Life of Jeff., II., pp. 412, 414. 



mi: SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

this feeling is even pitched too high, as far as the position 
of the state toward foreign powers which maintain a 
]i«. -tiK- attitnde toward it is concerned. The great fault of 
the Federalist leaders lay in this, that in their coolly-reck- 
oned policy of self-interest they did not estimate thi> fac- 
tor high enongh. But the experience already acquired 
had oot been without effect upon them. They were tli 
fore able to persuade the majority of the people of the 
New England states, by appealing to their interests and 
their prejudices, to give the most sluggish possible support 
to the administration, as lung as they were not too hard 
Bed themselves. But they would have had to have 
been not only far worse patriots, but also far worse politi- 
cians, than they were, if they had ventured to dream that 
they could bring the states, during the war, to open re- 
volt, either by separation from the Union or by the con- 
dition of a separate peace. The cowardice of such an 
action would alone have sufficed to ensure the angry r 
tion of every such proposal. 

Aside from these general grounds, the instant in which 
the convention was called together and met was especially 
unfavorable for such suggestions. The victory at P 
burg, the successes of Chauncey and Brown, the patriotic 
conduct of governor Tompkins of New York and Jacks 
energetic action in the south had made an impres 
which could not be effaced by the abandonment and blow- 
ing-up of Fort Erie, the blockading of Chaun piad- 
ron and the wretched condition of the finances. W 
over, the peace negotiations at Ghent were in prog 
a- long as they were not broken off, there was no ne< 
despair, even if the reports were not of a favorable tenor. 
But with the conclusion (^ peace, the main grievance 
the New England states ceased to exist of thems< 
All these things co-operated to prevent, even in the i 
radical circles, any enthusiasm for the convention project. 
Even in Massachusetts it had a surprisingly lukewarm re- 



THE CONTENTION MEETS. 263 

ception. This could not be misinterpreted by the origin- 
ators of the plan, and could have been just as little disre- 
garded, even if they had thrown all other reasons to the 
wind. Nothing had happened which could have nerved 
them to the point of suddenly cutting themselves off from 
any way of retreat. All the reasons drawn from the inner 
and outer facts of the case led much more to the conclu- 
sion that the best course was to really entertain no design 
except the one that had been stated. Awaiting the fur- 
ther course of events, men wished to try to unite upon a 
common programme and — whatever might be decided 
upon — make a stronger impression upon the dominant 
party by harmonious action. The method and way in 
which the convention went to work and the result which it 
brought about, are the practical confirmation of this view 
of + ,lie case. 

Dec. 15, 1814, twenty-six delegates 1 met together at 
Hartford and began their deliberations with closed doors. 
If, as the Democrats wished to have it thought, a conspira- 
cy was being worked up which aimed at the separation of 
the New England states from the Union, the sentence of 
death had already been passed upon the affair. A con- 
spiracy which aims at the overthrow of a government is 
a chimera in the United States. And if the conspirators 
meet on a publicly appointed clay, but exclude the public 
from their deliberations over the method of executing their 
project, the conspiracy becomes a complete absurdity. In 
this country thorough political changes can be effected on- 
ly by the direct and energetic participation of the people, 
and the only way to make sure of this is to carry on a 
public and long-continuing agitation. As far as the Dem- 
ocrats feared in good faith a dissolution of the Union on 
account of the resolutions to be adopted in Hartford, they 



1 Three of them were irregular, two from New Hampshire and one 
from Vermont, who had been chosen by local conventions. 



2G4 KEIGNTY and slavery. 

not only underestimated the attachment of the Federalists 
to the Union, bnt failed to appreciate how thoroughly the 
people were really pervaded by the democratic spirit. 

The Democrats pleased themselves then and thereafter by 
roundly den vine that they had nourished any fears whatev- 
er. Jeffersgn wrote, Feb. L5, L815, t<> Lafayette: " But they 
[the British ministers] have hoped more in their [!] Hart- 
ford convention. . . The cement of this [Jnion Is in the 
heart-blood of every American. I do not believe that there 
is on earth a government established on bo immovable ■ 
basis. . . They [the members of the convention] have 
not been able to make themselves even a subject of conver* 
sation, either of public or private societies. A silent 
contempt has been the sole notice they excite.'* 1 It 
is true that Jefferson had never feared that the Union 
would he brought to an end bj the convention. But before 
Jackson'.- victory at New Orleans and before the receipt of 
the news of the signing of the treatv of Ghent, he would not 
have used such language. It corresponded with his char- 
acter to blow a great blast of triumph, now that the con- 
vention, whatever significance it might have had for the 
moment, stood before the world as a wretched farce. It is, 
indeed, not difficult to obtain from his writings the proof 
that he had by no means such an unconditional trust in 
that "cement." Yet, whatever he might think, the a 

1 Jefferson, Works, VI.. pp. 425, 4-2<>. The passage left out in the 
text may show with what shallowness Jefferson judged the 
"Their [the English ministry's] fears of republican France being now- 
done away, they are directed to republican America, and they are play- 
ing the same game tor disorganization here which they played in your 
country. The Marats, the Dantons and Rohespierres ofMassaehi 
are in the same pay, under the same order-, and makingthe same i 
to anarchize us that their prototypes in France did there. I do n 
that all who met in Hartford were under tin- same motives of money. 
Some of them are Outa and wish to be In-; some the mere du 
the agitators or of their own party passions, while the Maratista alone 
are in then 



ANXIETY ABOUT THE CONTENTION. 265 

tion that the convention had not even become a subject of 
conversation, misrepresented the facts in a foolish way. As 
early as the spring of 1814, the position of the New Eng- 
land states excited serious apprehension even among the 
ambassadors to Europe, although the latter looked at things 
more clearly for not being exposed to the immediate influ- 
ence of the daily squabbles and exaggerated descriptions 
of the press. 1 As soon, then, as the three states which 
were represented in the convention took a position which 
must lead to a new phase of the struggle, the Democratic 
party began to Hurl its anathemas against the "Jacobins" 
with threefold zeal. At the same time, it lavished loud 
praise upon the noble community which (it said) was 
about to thrust the traitors into the abyss of eternal shame 
and political oblivion. From an easily intelligible policy, 
exaggeration was 'resorted to in both directions. If the 
student disregards these exaggerations, which pretty near- 
ly balance each other, he still finds traces of more anxiety 
than was reasonable. This was even more true of the ad- 
ministration than of the press. The constitution did not 
give the president the power to hinder the meeting of the 
convention. There was no cause for this, inasmuch as the 
delegates were only empowered by their respective legisla- 
tures to make proposals. It was also not easy to see 
how the twenty-six men could be able to surprise the gov- 
ernment by suddenly lighting the torch of insurrection. 
Yet it was considered necessary to notify col. Jessup to 
watch them carefully. The letters exchanged between 
Jessup and the president have unfortunately been in great 
part lost, but enough is known of them to prove that Mad- 
ison took the matter very seriously. From Dec. 15, 1814, 
to Jan. 23, 1815, Jessup sent a daily report to the presi- 

1 Thus, for instance, Gallatin writes, April 22, 1814: " Above all, our 
own divisions and the hostile attitude of the eastern states give room to 
apprehend that a continuance of the war might prove vitally fatal to the 
United States." Priv, Cor. of H. Clay, I., p. 30. 



LTE BOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

dent. 1 The letters were mostly sent in a private way and 
Bometimes thecolonel himself brought them to New York 
in order thai they might not be intercepted. This precau 
tion was superfluous, indeed, inasmuch as the news to he 
sent was by no means of such an important nature. Jessup 
wrote from New Haven, on the day the convention met: 
« I am surprised how little interest [among the Federal- 
the meeting excites." 2 Writing later from Hartford, 
lie had only to announce that BO far as he could learn, the 
convention kept strictly within the limits of the law. 

It' he nevertheless kept on sending his daily reports for 
fourteen days after the adjournment of the convention and 
spoke in -them of ''plans to destroy the government," " at- 
tempts to gain possession of the public stores/' etc., wo 
may well infer that Madison did not share JefFere 
pretended view. 

People in Washington and in the whole country were 
surprised, and, to speak truth, not merely pleasantly sur- 
prised, that the report of the convention, in which the rej 
suits of its secret deliberations were summed up, was not 
a more revolutionary document. As affairs now begao fed 
shape themselves, the ruling party would have preferred a 
.somewhat more decided manifesto in order to master the 
"conspiracy" with greater eclat. It was not contented 
with being aide to punish it only by scorn and "contempt/' 

After a thorough recapitulation of the complaints 
often discussed, the report recommends to the legislature! 
of the represented states certain measures for the removal 
of the most pressing hardships, suggests a series of amend- 
ments to the federal constitution, provides for the calling 
of a new convention in certain eventualities, and finally 
authorizes some of the delegates to again convoke the 
]. resent convention. 3 The report .starts on the assumption 

1 Ingcrsoll, Second War between the U. S. and Great Britain, II.. ; 
ll,Second War between the V. S. and Great Britain, II.. | 
" The whole report \& given in Niles' Reg., VII., pp. 305-313 and in 
Dwight'8 Hist, of the Hart. Con., pp. ;J.^-:JT ( J. Niles' Reg., VII., pp. 3W 



REPORT OF THE CONVENTION. 267 

that a " summary" removal of the evils complained of 
would be possible only by " direct and open resistance," 
since they had become a " system." The view had already 
struck root, that the final reasons for this were to be found 
in " intrinsic and incurable defects in the constitution." 
The delegates, however, did not consider this as yet suffi- 
ciently proved, but confessed their conviction that perma- 
nent help could be procured only by various amendments 
to the constitution. In their opinion, then, these formed 
the most important part of the report. Their substance 
was, in brief, as follows: Representation in the house 
should henceforth be based upon the free population alone; 
the president must not be eligible for re-election; state 
offices should be entrusted only to native-born citizens; 
embargoes should be limited to sixty days; and a vote of 
two-thirds of each house should be necessary for a prohibi- 
tion of commercial intercourse, the admission of new states 
into the Union, the authorization of hostilities (except in 
case of invasion) and a declaration of war. 

It was not meant by the substitution of these constitu- 
tional changes for summary relief by direct and open re- 
sistance, that until their adoption or rejection the critical 
condition of affairs which had been brought about by the 
ignorance and the unconstitutional encroachments of the 
government should be quietly borne. The convention 
recommended the most energetic opposition to the follow- 
ing measures, already executed or projected by the federal 
authorities: Calling out the militia by the president with- 
out the co-operation of the state governments; the trans- 
fer of the command of the militia to officers of the reg- 
ular army, the classification of the militia proposed by 
Monroe; the recruiting of the regular army "by a for- 

332. gives also Hie statistical lists contained in the report, and Dwight, pp. 
383-398, prints the whole journal of the convention. The latter, how- 
ever, is quite worthless, since it records only the meetings, adjourn- 
ments, etc. 



.!!: 90VXBBIGHTY and SLAVERY. 

cible draft o^ conscription"; and the enlistment <>f minors 
without the consent of their parents or guardians. Finally, 
the federal government Bhonld act in snch a way that the 

states concerned " may. separately or in concert, be em- 
powered to assume upon themselves the defense of their 

territory against the enemy." To this end, a part of the 
federal taxes should flow into the treasuries of the b1 
This resolution then recommended the legislator 
ciprocally pledge themselves to help each other with a part 
of their militia, or volunteer regiments raised especially 
for this purpose, or their regular troops, in order to repel 
invasion. 

In these last-mentioned resolutions the absurd notion of 
a separate league reached its highest point. Further prac- 
tical results were not to be attributed to the little league 
of three states in opposition to the federal government. 
The dissolution of the Union was of course thought about, 
but only as perhaps desirable in the future. If this con- 
viction was arrived at, then the separation u should, if 
possible, he the work of peaceable times and deliberate 
consent. . . . But a severance of the Union by one or 
more states against the will of the rest, and especially in 
time of war, can be justified only by absolute necessity." 
The-e " objections against precipitate measures tending to 
disunite the states . . . must, it is believed, be deem- 
ed conclusive." 

The form of these sentences was so skillfully selected 
that it cannot be said with certainty whether the conven- 
tion deduced from the nature of the Union a positive 
right in the individual states to withdraw from the Union, 
or whether it claimed only a moral justification for revolu- 
tion. It was prudent enough in the declaration of its 
position on the constitutional question not to venture 
beyond vague, double-meaning expressions, except so far 
as it could appeal to its opponents. But it went just far 
enough to repeat almost verbatim the declaration of 



SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONVENTION. 269 

faith laid down in the Kentucky resolutions of 1798. If 
the members of the convention, and those in sympathy 
with them, were " Maratists," they could claim that they 
had become so in the school of Madison and Jefferson. 
They had learned from Madison that a state had not only 
the right but the duty to " interpose its authority" as a 
shield between its citizens and the federal powers; and 
Jefferson had taught them that the fundamental principle 
of the autocratic right of deciding in strifes between 
parties without a common umpire applied to the relation 
of the states to the Union. 1 

The report was adopted by the legislatures of Massa- 
chusetts and Connecticut. Both these states thus formally 
declared their acceptance of the constitutional theories 
maintained in it as their own. American historians have 
laid only little weight upon this. They have almost wholly 
limited themselves to giving the proof or repelling the as- 
sertion that the originators and the members of the con- 
vention had plans which were inimical to their fatherland, 
or thoroughly treasonable. They have pushed the senti- 
mental and moral side of the question so far into the fore- 
ground that they have thus lost the proper point of view 
whence its political significance is especially to be sought. 

1 The passage bearing on this point in the report of the convention 
reads : " It does not, however, consist with the respect and forbearance 
due from a confederate state towards the general government to fly to 
open resistance upon every infraction of the constitution. The mode 
and the energy of the opposition should always conform to the nature 
of the violatioD, the intention of its authors, the extent of the injury 
inflicted, the determination manifested to persist in it, and the danger 
of delay. But in cases of deliberate, dangerous, and palpable infrac- 
tions of the constitution, affecting the sovereignty of a state and the 
liberties of the people, it is not only the right but the duty of such a 
state to interpose its authority for their protection in the manner best 
calculated to secure that end. When emergencies occur which are 
either beyond the reach of the judicial tribunals, or too pressing to ad- 
mit of the delay incident to their forms, states w T hich have no common 
umpire must be their own judges and execute their own decisions." 



270 STATE BOVKBEIGNTT AND SLAVERY. 

The convention and its resolutions are of weight only 
far as they wen- not simply the product of a few scatter, d 
*•< atalinarian existences," but gave expression to the be- 
liefs and ideas living in an important fraction of the pi 

]>le. or in the whole people. It' the convention had been, 
as historians of Democratic tendencies make it out to be, 
a quite exceptional bit of infamy, it would have been 
simply meaningless, if the Hartford convention had not 
been the cnlmination of the inner struggle from l si »l to 
181."). it would be mentioned, like the proposal made al- 
most half a century later by Fernando Wood, that the 
city of New York Bhonld cut loose from the Union and 
constitute itself an independent state, as an entertaining 
historic anecdote. 

Hate of England and admiration of France did not allow 
the domineering south to attribute an equal share of the 
guilt of infringing neutral rights to each of the bell igerant 
powers. Ignorance of the laws which govern industrial 
life drove it into a policy of defense which was practically 
a policy of reckless attack upon the commercial interee 
of its own country. Long-cherished prejudices against 
the commercial interests and the peculiarly commercial 
state- and a misjudgment of the intimate connection of 
these with the other economic interests of the win 
country, made it stray ever deeper into these unfortunate I 
Lpolitics, until party policy made return impossible. T 
Wholly unprepared for war. the party had to adopt the war 
policy which its few young and ambitious leaders dic- 
tated to it. The declared aim of the war was the vindica- 
tion of the rights, the infringement of which was espe- 
cially injurious to the interests of the commercial stato 
But the latter persuaded themselves that the dominant 
party had tried, under a false mask, to injure the commer- 
cial interests from the beginning. They expected only an 
aggravation of the evils from the war with England and 
condemned the way of conducting the war as the crowning 



CHARACTER OF THE OPPOSITION TO THE WAR. 271 

of a reprehensible policy, directed by sectional spirit. The 
stronger this conviction became, the more decided was 
their reaction. Thus they themselves constantly gave the 
struggle a more marked sectional character. They fought 
the tight not as a national party, but as an isolated geo- 
graphical section, the well-being of which depended upon 
commerce and the opposition of which was therefore a 
struggle against ruin, because the rest of the Union syste- 
matically, and perhaps, indeed, on principle, made war upon 
this interest. On this account they did not limit them- 
selves to making representations and presenting protests as 
states, but they tried to form a formal league with each 
other which would have made them a union within the 
Union. And all these steps were not justified by the iron 
law of necessity, but were put on the ground of a positive 
constitutional right. The threat of revolution was not 
made, but acting on the principle of the sovereignty of the 
states, an ultimatum was reserved in the utterances of the 
founders of the opposition party and of the originators of 
its confession of faith. 

In these last sentences I have condensed the true mean- 
ing of the strife which reached its culmination in the 
Hartford convention and came to a sudden end by the con- 
clusion of peace with England. The convention consisted 
of delegates from three state legislatures and the state leg- 
islatures represented not only legally, but actually, the 
majority of the population of the states, for the latter had 
had repeated opportunities to choose men of other opinions. 
And a very strong minority in several other states enter- 
tained the same or similar views. It is therefore laugha- 
ble folly to consider the convention as a gathering of brain- 
sick conspirators, although it must be admitted that the 
leaders of the party formed its radical wing. But the pro- 
gramme of the convention was always a party programme, 
and this party programme adopted, on the fundamental 
constitutional question, the position first chosen by the 



L'.lj .11; SOVEREIGNTY AM) SLAVERY. 

radical wing of the opposite party. Ultra-Federalists and 
ultra-Republicans met on a principleof constitutional law, 
the logical result of which was the dependence of th< 
istence of the Union upon the free will of every single 
state. It" the practical application of this principle in a 
way which would have seriously endangered the existence 
of the Union was attempted, at the moment, in neither of the 
two cases, this was only of secondary importance. The one 
<>r the other party could sooner or later hold that the time 
had come lor such an attempt, and neither the one nor the 
other could oppose the attempt on the ground of positive 
right, without putting itself into contradiction with its own 
past. 



THE TREATY OF GHENT. 273 



CHAPTEK VII. 

History of the Slavery Question to 1787. The Com- 
promises of the Constitution on Slavery. 

The news that the treaty of peace had been signed at 
Ghent was received with lond jubilation. Jay had been 
denounced as a British hireling and a traitor, while the 
contents of the treaty negotiated by him were still kept 
secret. The same party now boasted of a magnificent tri- 
umph, before it knew the stipulations of the peace con- 
cluded by its ambassadors. This over-hasty joy was the 
best proof in what straits the administration found itself 
and how weary of war the whole nation was. 

The extraordinary capacity of political parties to forget 
at the demand of the moment, stood the Democrats in good 
stead. If the declaration of war had been delayed only a 
short time, the United States would have heard that the 
orders in council already mentioned had been recalled. 
From the beginning of the war, the so-called pressing of 
alleged British subjects found on American ships was 
the only one of the officially stated causes of the declara- 
tion of war which remained in existence. 1 The report 
made to the house of representatives, June 3, 1812, by the 
committee on foreign affairs, declared that " it is impossible 
for the United States to consider themselves an indepen- 
dent nation" as long as this mischievous practice was not 
put an end to. 2 In the course of hostilities, it was reiter- 
ated by the executive as well as sharply declared by con- 
gress, that a prime object of the war was to force England 

1 Am. State Papers, VIII., p. 125. 
'Ibid, VIII., p. 159. 

18 



274: BEKHTTT AND SLAVERY. 

to give up tlii- pretended right. 1 Even the conclusion 
truce was made dependent upon England's abandonment of 
this practice. 1 Monroe, in his instructions of April 13, 
1813, to the plenipotentiaries who were charged with the 
negotiations for peace, declared that " a submission toil 
by the United States would be the abandonment, in favor 
of Greal Britain, of all claim to neutral rights and of all 
other rights on the ocean." 3 But on June 27, 1814, he com- 
municated to the peace commissioners, by order of the 
president, the advice that they should conclude the treaty 
without any stipulation on this point, if it should ap 
to be an impassable obstacle. 4 It so happened that in the 
treaty of peace not a word was said on either this point, 
or the whole question of neutral rights. 5 

ruder these circumstances it needed a bold front to be- 
gin the message, in which the president announced to con- 
gress the conclusion of peace, with the words: k * I con- 
gratulate you and our constituents upon an event which 
is highly honorable to the nation, and terminates with 
peculiar felicity a campaign signalized by the most bril- 
liant successes.'' 6 The Federalists naturally did not fail 
to point out with biting mockery the contrast between the 
facts and this presumptuous assertion. LJBut the people by 
no means always see events in a new light on account of 
their results. The nation wished peace if it did not have 
to be bought in a precisely shameful way. and had fe 
for some time lest it should perhaps cost some unbearable 

1 Am. State Papers, VIII., pp. 338, 425, 5G0. 
•Ibid, VIII., pp. 318, 336, 345. 

5 Ibid, VIII., p. 507. There are two differently paged editions of the 
State Paper-. I n tlie ot her edition, this reference would be: Ainer. 
State Papers, Foreign Relations, III., p. 695. 

1 Ibid, VIII.. pp.5934. 

'Statutes at Large, III., pp. 218-223. 

■American State Papers, VIII., p. O'y.l Statesman's Manual, I., p. 
325. In the latter the message is erroneously dated on the 20th in 
of the 18th Of February. 



DEATH OF THE FEDERALIST PARTY. 275 

sacrifice. It was not difficult, then, for it to persuade it- 
self, with the help of the national pride, that the restora- 
tion of the status ante was " highly honorable." The 
picture, seen " through the smoke of Jackson's victory," 
was fair enough to look upon. It happened, moreover, 
that the state of things in Europe promised a long 
peace, and so there was practically little ground for the 
fear that England would soon again have occasion to at- 
tempt a violation of neutral rights or the impressment of 
sailors. And her inclination to risk such an attempt 
must decrease every day with the powerful growth of the 
United States in population as well as in wealth. 

Despite the mockery and the blame, thoroughly justified 
in certain respects, which the Federalists lavished upon the 
Democratic party, the latter came out of the war strength- 
ened, while all was now over with the Federalists. Holmes 
had warned them that they were driving on to the "ship- 
wreck of their party." 1 Now that the sufferings of the war 
and of the whole "policy of restriction" were over and, 
thanks to the great prosperity of the country, were quickly 
forgotten, men only remembered how tardily the Federalists 
had discharged their duty to the Union in its hour of need. 
The latter could not free themselves from the suspicion 
that they had been willing to wholly withdraw their aid 
from the country, or even to turn against it, for a convinc- 
ing proof against such a suspicion can not be brought for- 
ward when a man will not be convinced. The positive 
assertions of their opponents left a shadow upon them, 
and the mass of the party was well contented to let itself 
be considered as innocently led astray. All the blame 
lavished upon the Federalists on account of their conduct 
during the war was ever more and more summed up in 
the one expression " Hartford convention," and the inex- 
piable guilt which was conveyed by these words rested 

1 See the whole speech in Niles' Reg., VI., Sup., pp.180-184. 



276 STATE SOVEKKIONTY AM) SLAVERY. 

only on the leaders. These apt tactics isolated the lea 
more and more, and soon made the number of their follow- 
er- dwindle into a little crowd, not worth noticing. 1 

The Democrats remained masters of the field, practically 
without a contest, and until circumstances developed new 
questions which could serve as a basis for party ac 
their supremacy could no longer l>e endangered. The 
European commotions which had given rise to dange 
crises in American politics since Washington's first ad- 
ministration, had finally come to an end. On this 
the water, too, there was no longer any great dang< 
internal commotion to be cared for. The dawn of the 
"era of good feeling'' had come. 

This time of outward rest was of no slight value for the 
inner strengthening of the Union. In this commonwealth, 
which developes with truly wonderful rapidity, as much 
progress is often made in months as in years in the more 
completely crystalized states of Europe. But it was a 
structive delusion which now mastered many heads, that 
this momentary rest could become permanent. If a repub- 
lican form of government were the condition precedent of 
the millenium, when lion and lamb will lie down together; 
if the United States was the land chosen by fate: yet the 
realization of this dream was now more distant than on 

' In the next presidential election only 34 of the 217 electoral 
were cast for the Federalist candidates. Even Rhode Island had now 
cut loose from her union with Massachusetts and Connecticut, while 
little Delaware voted for Rufus King. How demoralized the part} 
become appears still more clearly from the fact that the three 
divided up their vote tor vice-president. Massachusetts 
Howard, Delaware for Harper, and Connecticut divided In 

i [loss and Marshall. (Deb. of Cong., V., p. 662.) The uni 
the Federalist votes upon King was, on account of his peculiar position 
in regard to the war, an equally convincing proof of how deep the 
party had sunk in public estimation. He, like the other 1 
had beeo opposed to the declaration of war, but had wished, when it 
had once been declared, that they should support it with all 
strength. Compare Niles' Reg., VII., pp. 319, 326, u27. 



LEGALITY OF SLAVERY. 277 



the day of the birth of the Union. The dragon- seed of 
slavery had steadily grown rank and had already budded 
out so far that its true nature had often been recognized 
and very plainly pointed out. The violence with which 
former questions had been fought out, and their pressing 
importance, had, up to this time, only pushed this weight- 
iest of all questions again and again into the background. 
But now it began every day to protrude itself more into 
the foreground, and in a few years it led to a crisis which 
was more dangerous than all the others through which the 
Union had passed since the adoption of the new constitu- 
tion. The contest over the conditions of the admission of 
Missouri to the Union cannot be discussed until the his- 
tory of the slavery question up to this time has been re- 
called. 

At the outbreak of the American revolution slavery was 
a recognized fact in all the thirteen colonies. Whether it 
was thoroughly legal, may at least be questioned. Neither 
according to the common nor the statutory law of England 
had slavery a legal existence, and both common and statu- 
tory laws were valid in the colonies so far as they applied 
to their circumstances and were not in opposition to their 
peculiar rights and privileges. 1 But the charters of the 
colonies make no mention of slavery, and give the colonies 
no legal powers from which an undeniable right for the 



1 The supreme court of the United States declared in 1815, in the case 
of the town of Powlet vs. Clark: "Independent, however, of such a 
provision [as appears in the first "roj^al commission" for the provinces] 
we take it to be a clear principle that the common law in force at the 
emigration of our ancestors is deemed the birthright of the colonies, 
unless so far as it is inapplicable to their situation or repugnant to their 
other rights and privileges. A fortiori, the principle applies to a royal 
province." Cranch, Reports, IX., p. 333; Curtis, Dec. of the Sup. Ct., 
HI., pp. 370, 371. The first congress mentioned the common law, in its 
declaration of rights of Oct. 14, 1774, among the " indubitable rights 
and liberties to which the respective colonies are entitled." Journal of 
Congress , I., o. 28. 



STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVEBY. 

introduction of negro Blavery can he deduced. Although 
tin- matter has qo practical value, yet, based upon t 
grounds, the question may be asked whether the colonial 

laws, which start out on the supposition of the legalit 
existing tacts, were of such a sort as to give slavery a really 
legal existence. 1 The fact of its existence was not only al- 
ways recognized by the mother country, hut the ki: 
ernment constantly favored the introduction of slaves; and 
when different colonies wished to forbid their further im- 
portation it had repeatedly interposed with its decisive \ 
The colonists were fully convinced of the rightfulness of slaJ 
very, and up to the beginning of the revolutionary pi 
there was only here and there a doubt expressed about its 
moral justice. 3 There are many reasons for the supposition 
that in some states, for instance in Virginia, the know, 
of the political and economic disadvantages of slavery found 
expression in these doubts. One of the first results of the 
contest with the motherland in regard to colonial right! 
was to direct attention, on a somewhat greater scale, to the 
moral side of the question. Until then the matter had 
been regarded almost exclusively in the light of positive 
religion. The Quakers have the honor of having I* 
the agitation from this standpoint earliest and most radi- 
cally. Thanks to the fiery zeal of some members ^t' this 

- Hopkins, one of the first ami most energ 'tic opponents of si . 
declared in 177G, in his letter dedicated to congress, A Dialogu< 
cemingtke Slavery of the Africans, Showing it to Be the Duty and In- 

of the American States to Emancipate all their Africans 
"The slavery that now takes place" is " without the expres 
of civil government." Goodell, Slavery and Anti-slavery, \>. 7' 
also p. 112, where a judicial decision of the supreme court of M 
chusetts, which maintains this view, is quoted from Washburn's Judi- 
cial History of Massachusetts, p. 002. 

2 Lord Dartmouth declared in 1774: " We cannot allow Hi 
to check or discourage, in any degree, a traffic so beneficial to 1 
tion." W. Jay, Miscellaneous Writings on Slavery, p. 210. 
• ft, Hist. <»f the I'. S., VI., pp, 413-415. 

- - Life of J. Jay, I., p. 333; Adams, Works, X., p. 380. 



INFLUENCE OF FRENCH PHILOSOPHY. 279 

sect, the religious and moral instruction of the slaves and 
the struggle against any further importation of the negroes 
were begun by the close of the seventeenth century. By 
the middle of the eighteenth century the emancipation of 
slaves had gradually become a matter of action by the 
whole Quaker body, 1 while similar attempts in other sects 
were rather the acts of individuals. 2 If the agitation had 
been wholly left to the churches it would have been long 
before men could have rightly spoken of a " slavery ques- 
tion." 

It was due to the political philosophy of the 18th cen- 
tury that American politicians now began to concern them- 
selves about slavery much more and from wholly new 
standpoints. The negro had been long looked upon, 
uprightly and honestly, as an animal. There was no con- 
sciousness whatever that any injustice had been done him. 
When conscience began to slowly assert itself, it was 
quieted by the argument that bringing heathen doomed to 
hell to America made the blessings of Christianity attaina- 
ble to them. A sluggish faith could content itself with 
this lie, since it harmonized with worldly interests. But 
it could not stand before " sound common sense." The 
most notable characteristic of this period of the history of 
western civilization was that the French philosophers made 
the demands of sound common sense the basis of their 
political speculations and that the revolutionary politicians 
wished to make the results of these speculations the rule of 
conduct and the goal for practical politics. The American 
revolution was not based upon this philosophy, but the 

1 " By a resolution of that year [1774] all members concerned in im- 
porting, selling, purchasing, giving, or transferring negroes or other 
slaves, or otherwise acting in such a manner as to continue them in 
slavery beyond the term limited by law or custom [for white men], were 
directed to be excluded from membership, or disowned." Clarkson, p. 
60. Two years later this resolution was extended to cover the cases of 
those who delayed to set their slaves free. 

3 See some interesting notes in Goodell, pp. 106-108, and elsewhere. 



2S0 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

majority of its leaders were more or less affected by it. The 
more the struggle for definite political rights clothed itself 
in the glittering garb of a struggle for " freedom" in gen- 
eral, the more unavoidable it was that men should earnestly 
ask themselves whether their idealistic theories could be 
reconciled with the fact of slavery. 1 The idealistic impulse 
uas not strong enongh to overcome all the delays due to 
sol f- interest and political policy, but yet it was s<> great 
that the contrast between the institution of shivery and the 
theory of human rights was recognized as a question of 
practical politics, the solution of which must be found 
forthwith. 

There was no thought of a direct attack upon slav< 
It was supposed that by forbidding any farther importation 
of slaves, the gradual destruction of the institution would 
be accomplished. Erroneous as this hope was proved to 
be, it is readily explainable. The number of slaves at the 
outbreak of the revolution was about half a million. 2 Bat 
as the increase of the free population was greater than that 
of the slaves, the comparative number must have 
more in favor of the former every year. Moreover, enian- 

1 Life of Jay, I., pp. 229, 231; Laurens, of South Carolina, in th< 
lection of the Zenger Club, pp. 30, 21, quoted by Greeley, in The Ameri- 
can Conflict, I., p. 3G; Bancroft, VI., p. 417; and many other author- 
ities. 

3 According to the census of 1790, there were 097,897 slaves in the 
United States. These were divided among the different states as fol- 
lows: 

NORTH. SOUTH. 

New Hampshire 158 Delaware , 8,887 

Vermont 17 Maryland 101 

Rhode Island 952 Virginia 

Connecticut 2,759 North Carolina 11 

Massachusetts [6] South Carolina 101 

New York 21,324 Georgia 2 

New Jersey 11,4-23 Kentucky 

Pennsylvania 3,737 Tennessee :'-.417 

Totals 40,370 GOT 



ANTI-SLAVERY SENTIMENT IN THE SOUTH. 281 

cipation was expected to make great advances everywhere 
and to become a rule almost without an exception, so that 
the abolition of slavery would be striven for on political 
and economic as well as moral grounds. According to the 
avowals everywhere made, it was only natural to suppose 
that sooner or later all slave-owners would say with Lau- 
rens of South Carolina: "I am devising means for man- 
umitting many of my slaves. . . Great powers oppose 
me, the laws and customs of my country, my own and 
the avarice of my countrymen. . . These are difficul- 
ties, but not insuperable. 1 will do as much as I can in my 
time and leave the rest to a better hand." 

As long as it was generallv considered advisable that 
these wishes should have practical results, men acted with 
great unanimity. In the articles of the so-called " associa- 
tion," which the first congress adopted Oct. 20, 1774 and 
which was considered as the corner-stone of the Union, it 
was declared that after December, no more slaves should 
be imported and that the importations should not be aided 
in any way whatever. 1 Article II. declared that those who 
acted contrary to these articles of union ought to be "uni- 
versally condemned as the enemies of American liberty," 
and article XIY. signalized " any colony or province" 
which did not enter into the union as " unworthy the 
rights of free men." These articles, as Chase of Ohio 
expressed it in the senate in 1850, were u ratified by col- 
onial-conventions, county-meetings, and little gatherings 
throughout the country, and became the law of America — 
so to speak, the fundamental constitution of the first Amer- 
ican union." It is noteworthy that some of the most 
emphatic declarations in favor of article II. and so against 
the importation of slaves came from slave states which 

1 Amer. Archives. 4th Series, I., p. 915. 



STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVZBT, 

were afterwards the earliest and most determined cham- 
pions of slavocratio interests. 1 

Daring the next two years, the same standpoint wai 
maintained. April 0, 1770, congress repeated the prohibi- 
tion of the importation of slaves without any opposition 
from any quarter. 1 ]>ut a few months thereafter it became 
evident that in some states the suggestions of momentary 
self-interest had begun to he listened to. In the draft of 
the Declaration of Independence, Jefferson had bitterly 
complained of George III., because the latter had forbidden 
the attempts "to prohibit or restrain this execrable com- 
merce." This passage was struck out, mainly at thi 
quest of the delegates from South Carolina and Georg 
When we think of the later modes of speech of the slave- 
barons, we must admit, to the honor of South Carolina and 

1 This appears, for instance, in the declaration of the representati 
the Darien district in Georgia: "To show the world that we are not 
influenced by any contracted or interested motives, but a general phil- 
anthropy for all mankind of whatever climate, language or complexion, 
W€ hereby declare our disapprobation and abhorrence of the unnatural 
practice of slavery in America (however, the uncultivated state of our 
country or other specious arguments may plead for it) a pr 
founded in injustice and cruelty, and highly dangerous to our libertiet 
(as well as lives), debasing part of our fellow-creatures below men, and 
corrupting the virtue and morals of the rest, and is laying the baa 
that liberty we contend for . . . upon a very wrong foundation. Wi 
therefore resolve at all times to use our utmost endeavors for the lnanu- 
mifision of our slaves in this colony, upon the most safe and equitable 
footing for the master and themselves." Amer. Archives, 4th Beri 
p. 1136. 

3 Elliot, Deb., I., p. 54; Adams, Works, III., p. 39. 

'Jefferson writes: "The clause was struck out in complaisant 
South Carolina and Georgia, who had never attempted to restrain the 
importation of slaves and who, on the contrary, still wished to continue 
it." Jeff., Works, I., p. 170. This passage has been quoted in nearly 
every work on this period, but the fact has been almost wholly unno- 
ticed that in South Carolina, at any rate, such attempt- had been made. 
These efforts, however, had never attained so much significance that 
England had needed to oppose them, as she did in the case of Virginia. 
Elliot, Deb., V., p. 459. 



SLAVERY AND THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. 283 

Georgia, that they did not demand a strengthening of the 
passage because they had resolved, like Patrick Henry, to 
pay "the devoir to virtue" in gambling coin, that is, to sat- 
isfy their consciences by openly acknowledging the duty of 
reform and then to announce, by appealing to the weak- 
ness of the flesh, that they meant to persevere in the sweet 
sin. 1 

The excision of the passage I have mentioned from the 
Declaration of Independence was a turning point in the 
relation of congress to the slavery question. Men did not 
at once retreat, but they stood still, and eo ipso lost the 
ground already won. Up to this time congress, as a revo- 
lutionary body, had used only de facto power. Now, when 
it was endowed with legal powers, all control over slavery 
was taken away from it. The responsibility for this lies 
mostly on congress itself, since it elaborated the draft of 
the articles of confederation. It is not probable that the 
states would have made weighty concessions, but at least 
an attempt should have been made to keep what had al- 
ready been obtained. The resolutions of 1774 and 1776 
had not the force of law, and with the provision for leaving 



1 Patrick Henry writes, in January, 1773, to a Quaker: "Is it not 
amazing that, at a time when the rights of humanity are defined and un- 
derstood with precision, in a country above all others fond of liberty, in 
such an age, we find men, professing a religion the most humane, mild, 
meek, gentle and generous, adopting a principle as repugnant to hu- 
manity as it is inconsistent with the Bible and destructive of liberty ? 
Every thinking, honest man rejects it in speculation, but how few in 
practice from conscientious motives ! . . . Would any one believe 
that I am master of slaves of my own purchase ? I am drawn along by 
the general inconvenience of living without them. I will not, I cannot, 
justify it; however culpable my conduct, I will so far pay my devoir to 
virtue as to own the excellence and rectitude of her precepts, and la- 
ment my want of conformity to them. ... We owe to the purity 
of our religion, to show that it is at variance with that law which war- 
rants slavery. ... I could say many things on this subject, a se- 
rious view of which gives a gloomy prospect to future times." Ban- 
croft, VI., pp. 416, 417. 



284 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AM) BLA.TEBT. 

the regulation of commerce to the individual states con- 
gress resigned all right to again bring before it- forum 
the question of slave-importation in any shape whatever. 
The development of circumstances lias shown the great- 
of this mistake. Vet the blame should not be meas- 
ured only by the greatness of the fault. During the years 
of war the slavery question could only find scanty atten- 
tion, since congress was completely absorbed in the con- 
sideration of more pressing needs. Even in the north its 
consideration was postponed, so far as it was a national 
question. In regard to their own slaves several of the 
northern states went much farther than the continental 
congress had. done. In New York gradual emancipation 
became a suhject of earnest debate, and if the proposals 
in relation thereto could not at once be carried through, 
at least there was developed a righteous conviction that 
slavery could not exist there much longer. Pennsylvania 
did not put off the decision of the matter into the uncer- 
tain future, but at once assured her speedy and complete 
deliverance from the evil. In Massachusetts, before the 
Declaration of Independence, decisions had repeatedly 
been given by juries which can be justified only by the 
supposition that slavery had no legal existence in the 
colony. 1 But it was not till after the end of the war that 
the anti-slavery efforts again assumed more of a national 
character. The abolition societies of Pennsylvania sprang 
again into activity with greater energy and a broader pro- 
gramme; and in New York, Rhode Island, Connecticut, 
.Maryland, Virginia, and New Jersey, abolition societies 



this more in detail in Goo-dell, pp. 109-117. Yet tin- complete 
abolition of slavery in the north took a longtime. It will astonish 
many readers to know thai as late as 1840 Massachusetts, Maine 

luuiit, and Michigan were the only states which contained no shr 

all. The number of slaves in the so-called free ^tate< in this year WM 

1,129. Census of 1840. 



ABOLITION SOCIETIES. 2S5 

were founded by the aid of the most prominent citizens. 1 
The southern states by no means saw in this movement 
from the beginning any interference with their "sovereign" 
right of autonomy or a declaration of war against an in- 
terest vital and peculiar to them. In them that spirit had 
not as yet wholly died out which not only wished a sweep- 
ing, practical acknowledgment of human rights, but also 
considered it as practicable and sought to compass it. Thus 
for instance, Virginia, in 1788, forbade the importation of 
slaves, and a committee which was charged with a revision 
of the statutes drew up a plan for a law for the gradual 
emancipation of all slaves. But wherever federal affairs 
which concerned slavery came up for discussion and for 
the passage of resolutions, there the southern states went 
boldly on in a way which showed how little belief they 
really had in the speedy end of the " abominable institu- 
tion." July 12,1777, the question of federal taxation was 
debated in congress. The article relating to it in the draft 
of the articles of confederation proposed that federal taxes 
should be laid in proportion to the total number of inhab- 
itants in the different states. Chase of Maryland moved, 
instead of this, their imposition in proportion to the num- 
ber of " white inhabitants," because taxation should be 
regulated by population and the slaves were " property," 
and the southern states would therefore be doubly taxed if 
the clause should be adopted in its present form. This ar- 
gument was opposed by the delegates of the northern 
states. It is noteworthy that John Adams rested his op- 
position upon the assertion that the number of inhabitants 
should be adopted as the measure of the wealth of a state, 
and that slaves produced no less surplus wealth than free- 
men did. Wilson supported this view, and explained it 

1 In the five states last named the societies were first organized after 
the new constitution had come into force. 



LTE &OVEBEIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

by Baying that free laborers always produced more, but 
also, and in the same proportion, consumed more. 1 

On the 13th of October the question came once more 
before congress. After the proposition to lay federal taxei 
in proportion to the aggregate property of each state had 
been defeated, it was moved that slaves Bhould be wholly 
exempt from taxation. The four New England Btatea 
voted against this, Virginia, Maryland, and the two Caro- 
linas for it. The decision then lay with the middle states. 
The vote of Pennsylvania and New York was divided. 
New Jersey, therefore, had the decision of the issue, and 
decided it in favor of the south. 2 In the debate of duly 
12, Harrison had proposed to reckon two slaves as one free- 
man in reference to taxation. Wilson had said, in reply, 
that this would be setting a premium on the farther im- 
portation of slaves. A northern state, and, indeed, a third- 
rate northern state, now paid this premium to the south at 
the cost of the Union. 3 

The full meaning of this first victory of the slave-hold- 
ing interest was not appreciated at the south or at the 
north. The southern states were now thinking only of 
the protection of their own immediate interests; the idea 
of a slavocratic propaganda lay far beyond. After Vir- 
ginia (March 1. 17S4) had ceded her territory northeast of 
the river Ohio to the Union, a committee appointed on 

1 See the whole debate, according lo Jefferson's notes, in Elliot, Deb., 
I., pp. 70-74. 

- Bancroft, IX., p. 412: Wilson, Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in 
America, I., p. 10. 

3 In March, 1783, the report of the committee on the finances brought 
the question again before congress. The committee went back to the 
proposition made by Barrison in 1777. Madison moved, in place of 
this, that five Blares should be counted as time freemen. The amend 
ment was adopted, but immediately thereafter the whole clau» 
stricken out. (Elliot, Deb.. V., p. 79.) Hamilton, however, April 1, 
moved a re-consideration, and Madison's proposition was then adopted 
without opposition, (Ibid, V., p. 81.) Then ami there the germ of the 
notorious " three-fifth* compromise'' was planted. 



EAKLY LEGISLATION ON SLAVERY. 287 

Jefferson's motion laid before congress a plan for the gov- 
ernment of " the territory ceded or to be ceded by the dif- 
ferent states to the United States." The latter phrase was 
understood as referring to the territory then belonging to 
North Carolina and Georgia, between 31° and ^?, which 
comprises the present states of Tennessee, Alabama, and 
Mississippi. The plan divided the whole territory into 
future states, and declared, among other things, that after 
the year 1800 "neither slavery nor involuntary servitude" 
should exist in them. Spaight of North Carolina moved, 
April 19, to strike out this passage. The four New Eng- 
land states, New York, and Pennsylvania voted to retain 
it; Maryland, Virginia, and South Carolina voted against 
it, and the vote of North Carolina was lost by the division 
of its delegates. The decision, therefore, lay again with 
New Jersey, since the articles of confederation made the 
vote of a majority of all the states necessary for the adop- 
tion of a resolution. As only one delegate from New 
Jersey was present, the vote of the state conld not be given, 
and the slave interest therefore gained a victory again by 
this chance. The significance of this triumph was far 
greater than that of the first, on the question of taxation. 
If slavery had been eradicated from Kentucky, Tennessee, 
Alabama, and Mississippi, the free states would have soon 
had a decisive superiority. Without doubt this circum- 
stance decided the votes of Maryland, Virginia, and South 
Carolina. But it would be transferring the spirit of a 
later time to this period if we should suppose that they 
aimed in this at the perpetuation of slavery and the forma- 
tion of a slavocracy. The territories about which the dis- 
cussion took place were ceded to the Union by slave states, 
and the latter therefore thought it only right and proper 
that slavery should be permitted to continue to exist in 
them as long as they were not free from it themselves. 
Their moral and political judgment on slavery was not 
shown by the vote. Interest had not yet become of such 



ggg n; SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

power that self-deception had changed to conscious false- 

li 1. 

The so-called ordinance of 1787 gives a practical proof 
of the justice of this view of the case. July 11, 17£ 
committee of which Nathan Dane, of Massachusetts, was 
chairman, laid before congress a plan for the government 
of the territory northwest of the Ohio. Article VI. of 
the "compact between the original states and the people 
and Btatea in the said territory" forbade forever slavery 
and involuntary servitude, but provided for the surrender 
of fugitives "from whom labor or service is lawfully 
claimed in any one of the original states." The whole 
plan was unanimously adopted July 13 by the states, ami 
the only member of congress who voted against it was 
Yates of New York. 1 

The readiness with which the northern half of the ter- 
ritory had been devoted to free labor was in sharp contrast 
with the stiff-neckedness with which the slaveholding in- 
9t of the southern states was simultaneously defended. 
While congress, in session at New York, voted the ordi- 
nance of 1TS7, the convention which was to draw up a 
practical constitution for the Union sat at Philadelphia. 
In this, too, some of the southern delegates remained true 
to the principles they had followed in revolutionary ti 
but the decisive votes belonged to those who dismi 
freedom and human rights with words, and demai 
privilege after privilege for the sake of supporting slavery. 

An exhaustive history of all the incidents of the strug 
over these demands would exceed the limits set to this 
book. 2 The bare statement of the result does not come up 
to those limits. In these debates, for the first time, the 

1 The first congress under the new constitution ratified the ordinance 
August 7, 1789. Both acta are in the Statutes at Large, I., pp. 50-58. 

■he reader who wishes to gain a more exact knowledge without 
searching at the sources (Elliot's Debates) will find a correct and inter- 
esting sketch in Curtis, History of the Constitution. 



THE THREE-FIFTHS COMPROMISE. 289 

veil was rent which, had hitherto made a clear conception 
of the true state of the slavery question impossible. The 
rents were wide enough to let it be seen that behind 
them lay a world of war, of war to the knife, although 
they did not show how this war would develop and how it 
would end. 

The strife broke forth over the question of representa- 
tion and of direct taxation. Wilson of Pennsylvania, a 
man of clear, statesmanlike ways of thinking, and a de- 
termined opponent of slavery, suggested that in regard to 
representation five slaves should be considered equal to 
three freemen. 1 He who draws his political inspiration 
simply and solely from his bible of principles plays Don 
Quixote. Political policy is a necessity. But a concession 
which involves a principle that can be neither morally nor 
politically justified is a heavy weight, which sooner or 
later becomes too heavy for the strongest political swim- 
mer. In 1777 Wilson had branded Harrison's similar 
proposal as a premium on the importation of slaves. 
Row he himself offered the premium, but paid it in more 
valuable coin. The proposition was hastily adopted by 
nine votes to two, 2 and was afterwards again brought be- 
fore the convention by a committee. 3 Thus Wilson did not 
alone encounter the reproach of having been faithless to 
his principles. The great majority of the convention ap- 
proved of his proposition, and it was at the same time ex- 
pressly pointed out that congress had already united on 
the same compromise between the northern and southern 
states on the question of taxation. 

Wilson justified himself by the " necessity of a com- 
promise." 4 In the course of the debate, Sherman and 
Ellsworth sought through each other to bring the parties 

'Elliot, Deb., V., p. 181. 

2 Delaware and New Jersey. 

3 Elliot, Deb., V., p. 190. 

4 Ibid, V., p. 301. 

19 



090 n: sivi.Ktn.viv and BLAYEBT. 

nearer to one another and so urged the unavoidable™ 

omi8e . Gradually propositions were found oa 
which „„. requisite majority agreed. The race of north- 
em politicians who sated their thirst for glory by 
M trainbearers ... the slavocracy had not yet amen. The 

B tru Le was therefore severe. When the "three-fifth. 

coimise" came up for the decisive vote, only Connec. 

ticut, Virginia, North Carolina and Georgia voted for it, 
and Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delawar 
Marvland and South Carolina against it. 1 Among the 
state's in the negative, the first three and South Carolina 
naturally belonged there, although the latter's vote was dej 
termined by exactly opposite reasons.' All the southern 
states agreed with Randolph that they must demand aj 
"especial assurance" in regard to their slaves by reckon 
them in making up the ratio of representation. 1 inckn, 
was not contented with this. He demanded the compl 
equality of slaves and freemen in this respect. On the 
other side, the delegates of the northern states refused •• to 
.rive such an encouragement to the slave-trade as would 
be involved in an allowance of representatives tor the ne- 
eroes" Gouverneur Morris added that the eomplel 
elusion of the negroes would be unjust to the southern 
states, but, if he had only the choice between this or being 
■■unjust to human nature," bis decision could not he 
donbtfnl. But at the same time he expressed Ins convw 
tion that the southern states « would never confedera 
terms that would deprive then of the slave-trade. 1M 
^lizingand direct encouragement in the constitution ol 
m Trying sin against human rights or the surrender of he 
[Jnion-this, according to Morris, was the dilemma «h.eh 



1 Elliot, Deb., V.. p. 301. 

■ Maryland wished only a change in the worfling. 

•Elliot, Deb.j V., p. 304 

« [bid, V.. p.805. 

6 Ibid, V.. p. 301. 



THE SLAVE TRADE. 291 

confronted them. His judgment found proofs of this in 
the expressions of part of the southern delegates during 
the debate over the slave-trade. 

In the committee-report, which Eutledge laid before the 
convention August 6, art. VII., sec. 4 of the draft of the 
constitution provided that " no tax or duty shall be laid by 
the legislature upon the migration or importation of such 
persons as the several states shall think proper to admit; 
nor shall such migration or importation be prohibited." 
Both the Pinckneys declared that South Carolina, Baldwin 
that Georgia, and Williamson that the southern states in 
general, could not adopt the constitution unless all legal 
power in these two particulars was denied to the legisla- 
ture of the Union. 1 The northern states, they said, should 
be content with the assertion that "perhaps" all the south- 
ern states, following the example of Virginia and Mary- 
land, would voluntarily forbid the importation of slaves, 
if the whole matter was left for them to decide. Charles 
C. Pinckney scorned to cover his views with such juggling 
dissimulation. He freely confessed that the most to be ex- 
pected from South Carolina was an occasional prohibition 
of the importation. 2 The delegates from Connecticut have 
the sad honor of having encouraged the remainder of the 
southern delegates to throw off their masks. Roger Sher- 
man deprecated the slave-trade, but thought that " the pub- 
lic good did not demand" that the right of importing slaves 
should be taken away from the states. Ellsworth went still 
farther. To the future chief justice of the United States, 
the " morality and wisdom of slavery" were matters which 
did not concern the Union. With a bold hand, he threw 
the dollar as a decisive weight into the balance. 3 And if 

1 Elliot, Deb , V., pp. 379, 459, 460. 

2 Ibid, V., p. 460; compare IV., pp. 272, 278. 

3 " Let every state import what it pleases. The morality or wisdom 
of slavery are considerations belonging to the states themselves. What 
enriches a part enriches the whole, and the states are the best judges of 



i 



\TK SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

Borne of the most cultured men in the north treated the 
Blavery-question with such moral and political stupidity, 
it is not Btrange that there were some men in the south 
who had completely done with the dreams of the revolu- 
tionary period about a speedy general emancipation; 
Charles C. Pinckney bluntly said: "South Carolina 
Pffia cannot do without slaves." Far from seeking 
cases for this, he minutely followed up Ellsworth's argu- 
ment. 1 Rutledge took the last step. He systematically 
rejected every argument drawn from " religion or human- 
ity" because " interest alone is the governing principle 
with nations/*- South Carolina, Georgia and North Caro- 
lina would not he " such fools'* as to deprive themseb i 
such an important advantage.' 3 So said another man, who 
was afterwards chosen for chief justice of the Unite § 

The extreme champions of the slaveholding interest can- 
not he reproached with not having clearly defined their 
position. The delegates of the northern states made the 
compact with open eyes and complete knowledge. Their 
motive, as they repeatedly declared at Philadelphia 
later in the ratification conventions of the differen 
was the firm conviction that only in this way could the 
Union be maintained. 

their particular interest. The old confederation had not meddled w'vdi 
this point; and he did nol see any greater necessity for bringi 
within the policy of the new one." Elliot, Deb., V., p. 457. 

1 " He contended that the importation of slaves would be for the 
esl of the whole Union. The more slaves, the more produce to 1 1 
the carrying trade ; the more consumption also ; and the more ol 
the more revenue for thecommon treasury." Ibid, V., p. 459. Con 
IV.. p. 396. 

- "Religion and humanity had nothing to do with this question. 
alone i- the governing principle with nations. The trui 
at present is, whether the southern states shall or shall not be part 

aion. It' the northern states consult their interest, they will not 
oppose the increase of slaves, which will increase the commodil 
which they will become the carriers.'' Ibid, V., p. -457. 

' Ibid, V., p. 400. 



THE GREAT COMPROMISE. 293 

The compromise, as the bargain was called, contained two 
points: (1) representation and direct taxation should be in 
the same ratio, and in estimating them five slaves should 
be reckoned as three freemen; 1 (2) congress was forbidden 
to prohibit the importation of slaves into the states then 
existing before the year 1808, but it was allowed to lav a 
tax of not more than $10 per capita on the importation. 2 

These provisions did not concede everything which had 
been asked by some of the southern delegates. Whether 
and how far they can be called a compromise demands 
more careful examination. 

Under the confederation the states, as such, were repre- 
sented, and hence each had an equal voice. This principle 
was preserved in a modified form by the system of repre- 
sentation in the senate. For representation in the house, 
the population was taken as a basis. This was not the de- 
velopment of one distinct and clearly formulated concep- 
tion. In the debates the most common expression was 
that the population was the best measure of the industrial 
capacity, that is, of the public well-being. But if this 
supposition was just and if the representation should be 
measured by the public well-being, then no objection can 
be made to the first part of the compromise, provided the 
relation between the productiveness of slaves and of free- 
men was measured with approximate accuracy. Yet the 
south pretended that it far surpassed the north in wealth 
and constantly used this circumstance as a pretext for the 
more emphatic urging of its claims. If this assertion was 
well founded, then its quota of representatives as well as of 
taxes was set too low. It did not rest its claim to greater 
wealth upon higher industrial capacity or greater industry. 
The extent of the states, the fertility of the soil, the re- 
markable value of its products and its slaves were the main 



1 Art. I., Sec. 2, § 
1 Ibid, Sec. 9, § 1. 



» 



£94 I STATE SoVEKEIGNTY AM) SLAVERY. 

features in its inventory. It acknowledged by this that 
outside of the number of people, many other causes must 

he taken account of in order to determine, even approxi- 
mately, industrial capacity. Jt Mas, therefore, evidently 
unjust to apportion representation and direct taxes simply 
according to the number <>i' people, when tin's was con- 

ed only as a measure of industrial value. Butb< - 
this, and above all, the selection of ]>uhlic wealth as the 
- of representation is in contradiction to the idea, not 

of a democratic republic, but of any sort of repr< 
tative state. The idea of representation is always b 
more or Less, n]>on the individual, to whom as a member 
of the political community, an indirect share in the regu- 
lation of political affairs by representation belongs. The 
fact that the political institutions of no state have 
fully realized this idea, and that they never can fully real- 
ize it, is a matter of no moment. Institutions realize the 
idea more or less closely, and whether this right bel 
to all men of full age or only to a part of them, who thus 
act. so to speak, as trustees for the whole people, in vol 
difference of degree, not hind. Even where a so-called rep- 
resentation of interests or a grouping of population with 
a graduated quota of representation exists, the idea of repre- 
sentation remains the same. Interests as such are not repre- 
sented, hut, instead, a number of individuals, as themana- 

of certain interests; and the gradation of the right oi 
representation only recognizes the principle that this right 
should he measured by the proportion of certain indusl 
to the whole, hut does not thrust out of sight the principle 
that t<> the individual, as a member of the political com- 
munity, an indirect share in the regulation of political 
affairs by representation belongs. But, by the natun 
thing-, the supposition of this right must rot on the 
litical existence of the individual, or, at least, on the lull 
recognition by the state of his personal existence. The 
slaves were evidently not citizens, and in the southern si 



/ 



REPRESENTATION OF SLAVES. § 295 

they practically lacked, in the right meaning of the word, 
a personal existence, although the constitution designated 
them as " persons." As a general rule, the slave had no 
rights, for every right is positive, while the so-called rights 
of the slave were merely negative, that is, were limitations 
of the arbitrary power of his master. It was therefore a 
contradiction in itself to speak of the representation of 
slaves. The rights and interests of the slaves were not 
represented, but the people who considered it their interest 
to keep the slave absolutely without rights were, as the 
owners of human chattels, more fully represented than 
others entitled to representation. It has never been denied 
that not only were the states represented in relation to 
their population, but that also the population of the states 
ought to be represented. Yet Charles C. Pinckney openly 
declared in the debates of the legislature of South Caro- 
lina over the constitution that the slaves would be reckoned 
in the representation as property, so that the slaveholders, 
besides their right of representation in proportion to the 
population of freemen and of persons bound to service for 
a certain time, would have a still further right of represen- 
tation as the owners of this especial sort of property. 1 
This, indeed, cannot be read in plain words in the constitu- 
tion. It does not at all say Who or What is to be repre- 
sented, but speaks only of the apportionment of represen- 
tation. This circumstance was made great use of by those 
northern politicians who did not justify the bargain by sad 
necessity, but sought to demonstrate its complete equity. 
Through all this whirl of sophisms, however, we always 
come back to the simple facts that a representation of prop- 
erty was granted to the south, which the north did not 
have, and that as a result of this the vote of the owner of 

1 " We thus obtained a representation for our property; and I confess 
I did not expect that we had conceded too much to the eastern states, 
when they allowed us a representation for a species of property which 
they have not among them." Elliot, Deb., IV., p. 283. 



20G BBBIGNTT AND SLAVERY. 

fifty slaves was of as much weight, in regard to representa- 
tion in the house of congress, as the votes of thirty I 

men. 

In the ratification conventions of the northern sti 
the defenders of the constitution made the farther ac 
tion that, Bince the slaves were also reckoned in the appor- 
tionment of direct taxes in the proportion of five to three, 
a just recompense was made to the north for this coi 
siuii. The tictitiousness of this statement, however, is 
shown by the fact that the direct taxes which were to he 
raised wore not worth Bpeaking of. Moreover, the north 
paid much more than its share of indirect taxes, bee 
as good as nothing flowed into the federal treasury from 
the whole slave population in this way. The south had 
gained the advantage in representation as well as in the 
taxes for the support of the federal government. 

In regard to the second part of the compromise, it 
possible for the northern delegates to assert, at the - 
time, that the maintenance of the Union would have de- 
pended upon its adoption, provided the threats of the dele- 
gates of the two Carolinas and Georgia would have 
made true by their respective states. 1 Bat many of the 
defenders of the constitution also praised the provision 
concerning the importation of slaves as a great gain for 
the north and for freedom. This view, as well as its op- 
posite, can be better defended the farther back a man 

1 S t unc later utterances of the delegates show that those states might 
safely have been put to the test. Thus, for instance, Charles (\ Pinek- 
ney said in the legislature of South Carolina: " The honorable gentty 
man alleges thai the southern states are weak. I sincerely agree with 
him. We arc so weak by ourselves that we could not forma union 
Btrong enough for the purpose of effectually protecting each other. 
Without union with the other states South Carolina niusl soon fall 
there any one among us so much a Quixote as to suppose that this 
could long maintain her independence if she stood alone, or was onlj 
connected with the southern states? I scarcely believe there is." Elliot, 
Deb., IV, pp. 283, '-2S4 



THE TWENTY-TEAKS KEPRIEVE. 297 

chooses his standpoint from which to judge. Under the 
articles of confederation it was claimed that congress had no 
control whatever over the importation of slaves. It was 
evidently, then, an advance that it conld now hinder it by 
taxation, and could, after twenty years, forbid it altogether. 
This was answered by Madison's remark in the convention, 
that twenty years would be sufficient for working the evil 
that was to be feared from permitting the importation of 
slaves. 1 Mason had been of the same opinion, and had 
given as the ground of his belief that the west was already 
strongly desirous of introducing slavery. On the other 
side, men consoled themselves with the hope that a pro- 
hibition of importing slaves from Africa, even after twenty 
years, would still suffice to assure the gradual destruction 
of slavery. 2 This view was contradicted with great deci- 
sion by a very important section of the country. In the 
legislature of South Carolina, the clause concerning the 
import of slaves met with the strongest opposition that 
was anywhere shown against the constitution. Charles 
C. Pinckney considered the reprieve of twenty years that 
had been agreed upon as amply sufficient, and declared, in 
relation to it, that he would oppose every limitation of the 
importation " as long as an acre of marsh is uncultivated 
in South Carolina." Barnwell, too, ridiculed the fear that 
the eastern states, even after twenty years, would so little 
grasp their true interest as to put obstacles in the way of 
the importation, — " without we ourselves put a stop to 
them, the traffic for negroes will continue forever." 3 The 

1 Elliot, Deb., V., p. 477. 

9 " But we may say that although slavery is not smitten by apoplexy, 
yet it has received a mortal wound and will die of a cousumption." 
Dawes, in the ratification convention of Massachusetts, Elliot, Deb., 
II-, p. 41. Compare also Wilson, in the Pennsylvania convention, Ibid, 
II., p. 452. John Adams wrote in 1801, with a mistaken view of facts 
that is hard to understand: "The practice of slavery is fast diminish- 
ing." Adams, Works, IX., p. 92. 

z Elliot, Deb., IV., pp. 296, 297. 



vTE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

doubl cast on tlie pretended victory of the cause of free- 
dom by Mich utterances seemed still more grave when men's 
minds went back to the history of the time from 1771 to 
1776. Then the delegates from all the colonies had been 
for putting an end at once and forever to the slave-t] 
Now Virginia was reproached with opposing unlin 
importation only through motives of '* interest" and South 
Carolina was aware only of ''religious and political prej- 
udices" of the eastern states against slavery. 

Yet men's minds needed not to go back so far in order 
to find reasons for thinking that the public judgment on 
slavery had become more lax. The constitution contains 
still a third provision affecting slavery, which, stran< 
enough, received very little attention in the ratification 
conventions of the northern states. Art. IV., sec. i ; . 
provides that persons lawfully bound in any state to '' 
vice or labor," who fled into another state, should not be 
released from the service or the labor by a law or "any 
regulation" of the latter, but should be delivered up on 
demand. This clause was unanimously adopted, without 
debate, by the convention at Philadelphia. 1 This w 
backward step of great import and disastrous consequen- 
ces. The articles of confederation had contained no similar 
provision and it had never been pretended that the rendi- 
tion of fugitive slaves was a self-evident duty. Even Chi 
C. Pinckney admitted that the south had gained a new 
right in this. 2 If the articles of confederation had imp 
no limits whatever upon the states in regard to slavery, 
they had also, on the other hand, imposed no duties what- 
ever upon the Union. The new constitution did this and 
this is the weak point of the slavery compromise of the 

1 Elliot. Deli., V., p. 492. Only the wording was changed in the final 
revision oi' the constitution. The clause referred, too, to apprentices 
and the so-called "hound servants," but it was sell-evidently especially 
directed against fugitive b1 

- Elliot, 1Kb, IV.. p. 286; Bee also p. 17G 



THE CONSTITUTION ON SLAVERY. 299 

constitution. Slavery was not made a federal institution 
and the constitution did not contain, as was later asserted, 
a formal "guaranty" 1 of the "peculiar institution," but 
it recognized it not only, as the articles of confederation 
did, by silence; there were three provisions of the great- 
est weight in favor of slavery contained in the funda- 
mental law of the Union, and, without regard to the con- 
tents of these provisions, by means of them a mighty 
pillar of support was thrust under the rotten structure. Al- 
though the words " slave" and " slavery" were not used in 
them, yet this was not only a matter of no value, but made 
the thing still worse. Never have men tried by such a pit- 
iable trick to lie to themselves and the world about facts 
which could no more be lied away than the sun from the 
firmament. But the worst of it was that these circumlo- 
cutions were used on the demand, not of the south, but of 
the north. 2 The plantation-owners had already become such 
complete slavocrats that their ears were no longer offended 
by the word which carries in its sound its condemnation; 
and the north, which was henceforth to bear the banner of 
freedom alone, had already become such a moral coward 
that it tried to escape, by shunning the word, the respons- 
ibility for the legal recognition of the thing. 

Some of the most determined opponents of slavery af- 
terwards sought, strange to say, a just basis for their strug- 

1 In Prigg vs. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, however, the 
supreme court of the United States declared: "Historically, it is well 
known that the object of this clause was to secure to the citizens of the 
slaveholding states the complete right and title of ownership in then- 
slaves, as property, in every state in the Union into which they might 
escape from the state where they were held in servitude. The full recog- 
nition [!] of this right and title was indispensable to the security of this 
species of property in all the slaveholding states, and, indeed, was so vital 
to the preservation of their domestic interests and institutions that it 
cannot be doubted that it constituted a fundamental article without the 
adoption of which the Union could not have been formed." Peters, 
Rep., XVI, p. 611 ; Curtis, XIV, pp. 420, 421. 

2 Elliot, Deb, II., pp. 451, 452; IV, pp. 102, 176; V, p. 477. 



STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

igainst it in the fact that the constitution recognizes no 
" but only "persons." This would make a_ 
theme for very logical dissertations, but the dissertat 
cannot destroy the Btrong band of the logic of facts, 
which the south tugged the north, Btep by step, farther a 
its path. It has already been related in another chapter, 
with what arrogance the south seized the first opportunity 
to do BO. It could be answered, but it could not b 

d. Fig-trees do not grow from thistles in Ami 
any more than elsewhere. The principle had been bar- 
gained away for the sake of the Union, and hence every 
new demand dictated to the Blavocracy by the impule 
self-preservation presented to the north the alternative of 
yielding and therewith taking a farther step away from the 
right principle or of endangering the Union. This was the 
result which the relentless logic of historic justice, that is, 
of the moral order of the world, involved. Taxes could be 
laid without tearing the Union asunder, only as long as in 
the south the interests bound up in the Union outweL 
the slavocratic interests. The longer men shrank back 
from the test, so much the more dictatorially did the south 
necessarily speak, so much the more did it necessarily de- 
mand, so much the more was necessarily conceded to 
much the more did the distinct slavocratic interest m 
sarily outgrow the interests connected with the Union. 

An earnest struggle of the southern states against slavery 
on their own initiative was impossible as long as they 
thought that not only their industrial well-being, but their 
wry industrial existence, depended upon it. But this con* 
viction already existed, at least in South Carolina and 

gia. 1 

1 In the debates of the legislature of South Carolina over the consti- 
tution, Lowndes said: -Without uegroea, this state would degenenH 
into one of the most contemptible in the Union," and Charles C. Pinck. 
ncv: •• I am a- thoroughly convinced as that gentleman is that the na- 
ture of our climate and the tlat, swampy situation of our country oblige 



THE SLAVERY DILEMMA. 301 

If it remained confined to these states and grew 
weaker elsewhere, then human rights and the blessings 
of free labor would necessarily and steadily gain ground. 
If it struck deeper root and spread wider, then human 
rights, free labor and all freedom, political, religious 
and moral, would perforce ever bow lower under the 
yoke of the slavocracy, as long as men would neither sac- 
rifice the Onion nor venture to fight for the Union. The 
preservation of the status quo was impossible. 

us to cultivate our lands with negroes, and that without them South Car- 
olina would soon be a desert waste. . . We . . . assigned rea- 
sons for our insisting on the importation, which there is no occasion to 
repeat, as they must occur to every gentleman in the house." Elliot, 
Deb., IV., pp. 272, 285. The debates of the Georgia convention are not 
preserved, but the votes of the Georgia delegates at Philadelphia and 
the way in which they let the South Carolina delegates speak for them 
fully justify the assertion made in the text. In May, 1789, the first skir- 
mish in congress on the slavery question took place. The provocation 
thereto was the motion by Parker of Virginia to lay a tax of $10 per 
head upon slaves imported. Jackson of Georgia said on this occasion: 
" They [gentlemen] do not wish to charge us for every comfort and en- 
joyment of life and at the same time take away the means of procuring 
them; they do not wish to break us down at once." Deb. of Congress, 
L, p. 73. Georgia was for a long time the only state which permitted 
the importation of slaves. South Carolina did not repeal her prohibition, 
which had existed since the time of the Philadelphia convention, until 
1803. Georgia had then again forbidden it and by a clause in the con- 
stitution of 1798. Opinions of the Attorneys General, I., p. 449. 



:)ft-2 st. mi: SOVEREIGNTY and slavery. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

History of the Slavery Question from ITS 9 until the 
Missouri Compromise. 

Washington had written as early as 1786 to Lafayette 
that he " despaired' ? of seeing the spirit of freedom gain 
the upper hand. 1 Politicians and people, however, contiiv. 
ued to be convinced of the contrary, although under the 
new constitution proofs of the justice of Washington'! 
view rapidly accumulated. A most notable symptom of 
this was that no one was conscious how quickly the nation 
was striding forward on the wrong path. The constant 
speaking and writing about freedom during the revolution 
bore evil fruits. The gulf between abstract political rea- 
soning and the actual development of freedom had become 
perilously broad. Not only was the faculty of political 
judgment hurt, but the political will of the nation had 
suffered. Men became impatient and unjust because they 
had talked themselves into believing the flattering illusion 
that in the struggle against the injustice of others, one 
start- from the absolute principle of justice. The speediest 
courser on the road to despotism is a principle ridden 
without reins. If men had given themselves up to g 
illusions, at first, in regard to the readiness with which real 
interests would be sacrificed at the altar of principle, they 
now ruthlessly rejected the principle for the sake of empty 
prejudices. Their position on the slavery question might 
have been more or less excused by sad political necessity. 
But for the shameful treatment of the free men of color, 
not even this dubious justification can be brought forward 

Wash., Writ, IX., p. 1G3. 



TKEATMENT OF FREE NEGROES. 303 

— at least not vet — and it therefore throws an especially 
clear light upon how far the principles of the Declaration 
of Independence, with their consequences, had become 
flesh of the flesh and bone of the bone of the people. 

The free men of color, especially those in the northern 
states,had had an honorable share in the war of independence. 
Oil different occasions, as, for instance, at the defense of 
Red Bank, they had greatly distinguished themselves. The 
republic now praised them for this, while congress de- 
clared them unworthy to serve in the militia. 1 This did 
the slaveholders a service that involved the greatest con- 
sequences, for it had now been recognized as a fundamental 
fact that race and color were principles which should nec- 
essarily be taken account of in making laws. 

The consequences logically resulting from this fact were 
practically followed up so widely that they almost instant- 
ly amounted to an emphatic recognition of slavery as a 
national institution. In the southern states, slavery was 
looked upon as, without doubt, the natural position of per- 
sons of color, so that the presumption of the law was that 
every colored man was a slave. 2 If the freedom of a col- 
ored man was questioned by any one whatever, the burden 
of proof to the contrary rested on him. This upsetting of 
the fundamental principle of law recognized by all civil- 
ized peoples — affirmanti, non neganti, incumbit jprobatio — 
was formally approved by congress when it resolved that, 
in the District of Columbia, over which the constitution 
gave it unlimited power, 3 the laws of Maryland and Vir- 
ginia should respectively remain in force. 4 Yet this is not 

1 Law of May 8, 1792. Stat, at Large, I., p. 271. 

1 " In a state where slavery is allowed, every colored person is pre- 
sumed to be a slave." Prigg vs. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 
Peters, Rep., XVI., p. 669; Curtis, XIV., p. 470. 

3 Art. I., Sec. 8, § 17. 

4 Law of Feb. 27, 1801; Stat, at Large, II., p. 105. The part of the Dis- 
trict ceded by Virginia was afterwards given back to that state. In the 
report of the committee for the District, Jan. 11, 1827, it is affirmed: 



I 



304 LTE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAYKUY. 

all. Henceforth Blavery existed in the District only by 

virtue of this law,— a slavery with a code which was a veri- 
table muster-roll of horrors. It is possible, and in truth 
probable, that most members of congress were not aware 
what Bort of abominations they had made laws of the Union 
by adopting the >lave-code of Maryland, then nearly a cen* 
tury old. 1 Hut how far does the excuse reach? If human 
rights had already become so much of a lie, as far as 
and color were concerned, that it was no longer dee 
worth the trouble to inquire what laws were made about 
them, then the nation was only one step from letting such 
outrages against the first demands of justice, humanity and 
morality, to say nothing of the principles of freedom, he 
framed into laws with the full consciousness of their mean- 
ing. History affords proof of this. 2 Some decades after- 

"In this District, as in all the slave-holding states in the Union, the le- 
gal presumption is that persons of color going at large without any evi- 
dences of their freedem are absconding slaves and prima facie liable 
to all legal provisions applicable to that class of persons." Reports of 
Committees, XIX Congress, 2d Sess., I., No. -i'). 

1 " Laws of the Union" so far as congress, according to the decision of 
the supreme court of the United States, is not simply the local legisla- 
ture of the District, but acts, even in this respect, as the legislature of 
the Union. In Cohens vs. Virginia (1821) the court affirmed that " this 
power . . . is conferred on congress as the legislature of the Union; 
for >trip them of that character, and they would not possess it. I 
islating for the District, they necessarily preserve the character of the 
legislature of the Union. . . Those who contend that acts of coi 
made in pursuance of this power do not, like acts made in pursuance 
of other powers, bind the nation, ought to show some safe and clear rule 
which shall support this construction and prove that an act of coi 
clothed in all the forms which attend other legislative ads and p 

in virtue of a power conferred on and exercised by congre-s as tin 
latUTe <>1 the Union, is not a law of the United Slates and does not bind 
them." YVheaton, Rep., VI., pp. 424, 42.") ; Curtis, V.. p. 112. 

2 In the report already quoted of the committee for the District of 
Columbia, it is said: "If a five man of color should be apprehend, 
runaway, he is subjected to the payment of all fees and rewards [ ! 

by law for apprehending runaways; and upon failure to make such 
payment is liable to be sold as a slave." The committee recommended 



SLAYE CODE OF CONGRESS. 305 

wards, through the direct action of congress, it became law 
at the seat of the national government that persons known 
to be free should be sold as slaves in order to cover the costs 
of imprisonment which they had suffered on account of 
the false suspicion that they were runaway slaves. And 
this law was repeatedly put into full effect. How many 
crowned despots can be mentioned in the history of the old 
world who have done things which compare in accursed- 
ness with this law to which the democratic republic gave 
birth? Can all history furnish a second example of a na- 
tion throwing so great a lie, with such insolent hardihood, 
in the face of the world, as the United States, with their 
belief in the principles of the Declaration of Independence, 
did for almost a century? 

The judgment is hard, but just. Many people will not 
allow the least blame to be cast on this period, because it 
does not harmonize with their admiration of the "fathers," 
and because they have adopted, without any proof, the 
common view that the deeper shadows of slavery and slav- 
ocracy first appeared comparatively late. If we consider 
the spirit which filled the law-makers as the essential thing, 
we can still accept this view only as a partial justification. 
In order to judge of the spirit rightly, we must by no 
means fall into the very common error of overlooking the 
sins of omission chargeable to congress. In reading 
through the debates, single striking instances of injustice 
do not make the deepest impression. It is the omnipres- 
ent unwillingness to practice justice towards colored per- 
son. — ves, even to recognize them as actual beino-s. AYhen 
the defense of their rights is demanded, then congress has 
always a deaf ear. The representatives of the slave states 
oppose to every demand their firm and yet passionate Non 
possiimas with a consistency and energy which would have 

that the municipality of Washington should be charged with the costs, 
but the law remained unchanged. 

20 



30g STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

reflected honor on the papal curia. And in most ci 
they carry the majority with them. 

Bwanwick of Pennsylvania Laid before the house of rep- 
reaentatives, Jan. 30, L797, a petition from four North 
Carolina negroes who had been freed by their mas 
Since a state law condemned them to be sold again, they 
had fled to Philadelphia. There they had been seized un- 
der the fugitive slave law, a full explanation of which is 
given hereafter, and now prayed congress for it, interven- 
tion. Blount Of North Carolina declared that only when 
it was " proved" that these men were free, could cong 
consider the petition. Sitgreaves of Pennsylvania asked, 
in reply to this, what sort of proof was offered that the 
four negroes were not free. This question received no an- 
swer. Smith of South Carolina and Christie of Maryland 
simplv expressed their amazement that any member what- 
ever could have presented a petition of " such an unheard* 
of nature." Swanwick and some other representatives 
affirmed that the petition must be submitted to a commit- 
tee for investigation and consideration, because the peti- 
tioners complained of violation of their rights under a law 
of the Union. Xo reply could be made to this and no 
reply was attempted. This decisive point was simpl 
aside, and it was voted by fifty ayes to thirty-thm 
not to receive the petition. 1 Congress acknowledged by 
this vote the truth of the view expressed by Christie, that 
under the fugitive slave law no injury could happen to a 
freeman. In order to reach this result, Smith had pro- 
duced the customary impression by the declaration that t 
refusal of the demand made by the representatives from the 
southern states would drive a " wedge" into the Unions 
When, three years later, the same question was brougW 
before congress again by a petition of the free neg* 
Philadelphia, Rutledge of South Carolina declared in 

• See the debate in Deb. of Congress, II., pp. 57-G0. 



EIGHT OF PETITION. 307 

plainer terms that the south would be forced to the sad 
necessity of going its own way. 1 

It was always especially distasteful to the representatives 
of the south to see the crime of slavery brought before 
congress by colored people. But the whites who troubled 
themselves about slaves or free colored persons had no bet- 
ter reception. Tear after year the Quakers came indefat- 
igable with new petitions, and each time had to undergo 
the same scornful treatment. In 1797, the yearly meeting 
at Philadelphia set forth some especial wrongs in a petition. 
The most prominent place in the document was occupied by 
a complaint against the law of ]N~orth Carolina, which con- 
demned freed slaves to be sold again. Many southern del- 
egates expressed, in a bullying fashion, their scorn for the 
tenacity with which these men of earnest faith ever con- 
stantly came back again to their hopeless work. Butledge 
and Parker demanded that the petition should be laid "un- 
der the table." 2 Putledge even wished that " a sharp re- 
proof" should be sent to the petitioners. But the defend- 
ers of the right of petition succeeded, this time, in 
having the memorial referred to a special committee. 'No 
attention, however, was paid to it there. 

The year before, Delaware had laid before congress a 
memorial in regard to kidnapping. In reply to a question 
put by Murray, Swanwick declared that the term "kid- 
napping" was to be understood as referring both to run- 
ning slaves off in order to free them and to the stealing of 
free negroes in order to sell them as slaves. 3 Although 
congress was asked to take action in this case by a slave 
state, yet the representatives from the rest of the south 

1 Deb. of Congress, II., p. 443. 

2 Ibid, II., pp. 183, 185. The proposal was applauded. Christie and 
Jones of Georgia repeated it in 1800 on a similar occasion. Ibid, II., 
p. 439. 

3 Yet it appears from an utterance of J. Nicholas of Virginia, that it 
was especially desired to put an end to the hunt after free colored men. 



gQQ STATE BOVBBBIGNTY AM) SLAVERY. 

were Dot willing to allow it to " meddle" in anyway what- 
eV er with matters concerning slavery, since the power to 
, m ight be afterwards used against slaveholding inter- 
W. Smith affirmed that slavery was a "purely mu- 
nicipal" affair. Representatives from the northern stati 
supported this view from different motives. Coit of - 
aecticut asserted that "the laws of the different states 
amply sufficient" to stem the evil. On his motion, and 
by forty-six to thirtv votes, the question was postponed 
in such a way that it could not come before the house again. 
The assurance given by the states most concerned that 
their laws could not suffice for this purpose, especially 
since thev could have no jurisdiction whatever on the wa- 
ter, received no attention, although it was generally admit- 
ted that the evil existed to a marked extent. 

In all the cases mentioned, the tactics of the representa- 
tives of the slaveholding interest were the same and tli 
maintained them unchanged up to the last. If congn 
was urged to act in any way which did not please^ them, 
then slavery was always a " purely municipal affair." 
the literal interpretation of the constitution was ine 
up.-n; every constructive power of congress was declared 
to be inadmissible; and it was thus stripped of all power, 
since no authority over slavery, except in regard to the 
importation of slaves, was directly granted it. But it the 
act of congress was in their interest, then, just as steadily, 
exactly the opposite path was pursued. Then was heard 
the reasoning: the southern states would never have rati, 
fied the constitution if complete security in regard I 
slavery had not been promised them; all int. Lould 

have- equal rights and equal claims to the protection oi the 
Union And from the first instant a sufficient numb 
members from the north clasped hands with the south to 
make the laws a mere nose of wax in the hands of the latter. 
the slaveholding interest found it as easy to carry 



SLAVERY RECOGNISED IN TREATIES. 309 

through its own demands as to reject the demands of its 
opponents. 

December 22, 17S9, North Carolina ceded the territory- 
claimed by her to the Union. The deed of cession stipulated 
ten conditions, — among them " that no regulations made 
or to be made by congress shall tend to emancipate slaves." 
April 2, 1790, congress accepted the cession without any 
discussion. 1 April 2, 1802, Georgia ceded, in a similar 
way, her western territory, and in doing so imposed the 
condition that the ordinance of 1787 should be valid there- 
in, in all its parts, " except only the article which forbids 
slavery." 2 That congress accepted the cessions in this 
form without even an attempt to make a change in the 
conditions, is the more remarkable, because in this case the 
constitution can well be relied upon. The constitution 
declares that " congress shall have power to dispose of the 
territory and all the property belonging to the United 
States and to make all necessary rules and regulations for 
the same." 3 This clause is quite absolute and peremptory. 
Congress had also unquestionably a right, if it seemed good 
to it, to legalize slavery in the territories, but it could not 
bind itself and all future congresses (for this was what the 
states which made the cessions wished to have publicly un- 
derstood) to a limitation of its constitutional powers. 

In the same year that congress took into the possession 
of the United States, under the conditions already given, 
the western territory of North Carolina, the treaty power 
had already been used in favor of the slave-holders. The 
irony of fate willed that this should be the first treaty to 
be completed under the new constitution. August 7, 1790, 
a treaty with the Creek Indians was agreed upon in New 

1 Stat, at Large, I., pp. 106-109. 

2 In Little, Brown and Co.'s edition of the statutes at large, which I 
used, the deed of cession and its acceptance by congress are not given. 
In Bioren and Duane's edition they may be found in vol. L, p. 488. 

3 Art. IV., Sec. 3, § 2. 



iUO STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

Fork. 1 By its terms the Creeks bound themselves to de- 
liver up the slaves who had fled to them from Georgia, and 
to hold the Seminoles, who lived in Spanish Florida, to the 
same duty. That the president and senate had the right 
to insert in a treaty stipulations in favor of the slavehold- 
er.-, cannot be questioned, since the treaty power, according 
to the provisions of the constitution, is unlimited. I>ut a 
duty to do so could under no circumstances exist, Bince 
Blaverv was only an institution of the individual states, hut 
not of the United States. The Union therefore made it- 
self a direct accomplice in the crime of slavery, when it 
voluntarily used its power in behalf of the specific intei 
of the slaveholders. If. in regard to the slavery compro- 
mises of the constitution, it should be boldly affirmed that 
so far as the Union was concerned, slavery was only a 
ognized fact, with which it had nothing to do, yet this was 
now, at least, no longer true. According to the constitu- 
tion, treaties are " the supreme law of the land." Such 
treaty stipulations practically recognized slavery as an in- 
stitution, in behalf of which the legislative power of the 
Union should be used. 

Three years later this happened in a much more direct 
way. Mention has already been made of the clause of the 
constitution which provides that persons bound t<> ser 
or labor who flee into another state shall not be relei 
from their service or labor, as the result of any law or 
regulation whatever of this state, but shall be delivered 
up upon the demand of the person to whom the service or 
labor is due. This clause thus limited the legislative 
power of the states, and laid upon the states an obligation. 1 

1 ptatal Large, VII., p. 35. 

2 This view is in opposition to the decision of the supreme court of 
the United Siate>. In the case of Prigg vs. Commonwealth of Penn- 
sylvania it is declared that "the clause i< found in the national constitu- 
tion, and not in that of any state. It doe- not point out any state func- 
tionaries or any state action to carry its provisions into effect. The 



FUGITI YE- SLATE LAW. 311 

Action by congress on this matter was not demanded, at 
least not immediately. Yet in 1793 it passed, of its own 

states cannot therefore be compelled to enforce them, and it might well 
be deemed an unconstitutional exercise of the power of interpretation 
to insist that the states are bound to provide means to carry into effect 
the duties of the national government nowhere delegated or entrusted to 
them by the constitution. On the contrary, the natural, if not the neces- 
sary, conclusion is that the national government, in the absence of all 
positive provisions to the contrary, is bound, through its own proper 
departments, legislative, judicial, or executive, as the case may require, 
to carry into effect all the rights and duties imposed upon it by the 
constitution." Peters, Rep., XVI,, pp. 615,616; Curtis, XIV., p. 424. 
But it is a fundamental doctrine of American constitutional law, which 
has never been questioned, that "the constitution of the United States 
is a part of the law of every state." (Chief justice Taney said in the 
same case: "And the words of the article which direct that the fugi- 
tive shall be delivered up seem evidently designed to impose it as a 
duty upon the people of the several states to pass laws to carry into 
execution in good faith the compact into which they thus solemn- 
ly entered with each other. The constitution of the United States, and 
every article and clause in it, is a part of the law of every state in the 
Union, and is the paramount law." Peters, Rep., XVI., p. 623 ; Curtis, 
XIV., p. 435.) It repeatedly applies directly to the states, as well in 
prohibition (Art. I. Sec. 10.) as in command (Art. I. Sec. 4, § 1). It can 
not be inferred from the simple fact that the clause is in the constitution 
of the Union, that it does not bind the states to perform a direct action, 
but the decision of the supreme court is supported only by this fact. 
The clause is not expressed with especial clearness, but, judged by the 
usual meaning of the words, it unquestionably applies much more 
directly to the states than to the federal powers. However great weight 
I generally give to Story's reasoning, I cannot in this case find any 
sound argument in his work against my view that the states were not 
only allowed, but obliged, to provide, of their own motion, until the 
passage of a federal law, a means by which the rights given the slave- 
holders by this clause could be secured. This does not contradict the 
broader and evidently just decision of the supreme court of the United 
States, that congress had the right, and that it was its eventual duty, to 
regulate this question by a federal law, which would then evidently 
and eo ipso set aside all the state laws concerning the matter. Art. I., 
Sec. 8, § 4 (the provision concerning a bankrupt law) is a proof that 
the constitution recognizes rights which congress may or may not use, 
and which belong to the individual states until it sees fit to use them. 
The same fundamental fact seems to me applicable also to duties. 



.;! 



312 STATK BOYBBEIOHTY AND SLAVERY. 

motion. 1 a fugitive-slave law. 2 In the house of representa- 
tives the biO was passed by 4 s votes against 7, and, as it 
seems, without any debate worth mentioning. 1 The vote 
on this truly barbarous law shows what claim colored peo- 
ple had to human rights; how much truth there was in 
the exaggerated complaint that hard late imposed the curse 
of slavery upon the land; and how terribly earnest, not 
only at the south, but in the congress of the Onion, the 
"legal presumption" of the Blavery of every colored per- 
son was. 

The law empowered the pretended owner, or his agent, 
to bring the alleged fugitive " before any magistrate 
a county, city, or town corporate," in order to obtain a 
decision which ordered the return of the fugitive to the 
state or territory from which he had escaped. Th< 
preme court of the United States afterwards acknowledged 
that doubt might be cast upon the constitutionality of this 
provision. It declared that state magistrates could uM 
the authority thus entrusted to them by congress when 



Only here the freedom of action of congress is limited by time. It 
ceases as soon as a decisive cause makes the conditional duty an un- 
conditional one. 

1 In order to escape the reproach of inexactness the history of this law 
mnsl be given Bomewhat more in detail. The immediate cause of it 
was a message of Washington. This was due to the governor of Penn- 
sylvania, who reclaimed a criminal who had fled to Virginia. The 
expression used in the text is therefore so far justified that complaint 
had not been made of an ineffectual reclamation of a fugitive slave. 

2 Approved by the president Feb. 12. Statutes at Large, I., pp. 302 

3 Deb. of Congress, I., p. 417. It is not apparent what the moti 

the Beven representatives (among them two from slave .state-) who voted 
in the negative were. 

* Bouvier, Law Dictionary, II., p. 86, defines "magistrate" as "a pub- 
lic civil officer invested with some part of the legislative, executive, or 
judicial power given by the constitution; in a narrower sense this term 
includes only inferior judicial officers, or justices of the peao I 

know Of no judicial decision in which the meaning of magistrate in 
this connection is exactly stated. 






DISREGARD OF HUMAN RIGHTS. 313 

they were not prevented from doing so by state laws. 1 But 
this may well be doubted. Congress certainly could not 
oblige these state magistrates to use the powers given 
them, inasmuch as in their capacity as magistrates it could 
impose no duties whatever upon them. The voluntary 
use of the power, with the silent consent of the states, 
therefore appears possible only under the fiction that con- 
gress made all the state magistrates mentioned in this law 
federal magistrates for certain defined cases. Yet this for- 
mal reasoning is the least reproach which can be brought 
against the law. Legally, the decision of the question 
whether the fugitive was a runaway slave was not in the 
least prejudged by the permission given to take him back; 
but actually his fate was thereby sealed in nearly every 
case. That which is dearest to man was made subject to 
the judgment of a single person, an inferior magistrate. 
This was not only a shocking disregard of the first prin- 
ciples of justice, humanity, and freedom, but it was also a 
crying wrong to the spirit of the constitution, provided, of 
course that the " legal presumption" of the slavery of 
every colored person was not already to be found in the 
constitution. 2 The Seventh Amendment provides: "In 
suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall 
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be 
preserved." Men learned in the law might dispute 

! Prigg vs. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Peters, Rep., XVI., p. 
G-2-2: Cart's, XIV.. p. 430. 

2 Judge McLean says in the case of Prigg vs. Commonwealth of Penn- 
sylvania: l> Both the constitution and the act of 1793 require the fugi- 
tive from labor to be delivered up on claim being made by the party 
or his agent to whom the service is due, not that a suit should be reg. 
ularly instituted." (Peters, XVI., p. 667; Curtis, XIV, p. 469.) If 
tliis can be deduced from the wording of the constitution, — and there is 
much to be said for this view,— then, indeed, "the proceeding authorized 
by the law" must be " summary and informal." In this case each atro- 
cious provision of the law becomes less of a burden for congress and 
more of a burden for the Philadelphia convention. 



'■ 



814 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

whether the question of freedom or slavery was "a suit 
at common law"; slaveholders might deny that the 
freedom of the colored person was worth twenty dollars; 
bnt if must shock the sound common sense of every right- 
thinking man that in a land where suits for anything worth 
twenty-one dollars could be brought on demand before a 
jury, a man could be handed over to life-long slavery by 
any village judge willing to do so. And in such a 
the "parole testimony" of the pretended master or his. 
aucnt, if it seemed sufficient to the judge, was to suffice 
f<>r the award of the " certificate. " 

If the law-making power of a popular state unconsci 
lv plays in this way with the highest questions, then it 
may be inferred, a priori, that an evil is eating into the 
political, social and moral, yes, into each and all o\^ the 
ways of life of the people, — an evil which leads the nation 
to inevitable death, unless it frees itself from it betimes 
with knife and hot iron. 

If the whole responsibility and guilt rested upon con- 
gress, as Americans usually say and write, then all the 
preceding facts would be of little worth for the history of 
democracy in the United States. But outside of America, 
it is not so easy to forget that congress is not independent 
of the people. If the representatives of the north could 
voluntarily and with impunity serve the peculiar intei 
of the slaveholders, then the population of the north must 
have been, at least to a great extent, indifferent to the 
rights and interests of persons vt' color. And tins is 

the complaint which can be brought against the rep- 
resentatives of the north in congress. They had not yet 
sunk into submissive servants of the slavocracy. "W hen, 
as in the compromises of the constitution concerning slav- 
ery, the political interests of the northern states, that ' 
the white population of the north, were concerned, then 
south always had to tight a hard tight; but when q 
- ofhumanity, questions which directly concerned only 



NORTHERN SLAVE-TKADEKS. 315 

persons of color, were reviewed, then it was allowed to 
carry its point almost without opposition. The moral ab- 
horrence of slavery was at no time great enough to hinder 
the participation of northerners in the blackest crimes of 
slavery. 

As early as 1785, Hopkins complained that " some New 
England states and other states" had again begun to im- 
port slaves from Africa. Such extraordinary prices were 
paid for negroes in the West Indies and some southern 
states, " for instance, in South Carolina," that the evil 
would soon be as great as before if it were not checked 
without delay. 1 After the adoption of the constitution, 
the complaint was often repeated. In 1800, Wain of 
Pennsylvania declared in congress that the slave-trade was 
carried on in great part by Rhode Island, Boston and 
Pennsylvania. 2 In 1804, Bard of Pennsylvania repeated 
the same complaint in a much sharper form. 3 And no one 
denied the fact, for it was too publicly known. When an 
attack was made in congress upon slavery, the representa- 
tives of the southern states were always ready with the sneer- 
ing suggestion that the assailants should sweep in front of 
their own doors; and in truth, the dirtiest business 
connected with slavery was carried on in the north. Any 
excuses designed to palliate this proved reproach could be 
brought forward with less weight, since there were already 
delegates from the north who justified the slave-trade with 
an insolent boldness that could not be surpassed by the 
South Carolinians themselves. 4 

1 Goodell, Slavery and Anti-slavery, p. 122. 

2 Deb. of Congress, II., p. 438. 

3 Deb. of Congress, III., p. 132. 

4 Brown of Rhode Island said in 1800: "He was certain that this 
nation having an act against the slave-trade did not prevent the expor- 
tation of a slave from Africa. He believed we might as well, therefore, 
enjoy that trade, as to leave it wholly to others. It was the law of that 
country to export those whom they held in slavery — who were as much 
slaves there as those who were slaves in this country — and with as 



31G m: SOVEREIGNTY AND BLAVERT. 

The -i ii Lfl^' practical result which could be rightly de- 
dnced from the undeniable fact, was evidently the pressing 
sity of struggling against it with the greatest energy. 
A great part of the northern representatives wished, in- 
dee. 1. to go as far as the constitution then allowed them. 
But the representatives of some of the southern sta 
which wished a farther importation of slaves, acted as if 
the n<»rth was deprived by that fact of any moral justifica- 
tion for acting against their wishes in this respect. They 
carried their point, at least so far that congress did not for 
a long time express, even indirectly, its disapprobation. 
The attempt was repeatedly made to impose a tax of $10 
upon every slave imported. South Carolina's repeal of 
her prohibition of the importation was the main can- 
this. The representatives of that state did not venture to 
defend this, but sought only to excuse it. Lowndes 
plained that the continual violation of the prohibition 
could not be prevented, and that it had therefore been 
judged better to legalize what would at any rate exist, than 
to accustom citizens to such a disregard of the law. 1 The 
rest of the members of the house of representatives were 
unanimous in their condemnation of the legislature <>t 
South Carolina. But yet there were manifold obst 
against giving official expression to this judgment, by vot- 
ing the tax. Some affirmed that congress would thus give 
its sanction to the importation of slaves, and that the men 
engaged in the trade would at once claim its protection; 

much right. The very idea of making a law against this trade which 
all other nations enjoyed, and which was allowed to he very profitable, 
was ill policy. He would further say that it was wrong when consid- 
ered in a moral | !] point of view, since by the operation of the trade 
the very people themselves much bettered their condition. It ought to 
he a matter of national policy, since it would bring in a good revenue to 
our treasury." Deb. of Congress, II., p. 475. Rutledge expressed the 
same views, but even he shrank from stating them with such sham 
nakedness. Ibid, II., p. 47b\ 
1 Deb. of Congress, III., p. 128. 



IMPORT OF SLAVES FORBIDDEN. 317 

Others wished to draw no national revenue from such an 
unclean source; others contested the justice of the tax, 
because it would fall only upon one state; and still others 
affirmed that the representatives of the opposite views had 
almost a majority in the South Carolina legislature and 
that they would certainly renew the prohibition soon, if 
congress would but show a little patience. But the weight- 
iest objection was that it would be malicious, unjust and 
imprudent to thus point out one state of the Union and 
to formally invite the world to condemn it. South Caro- 
lina was therefore uselessly given two years' respite before 
the house of representatives voted the tax of $10. 1 If the 
interest of the northern slave states had not in this case 
agreed with the wish of the north, the opposition of the 
minority might have even now met with scant success. 

It was also due to this circumstance that in the follow- 
ing year the importation of slaves was completely forbid- 
den by an unanimous vote of congress, from January 1, 
1808, — in fact, from the very day from which congress had 
the right to forbid it. 2 No opposition was attempted, be- 
cause it was recognized as bootless, and no one was will- 
ing to uselessly incur the odium. The unanimous vote is 
placed in the right light only by the negotiations and con- 
clusions on the details of the question. 

The struggle was next renewed in the disposition to be 
made of negroes smuggled into the country. According to 
the bill as it was submitted to the house, these were to be 
forfeited to the United States. The opposition to this was 
mainly confined to delegates from the north. Their ob- 
jection was that this would be a direct recognition of 
slavery, since the United States would thus actually become 
slave-traders themselves. As the bill was framed, this 
could be, of course, only a technical consideration. The 

1 Jan. 22, 1806. Deb. of Congress, III., p. 391. 

3 The act was approved by the president, March 2, 1807. Stat, at L., 
II, pp. 426-430. 



31S ATE SOVEREIGNTY ANT) SLAVERY. 

clause referred to the provisions of a certain tax law, and 
Pitkin oi Connecticut objected that, according to this, the 
forfeited negroes must be sold at public auction to the 
highest bidder, and that at least half what they brought 
would flow into the treasury of the United State-. 1 But 
Quincy was of the opinion that congress could, and, as 
did not doubt, would, " devise means to make them use- 
ful members of society, without any infringement of the 
rights of man;"" But it' the very mot zealous defenders 
of the slaveholding interests expressed themselves decid- 
edly in favor of this provision, this was due not at all to 
any consideration for the "rights of man," hut only to the 
supposition that the negroes would he sold as slaves. 8 The 
opposition was therefore justified in not yielding. But 
it saved thereby only a beggarly appearance. On the 
motion of Bidwell of Massachusetts, the disposition to be 
made of the smuggled negroes was left entirely to tin 
Matures of the different states and territories. Qnincy 
had asked whether they were not thereby "made slaves as 
absolutely as by a vote of the house?" 

Although this was not simply a question of policy, but 
one which involved a principle, the debate over it wtt 
marked by a tone of policy. The discussions concerning 
the punishment of the smugglers were not free, however, 
from the violence and bitterness which were usually Bhownj 
at every mention of slavery. According to Tallinn. L 
Connecticut, the crime of the slave-trade should be consid- 
ered as "felony." The representatives of the south <>p- 
d to the utmost the imposition of the death penalty, 
which was demanded by a part of the northern del< j 
as the only effectual means of prevention. Negativ< 

i Deb. of Congress, III., p. 49G. 

•Ibid, IIImP.409. . 

RfacoD of North Carolina asserted that the matter was simply! 
"commercial question." Hesaid: "Itis in vain to talk of turning 
tin Be creatures loose to cut our throats." 



SLAVEnOLDING SENTIMENT. 319 

perience favored this view, then and thereafter; all other 
punishments failed to put an end to the trade. But, 
on the other side, it was agreed that it was probable that 
the threat of the death penalty would also be fruitless. It 
is an old teaching of experience that the effectiveness of a 
law which fixes penalties depends much less on the great- 
ness of the penalty than on the certainty of its infliction. 
Belying on this, the opponents of the clause urged that in 
the southern states, which were practically alone concerned 
in the matter, the law w T ould remain a dead letter. 1 These 
arguments w T ere striking, but they opened a dismal vista 
into the future which awaited the land, if men went on 
treating the slavery question in the way they had up to this 
time. Early of Georgia said: " I should like to know how 
the fear of death will operate on a man who is bound with 
his slaves to a country where he knows the punishment 
will not be enforced. He w T ill be bound to a country where 
the people see slaves every hour of their lives; where there 
is no such abhorrence of the crime of importing them, and 
where no man dare inform. My word for it, — I pledge it 
to-day and I wish it may be recollected, — no man in the 
southern section of the Union will dare to inform. It 
would cost him more than his life is worth. ... A large 
majority of the people in the southern states do not con- 
sider slavery as a crime. They do not believe it immoral 
to hold human flesh in bondage. ... 1 will tell the 
truth. A large majority of people in the southern states 
do not consider slavery as even an evil." 2 If the .majority 
of the southern people were of this opinion and if the 
number of the northern politicians who prided themselves, 
with Brown of Khode Island, on supporting " the rights 

1 Clay of Pennsylvania asserted that the death penalty could not be 
carried out, even in his state. Yet his colleagues did not fully agree 
with him iu this, for it had been proposed by Smilie of Pennsylvania. 

2 Deb. of Congress, III., p. 501. Holland of North Carolina re-affirmed 
this statement in all its essential parts. 



320 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AM) BLAVEET. 

and the property" of the slaveholders, as if they were 
themselves slaveholders, increased; 1 then the importation 
of Blaves was not needed in order to quickly make 
the Union a slavocratic republic in the full mux- of the 
word: then there was no need of buying a single 
negro more in Africa, for the time must surely come 
when men would he declared crazy it they did not repeat 
the words which Sedgwick of Massachusetts ( !) had \\>ci\ 
a- early as 1795: "To propose an abolition of slavery in 
this country would be the height of madness. Here the 
Slaves arc, and here they must remain;" 2 and then the law 
which threatened the importer of slaves with death 
must become a mockery. Early had accompanied the 
statements already quoted with the noteworthy commen- 
tary that in the south "thinking men feared in the distant 
future evil, immeasurable evil, from slavery." The hope- 
lessness of seeing the penalty fully enforced, and unques- 
tionably in great part also the conviction expressed by 
Lloyd that the punishment was out of proportion to the 
crime, left the advocates of the death penalty in a minority 
of ten votes. 3 Other causes also may have contributed to 
their downfall. The Union would have pronounced a 
peculiar judgment upon itself if it had now punished the 
importation of slaves with death after it had in its funda- 
mental law expressly forbidden congress to prohibit, dur- 
ing twenty years, their importation. The bill in its final 
form condemned the importer of slaves to an imprison- 
ment of not less than five and not more than ten years and 
a line of not less than ,$1,000 and not more than $10,000. 
Yet this measure of punishment did not especially har- 
monize witli the confident expectation that the .-lave statei 
would sell the forfeited negroes, to the advantage of their 

1 Deb. of Congress, II., p. 438. 

2 Ibid, I., p. 559. 

8 Ibid, III., p. 502. 



INTERIOR SLATE TRADE., 321 

treasuries. 1 And it scarcely harmonized with the permis- 
sion to carry on the slave trade within the Union as 
before.' 2 

1 See Gooclell, Slavery and Anti-slavery, pp. 261, 262. Attorney-Gen- 
eral Wirt said in 1820, in an opinion on this law: "Should they have 
been turned loose as free men in the state ? The impolicy of such a 
course is too palpable to rind an advocate in any one who is acquainted 
with the condition of the slaveholding states." Opinions of the At- 
torneys General, I., p. 451. 

2 The senate bill had also forbidden this interior trade. The house 
struck out the clause, but the senate refused to agree to the amendment. 
A committee of conference then arranged that only the "shipping of 
slaves in vessels of less than forty tons, with the intention of selling 
them" should be forbidden. Both houses agreed to this. The clause 
in the senate bill was evidently within the power of congress, for the 
constitution gives it authority " to regulate commerce . . . among 
the several states." (Art. I., Sec. 8, § 3.) It is an interesting fact that 
Henry Clay, relying upon the same argument which the Federalists 
had used against him and his party in the embargo controversy, declared 
it to be inadmissible that the power here spoken of should be deduced 
from this clause. In his speech of Feb. 7, 1839, on the abolition peti- 
tions, he says : " I deny that the general government has any authority 
whatever from the constitution to abolish what is called the slave trade. 
. . . The grant in the constitution is of a power of regulation and not 
prohibition." (Clay, Speeches, II., p. 407.) Chief-justice Taney says 
in Groves vs. Slaughter : " In my judgment, the power over this subject 
is exclusively with the several states; and each of them has a right to 
decide for itself whether it will or will not allow persons of this descrip- 
tion to be brought within its limits from another state, either for sale or 
for any other purpose ; and also to prescribe the manner and mode in 
which they may be introduced and to determine their condition and 
treatment within their respective territories ; and the action of several 
states upon this subject cannot be controlled by congress, either by vir- 
tue of its power to regulate commerce or by virtue of any other power 
conferred by the constitution of the United States." (Peters, Rep., XV., 
p. 508 ; Curtis. XIV., p. 148.) This is not. however, the judgment of the 
court, but only Taney's personal judgment. The striking out of the 
clause from the senate bill must unquestionably be considered as an in- 
direct sanction of slavery by congress. But the bill as it was finally 
agreed upon and signed by the president, that is, the law, contained a 
very direct sanction, since it " authorized" the slave trade under certain 
conditions. Section 9 provides that the captain of a ship of over forty 
tons, who has negroes and mulattos on board, " shall, previous to the 

21 



322 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

From a political point of view, another side of the slav- 
ery question, which had already been a subject of debate 
for some years, but had hitherto attracted comparatively 
little attention, was infinitely more important than the 
methods of punishing importers of slaves. Mason's decla- 
ration iu the Philadelphia convention that the west 
beginning to wish for .-laves, in order to cultivate its bound- 
stretches of laud, had found its justification. Since 
1802, the territory of Indiana had been working upon con- 
- to induce it to suspend for a term of years the pro- 
hibition imposed by the ordinance of 17S7. At first the 
request was unconditionally rejected. Later, however, it 
was favorably reported upon by different committees of 
both houses of congress. But it got no farther, before the 
opponents of the request gained the upper hand in the ter- 
ritory itself. Yet for full five years it remained an open 
question, despite the ordinance of 1787, whether the north- 
west would be saved to free labor. 1 

As early as 1798, the question had been decided in favor 
of slavery for the Mississippi territory. In March of that 
year, the house of representatives took under consideration 
the organization of the territorial government. It had 
been moved that the ordinance of 17S7 should be allowed 
to come into force there also, with the single exception «>f 
the prohibition of slavery. Thatcher of Massachusetts, the 
most determined champion of freedom on ^vvvy < 
wished to strike out this excepting clause.' 2 lie. as \v< 
Gallatin, expressly claimed for congress the power of 

departure ofsucb ship or vessel, make out and subscribe duplicate man- 
of every such negro, mulatto or person of color . . . and shall 
deliver such manifests to the collector of the port . . . when 
the said collector or surveyor shall certify . . . with a permit . . j 
and authorizing him to proceed to the port of his destination." 

1 Compare Deb. of Congress, III., pp. 383, 400, 503, 519, 550, 551. 
the later attempts to introduce slavery into Illinois, sec Ford, lli.-i 
Illinois, p. .")(), scq. 

■ Deb. of Congress, II., p. 281 



MISSISSIPPI ABANDONED TO SLAVERY 323 

bidding slavery in all the territories. 1 Not a single voice 
was raised against the justice of this claim, and it was just 
as little urged that the conditions on which Georgia had 
ceded the territory forbade the exercise of the power in 
this especial case. 2 Only reasons of expediency and equity 
were made use of against Thatcher's proposition. Nicholas 
affirmed that it was not the part of congress to try to make 
one part of the Union happier than the other. He said 
that the south should not be made to bear the evil of slav- 
ery alone, but that the possibility of arriving at a general 
emancipation by scattering its slaves over wider stretches 
of country should be offered it. Despite the untenable- 
ness of these objections, Thatcher's proposition received 
only twelve votes. 3 

These " signs of the times" were not wholly without 
effect upon the north. Here and there was a person who 
understood how to read them in their full meaning, and 
they kept awake in a strong minority the old jealousy and 
the old distrust of the south. But only a very few recog- 
nized the fact that the slavery question was the pivot about 

1 Deb. of Congress, II., p. 223. 

2 For the first time in 1808, Bibb and Troup claimed, on another oc- 
casion, that congress did not have the right to alter the conditions ac- 
cepted by the earlier congress without the consent of Georgia. (Deb. 
of Congress, IV., pp. 42, 44, 46. Compare also p. 324.) Poindexter, a 
delegate from the territory of Mississippi, urged in opposition to this : 
" It was decided at the last session by both houses that the United States 
had a right to rule the territory without the consent of Georgia. The 
constitution of the United States says that congress shall ' have power to 
dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the 
territory or other property belonging to the United States.' Can an ar- 
gument arising from the exercise of this power supersede the right of 
exercising the power expressly delegated by the constitution itself? Cer- 
tainly not." (Deb. of Congress, IV., p. 43.) Yet only seven months 
later, Poindexter defended the claim made by Bibb and Troup. (Ibid, 
IV., p. 141.) This is one of many instances of the way in which not 
only arguments but convictions have been " cheap as blackberries" 
among distinguished American politicians. 

3 Deb. of Congress, II., p. 224. 



324 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

which the fate of the Union would revolve for deci 
The prohibition of the importation of slaves completely 
lulled to Bleep the fears in regard to this, which had occa* 
sionallv appeared with fitting vigor. Men congratulated 
themselves that they were again leading the world on the 
way of freedom and true humanity, and then they turned 
more indifferently and more thoughtlessly every day from 
the real question, for they honestly thought that they had 
bound up the arteries of the institution, and that they 
might therefore trouble themselves no more about it. 1 
Since 1794 one anti -slavery society after another had given 
up its activity. 2 And those who worked on indefatigably 
henceforth had often to bitterly complain that they no 
longer found in the public any sympathy with their ell 
For a full decade, slavery could grow in breadth and depth 
without any opposition worth speaking of. There 
only a rare mention of it now, either in the press or in the 
debates of congress, and then mostly in an indifferent way. 
All sorts of questions had to be treated which were in the 
closest connection with it and some of which sprang di- 
rectly from it, but one had to go back laboriously to their 
inception, in order to find out this hidden interconnection. 
The slaveholding interest knit mesh after mesh in tin 
in which it sought to entangle the Union, but men did not 
or would not see this. It was permitted to conceal its real 

1 "Owing to this mistaken expectation of the act of 1808 [1807] abol- 
ishing the slave trade, the attention of philanthropists was in a great 
measure withdrawn from the subject of slavery for ten years or m 
May, Some Recollections of our Anti-slavery Conflict, p. (J. 

2 In 1833, the abolition society of Pennsylvania complained thai 
'• since that time we have seen one after another discontinue its 
until wc were left almost alone.'' Wilson, I., p. 125, and elsev 
Compare (lay. Speeches, II., p. 400. 

s In 1809, the same society complained that "hitherto the appi 
voice of the community and the liberal interpretation of the laws 
Bmoothed the path of duty and promoted a satisfactory is>ue to our hu- 
mane exertions. At present, however, the sentiments of our fellow-citi- 
Eena and the decisions of our courts are less auspicious." 



GROWTH OF THE SLAVE TRADE. 325 

aims, and even when it scorned to do this, no obstacles were 
laid in its way. The embers left by the earlier struggles 
seemed glimmering into nothingness. Men covered them 
up, but not with ashes, — with materials that kept the fire 
down, but made it burn with so much the greater heat. 

If the prohibition of the importation of slaves had been 
the only or even the main reason of this apathy, the 
latter could not have long continued. The slave trade was 
a too enticing business to be completely given up, as long 
as no examples whatever were made of offenders against 
the law which forbade it. Yet the federal government did 
nothing to suppress it and the importation therefore quick- 
ly assumed greater proportions. Ignorance could not be 
pleaded as an excuse, for there were certain magistrates who 
kept a watchful eye on the evil and conscientiously in- 
formed the administration. But their reports remained 
unconsidered. 1 The regular station for slaveships at 
Amelia Island was of course finally broken up, but there 
was no interference until the evil had become altogether 
too great. The lawless folk settled there were engaged, 
besides, in smuggling and in mischief of every sort. It 
remains therefore an open question, how far their disper- 
sion is to be ascribed to the aid which they gave the slave- 
holders. 2 The prior conduct of the executive as well as of 
congress does not favor the view that the main reason of 
the interference is to be sought just in this. As early as 
1813, the Pennsylvania anti-slavery society had called the 
attention of congress to the fact that American ships were 

1 Jay, Misc, Writ., p. 278, seq., gives a number of verbatim extracts 
from such reports. 

2 Monroe says, in his message of Dec. 2, 1817 : " The island [was] made 
a channel for the illicit introduction of slaves from Africa into the Uni- 
ted States, an asylum for fugitive slaves from the neighboring states [ !] 
and a port for smuggling of every kind." States. Man., I., pp. 398, 399. 
Compare the message of Jan. 4, 1818; Deb. of Congress, VI., p. 19 and 
Niles' Reg, II, p. 93; X, p. 400; XIII , pp. 12, 28,47,62, 78, 221, 296; 
XIV, p. 100. 



STATE SOVEREIGNTY AM) SLAVERY. 

engaged in the slave trade under foreign flags. 1 ('.»!._ 
referred the memorial to a committee and theslave-tra 
went on with their business. By degrees the trade wm 
pursued with such impudent boldness that wider circles 
began to Bhake off the lethargy. Anti-slavery petition! 
were again presented to congress, and especially after L818, 
in greater numbers than ever. From the midst of the 
supreme court of the United States came the complaint 
that the crime was not checked, although the president had 
been authorized to use ships of war for that pur] 
Joseph Story, one of the greatest ornaments as a man and 
as a judge of the highest court of the Union, repeatedly 
exhibited to the grand jury of his circuit, and then 
the whole nation, the horrible picture of facts which lay 
behind the veil of the stringent penal law. 3 In con_ 
itself, it was not denied that there was cause for the com- 
plaints. Southern members estimated the number-: 
groes smuggled into the country every year at from 
thirteen thousand to fifteen thousand. But in the sama 
year the registrar of the treasury officially informed 
gress that the records of the department did not sh 

1 Deb. of Congress, IV., pp. 7, 14. See also Niles' Reg., V.. p 
Since Spain and Portugal still allowed the slave trade, the flags of 
two powers were especially used. 

- Law of March o, 1819. Stat, at L., III., p. 533. 

s In one of these warnings (1819) it is declared: "We have hut too 
many melancholy proofs from unquestionable sources, that it [tie 
trade] is still carried on with all the implacable ferocity and insatiable 
rapacity of former times. Avarice has grown more subtle in it- 
sions; it watches and seizes its prey with an appetite quickened rather 
than suppressed by its guilty vigils. American citizen- are - 
to their very mouths (I scarcely use too bold a figure) in this 
iniquity. They throng to the coasts of Africa, under the stained ll 
Spain and Portugal, sometimes selling abroad their 'cargoes <>l'i\< • 
and sometimes bringing them into some of our southern ports 
there, under the forms of the law, defeating the purposes of the la 
self, and legalizing their inhuman, but profitable, adventures. I « 
could say that New England and New England men were free 
this deep pollution." Life and Letters of J. Story, I., p. u40. 



THE SLAVE TKADE IS DECLAKED PIRACY. 327 

single forfeiture under the law of 1807. 1 In view of these 
facts, the assertion that the federal government honestly 
and to the full extent of its power tried to enforce the law, 
is laughable. As long as it was unwilling to do so, each 
added vigor of the penal laws only served still more to 
throw dust in the eyes of the nation and of the world in 
regard to the true state of things. If the suspicion that 
the federal government willfully did this was not justified, 
it was nevertheless near the truth. 

In the tenth article of the treaty of Grhent, England and 
the United States pledged themselves to their " best en- 
deavors" to bring about the "entire abolition" of the slave 
trade, because it was " irreconcilable with the principles of 
humanity and justice." 2 Taking this article as a basis, 
senator Barrill of Rhode Island moved, in January, 1818, 
the appointment of a committee for the consideration of 
the question whether it was advisable to enter into treaties 
with other powers in order to attain this end. The mo- 
tion was adopted by a majority of one. 3 But the minority, 
which made great use of Washington's warning against 
" entangling alliances," finally carried its point. The 
advances of England in the following year received no at- 
tention. Congress gave satisfaction to public opinion and 
its own conscience, when, about a year later, it declared 
the slave trade to be piracy. 4 How far the enforcement of 

J Jay, Misc. Writ., p. 281. 

2 Stat, at Large, VIII., p. 223. 

3 See the debate in Deb. of Congress, VI., pp. 11-19. 

* Law of May 15, 1820. Stat, at L., III., p. 600. Magrath, United 
States judge for the district ot South Carolina, decided, in The United 
States vs. Come, that only the individual crimes enumerated in the law 
were piracy, and that the slave trade was not. Kent's Comm., I., p. 
196. When England, in 1823, again entered into negotiations, the Uni- 
ted States made it a condition of united effort, that the slave trade should 
be declared piracy by international law. It is possible to be of the 
opinion that too much was asked for the sake of obtaining nothing, for, 
according to the English law, the slave trade was not piracy. Yet par- 



32S \TE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

this law was to be expected could be inferred from the fact 
that courts, 1 congress, 1 and president 1 had refrained from 
enforcing the earlier and milder law whenever the oppor- 
tunity of making an example under it was offered them. 

The zeal with which congress continued to increase the 
severity of the laws against the slave trade from l v <>7 on, 
was connected with another question, which contributed 
greatly to the strengthening of the slaveholding influi 
If. in earlier times, the further importation of .-laves had 
been contrary to the interest of northern slave states, this 
was now still more the case. This tact alone p 
their representatives from the accusation that they were 
playing parts in a treacherous comedy by voting for the 

liament passed an act to that effect, and a treaty signed at London, 
March 13, 1824, was sent to Washington for ratification. The senate, 
after long delays, and only when urged by the president, decided the 
question, but first mutilated the treaty to such an extent that it was made 
entirely worthless. England rejected it in this form, but did no: 
from her efforts until Henry Clay, at that time secretary of state, ex- 
pressed the opinion that it "appears unnecessary and impolitic to con- 
tinue the negotiations." 

1 The collector of Mobile advised the secretary of the treasury 
vember 15, 1818, that three slave ships had been seized, "but this 
owing rather to accident than any well-timed arrangement to prevent 
the trade." And in a later letter, he says: "The grand jury found true 
bills against the owners of the vessels, masters and supercargos, all of 
whom have been discharged, why or wherefore I cannot say. except that 
it could not be for want of proof against them." Jay. Misc. Writ, 
p. 381. 

■In April, 1820, the house of representatives released to three ]" 
the fine imposed on them for importing slaves, so far as the United 8 
were competent to do so under the laws. The pretense for this was thai 
these were house servants, and the violators of the law had been ass 
upon inquiry of an American consul that Mich slaves could be im- 
ported. Deb. of Congress, VI., pp. 573, 574. 

3 A slave trader by the name of Lacoste was condemned in Boston in 
1820 to three years imprisonment and three thousand dollars line. 
Monroe gave him a full pardon at the beginning of 1822, although the 
slave trade had in the meantime been declared to be pira. 
Keg., XXII., p. 114. 



THE COLONIZATION SOCIETY. 329 

laws supplementing the act of 1807. But the consider- 
ations brought forward at that time against the imposition 
of the death penalty would now have had still greater 
weight with them, if they had not had reason just at this 
moment to act as if they had resolved in sober earnest to 
take some thorough steps towards a radical and comprehen- 
sive struggle against the evil. In January, 1817, Randolph 
laid before the house of representatives a petition of the 
" colonization society," founded at Washington, December 
28, 1816, 1 which asked congress to aid its plan for coloniz- 
ing free negroes in some part of Africa. 2 The plan of 
organizing such a society had originated in Virginia, and 
its first beginnings dated back to the time of the revolu- 
tion. Early in the 19th century, it began by degrees to 
obtain a more fixed form. 3 The cause of this was the 
growing fear of slave insurrections which might be excited 
by free negroes. 4 A considerate reception had already been 
assured to the petition by the fact that a number of the 
first men of the slave states were among the founders of 
the society, 5 and the legislature of Virginia had passed, 
a short time before, a format resolution, with the same object 
in view. 6 In the house of representatives the request was 
referred at the suggestion of Randolph to a committee, which 
submitted a report February ll. 7 The committee did not 

1 Niles' Reg., XI., p. 206. 

2 Ibid, XL, p. 355. 

3 See Jefferson's Works, IV., pp. 419-422, 442-444; V., pp. 563-565. 

4 Such fears had been entertained even before the close of the 18th 
century. See Gibbs, Mem. of Wol., I., pp. 482, 486, 496 ; Jeff., Works, 
IV., pp. 196, 422. Randolph said in a speech of Dec. 10, 1811 : " Within 
the last ten years, repeated alarms of insurrection among the slaves; 
some of them awful indeed. . . I speak from facts when I say that 
the night-bell never tolls for fire in Richmond that the mother does not 
hug the infant more closely to her bosom." Garland, Life of J. Ran- 
dolph, L, pp. 294, 295. 

5 Bushrod Washington, Henry Clay, John Randolph, R. Wright, etc. 

6 Niles' Reg., XL, p. 275. 

7 The report is printed in Niles' Reg., XII., p. 103. 



330 \TE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

consider it proper that the house should at once pass final 
resolutions, but recommended that the president should be 
authorized " to consult and negotiate" with all foreign pow- 
ersfor the"entire and immediate abolition of the traffic in 

slaves; and also to enter into a convention with the govern- 
ment of Great Britain for receiving into the colony of Sierra 

Leone such of the free people of color of the United States 

as, with their own consent, shall be carried thither." This 
double recommendation met with the full approval of the 

colonization society. 1 Yet the house came to no definite 
conclusion. At the next session the question again came 
under consideration. By a law of March 3, 1^1'J. against 
the slave trade, the president was empowered to issue the 
necessary orders for transporting illegally imported neg 
back to Africa. 2 This decision was recognized as an ap- 
proval of the colonization plan, and was therefore xevy 
helpful to the society. Besides this, the latter got a con- 
siderable money subsidy from the treasury of the Union, 
for Monroe, who had been in favor of the plan since the 
beginning of the century, construed the law just mentioned 
in a way that was more than liberal. The government was 
far removed from making the cause of the society its own, 
but it showed such an interest in it that the propagandism 
among northern philanthropists was thereby powerfully 
aided. 

Both the petition of the society, in which it explained its 
aims, and its constitution were framed in the most discreet 
way. It did not pretend to labor for the abolition of slav- 
ery. The press emphatically declared that such an aim 
would be wholly foreign to it, even in the most distant fu- 
ture. 3 The only notice taken of the slaves in the petition 

1 See its address, Niles' Reg., XVI.. p.C5. 

2 Stat, at Large, III., p. 533. 

' "It is scarcely necessary to add that all connection of this propose 
tion with the emancipation of slaves, present or future, is explicitly 
disclaimed." Niles' Reg., XL, p. 2UG. 



FAILURE OF COLONIZATION. 331 

was to argue that emancipation was hindered by the in- 
crease in the number of free negroes then resident in the 
country. But u humanity" was rung in with such dexter- 
ity, in the statement of the motives and views of the orig- 
inators of the plan, that the north was actually of the 
opinion that here a way had been found by which the na- 
tion could gradually rid itself of slavery. It was thought 
that the process would be in this wise: By the departure 
of the free negroes, the weightiest objections of humane 
slaveholders against freeing their slaves would be removed, 
and emancipation and the transportation of the emanci- 
pated would thenceforth keep pace with one another until 
the United States would be completely rid of their colored 
population. But in this reckoning no account whatever 
was taken of the true disposition of the slaveholders. 
Even Jefferson now began to doubt the illusions concern- 
ing slavery, which he had all his life entertained. 1 But 
under all circumstances, the plan would have been an ab- 
surdity. This was so plain that even from the first instant 
there were persons who gave the proof of it in sober facts 
and figures. 2 The number of slaves was already much 
more than a million. Even if all the emancipated ones 
would consent to be transported, 3 and if as many slaves 
were freed every year as could be transported and colon- 
ized, yet the growth of the slaves through natural increase 
must constantly far exceed their decrease by colonization. 4 

'Jeff., Works, VII., p. 58. 

2 See the article in Niles' Keg., XIII., pp. 82, 177. 

3 It had been expressly guarantied that their voluntary consent should 
"be obtained. 

4 Up to the eighteenth year of the existence of the society (Jan. 1, 
1835) eight hundred and nine emancipated slaves had been taken to 
Africa, a number which equals the natural growth of the slave popula- 
tion in five and a half days. (Jay, Misc. Writ., p. 80.) It is easy to see 
from this what would have been accomplished in the course of the "cen- 
tury" within which the society promised to rid the country of all its 
negroes. African Kepository, I., p. 217 ; IV., p. 344 ; and elsewhere. 



832 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AM) SLAVERY. 

But figures prove nothing to a man who will not ho con- 
vinced. A mure kindly and humane way to get rid <>t'tlie 
terrible evil could not be easily devised, and therefore men 
believed in the possibility of the plan. 

The slave Btates in which the project originated indulged 
in no illusions. They knew exactly what they wished and 
laughed in their sleeve at seeing the philanthropists of the 
north fall so readily into the trap. 1 A bait thrown out by 
the founders of the society was the gaining of Africa to 
the Christian religion and western civilization by means of 
the settlement of the negroes there. But yet they seized 
every opportunity to brand free colored persons as the ref- 
use of the population, whose departure could not be too 
dearly bought by any sacrifice. 2 At the same time, the 
colonization society protested that its object was not in any 
sense the elevation of free persons of color. 3 What its 
" humanity" was, is clearly shown by this, and its true 
aims, too, could be inferred from this without difficulty. 
Moreover, it made no secret of them. Randolph had de- 

1 It is certain that there were victims among the victimizes. The 
brutal energy with which the "voluntary consent" of the free ni 
to their transportation was wrung from them is proof of this. Bee, <>n 
this point, Jay, Misc. Writ., pp. 50-58. A Florida slaveholder wrote In 
a hook entitled A Treatise on the Patriarchal System of Society: " Col- 
onization in Africa has been proposed to the tree colored people, to for- 
ward which, a general system of persecution against them, upheld from 
the pulpit, has been legalized throughout the southern states.* 1 

2 On one page of a speech delivered by Henry (lay, in b^'JT. are the 
following sentences: " They will carry back to their native soil the rich 
fruits of religion, civilization, law and liberty. . . Of all clase 
our population, the most vicious is that of the free colored. . . Every 
emigrant to Africa is a missionary carrying with him credentials in the 
holy cause of civilization, religion and free institution-." (Speeches, 
[., p. 282.) This is an example of the logic of slavocratic Democrats. 
Bee Wilson, The Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America, I., p. 
818; -lay, Misc. Writ., pp. 22-21. 

3 The BOCiety said, in one of it- addresses: "The moral, intellectual 
and political improvement of free people of color within the United 
States are objects foreign to the power of the society." 



COLONIZATION AS AN AID TO SLAYEET. 333 

clared, in the first meeting for the organization of the 
society, that it " must tend essentially to make slave prop- 
erty safe." With every year, not only did this show itself 
more plainly, but it was also roundly stated that the so- 
ciety's true aim was in fact the purification of the land 
from the pest of the free colored population in order to give 
increased security to slavery. 1 The time came when men 
of the north who could not entertain the idea of a com- 
promise between slavery and freedom, laid the hypocrisy and 
falsehood of the colonization plan so naked in the light 
of day that it could scarcely claim the dignity of a farcical 
interlude in the terrible tragedy, which hastened with giant 
steps towards its issue. But for a long time the upright 
philanthropists and friends of freedom in the north were 
lured on false paths. It was this and not the number — ■ 
scarcely worth mentioning — of free negroes who were taken 
over to Africa, which made the colonization swindle of 
such priceless worth to the slavocracy. Such a piece of 
Don Quixoterie has never been indulged in, in more bitter 
earnest, and especially by such men. It would not have 
been possible if political thought had not already begun 
severely to feel the baleful influence of slavery. 

While law after law was passed against the African 
slave trade, and no words could be found which condemned 
it sharply enough, the interior slave trade constantly as- 

1 Clay denied this, but in the same speech he said : "Any project . . . 
by which, in a material degree, the dangerous element in the general 
mass can be diminished or rendered stationary, deserves deliberate con- 
sideration," and "the execution of its [the society's] scheme would aug- 
ment instead of diminishing the value of the property [that is, the 
slaves] left behind." Speeches, L, pp. 275, 283. Webster himself said 
in his notorious speech of March 7, 1850 : " If Virginia and the south 
see fit to adopt any proposition to relieve themselves from the free peo- 
ple of color among them, or such as may be made free, they have my 
full consent that the government shall pay them any sum out of the pro- 
ceeds of that cession [the western territory] which may be adequate to 
the purpose." Webster, Works, V., p. 364. 



334 STATE BOYBREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

samed greater dimensions and a more shocking form. 
And a centre of this trade was the capital of the country. 
Not in the darkness of night and against the law did the 
traders conduct their business. They paid ont their blood- 
money for permission to carry on their trade; the papers 
wen- tilled with their advertisements; and from the win* 
doWB of the capital long trains of fettered .-laves on their 
way to the sugar and cottOD plantations of the south could 
be seen. And behind these windows the white men of 
the republic spoke oracularly of the rights of man and of 
freedom. The scene was bo disgraceful that a Virginian— a 
slaveholder, whose body quivered with rage when he thought 
lie saw the slightest attempt to infringeupon the " rights'' 
of the slaveholders— held up the shame before the eyes of 
congress in words of thunder. John Randolph's long 
finger, the terror of all the little and sinful spirits in the 
house of representatives, was pointed, not at a single vic- 
tim, but at all congress, and it might have been thought 
that he wished to let his shrill voice scream his words into 
the conscience of the whole country when, on March 1, 
1816, he moved, after a scathing philippic, the appoint- 
ment of a committee which should inquire whether " the 
inhuman and illegal traffic in slaves" was carried on in 
the district, and report whether any, and if so. what means 
could be used to put a stop to it. 1 No one ventured to 
refuse the demand. Randolph himself was named chair- 
man of the committee. His report contained a crowd of 
facts which justified only too fully his complaints; but he 
submitted no resolution, and the whole thing, like all 
earlier complaints against slavery, was simply placed upon 

• Deb. of Congress. V.. p. G09. This haughtiest of the slave barons, 
who declared that he -would never weaken the form of the contract he- 
tweeo the owner and the slave,- asserted: " It is not necessary that we 
should have, here in the verv Streets of our new metropolis, a depot tor 
this nefarious traffic, in comparison with which the traffic from Africa 
to Charleston or Jamaica was mercy— was virtue/' 



FEDERAL RECOGNITION OF SLAVERY. 335 

record. The tragic comedy was the richer for one scene, 
and that by no means the worst. 

When it was to the interest of the slaveholders to take 
an active part, men were not satisfied with fruitless resolu- 
tions. In the first article of the treaty of Ghent, slaves 
were enumerated among the things which were to be re- 
stored. During the fulfillment of the treaty a strife arose 
over the question whether only the slaves found in the 
places occupied by the English, or also those who had fled 
to their ships or their armies, were to be understood as 
comprised under this provision. The Americans claimed 
all these slaves, while the English would deliver up only 
the first-named class. Negotiations on this point were 
carried on for twelve years. By its incomparable tenacity 
the American government wrung from three conventions 
a decision, the final result of which was the payment of 
$1,204,000. The owners of the escaped slaves made a 
good profit out of this. After they had received the 
settled average value of the runaways, with twelve years' in- 
terest, there still remained a surplus, which was also 
shared among them. It is not easy to see how the federal 
government could more clearly recognize the slaves as 
property which, like all other property, must be protected 
by the whole power of the Union. But yet the old prin- 
ciple that slavery was only a municipal institution, of 
which the Union, as such, knew nothing, was adhered to. 

A long time before this matter was settled the govern- 
ment had employed the armed power of the Union in 
Florida in the interest of the slaveholders. The aboli- 
tionists afterwards often asserted in their zeal that the 
contests of many years' duration which were here fought 
were only a slave-hunt, and that the final acquisition of 
the territory was only for the sake of increasing the do- 
mains of slavery. The assertion is as little justified in 
this case as in that of Louisiana. From the beginning of 
the century the United States had eyed the Floridas with 



336 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

a longing due to political and very cogent reason?. In 
consequence of the violation of rights guarantied to the 

United States in New Orleans the house of representatives 
appointed a committee in 1803 to prepare a report on the 
propriety and possibility of annexing Florida. This com- 
mittee came to the conclusion that "New Orleans and 
the Floridas must become a part of the United States, 
either by purchase or by conquest." 1 This report was fol- 
lowed by no practical result, until, on account of European 
troubles, Spanish embarrassments offered a favorable op- 
portunity therefor. A resolution and act of Jan. 15, Is 1 !, 
empowered the president "under certain contingencies'* 
and "with a due regard to the safety" of the United States, 
to take " temporary" possession of the territory east of 
Perdido and south of Georgia. 2 In accordance with this 
act, Madison had West Florida occupied. His secretary 
of state, Monroe, in response to the " solemn protest" of 
the English ambassador against this step, justified it by 
asserting that West Florida belonged to the Louisiana 
territory ceded by France, but at the same time took the 
ground that the demands for indemnification which the 
United States had against Spain were a sufficient, justifica- 
tion of the occupation. 3 These claims had to serve, after- 
wards, as a justification for the attack upon East Florida. 4 
In the following year the territory as far as Pearl river 
was formally united with Louisiana, and that from Pearl 
river to Perdido with the Mississippi territory. The 
house of representatives wished to also authorize the presi- 
dent to take possession of East Florida, but the senate 
rejected the bill on account of the critical condition of 
the country. During the war with England Mobile also 
fell into the hands of the Americans, and the p- 

1 Niles' Reg., III., p. 52. 

a Statutes at Large, III., p. 471. 

* See the correspondence in Niles' Reg., I , pp. 187-189. 

•Niles' Reg., I., pp. 189, 190. 



THE SEMINOLE WAK. 337 

of >Yest Florida was thereby completely assured to them; 
but, on the other hand, they had to evacuate East Florida. 
All these steps, as well as the temporary occupation of 
Pensacola by Jackson, had no connection whatever with 
the slavery question. The latter was considered for a long 
time only as an interest pertaining peculiarly to Georgia 
and scarcely worth notice. And it was not until after the 
end of the war that it was brought into prominence by a 
curious occurrence. 

In November, 1812,. a committee of the legislature of 
Georgia expressed its views very freely concerning the 
action of the federal senate in refusing its approval to the 
bill of the house of representatives, which authorized the 
president to occupy East Florida. The committee consid- 
ered this policy " inexplicable" and " subversive of the 
safety and tranquillity of this section of the United States." 1 
These words contained the clue to the peculiar interest 
which Georgia had in the question. For a long time, the 
fugitive slaves of Georgia found an asylum among the In- 
dians of Florida. This " evil" was so severely felt that the 
state was constantly urging upon the federal government, 
that it should redress it by acquiring the territory. The 
complaints were not without effect. Secretary of war 
Crawford ordered general Jackson, March 15, 1816, to no- 
tify the commandant at Pensacola of the fact that a fort 
which had been built at Appalachicola, during the war, by 
the Englishman Nichols, was occupied by Indians and 
negroes, who enticed slaves to flee from the territory of the 
United States. If the commandant refused to interfere, 
then the fort was to be seized, provided this could be done 
without the authorization of congress. Before the com- 
mand reached Jackson, he had already, on his own responsi- 
bility, sent general Gaines against the fort, with the orders 
" to advise the governor of Pensacola of your [his] inroad 

1 Niles' Reg., III., p/259. 

22 



33S STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

into the territory, and with its expressed object, to destroy 

lawless banditti." Gaines charged colonel Clinch 

with the execution of the command. The latter took soine 

gunboats with him. During the bombardment, which was 
preceded, as Clinch affirmed in his dispatches, by an attack 
from the negroes, a red-hot ball liew into the powder mag- 
azine. Of the three hundred negroes and about twenty 
Indians, who, according to the official report, were in the 
fort, two hundred and seventy were instantly killed by the 
explosion, and the rest were mortally wounded. 1 This 
''heroic deed," which was rewarded by congress in 1818, 
upon the motion of Pleasant of Virginia, with a grant of 
$5,-±65, was the beginning of the Seminole war, which 
the United States millions on millions and perhaps sur- 
passed all other Indian wars in ferocity. And the object 
of the campaign which ended in this heroic deed was, ac- 
cording to the official records, the destruction of the refuge 
of fugitive slaves and the return of the fugitives to their 
rightful owners. The troops of the Union were degraded 
into slave-hunters; the victor of New Orleans and the fu- 
ture president of the republic had stooped to this; and 
congress crowned the glorious transaction by voting a re- 
ward. In the heated debates which the Seminole war 
excited, men shunned going back to its first cause, although 
the hunt for slaves continued to play a leading part in it. 
Only one Pennsylvanian betrayed, in an unguarded moment, 
how deeply slavery was entangled in the struggle, and he 
defended the man-hunting. 2 For the rest, men quarreled 
over the question whether the war had been begun by the 
Indians, or whether the latter had first had reason to com- 
plain of the injustice of the whites. 



1 The records of these occurrences are in the fourth volume of the 
State Papers, XIX. Cong., 2d Sess. An interesting report is to be found 
in Niles, XI., p. :J7. 

3 Baldwin, Deb. of Congress, VI., p. m. 



war. 339 

So the last 1 of the long series of games which had been 
played during the first thirty years of the Union under 
the new constitution, on the white and black chess-board 
of free labor and slavery, was of a bloody character. The 
stakes had been high enough, and the north had lost them 
all. Even for its half- victory in the question of slave im- 
portation, it had to thank its league with the northern 
slave states. It would have been contrary to human nature 
if the south had not, after these successes, played the game 
with doubled assurance, and, where possible, for doubled 
stakes. The stake and the hardihood of the play increased 
in the same ratio, as slavery swallowed up in the south 
all other interests and came to be the one interest on which 
all others were dependent. 

1 1 call it the last, because it had the most widespread influence in 
the following period. 



340 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 



CHAPTER IX. 

The Economic Contrast between the Free and Slave 
States. The Missouri Compromise. 

From the instant that slavery was brought into connec- 
tion with the constitution, the sonth had shown a fevi 
irritation as soon as the li peculiar institution'' was made a 
theme of discussion in any way whatever. A great part 
of the questions it called forth had been settled only after 
long and heated struggles. And during these strug 
many a word had fallen on both sides which lifted with 
terrible certainty the veil of the future. But yet all the 
contests over the slavery question, with the exception <»f 
the debates in the Philadelphia convention, had been, 60 to 
speak, mere incidents. They constituted only one element 
of the regular political order of the day. " South" and 
" North," spoken in tones pregnant with meaning. ><">n 
became among the most frequent expressions of politicians. 
But " slaveholding" and "free" states bad not yet beconuB 
political catch-words. When they had become such, and 
when they became, as they did every day, more and more 
the keynote in all debates, fractional parties were formed <»n 
both sides, but especially in the north, which, appealii 
the olden time, protested against this with increasing 
lence. Even since the end of the civil war, thick books hav$ 
been written to prove that the slaveholding and i'v 
might have peaceably got along with one another till the end 
of time, if on this side and that, political short-sighted 
fanaticism, and demajjoodsm had not awakened discord and 
artfullykept it alive. The whole history of the Union s | 
1 7^7 so clearly contradicts this view that it can be attrib- 



AN ECONOMIC CONTRAST. 341 

n ted only to moral enervation. Luther and his opponents 
could have more easily remained true to their argument, 
and by keeping silent, have set a limit to the reformation 
already begun, than the contest in the United States be- 
tween the free and the slaveholding states could be kept, 
by simply not noticing it, from growing more violent every 
day until it finally culminated in an incurable breach. 
Even if this mutual opposition had been only a moral and 
political one, there was no possibility of mediation or rec- 
onciliation between them because it was a question of prin- 
ciple. But, besides this, it w T as also of an industrial nature 
and was therefore of greater signification, since it nec- 
essarily influenced practical politics earlier and more 
directly. 

Free labor, with unlimited competition, makes the high- 
est development and the highest employment of individual 
power the formative principle of the collective life of a 
nation. On the contrary, the only means of industrial ad- 
vancement with slave labor is the increase of the weight ot 
the dead mass. The essence of free labor is intensity; the 
condition of existence for a slavocracy competing with free 
labor is boundless expansion. 1 Moreover and above all, in 
the United States, expansion was offered to the free north 

1 During the last five years before the outbreak of the civil war, the 
leading statesmen of the south not only admitted this, but used it as an 
argument for the justice of their new demands. Robert Toombs de- 
clared, Jan. 24, 1856, in a speech at Boston: "Expansion is as necessary 
to the increased comforts of the sl.ave as to the prosperity of the master." 
But Barringer of North Carolina laid the most open statement before 
the peace convention of 1861. He said: "In my opinion you will 
never get back the seceded states, without you give them some hope of 
the acquisition of future territory. They know that when slavery is 
gathered into a cul de sac, and surrounded by a wall of free states, it is 
destroyed. Slavery must have expansion. It must expand by the ac- 
quisition of territory which now we do not own. The seceded states 
will never yield this point — will never come back to a government 
which gives no chance for the expansion of their principal institution." 
Chittenden's Report, p. 340. 



342 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

in a high degree, and intensity of labor could therefore 
come Into play only upon one side, and that the quantita- 
tive one. The final result in the struggle between the 
opposing industrial principles would not, however, be there- 
by changed. 

The industrial development of the slave states soon fell 
far behind that of the north, because this development on 
account of slavery continued to be thoroughly one-sided. 
The south remained essentially limited to agriculture, and 
this could be carried on only on a large scale, while the 
condition precedent of intense agricultural industry is the 
predominance of the small and middle-sized farm. Bat 
slavery has an invincible tendency in favor of planta- 
tion industry, which suppresses or swallows small faring.! 

1 According to the census of 1850 (Compend., p. 170), in the son''. 
the average size of landed properties, including the farms and ti 
called " patches" of the cottagers who owned a few slaves, was two hun- 
dred and seventy-three acres. Cotton plantations were seldom less than 
four hundred acres. According to De Bow, the first class of slavehold- 
ers,' those owning from fifty slaves up, altogether numbered in all the 
slave states only seven thousand nine hundred and twenty-nine, 
majority of the cotton planters, who owned from ten to twenty-five - 
lived, according to Olmstead, in great indigence (The Cotton Kingdom, 
I., p. 18. Compare also, II., p. 233). De Bow— an authority who 
not well be doubted when the misfortunes of the slave states at 
subject of discussion — writes: " But. what would be his [the hean 
surprise, when told that so far from living in palaces, many of 
[cotton] planters dwell in habitations of the most primitive con- 
tion, and these so inartificially built as to be incapable of defending 
inmates from the winds and rains of heaven; that instead of any 
tical improvement, this rude dwelling was surrounded by cotton-fi 
or probably by fields exhausted, washed into gullies and abandi 
Resources of the South and West, II., p. 113. The same auth 
writes: "I am satisfied that the non-slaveholders far outnumber the 
slaveholders, perhaps by three to one. In the more southern porti 
this region [the southwest], the non-slaveholders j erally bol 

very small means, and the land which they possess is almost univ< 
ly poor, and so sterile that a scanty subsistence is all that can bed< i 
from its cultivation, and the more fertile soil, being in the hands ol 
slaveholders, must ever remain out of the power of those who 
none." II., p. 100. 






SOUTHERN SOCIETY. 343 

The great planter gave the tone to industrial life. He 
abandoned himself, in great part, to the finer enjoyments 
of life, leaving the control of the plantation to the overseer, 
who, as a rule, paid attention only to the greatness of the 
crop, since this was usually looked upon as a measure ot 
his capacity and served also as the measure of his remuner- 
ation. In most cases the soil was systematically exhausted. 
The surplus yield was laid out when necessary in new 
lands, but especially in new slaves; for wealth was esti- 
mated according to the number of slaves, and social posi- 
tion depended, in certain respects, upon this also. The 
price of slaves rose more quickly than their value. He 
who had fewest slaves suffered most on this account, as 
well as from the lack of means of exchange. His labor 
power was only sufficient to wring from the ground -what 
was needed for the accpisition of the barest necessaries. 
There was no spur to emulation, for the great planter stood 
too far above him, and a moderate advance brought with it 
no increase of the enjoyments of life which could exercise 
a marked influence upon him. If he was especially indus- 
trious, and if fortune smiled upon him, he aped the large 
planter and like him devoted his savings to the purchase 
of new slaves. Production was increased without any in- 
crease in comfort. What was considered as the growth of 
wealth was really, in great part, only an increase of the 
laboring population, together with an increasing destruc- 
tion of capital. The south lived almost exclusively by 
agriculture, and with every decade the price of land fell 
farther behind its price in the north, a country much less 
richly endowed by nature. 1 

According to the census of 1850 the average price of an acre in 
Virginia was $8, and in Pennsylvania, her next-door neighbor, $25. 
The same remarkable difference in price appeared in the slave states 
themselves, where, in different sections, the proportion between the 
slaves and the free population was notably different. Thus Olmstead 
found that the price of an acre in the northwestern portions of Virginia, 



3-14 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

And recompense for this in other branches of indue 
utterly lacking. Manufacturing on a great scale 
found no footing in the peculiarly slave 6tates, and could 
find none. 1 The capital of the section was monopolized 
by agriculture. Manufacturing industry did not accord 
with the longing for aristocratic leisure which must char- 
acterize the free population in a community which owi 
specific industrial character to slave labor. The natural 
resources of the section had to offer quite extraordinary 
advantages to foreign capital before the latter would ven- 
ture to try to overcome the difficulties which an industrial 
system founded on slavery laid in the way of every great 
industrial undertaking. Skilled labor was more difficult 
to get there than anywhere else. The slaves could not be 
trained to it. Since they did not enjoy the fruits of their 
labor they labored only under the impulse of fear. The 
constant conscientious watchfulness which is the first 
requisite for a successful factory-hand could not be got 
under the lash. There was, indeed, no lack of free work- 
men, but in every respect they were far behind the work- 
men of the free states. The demoralizing influence of 
the scorn entertained for labor showed itself especially up- 



where the proportion was 1 : 15, was above $7.75, and in the other conn 
here the proportion was 1 : 2 52-10, was only $4.50. The Cotton 
Kingdom, I., p. 114. 

1 Other conditions being the same, the manufacture of a raw materia] 
will always he carried on in the neighborhood where the material is 
produced.' The tendency of botli sections to the development of manu- 
facture- can best be compared in the case of the cotton manufacture. 
According to the report submitted June ;J0, 1855, by 11. ('. Morgan and 
A. Bhannon to the secretary of the treasury, this represented, in ls-Ju. in 
the Blave Ma'cs, a value of and in the free Mates of $4,04* 

in I860 it had reached in the slave Mates $9,307, 331, and in the free 
|52,501,853. All the manufactures of the south represented, in 
tic value of $93,362,202, and those of the north $347,748,61* 
Kettell, Southern Wealth and Northern Profits, p. 55. The numl 
■ ged in manufacturing was, according to the census of 
in the slave Mates 151,944, and in the free Mates B07,125. 



LABOR AND POPULATION. 345 

on them. Moreover, the independent artisan, whose work 
forms the natural basis of a healthy general industry, 
had only a precarious existence in the slave states. The 
possibility and necessity of a division of labor stand in a 
certain relation to the density of population. 1 It was there- 



1 At the end of the revolutionary war the population of the southern 
states was about 1,600,000 souls. Their area was 128,000,000 acres. 
There were therefore about eighty acres per head. By 1860 the popula- 
tion of the slave states had increased to 12,000,000, and their territory 
embraced nearly 540,000,000 acres, about forty-rive acres per head. 
While the population had increased in the proportion of 1 : 7.5, the area 
of slavery had been extended in the proportion of 1 : 4.5. Carey (The 
Slave Trade, Domestic and Foreign, p. 99, seq.) gives a series of author- 
ities from the slave states in support of the fact that in those states the 
ground was rapidly used up, and soon completely exhausted, so that the 
population either grew poor or had to exchange their old abandoned 
homes for new stretches of virgin soil. He then says (p. 102) : " When 
. . . they [men] separate from each other the greater is the tendency 
to a decline in the value of land, the less is the value of labor, and the 
less freedom of man. Such being the case, if we desire to ascertain 
the ultimate cause of the existence of the domestic slave trade, it would 
seem to be necessary only to ascertain the cause of the exhaustion of 
the land." This cause is commonly and quite wrongly, he says, sought 
in slavery; for in the northern states u exactly the same exhaustion" [?] 
of the soil takes place. " It is not slavery that produces exhaustion of 
the soil, but exhaustion of the soil that causes slavery to continue" 
(p. 105). He then estimates the products of the slave states in 1850 
at §300,000,000 and those of the free states at $1,250,000,000, and con- 
tinues : " The difference is caused by the fact that at the north artisans 
have placed themselves near to the farmers, and towns and cities have 
grown up, and exchanges are made more readily, and the farmer is not 
to the same extent obliged to exhaust his land, and dispersion goes on 
more slowly. . . . With each step in the process of coming to- 
gether at the north, men tend to become more free ; whereas the disper- 
sion of the south produces everywhere the trade in slaves of which the 
w r orld complains, and which would soon cease to exist if the artisan 
could be brought to take his place by the side of the producer of food 
and cotton. . . (p. 115). Upon whom, now, must rest the responsi- 
bility for such a state of things as is here exhibited ? Upon the planter. 
He exercises no volition. He is surrounded by coal and iron ore, but 
the attempt to convert them into iron has almost invariably been 
followed by ruin. He has vast pow T ers of nature ready to obey his will, 



34G STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

fore exceedingly limited in the slave states. The market 
for manufactured articles outside of the few great c 
had such a wide range that the needed competition unfor- 
tunately could not he built up. Not only were the con- 
Bumers too widely scattered, but their absolute number 
was too small. The great landowners numbered only a 
few thousand, and their demand for luxuries could be easily 
and cheaply supplied by importation. The planters of the 
second class usually tasted according to their means the 
luxurious enjoyment which their rich exemplars alio 
themselves, and lived, for the rest, in the self-satisfied con- 
yet dare he not purchase a spindle or a loom to enable him to bring 
into use his now waste labor power, for such attempts at bringing the 
consumer to the side of the producer have almost invariably ended in 
the impoverishment of the projector, and the sale and dispersion of his 
laborers." According to Carey the blame for this falls upon England 
and those who, by supporting free trade tendencies, have aided her 
efforts to make herself the '• sole workshop of the world" for all man- 
ufactured and industrial articles. Space does not allow me to make 
further extracts, but it is worth while to answer the reasoning of this 
famous politico-economist, inasmuch as this will be an excellent proof 
of the view developed in the text. What he wishes to prove is op] 
to this. Care}* wholly forgets one fact, and this one fact turns all his 
arguments against himself. The commercial policy of the United 
States has not been different for the two sections, but precisely tin 
for the whole country. Whether it has been good or bad. in either event 
under it countless towns and cities have grown up in the north; manu- 
facturing and industry have struck root; the population has grown 
denser; "anvil and loom" hive "taken their places beside the plough 
and the rake"; while all this has not happened at the south. If it 
"could" not happen at the south, as Carey — and rightly indeed — affirm*; 
if all attempts to bring it about ended with the ruin of the projector, — 
the reason for this must be sought elsewhere. But this reason can 
be found only in slavery, for Blare labor and free labor was the only 
difference which influenced the industrial institutions and the industrial 
policies of the two sections. It cannot be denied that the exhaustion of 
the soil and the consequent "dispersion" of the population, tended to 
make the free whites of the south ever more and more tin; sla 
slavery. Cause and effect were here, as they so often are, entangled with 
each other in such a way that each influenced the other, so that each 
appeared both as a cause and as an effect 



MANUFACTURES AND TRADE. 347 

tentment of an idle semi-civilization. The mass of the 
small slaveholding landowners and of the poor artisans 
was the most sorrowful social product which the history of 
civilized nations has to show, an aristocratic proletariat 
which, both from its lack of culture and its arrogance, 
was terrible material in the hands of a self-seeking aristoc- 
racy and of politicians greedy for power. Partly poverty 
and partly savagery allowed manufacturing industry to 
find no market here for anything save the most necessary 
tools, articles of clothing, small arms, and the whisky flask. 
Finally, the slaves, with the exception of the house-slaves 
of the wealthy, figured among the consumers of manu- 
factured articles only as users of agricultural implements 
and of the coarse stuffs which served to cover their naked- 
ness. 1 

The wholesale trade was mainly in the hands of northern 
merchants. In all contests with the north, the right-bower 
of the southern politicians was the fact that the profit 
yielded by the export of southern raw products to Europe 
and the import of European manufactured goods to the 
south fell to the north. As threats of secession became the 
staple seasoning of political debates, the taunt was contin- 
ually thrown out that the shopkeeping- spirit of the north 
would think twice before it drove the south to separation 
and so deprived itself of the profit which the great-hearted 
south allowed it to make. Retail business languished un- 
der the conditions which held down all handicraft. Com- 



1 The Lynchburg Virginian said : " Dependent upon Europe and the 
north for almost every yard of cloth, and every coat, and boot, and hat 
we wear; for our axes, our scythes, tubs and buckets, — in short, for 
everything except our bread and meat ! — it must occur to the south that 
if our relations with the north should ever be severed— and how soon 
they may be, none can know (may God avert it long!) — we would, in all 
the south, not be able to clothe ourselves. We could not fell our forests, 
plough our fields, or mow our meadows. In fact, we would be reduced 
to a state more abject than we are willing to look at even prospective- 
ly." Quoted by Olmsted, The Cotton Kingdom, II., p. 366. 



34S STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

mercial life was confined, far more than at the north, to a 
few places, and commerce could therefore exercise its civil- 
izing influences only on a much smaller scale than there. 1 

The population of the slave states therefore lacked that 
manifold interlinking of interests which goes on develop- 
ing forever in a community that rests on a moral hasis. In 
the tree states, indeed, the social extremes constantly he- 
came farther apart, hut the transitions from 01 
stratum to the other were unnoticed and the whole com- 
munity was an organism which not only grew outwardly, 
but was continually developing within. In the south, on 
the contrary, society ever became more distinctly divided 
into three separate classes — the ruling great land owners; 
the less wealthy slaveholders, who had no leisure for in- 
tensely active participation in political life and neither 
leisure nor inclination for self-culture; and the free rab- 
ble. The foundation of the whole structure was formed by 
the slaves, who had no social standing. 2 Of course there 
was no lack of connecting-links, but they were not numer- 
ous and important enough to exercise a determining influ- 
ence. The character of the political and social life of the 
south was determined by the natural three-fold division of 
society which grew out of slavery. 

The consequences of this peculiar arrangement of social 
circumstances were the more destructive, the more the po- 
litical institutions assumed a purely democratic character, 
for in just this proportion the whole politico-social system 
was based on a broader lie. All class-government ifi 
moralizing, and the ruling class is so much the mon 
moralized the more its mastery is merely a matter of fact 

1 According to the census of 1830, commerce, trades and mining em- 
ployed 1^0,::;U persona in the slave >tatrs and 456,803 in the free - 

a In this general estimate, I have had in mind the state of thinj 
the regular plantation-states; In tin,' so-called border >»ates there were 
manifold and not unimportant modifications. Their kind and degree 
as well as their political significance, will be hereafter discussed. 



AN ARISTOCRATIC PROLETARIAT. 349 

and not grounded in law, for then the disproportion 
between power and lawfully-imposed duty is so much the 
greater. The careful preservation of democratic appear- 
ances was so much of a necessity that the ruling class did 
not appreciate how far the democracy had become an empty 
appearance. It was no conscious, naked lie, when the 
Pinckneys, Lowndes, Calhoun, Cobb, Davis and others 
praised the slave states as the chief stronghold of political 
freedom. Men of this sort do not consciously lie to them- 
selves for generations. The insolent compassion with 
which the role of Cinderella was assigned to the free states 
bore the unmistakable stamp of unfortunate conviction. 
It sounds absurd, and yet it was true, that just because the 
multitude followed them blindly, the leaders honestly 
thought that the south was inspired by that earnest spirit 
of freedom which was ascribed to the fathers of the re- 
public. 1 The multitude had an undeniable right to make 
its will the determining element, and it followed its leaders 
on the path on which their safety lay and which they 
locked at, from their standpoint, not without reason, as the 
path to freedom. And, in fact, the multitude applauded 
them the more loudly, the greater demands they made in 
the interest of their own safety. The wider the chasm 
between the mass and the great planter became, so much 
the more deeply the former, relying on the fact of equal 
political rights, intoxicated itself with a ludicrous belief in 
political equality and thought that the inevitable result of 
this was an equality of interests. There was no sober in- 
vestigation of the question how far the facts justified this 
view, because the multitude blindly confused power and 
freedom. It was precisely the poorest, and from every 

1 Yet I do not mean by this to say that the aristocracy had no eye 
whatever for the degradation of the city and country proletariat. When 
it considered the circumstances of the south by themselves, and not in 
comparison with those of the north, it was fully aware of this. The 
expression "white trash" originated, not in the north, but in the south. 



n 



350 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

point of view the most abject, whites who found the great- 

jatisfaction for their self-love in the thought that they 

were members of the privileged class. lie who wished to 

span the broad gulf which separated them from the slaves 
(who had no rights) or was suspected of entertaining this 
wish, was their deadly enemy, for he threatened to expose 
them in all their neediness, defenseless and naked; he 
puted their " right" to the beggarly pomp that was due 
only to the deeper degradation of others ; and he there- 
fore trespassed upon their " freedom." Attempts to show 
that the first cause of their material, spiritual and moral 
needs lay in this deeper degradation of others, could not be 
made. And if they could have been, they would have re- 
mained without result. 

When slavery had once become a controlling interest, 
a change for the better could not come except by means 
of a powerful impulse from without. There were no ele- 
ments within which could make an opposition to it of any 
weight whatever. The natural advantages of the section 
invited the immigration of fresh elements with sound 
moral, industrial, and political views; but the paralyzing 
curse on every effort prevented any especial result from 
this cause. Slavery became more and more of a Chinese 
Wall, which separated the south from the rest of the civil- 
ized world. Safety demanded that the comparatively 
small number of immigrants should be forced by moral 
pressure to swim with the stream. If this pressure did 
not at least impose silence upon them, then men soon 
ceased to limit themselves to moral suasion. And yet at 
every moment the fact made itself felt that modern civili- 
zation is not the peculiar possession of different nations 
but has a universal, world-embracing character. The re- 
sult of this was a growing violence and brutality in the 
etlurts to resist its influence. Everything was considered 
in reference to the " peculiar institution/- and therefore 
hostile distrust of everything was felt, because this insti* 



THE COTTON GIN. 351 

tution was in ever sharper contradiction with the spirit of 
the age. Slavery in the United States showed itself each 
day, to civilization, as more and more clearly the greatest 
piece of theft of all time, and the slavocrats, like a com- 
mon thief, began to fear the rustling of every leaf. 

The reconciling and healing power of time had, in this 
case, to be put to shame. North and south had to ever 
go farther apart, since their opposition in all the points al- 
ready mentioned was a natural result of their different in- 
dustrial systems. 

These systems had to develope themselves, and as they 
did so their results had to be more keenly felt, and the 
sectional separation had to become more sharply marked. 
This explains the frightful rapidity with which the contest 
narrowed down to u either — or." If the industrial devel- 
opment of both sections had been less rapid, then the 
Union would probably be divided to-day into slave and 
free states. " 

The unexpectedly speedy development of the industrial 
system of the slave states was the result of a single inven- 
tion. Cotton was exported from the United States for the 
first time in 1791. 1 It is apparent from art. XII. of the 
treaty negotiated by Jay with England, that cotton was 
not then known to Jay as an article of export. It had 
already become evident that some of the southern states 
were especially adapted to the cultivation of cotton. Up 
to this time the plant had not been cultivated on a greater 
scale only because the separation of the seed involved too 
mnch labor. The cotton gin, invented by Eli Whitney in 
1793, cured this misfortune. While a man could then 
make ready for the market only one pound per day, the 
cotton-gin cleaned three hundred and fifty pounds a day. 
As soon as the worth of this invention had been tested by 
experience the cultivation of cotton received a tremendous 

1 19,200 lbs. Webster, Works, V., p. 388. Compare Hamilton's Report 
on Manufactures, Dec. 5, 1791. Ham., Works, III., pp. 272-275. 



STATE BOVEBKIGNTY AND slavery. 

impulse. A- early as 1800, 19, ,000 pounds, worth 

$5,726,000, were exported. By 1824 the export had in- 
creased to L42,360,663 pounds, worth $21,947,401. 1 This 
sudden gigantic development of the new branch of indus- 
try involved a corresponding increase of the demand for 
labor, that is. a corresponding increase in the pric< 
slaves.' 2 The vague dreams of emancipation in which the 
people of the northern slave states indulged during the 
first years under the new constitution, had a realistic 
-. Slave labor proved to be so unsatisfactory that men 
began to think about the possibility of a time when it 
w«»uld become a mere consumer of capital. The emanci- 
pation of slaves became more common because it demand- 
ed only a small sacrifice. The invention of the cotton-gin 
altered these circumstances at a blow. The demand for 
slaves could no longer be satisfied, although the northern 
slave states — especially Virginia and Maryland — at once 
devoted themselves to slave-breeding. 3 In this way cotton 

1 Compare the statistical tables of the products and exports of the 
south, completed to 1860, in Kettell, Southern Wealth and .Northern 
Profits, p. 21. Kettell does not give his authorities. Compare also the 
somewhat different views of Kapp, Geschichte der Sklaverei. p. 107. 

2 I have not been able to find trustworthy statistical data ou this 
point. Kapp's statement (p. 10 s1 ; that the whole -lave property « 
timated, in 1790, at $10 000.000 and in 1820 at $1,200,000,000, certainly 

:i an error. According to the census of 1790 the number of slave* 
in the southern state- was To. 047. By that of 1820 it was 1,52 
The average price of a -lave, when children and the old were reckoned, 
Mould then have been in the earlier year- about $15, and in the later 
one- about $780. The frr>t sum is evidently too low and the 
probably too high. The Virginia Times, in 1836, estimated the av< 
value of the uegroes exported out of the state at $600 per head, i N 

LI., p. 83.) Kettell, p. 130, estimates the value of the slavi 
L798 at $200 and in 1815 at $250 per head. 
5 In 1829, in the Virginia convention, Mercer estimated the value of 
annually exported from that state at $1,500,000. Deb. <»t 
C<>nL r .. p. 99. In Alabama the value of the -laves imported from the 
northern slave states from 1833 to estimated at $10,000,000. 

Jay, Misc. Writ, p. 867. 



COMPARATIVE DEVELOPMENT. 353 

culture became a profitable pursuit for those slave states 
that were not especially fitted for it. The whole south 
saw the most brilliant future before it. It thought itself 
sure, not only of unmeasured wealth, but also of political 
mastery. If the north, despite the efforts of the ISTew 
England states, had hitherto steadily followed the leader- 
ship of the south, how could it emancipate itself from it 
when the cotton culture, to which no limits seemed. to be 
set, should have reached its full development? In the de- 
bate over the Missouri question M'Lane of Delaware 
thought he could safely prophesy a more speedy develop- 
ment for the south than the north, 1 and the latter by no 
means threw back the assertion as nonsensical rhodomon- 
tade. Roberts of Pennsylvania admitted its probability, 
and used it for a justification for the refusal to extend the 
slavery area. 2 

On a superficial view this idea might seem justified. 
The north only recovered slowly from the blows of the 
Revolutionary war. Nothing happened which could give 
its development a sudden, mighty impulse, and the embar- 
go policy of the Republican party, as well as the war of 
1812, put brakes on its progress. But this lagging of the 
north behind the south was only in appearance. Compari- 
son of the population of the two sections was the only 
thing needed in order to show this. As yet there was no 
noticeable immigration into the northern states, and yet 
the south was farther outstripped each year. The indus- 
trial development of the north struck its roots deep into 
the ground, so that a stem of hitherto unknown dimensions 
could shoot out from them in course of time; in the south, 
on the other hand, the stem, under hot-house pressure, 
burst into luxurious foliage, but the roots lay on the sur- 
face and withered away. The population of the two sec- 

1 Deb. of Cong., VI., p. 361. 
3 Ibid, VI., p. 492. 

23 



354: BTA.TE SOVEREIGNTY AND BLAVEHT. 

tions, according to the first four censuses, was as foil 

1790 L800 1810 

Norlh 1,908,455 2,034,025 3,753,820 5,1! 

JS;::;::.. 1,901,327 2,021,300 ^^ 1 

This slower increase of population in the south was mainly 
due to two causes. The slaves' impulse of self-pres. 
tl((11 was BU bject to the control of the masters. Food, 
Ctothin^ shelter, the kind and amount of labor— thesi 
pended solely on the will of the masters. Although, as 
g enera l ru l e , interest demanded the longest possible pres- 
ervation of the living capital, yet evidently, in both I 
and little things, less care would be shown for the b 
than the free workmen of the north showed for them* 
As the slaves produced less than the free laborers, I 
cost of supporting them had to be much less in order 
that their labor should pay. But less care involved 
a greater death-rate. Moreover, a good share of tin 
best plantation-districts was exceedingly unhealthy, and 
for this reason too the consumption of human I 
quite peculiarly great. 1 In this section, men partly cam! 
to the conviction, through experience, that interest de- 
manded, not the longest possible preservation of the w 
bat the greatest possible use of his strength during a shorter 
time. This conviction was naturally acted upon.- Hie 

1 According to the report of the secretary of the treasury of Jan. I 
1831, the number of deaths on the sugar plantations ol Louis. 
ceeded the births by two and one-half psr c :nt. According to an arm* 
in the New Orleans Argus in January, 1830, the 1 - ol Louisiana pla*. 
„, (m th e negroes imported Iron, more northern states amourfrf* 
twenty . nve per cent. This statement may h, exaggerated, but that i 
deatb . rate am ong this class of slaves must Have been very gr eat is platt 
from the fact that in the advertisements of slaves offered for sale, M 
mat ed n^v^ play a great part. Jay, Misc. Writ, p. 272. 

According toGiddings,thcnegroes imported from the slave 
states to the cotton plantations remained capable of work on an - 
only seven years. A convention of slavelv>ld,rs in South Carolina 
aft/r careful discussion, to the conclusion that it ^a. most proh. 
the masters to use up the slaves within this time. Giddings = 
p. I 



POPULATION. 355 

business of the slave-breeders increased all the more, but the 
artificial impulse which they gave to the speedy increase 
of the slave population could not keep pace with the natural 
forces which caused the extraordinarily rapid increase of 
the population in the free states. The difference was not 
at first very marked, but it grew — especially after immi- 
gration into the northern states began to assume significant 
proportions — in geometrical progression. 

This difference in the increase of the population of the two 
sections was of the greatest significance for their power in the 
federal legislature, since the representation in the lower 
house of congress was decided according to the number of 
people. Since, moreover, in making up the representation, 
five slaves were reckoned as only equal to three white men, 
the difference of representation in favor of the north was 
much greater than the difference in the absolute number of 
people. The absolute increase of the slave population of the 
southern states from 1790 to 1820 was 867,533, but this 
amounted to only 520,520 as far as representation was con- 
cerned. In 1820, the total slave population of 1,521,580 
souls counted as a represented population of 914,748. In this 
year, while the real difference between the populations of 
the two sections was 610,148, the difference, considered 
from the point of view of representation, amounted to 
1,219,980. The representation of the two sections in the 
lower house of congress until the rearrangement in accord- 
ance with the census of 1830 was as follows: 

Before the first census 

North 35 

South 30 

In these figures it was written, clear as day, that the 
slave states would have to yield the mastery of affairs to 
the north soon and forever, if they could not find in some 
other place a counterpoise to the north's growing power 
in the house of representatives. Threats and other politi- 
cal acts of every sort and of all manner of duplicity might 



1790 


1800 


1810 


1820 


57 


77 


104 


133 


53 


65 


79 


90 



in; BOVEBEIGNT? AND iLAVBRT. 

for a wfhilehold a sufficient number of northern repri 
tativee under their control, but in the long run this 
impossible, for the northern people had to come to believe 
that they were being driven by their politicians in direct 
opposition to their material interests. But the political mas- 
tery of the slave states was an essential condition tor the 
continued existence of slavery in the Union. The south 
had, then, to pay especial attention to the senate. In tl 
body representation was independent of the population 
I, could not only paralyze every anion of the hoot 
representatives, but it had besides this several especial 
privileges of the weightiest character. As long as the 
slaveholders controlled an equal number of states, so long 
was the equality of power maintained, as far as it possibly 
could be. And wherever the south had raised the question 
of slavery in any way, it was now practically certain that 
there the slaveholding interest would be the ruling one, tor 
it had the whole power of the section behind it, since self- 
preservation made it necessary for the south to form in solid 
phalanx in its support. This gives the key to the stubborn 
tenacity and passionate energy with which the south tor 
three years fought out the Missouri struggle and all the 
later contests in behalf of the extension of .lave territory. 

The outer history of the struggle between the two 
tionsover Missouri can not be followed out here in all its 
different phases. 1 The facts, a knowledge of which is 

■ It can be found in Kapp, Lunt, Giddings, Wilson, and linmany other 

easily attainable 1 b. Neumann's Darstcllung (II, p. 324 «, , ri*eU 

„.„ ,'„. U8 ed, since the most essentia, facts are wrongly J-^ 
tarns matters around wrong end foremost, in a laughable way, since SI 

I, h Miss:,,,,-! question appear as an appendix to the o^an^non 
STkansasas.tt.rritory. March 16, .MS a ^""'^Sel 
„„.„,„„, of representatives from inhabitants ol Missouri, who ass* 
Mission for Ll territory to form a state constitution ,,, ordei to !« 

referred to a committee which brought in a b.ll April o But u 
umil Dec. 10, 1818, that a committee was appointed, on the motion 



THE MISSOURI LIMITATION. 357 

essary in order to judge of the position of both parties, the 
character of the constitutional questions involved, and the 
consequences of the final issue, can be concentrated into a 
few words. 

In February, 1819, the house of representatives went 
into committee of the whole over the admission of Mis- 
souri as a state. The recommendation of the committee 
provided in the ordinary manner what was necessary 
to this end. Tallmadge of New York moved the 
amendment that the admission should be made dependent 
on the two following conditions: prohibition of the fur- 
ther introduction of slaves, and emancipation of all the 
slave children born after the admission as soon as they 
reached the age of twenty-live. This motion gave life to 
the whole strife, and the idea embraced in it remained the 
essence of the strife until the decision of its most impor- 
tant points. The majority of the house of representatives 
voted to make the admission of Missouri as a state depen- 
dent upon such a limitation of her power in regard to 
slavery; but the majority of the senate decided against 
this. Both houses insisted on their respective resolves, and 
congress adjourned without coming to any final decision. 
When the question again came up in the next session the 
opponents of the so-called " Missouri limitation" found 

Robertson of Kentucky, to consider the propriety of organizing Arkan- 
sas as a territory by itself. (Compare Deb. of Congress, VI., pp. 122, 
222.) It is a muck weightier fact that Neumann puts the north m a 
thoroughly false light, in that he makes Tallmadge bring in a motion 
" according to which precautions should be taken for the emancipation 
of the slaves already living in the territory." Tallmadge and his com- 
panions affirmed on numberless occasions, in the debate, that they had 
never had the intention of interfering with the right of property in the 
slaves already living there, and their opponents often used this to re 
proach them with inconsistency. On p. 327, the author makes the 
strangest statements about the growth of population of the two sections 
and the relation which the growth of representation had to this, etc. 
These short notes may serve as a further reason for the opinion already 
expressed concerning the thoroughness and reliability of this work. 



STATE SOVEBEHMTY AMD BLAVBBT. 

themeelveB materially aided 1 ,j anew circumstance. Maine, 
which had hitherto been a district of Massachusetts, ap- 
plied for admission as an independent state. The major- 
ft- of the senate coupled together the Main., and Missouri 
bills, and so put before the majority of the house th 
ternativeof admitting Missouri without any lmutatiomo* 
denying, for the present, the admission oi Maine. LM 
honle was not yet ready to acknowledge itsell ... easdy 
beaten. Neither earlier nor later lias a struggle been 
fought out in congress in which the majorities of both 
houses have stood by the decision once arrived at with such 
Btiff-neckedness. The close of the session constantly dr, 
,„,„,,, an d an agreement seemed farther off than ever. 
The whole country was in a state of feverish excitement 
\t the last moment, in the night between the second and 
third of -March. 1S20, free labor and the principle ot na- 
tionality Yielded to slavery and the principle of stat, 
ereignty. If the matter had affected Missouri alone* 
the defeat would have been of comparatively small 
practical significance; but two principles bad been gw 
up, and these two principles involved the weal and woe 

of the republic. 

The statesmen of the south had always pursued the sly 
policv of accusing the north of narrow-hearted and selfish 
police and of claiming for themselves a lofty ideal stand- 
point", from which they, impelled by brotherly love and in- 
born nobility, were ready to carry self-renunciation to the 
verge of folly, but could not yield an iota of the demands 
of The right for the sake of all the whole world could ..tier. 
This rough mask was good enough to serve as a pretext, not 
only for putting forward the most unjust demands, but also 
for declaring, in the same breath, with sublime shame- 
lesBness, that the interest of the south demanded such and 
B uch a thing, and that the north must therefore comply 
with it, whether or no. In the struggle over Missouri^ 
Brown of Kentucky repelled, in brilliant pomp of language, 



MISSOURI AND MAINE. 359 

as a pitiful and lying insinuation, the statement that the 
south was paying any attention to the "balance of power'*; 
he had been "alarmed" by such thoughts; the inexorable 
demands of justice and intelligence were alone in ques- 
tion. 1 It was foolish to twit the north with such phrases, 
after the south had reached its end by the unnatural al- 
liance of the Maine and Missouri bills. Smith of South 
Carolina had roundly declared in the senate that consent 
to the admission of Missouri without limitation " must'" 
be given before Maine could be let in. 2 Clay bad spoken 
just as plainly in the house, 3 and no one had pretended 
that the union of the two bills was only a harmless whim 
of the senate. It would have been unreasonable to make 
Maine suffer because the north wished to curtail the "con- 
stitutional rights" of Missouri. The matter was intelligible 
only on the supposition that- it compelled a bargain which, 
as the south affirmed, gave equal chances to both sections. 
We should do injustice to the political insight of the states- 
men of the south, if we admitted that they really looked at 
the bargain in this way. Hardin of Kentucky 4 and Tucker 
of Virginia 5 openly explained: " We are struggling for 
our political existence." 6 

The south by no means limited itself to a discussion of 
the mere question of law, but brought forward a crowd 
of pleas in justification. It was asserted that the Louis- 
iana territory, to which Missouri belonged, had been ob- 
tained at the cost of the whole Union, and that it would 

1 Deb. of Cong., VII., p. 103. 

2 Ibid, VI., p. 383. 

3 Ibid, VI., pp. 472, 474. 

4 Ibid, VI., p. 499. 
4 Ibid, VI., p. 559. 

6 John Randolph wrote : " They [Arche, Mason, and himself J deter- 
mined to cavil on the ninetieth part of a hair in a matter of sheer right, 
touching the dearest interests, the life blood of the southern states." 
Garland, Life of J. Randolph, II., p. 128. 









360 BTATB SOVEREIGNTY AND BLANKET. 

therefore be unjust to deprive the inhabitants of half the 
Union of the -colonization right"; but this would evi- 
dently be the case if they were forbidden to take their 
property with them. It was said, on the other hand, that 
Blavery would present an impassable wall to immigration 
from the north. Where labor hears the stamp of shame 
the free laborer cannot turn his steps. But how could 
there he hesitation when the choice was to he mad. 
tween the exclusion of slavery or free labor? The Unio 
should be a nursery of freedom, and not a breeding-p 
for slavery. The south itself declaimed with the great. 
pathos oyer the curse of slavery. Was it not, them a self- 
evident duty to preserve the land from any extension of 

the cur- 

The last part of tins argument was repelled with great 
decision by the majority of southern members. They af- 
firmed that when it was proposed to allow the importation 
of slaves from Africa or from any foreign country, the 
south would be first and mostearnest in protesting against 
it. But by compliance with the wish expressed by the 
south, the slave population of the Union -would not he 
increased by a single soul." Ever and ever again it was 
affirmed with Jefferson in his old age: -AH know that 
permitting the slaves of the south to spread into the 

will increase the happiness of those existing and 
by spreading them oyer a larger surface will dilute the evil 
everywhere and facilitate the means of getting rid ol it. an 
event more anxiously wished by those on whom it pr 
than by the noisy pretenders to exclusive humanity. ' The 

. Jefferson's Works, VII., p. 194. In tin- sum. letter, he curtly de- 
clares- " It is not a moral question, but one merely of power. 
was no. willing to admit that the south wae fighting merely tor the bal- 
ance of power. Ln another letter he writes : "The Missouri quesnoa 
is a mew party trick. The leaders of Federalism, defeated In tbeW 
BChemes of obtaining power by rallying partisans to the prme.ple «f 
monarchist . • . have changed their tack and thrown out auoth* 



DILUTING SLAVEBT. 361 

north had to let its "pretended humanity " be thrown into 
its face, as an impudent lie. Instead of lightening the lot 
of the unfortunate slaves, it wished, said southern men, to 
hedge them into a fixed territory, where they must infalli- 
bly "perish of hunger and want" in the course of time. 1 
It was not difficult for the representatives of the north to 
overthrow this dishonest as well as weak reasoning. The 
assertion that the number of slaves would not be increased 
by the extension of the slave territory — said Roberts — is 
plainly false, because the extension of the market must re- 
sult in an increase of price, and the latter must give a 
strong impulse towards increasing the supply of slaves. 2 
Moreover, it is a known law that when the means of sub- 
sistence increase, an increase of population takes place. 
These reasons were so convincing that Barbour of Virginia* 
and Pinckney of Maryland 4 could not but recognize their 
validity. Yet despite this, just as before, speech upon 
speech was piled up on the theme that an extension of the 
evil would be a " dilution" and, therefore, a mitigation 
of it. 

After these reasons for justification, the treaty of pur- 
chase with France was brought in as a legal objection 
against the limitation. Art. III. read: "The inhabitants 
of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the Union 
of the United States and admitted as soon as possible, ac- 
cording to the principles of the federal constitution, to the 
enjoyment of all the rights, advantages and immunities of 
citizens of the United States; and in the meantime they 

barrel to the whale." Works, VI., p. 180. From another point of view, 
as we shall see, he recognized with perfect clearness the tremendous 
range of the question. 

1 The Baptist churches of Missouri " protested" against the limita- 
tion and " warned" congress " in the name of humanity" not to adopt 
it. Niles'Reg., XVII., p. 210. 

2 Deb. of Congress, VI., p. 432. 

3 Ibid, VI., p. 429. 

4 Ibid, VI., p. 441. 






862 .u. SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of 
their liberty, property and the religion which they pro- 
fess." 

The south Bought to deduce from this article the im- 
ibility of obliging Missouri to free the children born 
of slaves, after her admission into the Union, as soon as they 
reached their twenty-fifth birthday, because this would in- 
fringe upon the right of property guarantied by the treaty 
to the masters. This was denied by the champions of the 
limitation, because it was againsl natural right and sound 
common Bense to recognize in the master an endless right 
of property in the yet unborn descendants of his 
It was just as little possible to use the assurance "of all 
the rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the 
United State.-" as an argument against the limitation. 
Slavery existed only through municipal law; as a citizi 
the United States, no one had the right to hold slaw-.-' 

The opponents of the limitation found a further ground 
in the provision of the treaty that the inhabitants of the 
Louisiana territory should be admitted to the lull enjoy- 
ment of the rights of citizen> "as soon as possible." It 
was affirmed that Missouri now had the necessary number 
of inhabitants to organize as a state, and that therefore, 
according to the treaty, her admission must follow without 
delay. 

Despite the evident absurdity of this object ion, the exhaus- 
tive debates over it must be reviewed, because constitutional 
questions of deep significance were touched upon in them. 

If, on one side, the expression " a- soon a- possible" 

1 Slat, at L., VIII.. p.803. 

■ M'Lane, of Delaware said: "Assuch, as citizens of the United 
the right to possess slaves i> unquestionable." i Deb. of Con 
VI., p. 362.) This assertion was so bold that it was not made party dot* 

trine. But men Bought to attain tin- same end by a thorough trick. 
They "proved" that the states had tin' right of allowing or forbidding 
slavery, and then argued with bold misuse of language, as if they hud 
spoken not oi' states, bul of •• citizens of the United States." 



POWERS OF CONGRESS. 303 

emphasized, upon the other, emphasis was laid upon the 
phrase i; according to the principles of the federal consti- 
tution." These certainly did not require exclusive attention 
to the population of a territory. What they required 
in the case now before us, congress had to discover and 
decide for itself; only it could not delay admission without 
a reason. But even if a more sweeping duty could be in- 
ferred from the clause of the treaty quoted, yet it is unde- 
niably true that congress could not be further bound by 
any sort of stipulation. Treaties are, indeed, according to 
the constitution, " the supreme law of the land," but only 
so far as they do not stand in opposition to the constitu- 
tion itself. 1 President and senate, to whom the treaty 
power is confided by the constitution, could not, by their 
one-sided action, curtail the constitutional powers of con- 
gress. Whether this has been clone in a given case, is not 
simply a question for the supreme court to decide. The 
three branches of the government are co-ordinate, 
and each of them, therefore, has the right to decide inde- 
pendently concerning the extent of its constitutional power. 
The first part of the argument was absolutely unanswer- 
able, and if the rest may perhaps be questioned, yet it 
could not be readily contradicted by the party which passed, 
April 7, 1796, a resolution which claimed for the house of 
representatives the right, in all cases in which its co-opera- 
tion was necessary for the accomplishment of treaty stip- 

1 Compare Story, Comrn., §§ 1836-1841. " The stipulations in a treaty 
between the United States and a foreign power are paramount to the 
provisions of a constitution of a particular state, or the confederacy." 
Lessee of Harry G-ordon vs. Kerr et al., Washington Circuit Court Rep., 
I., p. 322; Stat, at L., VII i., p. 3. According to this the senate and 
president could overthrow the whole constitution. The treaty power is 
created by the constitution. It is therefore subordinate, and not supe- 
rior, to it. The constitution can not give its creatures the right to arbi- 
trarily destroy it. 



364 PTATE BOYKKEIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

ulations, to deliberate and determine on the "exp 
of the stipulations. 1 

These justifications and the treaty were brought forward 
by the slaveholders and their comrades only as props fed 
their position. They were neither able nor willing to real 
the derision <<t' the question of law upon any other ground 
than that of the constitution. We must do the south the 
justice to admit that in this struggle over constitutional 
questions it did not indulge in the verbal quibbling which 
became more and more the rule in such debates. It p 
itself openly, and without any duplicity, on the bro 
basis upon which it could take position. It denied to con* 
gress the least shadow of right to make the admission of 
a territory as a state of the Union dependent upon any 
conditions whatever. This view was not based upon cer- 
tain clauses of the constitution, but on the nature of the 
Union, that is, on state sovereignty. 2 Pindall of Virginia 
stripped off all the vagueness which had hitherto envel- 
oped the definition of this expression, and with a rigorous 
h»gic drew from it the last consequence, which was first 
recognized as a fundamental party belief when formulated 
with the same rigor many years after this by the >tate- 
rights men; he explained the federal constitution as an 
" international compact.'' 3 On this basis the whole argu- 
ment for the general, as well as the specific, cases can be 
condensed into four short sentence.-: The federal govern- 
ment has only the powers granted it by the sovereign 
state- ; newly admitted states become members of tlie 
Union with equal rights; no other grant- of power can 
therefore be demanded from them than those voluntarily 



Deo. el' Cong., I., pp. G9G, 702. When, in 1816, the same qu< 
came up again, the house of representatives abandoned these preten- 
Bions, luu the positioo it took did not contradict the doctrine developed 
in the text in any way whatever. 

i. "t Cong., VI., p. 861, and in many other places. 
3 Ibid, VI., p. 527. 



THE ADMISSION OF NEW STATES. 3G5 

made by the thirteen original states, and exactly stipulated 
in the constitution: no one affirms that the thirteen orijr- 
inal states gave up the right to decide whether slavery 
should be permitted or forbidden within their boundaries. 

On the other side, the principle of nationality was by 
no means used with equal decision in opposition to this 
extreme particularism. The general reasoning had more 
of a moral than a legal character. Men went back to the 
principles of the Declaration of Independence, and appealed 
to the clause of the constitution according to which " the 
United States shall guaranty to every state a republican 
form of government." 1 The elucidation of the question 
from these two points of view was not worthless, but so 
far as the decision of pending legal questions was con- 
cerned, it was irrelevant. The Declaration of Indepen- 
dence was no binding, legal instrument, and slavery could 
not legally be regarded as in opposition to a republican 
form of government, since it existed in most of the states 
as a fact recognized by the federal constitution, and even 
cared for therein by positive provisions. Search was there- 
fore made for a constitutional provision from which, in 
other ways, the legal right could be inferred, first, to im- 
pose conditions upon the admission of states to the Union, 
and second, to impose just the condition now under dis- 
cussion. 

In regard to the general right, reliance was placed upon 
the fact that Ohio, Louisiana, Indiana, and Illinois had 
been admitted under certain conditions, without any oppo- 
sition being made to this from any side. Even in the 
Missouri bill, then under discussion, other conditions had 
been inserted with the approval of the same members of 
congress who now wished to deny the existence of the 
right. 2 Moreover, this right was undoubtedly conferred 

1 Art. IY., Sec. 4. 

2 An amendment submitted by Taylor was adopted, which forbade 
the state to tax, for five years, the lands of soldiers. Deb. of Cong., VI., 
p. 352. Compare Statutes at Large, III., pp. 547, 548, Sec. 4 and Sec. 6. 



3*'»6 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AM) SLAVERY. 

in art. TV., see. 3, £ 1. of the constitution: " New stated 
may be admitted by congress into this Union.'' This does 
not impose a duty upon congress, but grants a right which 
ir can use in accordance with its discretion. 

The opponents of the Limitation tried to escape from 
these precedents by every sort of possible pretext. They 
paid especial attention to the constitutional provisions 
Pinckney of Maryland made the keenest argument on this 
question. 1 lie admitted without reserve that cono 
could reject an application for admission into the Union, 
but contended just as unreservedly that from this the right 
to attach conditions to the granting of the application 
could not.be inferred. The doctrine that the powers of 
the Union consisted only of those " expressed" 2 has never 
been more recklessly followed out to the verge of absolute 
absurdity than in this debate. But Pinckney, who, 
spite his unbearable pomposity of language, was a sharp- 
witted lawyer, saw himself compelled to choose thi 
State sovereignty did not suffice to maintain the position 
already taken, even if the other absurdity had been admit- 
ted that a territory which wished to become a state became 
possessed of full state sovereignty by merely express 
this wish. Directly from this " sovereignty" the right 
could be deduced to conclude a treaty with the Union 
through congress, or, if this expression falls short of the 
truth, to impose certain conditions upon the proposal. It' 
this should be denied, then, too, the right of congres 
make such proposals, that is, to conclude such a treaty. 
must also he denied. 

All the state-rights men would notgoasfar as Pinckney« 
Some of them laid especial emphasis, in their argument, 
upon another idea. They affirmed that it would be 

to burden the territory with a condition, because the 

'Del., of Cong., VI.. p. 440. 

- I -]>< ;ik here only of this one side of the argument; another >idc of 
it will be discussed later. 



LIMITATIONS OF STATE POWER. 367 

sovereign state would not be bound by it. Quite consist- 
ently they then farther affirmed that the states formed out 
of the northwestern territory and admitted under the anti- 
slavery provision of the ordinance of 1787, were free to 
legalize, at any moment, the introduction of slavery. 

On this question, which involved the fundamental prin- 
ciples of the whole constitutional law of the United States, 
the defenders of the limitation were not all of the same 
opinion, and they entirely failed to grasp its whole range. 
Roberts wished to have the prohibition declared ;i absolute 
and irrevocable." 1 Otis thought it laughable that a duty, 
without undertaking which the territory could not become 
a state, and which was not to take effect until the instant 
when it did become a state, could yet lose its binding 
force because the territory had become a state. 2 Taylor 
did not consider the assertion of the state-rights men as 
correct, but expressly declared that he would be in favor of 
the restriction in the opposite case, because the desired 
end would be reached by its moral influence. 3 Others ap- 
proached the difficult question with still greater foresight. 
Yet not one rejected the claim that had been made on the 
ground that it was clearly and certainly in direct contra- 
diction to the fundamental law of the Union. As a terri- 
tory — and this was now commonly recognized — Missouri 
was absolutely under the legislative control of congress. 
If her admission as a state was made subject to such a 
condition, then the state of Missouri found itself confront- 
ed by a federal law in full force, which might be eventu- 
ally declared unconstitutional by the supreme court of the 
United States, but upon which the state could in no way 
lay its hand. The " holiness of treaties," the " sacredness 
of compacts," etc., to which men appealed, 4 were not 

1 Deb. of Cong., VI.. p. 389. 
! Ibid, VI., p. 418. 

3 Ibid, VI., p. 338. 

4 Ibid, VI., p. 353, and in many other places. 



3C8 Hi SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

Deeded to prove this, — always supposing that the separate 
-. as tar aa they came iii question, had not the right 
to decide concerning the constitutionality of federal laws, 
to decide, that is, whether they were laws. 

The debate over the other question, whether a provision 
could be found in the constitution which especially author- 
ized the prohibition of Blavery in a state about to be ad- 
mitted, is of little importance in constitutional history, 
inasmuch as it was only a wrangling about words. 1 There 
was, moreover, no need whatever of any special authority, 
it' the general power was maintained. This was the kernel 
of the whole strife. The fundamental question of the 
nature of the Union was contained in it and only in con- 
nection with this could the strife between slavery and free 
labor come to a decisive result. 

From the nature of the Union, then, an argument was 
drawn which the reasons advanced in behalf of the limita- 
tion shook but could not overthrow. Charles Pinckney 
affirmed with great keenness that the constitution author- 
ized the admission of new states" into this Union," that is, 
into the Union as it then was. 2 He went on to say that it 
was an undeniable fact that the rights of the thirteen orig- 
inal states under the constitution had been absolutely equal 
No one will deny that the constitution could never have 

1 It was made a matter of discussion whether the words " import*, 
don" and "migration" in the clause which in negative form gav< 
gress the right to prohibit the foreign slave-trade from 1808, were synony- 
mous. Charles Pinckney (Del), of Congress, IV.. p. 534), recalling his 
participation in the deliberations of the Philadelphia convention, af- 
firmed that "migration" was understood to refer only to --frit- whites." 
MLadison, however, declared in a letter written Nov. 27, 1819, to .[. Walsh 
that both words were used as meaning exactly the same thin-. The 
superfluous " migration" had been used instead of u importation" for 
precisely the same reason that caused the avoidance of the word " slave." 
However this may be, it seems to me that there cannot be the slightest 
doubt that" migration" was used for " importation"' and was not under- 
stood as " migration from one state into another." 

9 Deb. of Congress, VI., p. 440. 



EQUALITY OF THE STATES. 369 

come into being if this had not been the ease. It is there- 
fore no longer this, but a substantially different, Union if 
the members of it are to have different rights. That the 
thirteen original states had and have to-day the right to 
forbid or allow slavery, will not be questioned. If this 
right is taken away from newly-admitted states, then the 
Union evidently consists no longer of equal members. But 
if congress has the power to deprive newly-admitted states 
of a substantial right belonging to the original states, it 
can do the same thing with other rights. E~o boundary 
can be drawn, if the principle is once admitted. The as- 
surances that congress would never wish to impose other 
essential limitations are worthless. Since the majority of 
the house of representatives is now of the opinion that the 
prohibition of slavery is demanded by the well-being of 
Missouri as well as of the whole Union, a future congress 
may be of the same opinion in regard to any other prohi- 
bition whatever. The principle of choice is introduced 
into a fundamental constitutional question. It must tend 
to change the harmonious formation of the Union into a 
chaotic confusion. 

It was not wholly without reason that the slaveholders 
and state-rights men declared that a comparison between 
the slavery-limitation and the other conditions which had 
been laid upon newly-admitted states was not possible. 
From the beginning: the latter had either been self-evident 
or had concerned relatively unimportant questions and had 
bound the states concerned only for a certain time, but this 
was permanent and concerned a right that could be consid- 
ered, without doubt, as a fundamental one. It was indeed said 
that the slavery-limitation did not really withdraw a " fun- 
damental right," but rather did away with a " fundamental 
wrong." But the constitution had left to the original 
states the right of tacitly letting the fundamental wrong 
stand as a " right" or of making it one. If several states 
made no use of this prerogative, and if the facts of every 

24 f 



370 ATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

day Bhowed it to be more than a destructive fiction that 
Blavery watfa " purely municipal institution," yet this did 
not change the positive right. Slavery ate into the life- 
marrow of the whole Union; therefore not only considera- 
tions of morality, but the highest self-interest of the Union, 
demanded the absolute prohibition of its further extension. 
Bnt morality and self-interest could not do away with the 
feet that the whole constitution rested upon the foundation 
of the equality of the members of the Union, and that the 
original members had full freedom of action in regard to 
this particular question. 

The unconquerable obstacle can be expressed in a single 
sentence:— the tact could not be done away with that the 
Union was composed of free and slave states, that is. the 
fact could not be done away with that the attempt had been 
made to construct out of heterogeneous elements not only 
a harmonious, but a homogenous, whole. 

Arguments could not bring the question any nearer 
solution. After the differences of principle between the 
two parties had been clearly established, the debal 
only to excite passion. The slaveholders sought more than 
ever to make a bridge of threats upon which they odd 
cross to their goal. 1 It is said that Randolph proposed to 
Clay to abandon the house to the northern members 
that Clay actually gave the project serious consideration." 
Missouri herself took an extremely arrogant position. 
When Taylor moved, Dec. 16, 1S19, to defer the consi 
tion of the bill until the first Monday in February. 
Scott, the delegate of the territory, objected that MissonJ 

1 Even in brutality of expression, a marked advance wa< made , 
for instance, Colton of Virginia said : " He [Livermore of N 
Bhire] is no better than Arbuthnotor Ambrister and desen 
lal .. 5 s, VI.. p. 351.) Arbuthnot and Ambrisl 

been Bentenced to death, under martial law. by Jackson on account of 
their alliance with the Seminc 

3 Garland, Life of Randolph, II.. p. 127; Colton, Life, Corn 
deuce, and Speeches of Henry Clay, II.. p. 86& 



IMPOKTAXCE OF THE MISSOTJKI CONTEST. 371 

would, in this case, go on and organize a state government 
without waiting any longer for leave from congress. 1 And 
this threat of the territorial delegate against the whole 
Union was not punished as a piece of laughable insolence. 
Keid of Georgia declared that Missouri would "indignant- 
ly throw off the yoke" and "laugh congress to scorn." 2 
Tyler of Virginia, the future president, asked what would 
be done if " Missouri sever [herself ] from the Union?" 3 
And Jefferson, the ex-president, expressed the fear that 
Missouri would be "lost by revolt." 4 However serious or 
little serious these threats and expressions of fear were 
intended to be, it may yet be inferred from them how high 
the slaveholders and state-rights men estimated the strength 
of the Union. They had a truer idea of the nature and 
the range of the question than their opponents. It was a 
really true prophecy when Cobb of Georgia cried out: 
" You are kindling a fire which all the waters of the ocean 
cannot extinguish; it can be extinguished only in blood." 5 
But indeed the prophecy was verified only because ever 
and ever again representatives of the north were found 
who paid the price upon which dear peace apparently de- 
pended. 

During the whole struggle the decision had depended 
only upon a few votes, for a number of northern represen- 
tatives had voted, from the beginning, with the south. 



1 Deb. of Cong., IV., p. 469; Colton, Clay, I., p. 278. 

2 Ibid, VI., p. 490. 

3 Ibid, VI., p. 551. 

4 Jeff., Works., VII., p. 148. Even the state legislatures took a lively 
part in the strife. As a general rule the agitation was much more 
vigorous in the north than in the south. The northern legislatures, 
and with them that of Delaware, expressed themselves in very decided 
resolutions against the extension of the slave area. The house of dele- 
gates of the Virginia legislature, on the other hand, passed resolutions 
containing the expressions '• bound to interpose" and "resist." Niles' 
Reg., XVII., pp. 343, 344. 

5 Deb. of Cong., VI., pp. 351, 372. 



372 STATE SOVSBEIGHTT AND 8LAVKBT. 

That it was, nevertheless, so long before the sonth obtained, 
by threats and worse means, the necessary number of \ 

plain proof that an independent and honorable spirit 
was then much more common among northern politicians 
than later. The restriction was finally stricken out by ■ 
majority of only three votes. 1 

The results of this defeat were immense; hut still more 
fraught with evil was the second defeat which the north 
suffered at the same time, and almost indeed without a 
struggle. This question lias often been treated in co: 
tion with the first, but it was not only actually indepen- 
dent of it, but essentially different from it, as a mi 
both of constitutional law and practical politics. 

Since only the northern part of the Missouri terril 
was to be organized as a state, the southern part, thi 
called Arkansas district, had to receive a territorial govern- 
ment of its own. When the bill concerning this came up 
for discussion in the house, Taylor proposed an amend- 
ment in regard to slavery like the one which Tallin 
had brought up in the case of Missouri. In commit r 
the whole the amendment was rejected by eighty t<» - 
eight votes. In the house it had a somewhat better fare. 
The first part, which forbade the further introductioi 
slaves, was rejected by seventy-one to seventy votes; but 
the second part, which freed slave children born in the 
territory upon their twenty-fifth birthday, was adopte 
seventy-five to seventy-three votes. With the help of 
parliamentary rules, however, the question was brought 
once more before the house. By the casting vote of the 
speaker, Clay, the bill was referred back to the commit 
and on the same day, in accordance with its report, the 
previously adopted amendment was rejected by eighty-nine 
to eighty-seven votes. 2 

The attempt to lay hand upon the peculiar institution 

1 Ninety against eighty-seven. 

e all the votes in Deb. of Cong , VI., pp. 363-3G6. 



ARKANSAS. 373 

in this territory was regarded by the slaveholders as an 
especial bit of spitefulness, because Arkansas was consid- 
ered as belonging to the peculiar domain of the south. 
This opinion influenced some northern representatives, 
and to it the easy victory of the south is to be ascribed. 
The arguments brought forward on both sides of the de- 
bate were the same as in that over Missouri, only the con- 
stitutional question was not raised. Taylor of New York 
laid stress upon the fact that the " sovereignty" of con- 
gress over the territories was " full and undisputed." 1 
M'Lane, indeed, did not unconditionally admit that con- 
gress could forbid slavery in the territories, but he could 
only allege in justification of his doubt that the territories 
would become states in time. 2 But when Taylor after- 
wards expressed his conviction that no member of the 
house doubted the power of congress to do this thing, then 
neither M'Lane 3 nor any other member of the house in- 
terposed any objection, and some leading slaveholders ex- 
pressly admitted the right. 4 The thing was considered, as 
Taylor plainly expressed it, only as " a question of policy." 
And yet the victory of the south was so easy. This must 
be closely looked at in connection with the stiff-necked 
strife over Missouri, if we are to rightly judge the position 
of the north at this time in regard to slavery. "When the 
territorial question soon after this came up again in anoth- 
er and much more important form, not a blow was struck 
for the universally recognized right and for the uncondi- 
tional supremacy of free labor. 

The eighth section of the Missouri act of March 6, 1820, 



1 Deb. of Cong., VI., p. 353. 

2 Ibid, VI., p. 362. 

3 In the Missouri debate he declared afterwards : " I admit it [the 
power to give laws to a territory] to be plenary, so long as it remains 
in a condition of territorial dependence, but no longer." Ibid, VI., p. 
513. 

4 Ibid, VI., p. 341, and elsewhere. 



s 



374 state sovereignty ajto slavery. 

provided "that in all that territory ceded by France to the 
United States, under the name of Louisiana, which 
north of 36° 30' north latitude, not included within the 
limits of the state contemplated by this act, slavery and 
involuntary servitude . . . shall be, and is hereby, for- 
ever prohibited." 1 This was the second half of the 
called Missouri compromise and the responsibility forita 
adoption doc* not wholly rest upon a few weak or venal 
delegates from the north. Only five northern mem 
voted against it. 2 The north thus gave its approval by an 
overwhelming majority to the division of the territories 
between free labor and slavery. It was indeed only declared 
that slavery should not be allowed north of 36° 30', but this 
was self-evidently equivalent to saying that south of this 
line no hindrance would be put in the way of the slave- 
holders. The first suggestion of such a comproini.-e 
made by M'Lane in February, 1819, and he then 
pressly declared that the territories should be " divided" 
between the free and slave states. 3 It was never afterwards 
denied that this was a fair interpretation of thecomprou 
The action of the northern members can be justified from 
no point of view. Even in mitigation of their fault, it can 
only be alleged that, when they had decided to make a bar- 
gain, the one agreed upon seemed not disadvantage 
provided men did not look beyond the present time. The 
Louisiana territory — according to the boundaries set to it 
by the United States — was divided into two nearly equal 
parts by the line of 36° 30'. But while the Missouri q 
tion was still pending, an agreement was reached with 
Spain concerning the boundary line by which a great part 
of the southern half was lost to the United States. 

How far the north soothed itself with the hope that the 

• Stat. atL., Ill, p. 548. 

2 Deb. of Cong., VI, pp. 570, 571. Benj. Adams, Allen :m<l Folger of 
Massachusetts, Buffum of New Hampshire, and Gross of New York. 
[bid, VI, pp. 359, 363. 



the line of 36° 30'. 375 

utmost bounds of slavery had now been definitely and per- 
manently fixed, cannot be decided. But it needed no won- 
derfully great political insight in order to know that the 
slaveholders would sooner or later bend every nerve in or- 
der to make this hope an illusion. If they did not yet 
oppose the right of congress to forbid slavery in the ter- 
ritories, yet they showed themselves prepared to question 
it whenever circumstances demanded such action. Hhea 
of Tennessee had already used the word " unconstitution- 
al." 1 Smyth of Virginia went much straighter to theo-oal 
when he remarked, in relation to the constitutional provis- 
ion for the territories: u This clause speaks of the territory 
as property, as a subject of sale. It speaks not of the 
jurisdiction." 2 Yet the clearest utterance was that of the 
fact that the most violent opposition to the "Missouri 
line" came from slaveholders. No less than thirty-seven 
southerners voted with the Hve northern members against 
this part of the compromise. 3 

If men thought these signs worthy of no further atten- 

1 Ibid, VI., p. 366. It is evident from later discussions that lie 
must have used the expression in relation to the division of the terri- 
tories by a fixed line. 

2 Ibid, VI., p. 487. 

3 This fact was the foundation of the later assertion of the south that 
the compromise was a northern and not a southern measure. The asser- 
tion was not wholly ungrounded, if it was substantially false. Benton, 
the first senator from the new state, writes: "This ' compromise' was 
the work of the south, sustained by the united voice of Mr. Monroe's 
cabinet, the united voices of the southern senators and a majority of the 
southern representatives. . . This array of names shows the Missouri 
compromise to have been a southern measure, and the event put the 
seal upon that character by showing it to be acceptable to the south." 
Thirty Years View, I., p. 8. Crowninshield of Massachusetts said, in J 
1861, at the so-called peace convention: "Southern men forced the 
measure upon the north. The few northern men who voted for it were 
swept out of their political existence at the election which followed its 
passage." (Chittenden's Report, p. 318.) If this is to be applied to 
those who voted for the " Missouri line", then the assertion has no his- 
torical foundation whatever. 






37G BTATE BOVBBBIQWTT AND SLAVERY 

tion, because the CTnited States had at that time no further 
territorial possessions, they understood very badly the his- 
tory of the Onion and of slavery up to that time. E 
rience had already shown that the politics of the Qnited 
States was not a pastoral idyl. As Louisiana and Florida 
had been acquired, a hand might be stretched out towards 
other territory. Circumstances offered any number of al- 
luring opportunities. And if new acquisitions were ever 
made in southern latitudes, the slave states would doubt- 
less claim that the Missouri line was self-evidently binding 
in respect to these, too. The north might thenceforth for- 
ever oppose the soundness of this logic and depend upon 
constitutional rights; the fact still remained that it had 
been indirectly stipulated in a solemn compact by the almost 
unanimous consent of the northern representatives that in 
a certain territory south of a certain line slavery should be 
allowed, whether or not congress forbade it, That the 
south knew how to use such facts had already been suffi- 
ciently shown. As surely as a slave-territory became a 
slave-state, so surely no veto of congress could hen 
prevent the existence of slavery "m this Union" in a state 
or territory lving south of 36° 30". 

The south had allowed itself to pursue a purely idealistic 
policy, where European relations were concerned, but where 
the interest of the slaveholders was touched upon, it had 
followed from the beginning a policy that was nut only 
realistic in the highest degree, but wise. It took good care 
to demand everything forthwith. What it needed at 
moment satisfied it for the moment, it propped the 
planks securely and then shoved them just so much iartl 
er that it could safely take the next step when it became 
necessary. It had done this at present and was therefore 
contented for the present. Up to this time the fi 
badalwaya been one more in number than the slave si 
Now the' latter got Alabama and Missouri into the U.mn, 
and the former only Maine. The balance of power m the 



A GEOGRAPHICAL PRINCIPLE. 377 

senate was therefore fully established. Their territorial 
possessions were, in the meantime, ample; Florida, just 
acquired from Spain, 1 Arkansas and the rest of the southern 
part of the Louisiana territory balanced for a while the 
northwest, which, as Charles Pinckney wrote, had been 
inhabited until now only by wild beasts and Indians. Why 
express alarm now over things which could become reali- 
ties only after the lapse of many years? But it did not 
follow from this that alarm should never be expressed 
over them. Peid of Georgia had already asked why a 
partition line should not be drawn between the two sec- 
tions " to the Pacific Ocean." 2 

Until the time came when the Missouri compromise 
could no longer be considered as the " final issue" of the 
question whether the territories and the new states should 
belong to slavery or free labor, it was permanently fixed. 
What M'Lane praised as the simplest and therewith the 
happiest means of permanently adjusting the controversy, 
Jefferson rightly recognized as the most destructive part 
of the whole unfortunate compromise. April 3, 1820, he 
wrote to "W*. Short: "The coincidence of a marked prin- 
ciple, moral and political, with geographical lines, once 
conceived, 1 feared would never more be obliterated from 
the mind; that it would be recurring on every occasion 
and renewing irritations, until it would kindle such mutual 
and mortal hatred as to render separation preferable to 
eternal discord. I have been among the most sanguine in 
believing that our "Union would be of long duration. I 
now doubt it much." 3 This was a truly statesmanlike 
idea. If it could have given the text for the half of the 
speeches which were delivered in favor of the prohibition 

1 Feb. 22, 1819. Stat, at L., VIII., p. 252, seq. The ratification of the 
treaty by the United States was not given until Feb. 19, 1821. 

2 Deb. of Cong, VI, p. 502. ' 

8 Jeff, Works, VII, p. 158. Compare also the letter to Holmes of 
^pril 22, 1820, VII., p. 159. 



37S ATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

of the further importation of Blaves, the fate of the Union 
would perhaps have had a wholly different turn. Up to 
this time the division of the Union into two sections had 
been only a fact: henceforth it was fixed by law. In inter- 
nal politics no question of cardinal importance could arise 
in which the opposition of the two industrial principles 
did not play a greater or les6 part. And in all such ques- 
tions the Law-making power stood not only before a num- 
ber of states, but before two geographically divided groups 
of states. Each of the two groups inevitably constantly 
consolidated more and more; and the more they consoli- 
dated the more the Missouri line lost its imaginary char- 
acter. For the first time there was, in the full sense of 
the term, a free north and a slaveholding south. "Politi- 
cal prudence," as it was hyper-euphemistically called, 
might lead one to oppose this with the strength of 
spair; but all political artifices were put to shame by the 
power of facts. Even the last resource, the erasure of the 
black line from the map by another law and by judicial 
decisions, remained without effect; the line was etched too 
deeply into the real ground. Only one thing could erase 
it, and this one thing was the destruction of the gloomy 
power that had. drawn it. From the night of Marc 
1820, party history is made up, without interruption or 
break, of the development of geographical parties. 

This was what was really reached when men breathed 
i'l'vv. as if saved from a heavy nightmare. The little 
cowardly souls congratulated themselves that the slavery 
question had been buried for ever, and yet men n< 
sho«»k themselves i'vcv from the Missouri question. 

The strife was kindled again by a clause of the constitu- 
tion of Missouri, by which the legislature was oblig< 
pass laws against the entry of free colored persons into the 
state. The north declared that this clause infringed upon 
the constitutional provision, according to which " the citi- 
zens of each state shall be entitled to all priviL 






CITIZENSHIP OF FREE NEGROES. 379 

immunities of citizens in the several states." 1 The slave- 
holders affirmed that free blacks were not to be considered 
as citizens u in the sense of the constitution." The north- 
ern congressmen opposed to this the fact that free blacks 
were citizens in some northern states, and that the clause 
in question spoke of " citizens of every state." The de- 
bate was finally lost in endless arguments over the mean- 
ing of the words " citizens" and " citizens of the United 
States," without reaching any result. 2 

1 Art. IV., Sec. 2. Art. IV. of llie articles of confederation contained 
the same provision, except that in it the common expression " all free 
inhabitants" was used. 

- The discussion of this question more in detail belongs to the second 
part of this work. I will here refer only to Bates, On Citizenship, and 
to Livermore, Opinions of the Founders of the Republic on Kegroes as 
Slaves, as Citizens, and as Soldiers, and will remark that in the same 
year in which the question was discussed in congress attorney-general 
"Wirt gave an opinion in which he says : " I am of the opinion that the 
constitution, by the description of l citizens of the United States,' in- 
tended those only who enjoyed the full and equal privileges of white 
citizens in the state of their residence." Opinions of the Attorneys-Gen- 
eral, I., p. 507. "Wirt was a skillful jurist, but in this argument his reason- 
ing is not only weak in the highest degree, but also illogical. In Bou- 
vier's Law Dictionary, I., p. 275, is the statement that the constitution of 
the United States " does not authorize any but white persons to become 
citizens of the United States." This can be understood in no other 
way than that the constitution contains a clear provision to this effect, 
while in fact the only grounds for the assertion are some judicial dicta 
and decisions, which must be a stain on the annals of the United States 
forever, and from every point of view. Such a statement in a thorough- 
ly scientific work is simply inexcusable, for either the choice of expres- 
sions is made with inexplicable carelessness, or party politics has crept 
into the book. It may also be noted that the edition of the Law Dic- 
tionary which I used was dated 1872, while in 1S0S the 14th amend- 
ment was adopted, in which it is provided : " All persons born or nat- 
uralized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 
are citizens of the United States and of the states wherein they reside." 
The editor, Childs, is, indeed, not to be blamed for failing to take notice 
of this amendment. The edition is actually that of the year 1867, and 
the date 1872 is only a mercantile nick, which is only too often resorted 
to by American booksellers. 



STATE SOVEREIGNTY' AND SLAVERY. 

The discussion of the question of law from other points 
of view was also fruitless. The slaveholders and Btate- 
rights party argued that not only were similar laws against 

free blacks in existence in other states, but that even in 
free Btates there were excluding laws, which concerned 
white citizens, and were douhtless unconstitutional, if this 
reproach could rightly be brought against the constitution 

of Missouri. 1 These assertions were partly well founded, 
but it did not follow from this that the clause was not in- 
consistent with the federal constitution. 

As little tenable were the arguments by which it was 
attempted to prove the uselessness of any objection to this 
clause by congress. If it is unconstitutional — so the argu- 
ment ran — then it is eo ipso null, and the decision of the 
supreme court of the United States will give it that effect. 
The overwhelming answer to this was that the clause, de- 
spite its abstract worthlessness, would actually be in force 
until it had been declared unconstitutional. Moreover, 
congress could not impose upon the judiciary the responsi- 
bility which the spirit of the constitution placed upon it; 
to it belonged the right of admitting new states, and upon 
it, therefore, rested the duty of deciding in such c 
whether the conditions had been fulfilled which were nec- 
essary in order to make admission possible. 

Although these points were of slight importance in 
comparison to those decided at the previous session, the 
debates — which lasted some weeks — were not less violent. 
The main reason of this was the well-known wish of a 
minority in the house to use this opportunity to overthrow 
the compromise. The slaveholders therefore did not ven- 
ture to in>i>t upon the alternative of an unconditional ad- 
mission of the state or an unconditional rejection of the 
constitution that had been submitted. The senate first 
showed a disposition to find a middle course. This gave 

1 Compare Deb. of Cong., VI., p. G72, seq. 



THE FINAL COMPROMISE. 381 

Clay an opportunity to lead back again into the path of 
compromise the house, which had already, thanks to the 
members hostile to compromise, rejected amotion to strike 
out the offensive clause. The two houses finally agreed to 
allow the state admission, provided its legislature " by a 
solemn public act shall declare the assent of the said state 
to the fundamental condition" that a right should never 
be deduced from this clause to pass a law and that a law 
should never be passed " by which any citizen of either of 
the states in this Union shall be excluded from the enjoy- 
ment of any of the privileges and immunities to which 
such citizen is entitled under the constitution of the United 
States." 1 The legislature complied with this condition and 
therewith the Missouri conflict ended. 

Three constitutional questions — two of them of cardinal 
importance — had been discussed. Men had fought shy of 
all three for the moment, and for this reason the origin- 
ators of the compromise claimed that they had postponed 
the decision to the Greek calends. From a legal point of 
view, only one positive result had been reached, and this 
was on a point concerning which no legal question existed. 
The northern majority had indirectly renounced the right 
of congress to forbid slavery, as far as the territory lying 
south of the line of 36° 30' was concerned, and it had 
agreed to this renunciation, because the southern minority 
had renounced, on its side, its claims to having the ques- 
tions of law involved decided now in its favor, — provided 
its concrete demands, which it based upon its interpreta- 
tion of the constitution, were complied with. 

This was the true nature and the substance of the "com- 
promise" which gave Henry Clay the first claim to the 
proud name of " the great peace-maker. 

1 Stat, at L., III., p. 645. 



MATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 



CHAPTER X. 

Development of the Economic Contrast between the 
Free and Slave Stai 

The Missouri compromise produced no change in pi 

relations. Monroe was re-elected president by all the i 
toral votes except one. 1 The " era of good feeling,'' which 
had begun to dawn just after the end of the war with i 
land, now really commenced. The people, wearied by the 
feverish excitement of the last years, abandoned politic- to 
the politicians and the latter had to content them-' 
with routine business, since there was, for the moment, no 
burning question and no noteworthy opposition. But as 
yet a peace had not been made; only a truce had been con- 
cluded. Xew questions appeared, which sprang from the 
self-same roots as the earlier ones. Their germs could be 
traced back to the first year of the existence of the new 
constitution and their development had kept pace with the 
industrial development of the country. If their full im- 
portance was not yet appreciated, this could be parti; 
cribed to purely accidental circumstances and it was partly 
due to the fact that the opposition of principles in the in- 
dustrial life of the two sections was less and less under- 
stood as it assumed a concrete form in the different indus- 
trial regions. A little while therefore elapsed before the 
party-programmes became clear, and meanwhile the pa 
ne more and more geographical ones. This tin 
transition was rich in Btrange transmutations in party- 
relations. Leading statesmen changed their positions in 
the most barefaced manner. 

1 Deb. of Cong., VI., p. TOG. 



THE NATIONAL DEBT. 383 

During the first presidency of Madison, the bank-ques- 
tion again arose, although it was still partially clad in the 
old party-robe which it was soon to lose entirely. The 
national bank called into life by Hamilton, in 1791, pre- 
sented a petition for the renewal of its twenty-year char- 
ter. Since the Eepublicans, who had not yet lost their 
old dislike of the institution, formed the majority of con- 
gress, the request was refused. At the moment the govern- 
ment did not need the support of the bank; the cry against 
the " monopoly of the money-aristocracy and the specula- 
tors" could reckon, now as twenty years before, upon a 
favorable reception with the masses; numerous capitalists 
were only waiting until this dangerous competition should 
be taken out of the way in order to start banks under state 
charters; and the constitutional objections brought forward 
in 1791 were again vigorously urged, especially by Clay. 1 
The reasons were too many for the influence of the bank to 
overcome. 

In three years, the picture had completely changed. One 
of the most effectual means which the Eepublicans used 
in the struggle against the Federalists had been the con- 
stant cry against high taxes. "When they came into power 
they had to pay some attention to this in their financial 
management and, owing to the general prosperity, they 
could easily do this without causing any immediate dam- 
aging results. After the embargo-policy had begun to 
weigh heavily upon the whole industrial life of the nation, 
the weak points of the new financial system were soon ap- 
parent. The sj^stem itself, moreover, was not so different 
from that of Hamilton as the earlier utterances of Jeffer- 
son and his secretary of the treasury, Gallatin, might have 
led people to suppose. The war destroyed the plan. The 
reproach of the Federalists that a contest with the greatest 
maritime power of the world had been entered into wholly 

1 Deb. of Cong., IV., pp. 279, seq. ; and 311. 



3S4 11- SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

without preparation was truer from no point of view than 
from that of the finances. The heavier capitalists, who 
could have made the more important contributions, be- 
longed for the most part to the dissatisfied states of the 
northeast, and the Republican party did not dare to 
taxes which would have laid the financial strength of the 
country under heavy contributions, for fear of injuring its 
popularity. So the government laboriously Blipped along 
from month to month by means of small loans which 
only placed with the greatest difficulty, by the issue of 
treasury notes, and by other palliatives. All government 
securities quickly depreciated, gold and silver constantly 
became more scarce, paper money more abundant and 
more worthless, and the credit of the nation was smaller 
every day. The country was rich all the while, but the 
government was rapidly approaching bankruptcy. 
3 Under these circumstances the project of a national 
bank was again brought before congress by the petition of 
New York. Eppes, the son-in-law of Jefferson, brought 
in a report as chairman of the committee on way, and 
means, Jan. 10, 1814, which denied to congress the p 
"to create corporations" within the limits of the Btate* 
without their consent. 1 This was the first ^ change in the 
party's position on the constitutional question. The 
inal Republican doctrine was that congress could create no 
corporations at all. Calhoun at once sought to take ad- 
vantage of this first breach made by the English cannon 
in tluTparty principles, lie moved the appointment of a 
committee to consider the propriety of founding a national 
bank in the District of Columbia. 2 The motion was 
agreed to without opposition, but the matter ended there. 
°Late in the summer of the same year affairs took a new 
turn. After the capture of Washington (Augu 
the banks incorporated by the states, with the exception of 

1 Deb. of Cong., V., p. 133. 
J Ibid s V., p. 171. 



385 

those of New England, suspended specie payments. 1 The 
fearful confusion of all financial affairs which resulted 
from this bore hard upon the treasury. The secretary of 
the treasury, Dallas, declared in a report of Oct. 17, 1814, 
to the committee of ways and means: "The monied trans- 
actions of private life are at a stand, and the fiscal opera- 
tions of government labor with extreme inconvenience. 
It is impossible that such a state of things should be long 
endured." And the sum and substance of his reasoning 
was that, " after all," a national bank was the " only effi- 
cient remedy." 2 At the end of the report he touched upon 
the constitutional question, and came to the conclusion 
that "discussion" must cease and "decision" become 
"absolute"; that the judgment of a congress must be 
recognized as settling the question; and that a national 
bank was " necessary and proper for carrying into execu- 
tion some of the most important powers constitutionally 
vested in the government." The man who had said, in 
1791 or 1798, that a member of a Republican cabinet 
would ever use such language, would have been looked up- 
on as crazy. The crown was set to this change of parts, 
however, by the accompanying provisions: The capital of 
the bank was to be fixed at $50,000,000; the United States 
were to subscribe $20,000,000 of this; the bank was to be 
obliged to loan the United States $30,000,000; of the 
fifteen directors, five, the president among them, were to 
be named by the president of the United States; the bank 
was not to be taxed, except on its real estate, by the gen- 
eral government or the different states; the obligation of 
redeeming its notes with specie was not to exist, but other 
means were to be tried in order to prevent their deprecia- 

1 See the details in Ingersoll, Second War between the United States 
and England, II., p. 251. 

2 Life and Writings of A. J. Dallas, p. 236. Annals of XIII. Con- 
gress, p. 1285. 

25 






380 state BOYBBEIGNTT AND 3LAYEET. 

tion. 1 Even Hamilton would scarcely have ventured to 
lay Buch a plan before eongrec 

Congress at once took the proposal under consideration. 
Dallas urged speedier action, while he laid hare the whole 
financial misery of the government, without regard to 
consequences. In a second report of Nov. 27 he said: 
" The dividend on the funded debt has not been punctually 
paid; a large amount of treasury notes have already been 
dishonored; and the hope of preventing further injury 
reproach in transacting the business of the treasury i 
visionary to afford a moment's consolation. . . . Thus 
public opinion, manifested in every form and in e 
direction, hardly permits us, at the present junctui 
speak of the existence of public credit; and yet it is not 
impossible that the government, in the resources of its 
patronage and its pledges, might find the means of tempt- 
ing the rich and the avaricious to supply its immediate 
wants. But when the wants of to-day are supplied, what 
is the new expedient that shall supply the want- of to-mor- 
row?" 2 Jan. 17, 1S15, Dallas summed up his acco 
and showed that " pressing" demands of the previous 
amounting to 813, ISO, 92!*, must be satisfied, and that 
there were no means provided for doing so. : * In the 1 
of representatives Hanson of Maryland illustrated this 
general statement by giving some particulars. Ileaftir 
that in the state department the bills for writing mate 
could not be paid; that the government "was obligi 
borrow pitiful sums which it would disgrace a merchant 
of tolerable credit to ask for"; that the paymaster could 
not satisfy bills for thirty dollars, etc." 1 Grosveno 
New York added that $40,000,000 of national paper 

1 Life and Writings of Dallas, pp. 238, 009. 

■ Ibid, pp. 245, 246. 

3 Ibid, p. 265. 

* Deb. of Cong., V., p. 380. 



BANK DEBATES. 3ST 

in the market and that it had sunk from eighty to sixty-five 
per cent. 1 

The necessity of creating some means of help in almost 
any way was plain to see from these facts. Yet the de- 
bates of congress spun out endlessly. Some Democrats 
remained true to the old party doctrine, and denied the 
right of congress to call into life a corporation of any sort 
whatever. 2 With the great mass of the Democrats, as 
well as of the Opposition, 3 the only question was over the 
details of the bill. 

In the first weeks of the new year the two houses of 
congress finally agreed upon a bill. Madison sent it back 
to the senate, Jan. 30, 1815, with his veto, expressly stating 
that he "waived" the constitutional question. 4 

Three weeks later the administration was freed from its 
most pressing needs by the close of the war; but the de- 
plorable condition of the finances 5 and the disturbance 
of foreign exchanges still continued, and men knew no 
way of extricating themselves from the difficulty, except 
by the establishment of a national bank. Madison, in his 
message of Dec. 5, 1815, recommended congress to once 
more take the question into consideration. 6 Calhoun, too, 
brought in a bill, Jan. 8, 1816, and defended it, Feb. 26, 
in a very long speech. 7 He did not touch upon the con- 
stitutional question, because, as he said, it would be " use- 
less consumption of time" to discuss that any further. 
Clay took a prominent part in the debates and warmly 
supported the establishment of a bank. He justified him- 

1 Ibid, V., p. 383. 

2 Ibid, V., pp. 369, 401. 

3 Webster, Works, III., pp. 35-48. 

4 Statesman's Manual, I., p. 323. \ 

6 ''Gold and. silver have disappeared entirely. . . . Since 1810 or 
1811 the amount of paper in circulation bad increased from eighty or 
ninety to two hundred millions." Calhoun, Works, II., pp. 155, 158. 

6 Statesman's Manual, I., p. 330. 

7 Calhoun, Works, II., pp. 153-162. 



s 



3S8 STATE BOVEBEIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

self for this by Baying that " the force of circumstances and 
the Lights of experience" had madehim see "the necessity* 
of attributing to congress this "constructive ]><>v. 
Both houses agreed, at the end of three months, upon i 
bill, and on April 10 it received Madison's approve 
though in 1791 lie had questioned the power of congn 
and in 17iK>, in his report to the legislature of Virginia, 
had mentioned the incorporation of the bank as one of the 
examples of the usurping tendencies of the federal govern! 
nieiit. 4 

The second national bank was also a purely Democratic 
creation, and the most noted Democrats had most to do 
with it. Necessity is the mother, not only of invention, 
but also of the interpretation of constitutions. Three years 
later, the supreme court of the United States gave an unan- 
imous decision in favor of the constitutionality of a na- 
tional bank. 5 Yet the bank question once more raised I 
fearful storm. In this, indeed, the two sections were not 
opposed to each other, but the economic differences came 
straightway into play, and the result was the strengthening 
of the power of the slaveholding aristocracy. But this 
last and most heated struggle belongs to a later period. 

Of much greater and especially of much more permanent 
importance was the question of so-called internal imp 
ments, that is, the question whether and how far the f< 
government was empowered to undertake or to aid the 
construction of roads or canals, the improvement of rivers 
and harbors, and the like. Even before the adopti* 
the constitution of 17ST, negotiations had taken plac 
tween different states, in regard to undertakings of this 

1 Deb. of Cong , V., pp. 022, 623. Compare Beaton's note, V., p 
•Stat at L., III., p. 266. 

Deb. of Cong., I., pp. 274, seq., 306. 
4 Elliot, Deb., IV., p. 650. 

s M'Culloch vs. the Stale of Maryland. Wheaton's Rep., IV., p 
Curtis, IV., p. 432. 



INTEKNAL IMPROVEMENTS. 3S9 

sort which would be to their mutual advantage. Madison 
pointed out in the Federalist (JNo. XIY.) how greatly the 
Union would be strengthened in the future in this way, 
and prophesied a rapid advance in this respect. Under 
the two first presidents, however, the fulfillment of these 
prophesies was impossible, because bringing order out of 
the financial confusion absorbed every exertion. During 
the administration of Jefferson, the idea was again brought 
up, and the building of the so-called Cumberland road was 
undertaken. But soon after the embargo-policy and the 
war with England turned the public attention and the na- 
tional revenues to other affairs. 1 It was not until the 
beginning of the third period of the history of the Union 
that internal improvements became a fixed question, which 
occupied a permanent and prominent place in all political 
programmes. Up to this time, and for some time after, 
practically only one view prevailed, and this was that it 
was desirable or quite necessary to develope a comprehen- 
sive and systematic activity in this application of the 
federal resources. Jefferson, in his message of Dec. 2, 1806, 
directed the attention of congress to this point; 2 Madison 
came back to the question, as Calhoun said, " every year, 7 ' 3 
and even Monroe favored the idea, although he drew the 
boundaries of its practical application vaguely and narrow- 
ly. 4 The only question was whether congress already had 
the necessary power, or whether it was necessary to first 
give this to it, by an amendment of the constitution. All 
the three presidents named held the latter view. The fact 
that they came from a slave state had no influence on this. 
They were " strict constructionists," that is, they found in 
the constitution no " express" grant of the right and 
thought that it therefore could not exist. In the part of 

1 Compare Deb. of Congress, V., p. 676. 

2 Statesman's Mann., L, p. 191. 
8 Ibid, I, pp. 332, 335. 

4 Ibid, I., pp. 402, 491. 



STATE niVIKKK.NTV AND SLAVERY. 

the message already mentioned which touched upon this 
point, Jefferson seems to have flatly denied the right 
Madison had not yet wholly given up the position defended 
by him in ITim;, 1 but it is impossible to say exactly how 
firmly he still held to it. In his message of Dec 3, L816, 
he spoke expressly of the " existing powers" of cong 
which needed only "enlargement", 2 and yet, on March 3, 
1817, he vetoed an appropriation for the Cumberland road, 
en constitutional grounds, without pointing out how far 
the -existing powers" reached and wherein congress, in 
this particular case, had exceeded them. 3 He Bpoke quite 
clearly on this point, that the consent of the states, within 
whose limits internal improvements were to be undertaken 
by the CTnion, could not supply the needed constitutional 
power. 4 Monroe seems to have had exactly the opposite 
opinion on this point. 5 His view is still more hard t 
certain than Madison's, although he sketched it in his veto 
message of May 4, 1822, in tedious detail. In this med 
' sage he affirms that the building of the Cumberland road 
had been "originally commenced and so far executed . . 
under the power vested in congress to make appropria- 
tions," but that the present bill contained provisions which 
could not be justified by that power. Clay, however, de- 
clare.] it absolutely inadmissible to appeal to this particular 
right, because the appropriation of money was a result, not 
a cause. Monroe's message contains a long argument, 
which is wholly based upon this view. 6 It is difficult to 

•SeeNiles' Beg., XK, p. 208. 

2 « I particularly again invite their attention to the expediency ol ex- 
ercising their existing powers and, where necessary, of resorting to the 
prescribed mode of enlarging them, in order to effectuate a couipreheM 
Bta system of roads and canals." Statesman's Manual, I., p. 3J 

3 Deb. of Cong., V., p. 721. 

* Compare Clay, Speeches, I., p. G9. 
6 See Statesman's Manual, I., p. 491. 
6 Statesman's Manual, I., p. 515, seq. 



CONGRESSIONAL QUIBBLING. 391 

see where lie found the reconciliation of the two directly 
contrary views. 

At the same time, very vague ideas prevailed in congress 
on the constitutional question. Its discussion was marked 
by the same narrow legal spirit which had dictated Monroe's 
message and which now reasoned in circles and quibbled 
over words. The house of representatives, in 1818, took 
refuge behind the right of making appropriations. It de- 
cided, March 14, by ninety to seventy -five votes, that con- 
gress could " appropriate money" for the construction of 
roads and canals, but voted down, by eighty-four to eighty- 
two votes, a resolution that it had the right to" construct" 
post and military roads and — by eighty-three to eighty-one 
votes — that it could " construct" canals for military pur- 
poses. 1 As soon, however, as men tore themselves loose 
from the literal reading of the constitution, a freer, more 
statesmanlike method of thought came into play. It was 
infinitely petty to raise a constitutional question at first 
and then to crawl out of the difficulty by the shallowest 
excuses; but the main point was that the majority of con- 
gress was always thereafter prevailed upon to make appro- 
priations for internal improvements of national importance. 
The quibblers were overwhelmed with such a flood of 
arguments appealing to sound common sense that, despite 
all their efforts, they remained steadily in the minority. 
Clay asked whether the federal aims of the government 
could be reached in any other way than by the use of the 
federal resources. They could not answer, and it thrust 
aside all their hair-splitting objections. It was proved to 
them, by a multitude of examples, how greatly the essen- 
tial ends of the Union had already suffered, simply because 
the resources of the Union had not been earlier applied in 
this way. And it was farther argued, with unanswerable 
logic, that their principles gave every state the right and 

1 Deb. of Cong., VI., pp. 121, 122. 



392 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

the might to make the attainment of the main cn(]> of the 
Uniun impossible. Despite the superfluity of spiritlesi 
bits of subtlety which were brought forward at every 
ceeding session of congress, the strife finally came to 
depend, in every instance, upon the simple question whether 
in the certain case a certain sum of money should be voted 
by congress. This was so plainly the only solution of the 
question, at once intelligent and corresponding to the pi 
ing demands of circumstances, 1 that even the three | 
dents who denied the constitutional right signed a great 
number of bills, which had no other end save the appro- 
priation of moneys for internal improvements. 1 

The most decided champions of the right and the most 
zealous defenders of its extended use belonged to the young 
states of the west. 3 The development of these states would 
necessarily remain far behind their capacity for develop- 
ment unless the general government, by constructing 
canals and roads and regulating river-courses, gave a strong 
impulse to immigration and created a profitable market for 
their products. Their own resources were not sufficient II 
yet for great undertakings, and, moreover, the proportionate 
co operation of several states, needed in most cases, would 
have been an almost insuperable obstacle. But sufficient 
means of communication became, every year, a more 
pressing necessity. Even the lower classes of the population 
began to see that these must be created, even if this in- 

1 In response to repeated recommendations to lay a constitutional 
amendment before the states, the majority pertinently answered that 
they had no reason for doing so, since they did not doubt that con| 
already had the right. Sec the short but excellent discussion of the 
constitutional question in Kent, Comin., I., pp. 383-284 

•Jefferson's presidency: Stat, at Large, II., pp.180, 359, ::!i7 .three 
different appropriations), 534; Madison's: II., pp. 555, 661, 6j69, 671, 
730, 820; III., pp. 206, 282, 315, 318, ::77; Monroe's: III., pp. 412 
480, :»<»<>. 660, 563, 605, 634, 728, 77!): IV.. pp.5, 6, 23, 33, 71, <!, «J4, 101, 
124, 128, 133, 135,227. Bee also IV.,pp. 83, 151. 

3 Deb. of Con-., VI., p. 400; Clay, Speeches, I., pp. 182, 183. 



S" 



THE EKIE CANAL. 393 

volved, at the beginning, great sacrifices of money. The 
completion of the Erie canal contributed greatly to open 
the eyes of the masses to this fact. DeWitt Clinton had 
experienced the greatest hostility and unmeasured mockery 
on account of the work which has made his uame immor- 
tal. Now, not only was its feasibility proved, but under 
its influence wildernesses were converted into fruitful, cul- 
tivated lands with magical rapidity. These and many 
other less striking experiences imbued the west with an 
enthusiasm for internal improvements, which afterwards 
brought it into peculiar discord with party-orthodoxy. 
When the Democratic party split in two, it was sharply 
affirmed — though, indeed, the assertion was scarcely justi^ 
fied by the facts— that Jackson and Adams took substan- 
tially different positions on the question of internal im- 
provements. Jackson was praised by the majority of his 
supporters, because he had given a strong check to the 
reckless mischief of the work of this sort carried on under 
Adams. But Missouri, which supported Jackson with 
spirited enthusiasm, declared with triumphant joy that 
this was a wholly groundless calumny, since more had been 
spent upon internal improvements during the first two 
years of Jackson's presidency than during the whole of 
Adams's administration. 1 

At first, the leading statesmen of the south went hand 
in hand with the west. Calhoun urged, in 1816, a plan for 
constant and systematic action, on the part of the general 
government, for the improvement of the means of inter- 
communication. On his motion, a committee was ap- 
pointed in order to investigate whether it was advisable to 
devote the revenue derived by the government from the 
national bank to this end. December 23, 1816, he re- 
ported a bill, corresponding to this motion, which was 

1 See Niles' Reg., XL., p. 58 and XLIL, p. 79. During Adams's ad- 
ministration, $2,083,331, and in 1829 and 1830, $2,501,590. 



394 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND BLAVERT. 

passed by eighty- six to eighty-four votes. 1 Lowndes took a 
similar position. In the vote of March 14. 1818, thirty south* 
vni representatives openly declared theirbelief in the right 
to appropriate money for the construction of roads and ca- 
nals. Moreover, in December, L824, Johnston of Louisiana 
submitted a resolution in favor of the right to make interna] 
improvements. 9 Only by slow degrees was it clearly 
that this question too tended to a geographical consolida- 
tion of parties, although this tendency could never be fully 
carried out. The northwestern slave states, in which >lave- 
industry was not the sole master, were deeply interested in 
having the general government help them to a closer union 
with the eastern and southern seaboard states. The north- 
east long remained, in part, in a cautious and even suspi- 
cious position. It had the least need of federal aid and had 
not yet so wholly outgrown its old jealousy of the w< 
to clearly see how greatly the industrial development ot 
the west would be to its advantage. Moreover, the princi- 
ple of state rights played a part in this question among the 
politicians who sought to make their way by servility to- 
wards the south. Thus, Yan Buren brought in resolutions 
in December, 1825, which opposed the right of congres 
construct roads and canals and favored the introduction ot 
an amendment to the constitution which should define the 
limits of the congressional prerogatives in this respect in 
such a way as should " effectually protect the sovereignty 
of the respective states" and should insure to every state a 
more exact proportional part of the sums voted for internal 
improvements. 3 

In the south proper and in the remaining slave states, in 
which the slaveholding interest was supreme, a sectional 
opposition to the whole system developed itself very 

1 Deb. of Congress, V.. pp. 67G, GS2, 711; Calhoun, Works, II., pp. 
18G-UJ7. 
■ Nile- Heir.. XXVII., p. 270. 
3 Deb. of Coil-re^, VI 1 1., pp. 3G4, 365. 



fc' 



SOUTHERN OPPOSITION. 395 

strongly in course of time. The simplicity and crudeness 
of their industrial methods did not let them feel sufficiently 
the need of a great network of means of intercommunica- 
tion. They were always glad to see the improvement of 
their harbors and of their rivers, by which the products of 
the west reached them, undertaken by the federal govern- 
ment, but yet the conviction curtly expressed by a Louis- 
iana congressman as early as 1817: "Louisiana wants no 
roads!" 1 steadily gained ground. If they did not wish to 
go as far as this, they declaimed against the injustice with 
which everything w T as lavished upon the north, while the 
south went empty-handed away. 2 That the facts gave not 
the slightest support for these complaints made no differ- 
ence. 3 The south never asked for facts when its presumed 
interests demanded that it should wail over the tyranny of 
the north. The legal grounds for the opposition were 
found, of course, in state rights, but as a general rule this 
doctrine was kept within comparatively narrow limits. 
Yet the legislature of Virginia suffered itself once (1826) 
to be carried away so far as to declare, by a verbatim quota- 
tion of the decisive sentences in the resolutions of 1798 
and 1799, that the increase of duties for the purpose of 
protecting home industries and the passage of acts " pre- 
paratory to a general system of internal improvements" 
were " unconstitutional." 4 

When the Jacksonian wing of the Republican party 
came into power, the Opposition thought its time had come. 

1 Deb. of Cong., V., p. 710. 

2 The Charleston Mercury of Feb. 20, 1830, said : "The uniform prac- 
tice of that system proves that the south, so far from partaking equally, 
has been totally excluded, and that the system itself has been wholly 
used as an engine for the oppression o^Uie south and the enrichment of 
the north." Niles' Keg., XXXVII L, p. 235. 

3 See Niles' Reg., XXXVI, p. 163, and XXXVIII, p. 255, where there 
is an exact statement of how much of the sums voted for internal im- 
provements up to the end of 1828 fell to each state. 

4 Ibid., XXX., p. 38. 



896 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

Thi< hope seemed justified when the president vetoed the 
Maysville road bill. But it soon appeared that Jackson 
only laid claim to the right to decide in each particular 
case whether or not the matter was properly a " national'' 
undertaking and whether the use of federal resources was 
u expedient. ,,J The constitutional question did not pro- 
gress an inch. The strife continued with varying violence, 
but one internal improvement after another was under- 
taken, and the system w T as constantly pushed farther and 
farther. 

The industrial contrasts of the free and slave si 
entered much more directly into the tariff struggle than 
into the questions of a national bank and internal improve- 
ments. In modern civilized countries free trade and pro- 
tection have fought an almost constant battle, which dates 
much farther back than the origin of the North American 
republic. Ilere it began independently of slavery, a- it has 
continued since the abolition of slavery. But yet the 
thirty-year tariff war (1816-1S46) finds its explanation 
only in the form given by slavery to the industrial circum- 
stances of the south. It is, in fact, " the expression of 
the struggle, in the sphere of economics, between freedom 
and slavery/' 2 All the great questions upon which the in- 
ner contests of the republic from 17^!* to 1S61 were 
fought did not have their origin in slavery, but it was 
slavery which, in this as in all the others, made parties 
coincide with geographical sections. 

The necessity of a common commercial law and of as- 
sured national revenues, which could be most easily r, 
by duties, had given the strongest impulse to the call of 
the convention at Philadelphia. One of the first ques- 
tionBj then, that came before congress for action was the 
regulation of duties on imports. The preamble to the 

1 Compare Niles 1 Reg., XL., p. t06. 

2 Kapp, Geschichte der Sklaverei, p. 171. 



ft 



THE TARIFF. 397 

bill signed by the president July 4, 1789, provided that 
the customs and other taxes were to serve " for the en- 
couragement and protection of manufactures." 1 Repeated 
reference was made in the debate to this side of the ques- 
tion. Fitzsimmons of Pennsylvania demanded protection 
for the makers of tallow candles. Hartley, of the same 
state, expressed himself as generally in favor of protective 
duties, and Madison recognized the justice of the demand 
to a certain degree. Clymer of Pennsylvania went far- 
thest, and declared that the protection of home industries 
by duties was a " political necessity." On the other 
hand, Bland of Virginia, and especially Tucker of South 
Carolina, demanded that in deciding upon duties only the 
revenue to be obtained should be considered, because under 
a protective system all are taxed for the benefit of a few. 
Partridge and Ames paid especial attention to the shipping 
interest, and opposed the taxation of hemp and rope. 2 Here 
the party-grouping of the next five-and-twenty years is 
already indicated. Madison expressed his especial satis- 
faction over the fact that no geographical division had be- 
come noticeable; 3 he said that it was plain that different 
views about the propriety of a protective policy prevailed 
in all parts of the Union. The constitutional question 
was not once raised. But then at least no one thought of 
taxing imported wares simply for the purpose of protect- 
ing existing American manufactories from foreign compe- 
tition, or, indeed, for the sake of making it possible, for 
the first time, to establish American manufactories. Men 
only wished to see the duties necessitated by the needs of 
the treasury laid in such a way that they would actually 
serve to encourage American industry. A large majority, 
at the moment, wished that this should be done. Hamil- 
ton was directed by the house of representatives to prepare 

1 Statutes at Large, I., p. 24. 

2 Deb. of Cong., I., pp. 25, 26, 27, 35, 36. 

3 Deb. of Cong., I., p. 55. 



. n: SOVEREIGNTY and SLAVERY. 

a report upon "the means of promoting snch [manufac- 
tures] as would render the United State- independent oi 
foreign nations tor military and other essential Buppli 

Hamilton prefaced hie Long report with the remark that 
the propriety of a protective tariff, in the sense already 

given, was now u pretty generally admitted," and then 
defended the view himself with great ability. 8 

During the war with England, the question assnmed a 
new phase. Thanks to the European war troubles, the 
American shipping business, which was mainly in the 
hands of New Englanders-, received a great impulse, until 
the embargo policy began to lay tetters on its further de- 
velopment. Manufacturing industry, which quickly re- 
vived when the war closed the European sources of supply, 
offered a certain compensation for this. The financial 
difficulties of the government had already, in 1812, com- 
pelled a doubling of all the customs, with a further tax <»t" 
ten per cent, on goods imported in foreign ships. ■ In 
order to make this heavy imposition seem more endurable 
to the discontented New England 6tates, thev were com- 
forted with assurances that this proviso was to give an im- 
pulse to their own peculiar industry. 4 The prophecii 
the comforters proved true, but only as long as the abnor- 
mal state of things continued. 5 The end of the Napoleonic 
wars and the peace of Ghent threatened the ship-ow 
as well as the manufacturers with speedy ruin. The 

1 Dallas' report of Feb. 13, 1816. Niles' Reg., IX., p. 441. 

2 Ham, Works, III., p. 193. 

3 Statute- at Large, II., p. 768. 
■ Webster, Works, III , p. 330. 

'Randolph wrote, Dec. 15, 1814, to a New Englander: " Of all the 
Atlantic state- you have the least cause to complain. Your mmutac- 
ind the trad i which th<> enemy has allowed you have drained us 
of our last dollar." Garland, Life of Randolph, LI., p. 60. Ingham 
of Pennsylvania estimated, in l*l<;, the capital invested in man u fa- 
within the last eight or ten years at $100,01)0,000. Debates of Cong 
V., p. I 



TARIFF OF 1816. 3§9 

were again free to all ships, and England threw an over- 
snpply of goods upon the American market, in order to 
destroy the home competitors before they acquired a firm 
footing. Congress was therefore overwhelmed with peti- 
tions for aid from persons engaged in manufacturing pur- 
suits, who complained the more earnestly because, accord- 
ing to the law of July 1, 1812, the double duties were to 
cease one year after the conclusion of peace. The failure 
of many manufacturers gave proof that the young indus- 
tries could really be maintained only by artificial aid. But 
this could scarcely be given without sadly interfering in 
many ways with the interests of the ship-owners. The 
New England states were therefore at odds with one an- 
other on the tariff policy to be followed. In E"ew Hamp- 
shire and in Massachusetts, to which Maine then belonged, 
the shipping interest prevailed; in Rhode Island and Con- 
necticut the manufacturing interest. The agricultural 
states held fast to the latter. The south wavered, for it 
had not yet learned to see that slave labor and manufactur- 
ing on a large scale exclude each other. 

Under these circumstances a sort of compromise was 
brought about in 1816. The report of secretary of the 
treasury Dallas emphatically advocated protection to home 
industry by high duties, especially in. the case of those 
goods which could be produced in sufficient quantity in. 
the United States. 1 He wished to see the goods which 
would be produced, beyond question, in the United States 
subjected to a light revenue tax, and those which must be 
in the main imported placed under medium duties. The 
bill which was introduced by Lowndes of South Carolina, 
as chairman on the committee on ways and means, adopted 
this classification, but in general agreed with the funda- 
mental theory that the raising of revenue should be the 
leading principle in the calculation of the duties. The 

1 Kiles' Reg., IX., pp. 436-447 






400 BEIGNTT AND SLAVERY. 

principle of protection was only incidentally recognized 
here. The makers of cottoo and woolen wares, who had 
been the especial snbjects of congressional care, bad to 
satisfy themselves with a duty of twenty-five per cent., 

which was to be lowered to twenty in three years. It is 
characteristic of the position of parties at that time that 
Calhoun appeared as a champion of protective duth 
pecially in reference to cotton and woolen manufactures. 1 
He was of opinion that " things naturally tend at this 
moment" to the " introduction of manufactures." 3 Web- 
ster stood up for the opposite side. Louisiana demanded 
protection for the sugar planters. 3 

This compromise satisfied nobody. The agitation for 
higher duties was at once begun again. The tariff adopted 
by the house of representatives in 1S20, but rejected by 
the senate, bore the mark of an undisguised protective 
system. The ship-owning states took, in part, the positi-on 
they occupied in 1S16. Whitman of Massachusetts was 
among the most violent opponents of protection. 4 In all 
things else parties had evidently already reared the : 
tion which they finally occupied. 5 The south had gained 
clearer views of its interests, and the young west strove 
for the leadership on the side of protection. Yet Henry 
Clay, the lather of the so-called " American system.'' 
still showed some foresight in his expressions. lie wa 
his guard, lest manufacturing should be given unreason- 
able encouragement by protective duties. 6 

Defeat did not discourage the protectionists, but rather 
spurred them on to redoubled activity. Other ca 
which were in great part of a purely personal nature, con- 

1 Calhoun, Works, II., pp. 1G3, 1G4; Deb. of Cong., V., p. 640. 
- Calhoun, Works, II., p. 109. 

3 Debates of Congress, V., p. G32. 

4 Clay. .Speeches, I., p. 138. 

6 Bee Niles' Reg., XV1IL, p. 1G9. 
8 Clay. Speeches, I., p. 10.3. 



TARIFF STRUGGLE OF 1824. 401 

tributed to split- the Republican (Democratic) party into 
the Democrats 1 and the National Republicans (Whigs), but 
the tariff was the leading political question for a series 01 
years. The . load which had weighed down all industrial 
life during the last few years put a priceless means of agi- 
tation into the hands of the protectionists. Under the 
leadership of Clay they availed themselves of this with 
such dexterity that Monroe yielded to their pressure, and 
recommended, in his messages of Dec. 2, 1822 and Dec. 
2, 1823, a revision of the tariff in behalf of protection. 2 
Strengthened in this wise, the protectionists again began 
the fight in 1824. Its character was from the first mark- 
edly different from that of the earlier debates. The con- 
stitutional question, which had hitherto been raised quite 
incidentally and in the form of doubts, was now sharply 
urged. The constitution gives congress simply the power 
" to lay and collect taxes" and " to regulate commerce 
with foreign nations." 3 Nowhere in the instrument is 
there a limitation or any sort of qualification in regard 
to duties, except that they must be the same for the whole 
Union. The party which had such an abhorrence of every 
" construction" of the constitution and of all " derived 
powers" saw itself, therefore, again obliged to use the art 
of construing in a really wondrous manner, in order to 
settle the legal question. 4 The right of taxation, they 
affirmed, had only been granted to congress in order to 
obtain the money needed for the legitimate aims of the 
government. To levy a tax for any other purpose, or to 

1 The official name, so to speak, of the party had been, up to this 
time, Republicans. 

3 Statesman's Manual, I., pp. 448, 458. 

3 Art. I., Sec.8, §§1, 3. 

r Asfaras this was concerned Madison stood unconditionally with 
the protectionists. Niles' Reg., XLIII., Suppl., pp. 33-37. Jefferson 
took practically the same ground in his reports on the fisheries (Feb. 1, 
1791) and on the limitations of trade (Feb. 23, 1793). Compare also, his 
letter to Dr. Leiper, Jan. 21, 1809, Works, .V., p. 416, seq. 
26 



402 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

fix B customs duty imposed for such a purpose in any 
other way than that dictated by an exclusive consideration 
of the needs of the treasury, was. they said, beyond the 
power of congress. The first condition precedent to the 
Union, the equality of all its members, would be over- 
thrown if all were burdened for the benefit of a few. It 
would be madness to authorize congre.-s to fatten northern 
manufacturers on the life-blood of the south. 

This was the real party-cry and it was now uttered in 
all distinctness for the first time. Randolph called atten- 
tion, with natural boastfulness, to the fact that Massachu- 
setts, now as at the time of the Revolution, stood side bi 
side with Virginia in the cause of freedom. And b< s 
Massachusetts, Maine and Xew Hampshire went with the 
south. 1 But yet it was the fashion to decry the protective 
system as an attempt of selfish New England, and the 
south sought to monopolize the role of the maltreated vic- 
tim. Randolph dwelt with bitter satisfaction upon tin 
that the south stood together in solid phalanx. 2 Of co 
the geographical division of parties was not precisely in 
accordance with his view. Clay himself represented a 
state which is commonly spoken of as belonging to the 
south. The inhabitants of the plantation si 
course opponents of protection to a man, and this was amply 
sufficient to give the strife the hateful n ess and perilous 
of a sectional struggle. They were, indeed, still half in 
doubt whether every possibility <>t manufacturing develop- 
ment had been taken away from them by slavery, but they 
appreciated the fact that they had no sort of manufacl 
and showed no inclination whatever to venture upon man- 

1 Deb. of Cong., VIII., pp. 10, 10. Webster, Works, III., p 

3 "I bless God that in this insulted, oppressed and outraged n 
we are, as to our counsels in regard to ibis measure but a- one man; 
that there exists on the subject but one feeling and one interest." Deb. 
of Cong., VIII., pp. 1<>, l"). 

3 The sugar and indigo planters always formed an exception. 



DEFEAT OF THE SOUTH. 403 

nfactnring enterprises. They had only their staple ex- 
ported articles and depended for every other thing upon 
the rest of the world. They could therefore obtain no 
direct compensation for the heavy burdens of a protective 
tariff, and they either wholly failed to recognize the indi- 
rect advantages which accrued to the whole Union from 
the protective system, according to its champions, or con- 
sidered them of a worth which could bear no sort of com- 
parison with the burden of taxation. They rightly under- 
stood that the promises of a speedy lessening of the load 
would only be fulfilled when their opponents reconciled 
themselves to a partial abandonment of their main princi- 
ple. The latter evidently thought nothing of their own 
promises. Tyler of Virginia had foretold, as early as 1820, 
that the manufacturers would have to come back again and 
again with increased demands. 1 This explains the sharp- 
ness of speech noticeable from the first in the debates of 
the representatives of the plantation states. They held it 
necessary to use at once the threat of a full enforcement of 
state sovereignty as a radical check to all displeasing meas- 
ures of the general government. Randolph spoke with 
more than customary emphasis of " the might" of the 
south and reminded his hearers that under every constitu- 
tion " by an unwise exercise of the powers of the govern- 
ment, the people may be driven to the extremity of re- 
sistance by force." 2 Such pregnant words had been let 
fall in congress too often to frighten the majority of mem- 
bers, as long as it was not known whether there lay behind 
the words an earnest, determined will. The bill passed 
both houses, in the lower, indeed, by only one hundred and 
seven to one hundred and two votes, and in the senate by 
twenty -five to twenty-one. 3 

1 Deb. of Cong., VI., p. 617. 
1 Ibid, VIII., p. 11. 

3 Benton, Thirty Tears' View, I., p. 34; compare Niles' Reg., XXVI., 
p. 113. 



404 ^TE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

The plantation Btates used this scanty majority as a con- 
vincing answer to the accusation of the protectionists that 
the south sought to overthrow, by threats, the highest fun- 
damental principle of a republic, the rule of the maj< 
In a political organization of the peculiar compositi 
of the Ininn. they objected, it is not only imprudent, 
unjust, to allow a majority of half a dozen vote, to l> 
ficient to decide a question of this nature and of sue 
significance, when the separation of economic inter. 
so° sharply marked by a geographical line. The. 
truth and important truth in both views, hut inter, 
so overpowering on both sides that men were incapabl< 
a sober consideration of the just complaints of their 
ponents. The battle continued and assumed a still more 
hitter and critical character, inasmuch as the manufacturi 
interest began to identity itself with the National republi- 
cans or Whigs. Before this, the protectionists had a 
brought forward their demands at the time of the presi- 
dential election, and now their leaders sought to fully 
entwine it with this question, in which, every four ) 
all the passion and the hate of American party polil 
summed up. Both parties were carrying on the agit 
among the masses of the people with energy and s> 
when the request of the woolen manufacturers ami 
growers for more effective protection gave, in 1- 
impulse to a new protectionist revision of the tariff. S 
Carolina and Georgia formed the extreme wing i 
anti-tariff party, while Webster, now in league with I 
stood at the head of the protectionists. Webster jus 
his desertion to the other camp by explaining that 
adoption of the tariff of 1821 had given the country 
derstand that the protective system was to be the pern 
policy of the nation: New England had guided itse 
this decision and was now obliged to demand prot 
for the manufactures which had arisen in consequ* 



THE TARIFF AND SLAVERY. 405 

this. 1 This justification was not adapted to weaken the 
opposition of the plantation states. Whether or not the 
protective system had been recognized as the permanent 
policy of the country, they could only lose by giving up. 
According to their views of the working of the system, 
they were, as Hamilton of South Carolina expressed it, 
" coerced to inquire whether we can afford to belong to 
[such] a confederacy." 2 They could not shut their eyes to 
the fact that they were going backwards, in an economic 
sense, despite the increasing demand for cotton and their 
other staple products, and they painted their own decline 
in the most glaring colors, because they ascribed it wholly 
to the tariff and the other features of the economic policy 
of the general government. 3 This was the way to handle 
the theme in order to drive the southern people to frenzy,: 
for if this assertion was true, they were practically given 
the alternative of putting an end at any cost and by all 
means to. that policy or of abandoning themselves, with 
torpid resignation, to inevitable ruin. But yet these com- 
plaints of the retrogression of the south gave the north a 
trump card, which it did not fail to play. Not the tariff- 
said the northerners — lets " the fox house himself where the 
hearthstones of your fathers stood": it is slavery that has 
turned fields which bore rich fruit twenty and thirty years 
ago into deserts. In the heat of the conflict, many a word 
slipped from southern lips which proved the justice of this 
reproach. 4 But for the very reason that this was well, 
founded, it kindled the strife to a more fiery glow, so that 
slavery was again directly pointed out as the demon which 
sowed discord between north and south. 



1 Webster, Works, III., pp, 228-247. 
■Deb. of Congress, X., p. 112. 

3 Niles' Reg , XXXV., p. 205 ; Benton. Thirty Years' View, L, pp. 98, 
99, and in many other places. 

4 See the eighth paragraph in the protest of the legislature of South 
Carolina. Niles' Reg., XXXV., p. 309. 



406 LTB SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

The loss of the greater part of those who had been np to 
this time its allies in the north made the defeat of the 
south a certainty if its opposition was managed in the same 
way as in 1824. The representatives of South Carolina 
therefore labored to bring about common action by all the 
anti-tariff states in accordance with a definite programing 
The discussions in their meetings for counsel Bhowed that 
matters must come to a decided crisis if everything went 
according to their wishes. 1 Hamilton, the future govenKMj 
of South Carolina, already weighed the possibility of an 
attempt to execute the law by force, and declared that the 
idea of a man's really thinking of this was " an absurdity 
not to be heard of." No conclusions could be arrived at, 
and still less was it possible to succeed in forming a com- 
mon plan of operations with the other members who were 
of the same general opinions. 

A part of the press outdid even the members of cong 
in the violence of its opposition as well as in the scope of 
its projects. Thus the Southron and the Columbia . 
scope, for example, advised the calling of a congres- of the 
Opposition states, an idea, the meaning of which was 
erally recognized, but which had to be dropped bee 
discontent, at any rate in Georgia, had reached such a height 
that the extreme proposals of South Carolina might have 
been agreed to. 2 There was also no lack of moderate coun- 
sels on the part of the press — counsels which conden 
all unconstitutional opposition. 3 

The legislatures took up the matter. The South Caro- 
lina legislature did so most vigorously. Protests wen 
order of the day. Every member considered himself bound 
to introduce a series of resolutions which strove t<> outdo 

1 Compare the declarations culled forth from different members by 
tin- Hayne-Mitchel debate. Niles' Reg., XXXV.. pp. 1*3-18.' 

* Ibid, XXXIV.. pp. 300,801. 

>mpare the numerous extracts in Niles' Reg., XXXIV., pp. 35$- 
356. 



PRACTICAL NULLIFICATION. 407 

each other in bitterness. 1 Passionate speeches were, more- 
over, made at meetings in different districts, at banquets 
and on similar occasions. Men especially delighted in 
toasts, in which eloquence went far beyond the bounds of 
good taste, and threats extended to the farthest limits of 
the "moral high treason" so greatly blamed a short time 
before. 

The terrible earnestness of all these demonstrations lay 
in the theories of constitutional law upon which they were 
based. They rested wholly on the Virginia and Kentucky 
resolutions, to which, indeed, the legislature of South Car- 
olina directly appealed. 2 The Colleton district declared: 
"We must resist the impositions of this tariff . . and 
follow up our principles ... to their very last conse- 
quence.'' 3 Resolutions introduced by Dunkin in the leg- 
islature gave the legal formula by which this was to come 
to pass in a way commensurate, so to speak, with the mat- 
ter. He demanded in this and in all similar cases the 
convocation of a convention of the states in order to nul- 
lify the laws objected to. 4 

Simultaneously, all sorts of other means were brought 
into play in order to nullify the tariff practically if not 
legally. Numerous leagues were formed, which bound 

1 A passage in the resolutions introduced by Cook in the legislature 
of South Carolina deserves to be quoted, because it is a sign of the 
spirit in which the radical wing of the state-rights party began to look 
upon the relation of the states to the federal government. It says: 
" When a state solemnly protests against an act of congress because it 
is an usurpation of power, congress ought forthwith to call a convention 
of the states to decide upon it and suspend its operation until the sense 
of the states be taken, and if congress, on the application of a state or 
states, should refuse to call such conventions, neglect to suspend its op- 
eration or not immediately repeal the act on the grounds of its uncon- 
stitutionality, it thereupon becomes null and void to all intents and pur- 
poses." Niles' Reg., XXXY., p. 306. 

2 Ibid, XXXY., p. 206. 

3 Ibid, XXXIV., pp. 288, 290. 

4 Ibid, XXXY., p. 305. 



408 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY 

themselves not to buy from the north and west any goods 
which were protected by the tariff from foreign competi- 
tion, but instead to use wares of native manufacture. Even 
in South Carolina, Georgia and Alabama, the embitterment 
against the north produced a momentary possibility of 
building up a manufacturing industry of their own. 1 Bat 
it had to be admitted that it would be at least very doubt- 
ful whether much could be done by individuals in this way, 
and an energetic display of state power was therefore de- 
manded. Prohibitory duties were thought of and other 
projects were broached, which were also in direct opposi- 
tion to the constitutional provisions in art. I., sec. 1 
1 and 2. It was therefore only talked of, and this did not 
avail to crown the policy of terrorism with any practical 
result. The new tariff became a law and the collection of 
the duties was nowhere opposed. But the accomplishment 
of the fact did not bring back repose to the land. 2 The 
outward alarms were weaker for a while, but the agitation 
was so much the deeper. It was felt on both sides that the 
decision would come with the next war. The protection- 
ists soon recognized the fact that Tyler's prophecy was 
always true and South Carolina prepared herself to test the 
efficacy of her constitutional means of protection. 

1 Niles' Reg., XXXV., pp. 15, 48, CO, 62, 63, 64, 83. 

2 Part of the events mentioned above happened after the adoption of 
the tariff. 



SECRET WORKINGS OF SLAVERY. 409 



CHAPTEK XL 

The Panama Congress. Georgia and the Federal 
Government. 

After the Missouri compromise, the slavery question ap- 
parently slept for some years. Its intimate alliance with 
the tariff-struggle was only understood by slow degrees, 
and other problems, which would have brought forward the 
opposing principles and interests involved in it, did not 
crop out for the moment. The politicians felt no inclina- 
tion to artificially create such problems. There were, in- 
deed, Catalines in the south even now, but they were not of 
such extraordinary talents that they would have ventured 
to play with this tire, when its ravaging strength had just 
been so powerfully shown. The justification of the com- 
plaints which became so current, later, among all parties and 
were already becoming loud here and there, that the apple 
of discord had again been thrown among a people longing 
for rest by ambitious men, fanatics and demagogues, re- 
duces itself, everything considered, to a minimum. The 
best proof of this is that slavery, despite the silent agree- 
ment of the politicians to try to shun every mention of it, 
often suddenly and unexpectedly became the determining 
element in questions which in and for themselves stood in 
no sort of relation to it. 

The most important instance of this sort, which had, in- 
deed, no practical results, but sharply sketched the situa- 
tion, happened at the beginning of the presidency of the 
younger Adams. 

As early as 1821 the idea of forming a close connection 
between the Spanish colonies in Central and South Amer- 
ica, then engaged in revolution, had been suggested by 



410 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

Colombia. 1 A few months before their independence was 
recognized by the United States, 2 a treaty was negotiated 
between Colombia and Chili (July, 1822) in which a con- 
vocation of a congress of the new republics was contem- 
plated. ••The construction of a continental system for 
America," which should "resemble the one already con- 
structed in Europe," was the apparent project of I 
two powers.' The idea ripened very slowly. It was not 
until the spring of 1825 that the meeting of the con^ 
in Panama was so far assured that the ambassadors ol 
Colombia and Mexico verbally inquired of Clay, who was 
then secretary of state of the United States, whether an 
invitation to be represented at the congress would be ac- 
ceptable to the president. 4 Adams had an answer sent, 
worded in his own cautious way, to the effect that he first 
wished to be informed concerning the topics agreed upon 
for discussion, the nature and form of powers to be given 
to the "diplomatic agents," and the "organization and 
method of procedure" of the congress. The ambassadors 
of the two mentioned states, in their formal letters of in- 
vitation, gave very unsatisfactory assurances on these 
points. 5 Clay referred to this in his answers, but at the 

1 Webster, Works, III., p. 19.5; report of the senate committee on 
foreign affairs of Jan. 16, 1826; Niles' Reg., XXX., p. 10:5. All the 
documents referring to the congress of Panama, as far as the United 
States are concerned, can be found in the State Papers (Foreign 
tions) and also in Niles' Reg., Vol. XXX. Part of them are printed in 
Elliot. American Diplomatic Code, II., p. 648, seq. 

- Monroe recommended the recognition to congress in a special mes- 
sage of March 8, 1822, (Elliot, Diplomatic Code, II., pp. 840-643; 
compare also Adams's dispatch of May '27, 1823, to Anderson, the am- 
bassador of the United States in Colombia) and this was ratified by both 
houses by the almost unanimous appropriation of the money ni 
for the creation of embassies. (May 4, 1822, Statutes at Large, III., p. 
G78.) 

1 Report of the senate committee, Jan. l(i, lS'2'i. 

4 Clay's report of March 14, 1826, to the house of representath 

azar (the ambassador of Colombia) to Clay, Nov. 2, 1835, and 
Obregou (the ambassador of Mexico) to Clay, Nov. 3, 1825. 



JOHN QUINCY .ADAMS. 411 

same time declared that the president had decided to ac- 
cept the invitation " at once." 1 

When the question of sending representatives to the 
congress came up in the senate, and later in the house, the 
Opposition tried to make capital out of this piece of incon- 
sistency. It was too meaningless in itself to deserve any 
censure. Its interest was due simply to the fact that it 
lifted for a moment the veil of the future. 

Adams, both as a statesman and as an individual, re- 
sembled his father in many respects. He was of an ear- 
nest, deeply moral nature, and knew how to stamp this 
character upon his administration in a degree which, com- 
pared with all the following presidencies, makes an ex- 
tremely favorable impression. Political ambition was one 
of his most prominent characteristics; but this did not de- 
generate in him, as it did in his father, into morbid vanity. 
He did not know what the fear of man meant. In the 
struggle for the right of petition, which he afterwards 
carried on alone in the house of representatives for a long 
while, he found a certain satisfaction in driving to frenzy, 
by his biting satire, the representatives of the slaveholding 
interest, who then held almost absolute power. But his 
scorn for all the arts of demagogues not infrequently 
turned into rudeness, and his firmness into obstinacy; and 
yet, at the same time, under certain circumstances, he let 
himself be influenced too much by others. During his 
long diplomatic service he had acquired a habit of prudent 
examination, which sometimes led, in the more difficult 
questions, to irresolution and vacillation. This is, how- 
ever, partly due to the fact that sober, statesmanlike 
thought and idealism were not properly fused together in 
his nature. The former decidedly outweighed the other; 
but yet the latter made itself felt, and not infrequently in 
a destructive way. 

1 The answers are dated Nov. 30. 



412 BTATE BOVEREIGBTX AND slavery. 

Ingham of Pennsylvania read in the house of represen- 
tatives two newspaper articles, which treated the request 
for participation in the Panama congress in exactly differ- 
ent ways, lie stated that it was as good as certain that 
the article opposing this had proceeded from or been in- 
spired by Adams, and the one in its favor by Clay. 1 He 
gave no proof for the assertion. It must therefore remain 
a question whether Ids zeal in opposition did not lead him 
to put forward groundless suspicions as facts. But it may 
be considered as sufficiently proved that Adam- at first 
looked on the project much more coolly than he did after- 
wards, and that Clay was not without influence upon this 
change of opinion. 

Clay had rendered great services to the young republics. 
He had heen the most determined champion of their affairs 
in the United States. He had at first demanded with 
stormy energy that sympathy for them should not exhaust 
itself in worthless words, but take the form of acts. Xo 
defeat frightened him from the Held, and it was hi: 
due to his constant efforts that their independence had 
been already recognized by the United States in the spring 
of 1S22. His speeches on these questions are among 
the most brilliant productions of his genius. His most 
notable characteristics, as well as his greatest weakm 
appeared in them in the clearest light. His enthusiasm 
lifted him, with a bold sweep, to a height from which 
he looked down with compassionate impatience upon the 
petty politicians who, in their routine-wisdom, could not 
see the forest because of the trees around them. The 
knowledge that America was an integral part of one civi- 
lized world dawned in his mind. If his agitation was 
based on the sharp emphasis which he laid on the opposing 
positions of America and Europe, yet the fact (\ocs not 
tradict this assertion. Exactly because he did not, in his poli- 

1 Debates of Congress, IX., pp. 198-200. 



413 

tical reasoning, lose sight of Europe, lie strore for the consoli- 
dation of America and insisted upon its peculiar characteris- 
tics and its specific interests. The attempt of the Holy Al- 
liance to fetter together Europe in behalf of the interests of 
absolute monarchy made it seem to him desirable, if not 
necessary, to oppose to this "unholy league" a union of the 
states founded upon the " American principle" of popu- 
lar sovereignty. The authorship of this idea of a solidar- 
ity of the interests of all America, resting not only upon 
the geographical proximity of states, but mainly, indeed, 
upon the identity of their fundamental political principles, 
belongs, not exclusively, but yet chiefly, to Clay. Accord- 
ing to his plan this solidarity of interests was to assume 
concrete form in the Panama congress. It would there be 
legally adopted so far as this fundamental political prin- 
ciple had obtained practical recognition. From this firm 
standpoint he hoped to see the great plan he had announced 
as early as 1820 realized — the establishment of a "human- 
freedom league in America," in which "all the nations 
from Hudson's Bay to Cape Horn" should be united, but 
not simply for the sake of remaining in permanent con- 
trast to Europe, tortured by despots. He declared that 
through the power of example, through its moral influence, 
the American system would ever extend farther and far- 
ther, so that a point of union, a haven for freedom and 
lovers of freedom, would be formed upon the soil that was 
wet with the blood of the revolutionary forefathers. 

Iriedrich Kapp finds in these ideas the "far-seeing 
view of a clever statesman," and apparently makes the 
slaveholders alone responsible for the fact " that Clay's 
high aims remained only pious wishes." 1 The facts do 
not, in my opinion, fully justify this judgment; too much 
responsibility is laid upon the slaveholders. Even with- 
out their opposition Clay's ideas could not have been 

} Geschichte der Sklaverei, p. 193. 



414 STATE SOYEBEIGHTY ANT) SLAVERY. 

realized. Under the actual circn instances the ideas were 

too clever, and so not truly statesmanlike No one will 
deny ('lav's gifts for statesmanship; but he yielded toe 
readily and too earnestly to the lead of his vigorous fancy. 

lie had to thank it for many fruitful thoughts, but it often 
prevented his weighing the nature of his plans and the 
chance of their realization with the necessary soberness. 

The vast extent and the uncivilized condition of the young 
west, whose most distinguished representative he was, 
mirrored itself strongly in his thoughts. lie dazzled his 
hearers by the splendor of his projects, won them a hear- 
ing by his fiery, alluring eloquence, and helped himself 
and his followers over the difficulties in the way by a glit- 
tering sketch of the consequences which must result from 
the development of the ideas. His fancy's flight was 
towards the sun, but it bore him so high that mountains 
and valleys began to melt into a plain, and the foot resting 
on earth stepped uncertainly and insecurely. Moreover, 
his boldness in decision and action, when every-day cir- 
cumstances created great and momentous problems that 
imperatively demanded a thorough solution, did not cor- 
respond with his boldness in planning. At such times he 
could not even entertain an energetic wish for a solution, 
partly because he did not subject the question vt' its ni 
sity to proper inquiry, and partly because traditional 
dogmas and a lack of moral courage made him start with 
the supposition of its impossibility. Bargaining was 
then the sum of his wisdom, and his activity degenerated 
into obstinacy in chaffering. An idealist who wasted the 
best part of his creative power in impracticable projects, 
and a politician who was an unsurpassable master of the 
art of solving great and unavoidable problems by little 
expedients, — these are the most notable traits in Clay's 
political character. They do not give his picture in full, 
but they mark the tendency of his influence upon the fate 



HENRY CLAY. 415 

of the Union. His other qualities and achievements did 
not lift him above the level of ordinary politicians. 

In his speech of March 24, 1818, " on the emancipation 
of South America/' he denied the justice of the assertion 
that the South Americans were too ignorant and too super- 
stitious " to allow of the existence of a free state." He 
questioned the ignorance, but jet denied that ignorance 
necessitated incapacity for self-government. That, he de- 
clared, was the doctrine of the throne, and conflicted with 
the natural order of things. 1 The South Americans, he 
said, " adopt our principles, copy our institutions, and in 
many cases use both the language of our revolutionary 
ordinances and the thoughts therein expressed." These 
were facts, indeed, but this blind imitation of the " great 
example" surely pointed much more to incapacity than to 
capacity for intelligent self-government. If the Holy 
Alliance was to be opposed by a league of free states of a 
sort that could exist, it was self-evidently a condition prece- 
dent that the members of the league should be in harmony 
with the suppositions upon which the league was to rest. 
It was not enough that they were not ruled by kings; they 
must be in truth republicans, that is, must have put the 
theory of popular rule into execution in a rational manner. 
This was not the case, to a sufficient degree, among the 
younger free states. On this account Clay's hopes would 
doubtless have remained beautiful illusions, even if the 
Opposition had not delayed the decision so long that the 
ambassadors of the United States reached Panama too late. 
It is another question whether Adams's more modest wishes 
might not have been partly fulfilled. 

The secretary of state had known how to impart to the 
president something of his own enthusiasm, which let him 
see in the Panama congress the boundary stone of a " new 

1 Clay, Speeches, I., pp. 89, 90. 



416 LTK BOVEBEIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

epoch of the world's history." 1 Adams's message to the 
house of representatives fairly surpassed Clay's effusions 
in pompous phrases. lie doubted whether such a favor* 
ble opportunity for Bubserving "the benevolent pur] 
of divine providence " and dispensing " the prou 
blessings of the Redeemer of mankind" would again he 
presented to the United States in centuries.- With this 
tasteless piece of declamation, however, lie satisfied his 
artificially-kindled enthusiasm. The message now begini 
to treat, in a measured, statesmanlike way, of the que** 
tions which the president especially wished to see disc 
by the congress and in regard to which he thought the 
attainment of advantageous results not impossible. He 
discusses, first and most thoroughly, the conclusion of friend- 
ly and commercial treaties, on the basis of complete reci- 
procity, on the footing of the most favored nation, " the 
abolition of private war upon the ocean," and limitations 
of war-usages, in regard to contraband-of-war and blockade, 
in such a way as to favor neutral trade. After explaining, 
with great minuteness, his position on the Monroe doctrine 
and the way in which he wishes to see it brought before 
the congress and treated by the latter, he touches upon 

1 Instructions of May 8, 1826 to the ambassadors. Niles' Reg., 
XXXVI., p. 71. 

9 M But objects of the highest importance, not only to the futon 
fare of the whole human race, but bearing directly upon the special in- 
terests of this Union, will engage the deliberations of the congri 
Panama, whether we are represented there or not. Others, if w 
represented, may be offered by our plenipotentiaries tor consideration, 
having in view both these great results, our own interests and the im- 
provement of the condition of man upon earth. It may be that in the 
lapse of many centuries no other opportunity so favorable will be pre- 
sented to the government of the United Slates to subserve .he beuei 
purposes of divine providence, to dispense the promised blessii 
the Redeemer of mankind, and to promote the prevalence, in l'utun 
of peaee on earth and goodwill to man, as will now be placed in their 
power, by participating in the deliberations of this congress." Xiles' 
Reg., XXX., p. 53. 



KEA80XS OF OPPOSITION. 417 

Hayti and Cuba with diplomatic prudence, 1 and finally ex- 
presses the opinion that an effort should be made on the 
part of the United States to obtain the recognition of "the 
just and liberal principles of religious liberty." 2 The mes- 
sage ends with a sort of apology for the exaggerated hopes 
expressed in its beginning. Adams repeated, indeed, that 
the matter was one of " transcendent benefit to the human 
race," but yet called the meeting of the congress " in its 
nature, a measure speculative and experimental," and de- 
clared that it would perhaps be " too sanguine" to expect 
the realization of "all or even any" of its grand aims. 

If Clay reveled in Quixotic allusions and if Adams, too, 
had been drawn into his intoxication, the Opposition in 
both houses of congress went just as far on the other side. 
The zeal shown was, indeed, in great part, a sham. The 
Panama mission was not the ground of the opposition, but 
merely gave this the opportunity of introducing itself with 
effect as an Opposition party. 3 To this was due the bound- 
lessness of the attacks by which congressmen made them- 
selves still more ridiculous than the secretary of state had 
made himself by the boundlessness of his hopes. Adams 
rightly called the idea and the plan " benevolent and hu- 
mane." But the Opposition was so crazed in its blind zeal, 
that, out of policy, it had not the slightest word of approval 

1 I shall return to these three points. 

2 Adams had already urged this view, as secretary of state, in his in- 
structions to Anderson, May 27, 1823. (Elliot, Dip. Code, 1L, p. 653.) 
It appears, indeed, from the message that he at first thought only of 
assuring to citizens of the United States the free exercise of their .relig- 
ion, which had already been secured to them in the treaties with Co- 
lombia and Central America. 

3 "An opposition is evidently brewing. It will show itself on the Pan- 
ama question." Webster to J. Story, Dec. 31, 1825, Webster, Priv. 
Corres., I., p. 401. Brent of Louisiana said in the house of representa- 
tives: " Can an Opposition to the present administration be so preju- 
diced as not to see that this measure recommended by the president is 
for the protection of our southern interests ?" Deb. of Congress, IX., 
p. 105. 

27 



418 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

for an j point whatever of the whole Bcheme. Every part of 
it was raked over the coals and the most innocent portion 
was held ap as the source of sure destruction. In the senate^ 

as well as in the house, a morbid conscientiousness in the 
fulfillment of pretended neutral duties was displayed. 1 All 
proofs drawn from international law against the all' 
danger were, fruitless, since men would not be convinced. 
They constantly argued on the supposition that represen- 
tation in the congress involved an active participation in all 
its debates and decisions. A breach of neutrality might 
easily be deduced from this, for Spain still maintained all 
her claims to her former colonies, and the latter had placed 
upon the programme of the congress different questions 
directly relating to the war with the mother country. This 
was carrying the dishonesty of the conflict to an extreme. 
From the time of the first informal negotiations, it had 
been provided for and agreed to by both sides at every op- 
portunity, and in the most express words, and it was clearly 
understood, that the neutrality of the United State- w 
be in no way endangered. Adams pointed this out in his 
messages to congress and added, moreover, that the partic- 
ipation of the representatives of the United States was 
" wished" only in those discussions which did not bear 
upon the war of the other powers with Spain. 2 

All the other points were treated in the same wa 
this. Adams brought forward — what, in fact, did not i 
to be said at all — that the congress would be a simply "de- 
liberative" assembly. 3 But the Opposition deim 

1 Deb. of Congress, VIII., pp. 423, 432, 433, 436; IX., p. 1G*, passim] 
Niles 1 Reg., XXX., p. 103. 

2 Salazar, in his letter of Nov. 2, ls^r )% to Clay, divides the topi 
discussion under the heads (I.) and (II.) into the common conc< i 
the war-making powers and the interests common to them and th< 
tral powers. 

3 In Clay'- instructions of May 8, 1826, to '.he ambassadors is ihis 
passage: "All notion is rejected of an amphyctionic council, iir- 
with power finally to decide upon controversies between the American 



THE HOLY ALLIANCE. 419 

to him that the congress would have the right to make 
■binding resolves, and stamped it as ignorance and folly to 
let the country be bound by Epigoni of unequal birth. 

Objections of this sort were brought with especial em- 
phasis, and not without a certain justification, against the 
suggestion of an universal endorsement of the Monroe doc- 
trine, a doctrine that originated in the same circumstances 
that gave birth to the Panama congress. In July, .1818, 
lord Castlereagh told the American ambassador Rush, in 
a conversation at the house of the French ambassador, 
that England had been requested by Spain to mediate, with 
the co-operation of the Holy Alliance, between her and her 
rebellious colonies. Rush answered this revelation with the 
declaration that the United States would take part in no 
intervention for peace, "if its basis were not the indepen- 
dence of the colonies." 1 In August, 1823, Rush learned 
from Canning that the Holy Alliance was beo-innino- to 
seriously think of interfering in colonial affairs in favor of 
Spain. 2 England's position on the question had meanwhile 
substantially changed. If Castlereagh had been willing in 
1818 to make the return of the colonies under Spanish 
dominion the basis of the attempt at intervention, Welling- 
ton had by this time used very different language at the 
congress of Yerona, and now Canning declared himself 
ready to -act in direct opposition to the plans of the Holy 
Alliance, provided he were assured of the co-operation of 
the United States. Rush at once forwarded these state- 
ments of Canning to his government, which received them 

states or to regulate in any respect their conduct." But hence Kapp has 
not a happily chosen expression when he says (Gesch. der Sklaverei, p. 
193) that Clay had in view the creation of " an American amphyctionic 
court to counteract the European Holy Alliance." See, however, Deb. 
of Congress, VIII., p. 649. 

1 Rush, Report of July 31, 1818; Elliot, Dip. Code., II., pp. 639, 640. 

2 Compare Rush, A Residence at the Court of London from 1819 to 
1825, II., pp. 30-40. See also Rush's letters to Clay of June 23, 1827, 
and February 15, 1842 ; Clay, Priv. Corresp., pp. 165, 467. 



420 BTATB SOVEREIGNTY AND BLAVEBY. 

with "great satisfaction," for, as Calhoun, the tin 
tary of war, afterwards declared, the power of the Alliance 
so great that the United States themselves had not 
felt safe from its intermeddling. Monroe sent the records 
concerning the matter to all the members of his cabinet^ 
and at the same time asked Jefferson for his opinion. The 
latter answered that " America, North and South,'' ae a 
result of its own peculiar interests, should also ha 
peculiar political system, founded on freedom. It should 
be a leading principle of the United States " never to si 
Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs." For the 
attainment of these ends the offered help of England should 
be accepted, even at the risk of a war. 1 The cabinet, after 
long and careful consideration, came to the same opinion. 
Almost at the very moment when Spain formally invited 
the allied powers to a conference in Paris, 2 the president 
announced in his annual message of Dec. 1, 1823, tin 
called Monroe doctrine. 3 Its essence is contained in the 
following sentences: 

. . "We declare that we should consider any attempt [of 

1 " Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle our- 
selves in the broils of Europe. Our second, never to suffer Europe to 
intermeddle with cis Atlantic affairs. America, North and South, has 
certain interests distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly her own. 
She should therefore have a system of her own, separate and apart from 
that of Europe. While the last is laboring to become the domicile of 
despotism, our endeavors should surely be to make our hemisphei 
of freedom. One nation, most of all, could disturb us in this pursuit 
She now offers to lead, aid, and accompany us in it. By acceding to 
her proposition, we detach her from the bands, brim: her mighty \\ 
into the scales of free government, and emancipate a continent at one 
stroke, which might otherwise linger along in doubt and difficulty. . 
. . But the war in which the present proposition might i 
should that be its consequence, is not her war, but ours. . . . It is 
to maintain our principle, not to depart from it. . . But 1 am clearly 
of Mr. Canning's opinion that it will prevent, instead of provoking, 
war." Jeff, Works, VII., pp. 815, 310. 

- Webster, Works, III , p. 303. 

3 Foreign State Papers, V., p. 250. 



MONROE DOCTRINE. 421 

the allied powers] to extend their system to any portion of 
this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. . . 
With the governments who have declared their independ- 
ence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, 
on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, 
we could not view any interposition for the purpose of op- 
pressing them or controlling, in any other manner, their 
destiny by any European power, in any other light than as 
the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the 
United States." 

This declaration was received by the people with lively 
satisfaction. It was largely due to this, that Spain's prayers 
for intervention received no attention. But now all 
fears that the Holy Alliance would try to put in a word or 
two in the affairs of the United States 1 had vanished. And 
on this account a very different interpretation was given 
to the Monroe doctrine. In the letters of invitation from 
Mexico and Colombia, this question occupied a prominent 
position. Obregon referred to Monroe's message and said 
that the " only means" of preventing or practically oppos- 
ing the interference of neutral powers, was " a previous 
agreement about the method in which each of the congress- 
powers should give its co-operation." Salazar spoke even 
of an u eventual alliance," and wished that u the treaty, no 
use of which is to be made until the appearance of a casus 
foederis, may remain secret." Besides this, both the am- 
bassadors declared that the congress would settle how all 
possible attempts of European powers to establish colonies 
on xVmerican soil were to be met. These were proposals 
of a very earnest sort. The Opposition affirmed, unques- 
tionably with justice, that their adoption by the United 
States would not be a simple re-affirmation of the Monroe 
doctrine. The Opposition defended itself from the reproach 
that it had become indifferent to the cause of freedom in 

1 Clay's report of March 9, 1826, to the house of representatives. 



492 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AM) SLAVERY. 

tlu' rest of America; it Bimplv wished, it said, to preserve 
to the United States the freedom <>f choice and not to bind 
them to draw the sword under all circumstances in behalf 
of the other American states, when European powers in- 
terfered in their affairs. The weak point in the argument 
of the Opposition was again the assumption that the ful- 
lillment of the wishes of Colombia and Mexico would 
result simply from the representation of the United Si 
in the congress, without any further action. Even in this 
case, there was no lack of apparent justification. Amond 
the documents which the president sent in to congress there 
was a dispatch of Clay to Poinsett, the ambassador of the 
United States to Mexico, in which was this passage: "< )nly 
about three months ago, when Mexico thought France was 
meditating an invasion of Cuba, the Mexican government 
at once demanded through you, from the government of 
the United States, the fulfillment of the memorable pli 
given by the president in his message of December, 1823, 
to congress." Clay, indeed, explained the opinion here 
expressed, in his report of March 29, 1826, to the hous 
representatives, by saying that the United Stat 
pledged, not to a foreign power, but only to themsel 
I3ut the Opposition naturally did not accept this explana- 
tion as sufficient. Yet whatever the secretary of - 
might think, in any event the view of the president must 
rule and the latter had expressed himself so clearly that the 
Opposition did not even try to twist his words from their 
meaning. As secretary of state, he had had a prominent 
part in the announcement of the Monroe doctrine and had 
steadily occupied a perfectly consistent position. He would 

' " If, indeed, an attempt by force had been made by allied Euro] 
subvert the liberties of the southern nations on this continent and to 
erect upon the ruins of their free institution- monarchical systems, the 
people of the United Stales would have stood pledged, in the opinion of 
their executive, not to any foreign state, but to themselves and theif 
rity, by their dearest interests and their highest duties, to rcAs\ to 
the utmost BUCh attempt." 



CLAIMS OF THE SLAVEHOLDERS. 423 

therefore have gladly seen the question brought before the 
congress and gave it to be understood that he considered a 
general declaration in its favor as not inadvisable. But he 
expressly stated that under no circumstances would any 
pledges be entered into beyond the reciprocal assurance of 
the powers represented that they would execute the princi- 
ples laid down in the doctrine, each within its own territory 
and with its own resources. 1 So, on this point, too, there 
failed to be any sufficient reason for such a violent opposi- 
tion. 

Yet there was no lack of objections of practical signifi- 
cance. In the house of rej)resentatives, these were only 
lightly touched upon, partly because the northern members 
of the Opposition party looked with the greatest displeasure 
upon any vigorous urging of them, and especially because 
only the question of appropriating money to pay the ex- 
penses of the mission, already decided upon in accordance 
with the provisions of the constitution and without the co- 
operation of the house, came before the latter body. The 
Opposition wished to attach conditions to the appropriation 
which amounted to instructions given to the president as 
well as to the ambassadors, and consequently the debate 
went far beyond the proper bounds. But yet it had to be 
kept within certain limits, so that the real cause of the 
embittered struggle, outside of opposition for the sake of 
opposition, can scarcely be discovered in it. But in the 
senate it appeared so much the more, clearly that the slave- 
holding interest was again the cause of strife. There was 
no attempt to conceal this. It was proclaimed in a hither- 
to unheard-of way. The slaveholders simply stated that 
they saw in the congress peril to their " peculiar institu- 
tion," and drew from this fact, in the same conclusive 
way, the inference that this must be recognized eo ipso 

1 See the message of Dec. 26, 1825, to the senate and the one of March 
15, 1826, to the house of representatives. Compare, also, the instructions 
to the ambassadors. Niles' Reg., XXXVL, p. 77. 



424 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AM) SLAVERY 

as an absolute veto. The municipal character of slavery 
was wholly stripped oil*, form and substance. It appeared 
as an independent power, which only obtained its rights 
when it dictated the domestic and foreign policy of the 

Union. (May and Adams had pointed out freedom and 
popular sovereignty, in contradistinction to the absolutistio 
principles of the Holy Alliance, as the underlying basis 
of the political and social life u of America." Now the 

south affirmed that in reference to the rest of America, as 
well as to Europe, slavery must be and remain the prima 

motive of the foreign policy of the United States. Who- 
ever cannot yet clearly understand that an "irrepressible 

conflict" existed between north and south can learn much 
from the rigorous logic with which the southern senator! 
in this debate put forward slavery as an impassable wall 
between the United States and the rest of the world. 

In the invitations to the congress Ilayti was mentioned, 
a name that had an ominous sound in the southern states for 
more than thirty years. If they could have blotted one 
page out of the book of history, it can scarcely be doubted 
that they would have chosen the one which told the st«»ry 
of the successful negro revolution in Ilayti. It was a cry 
of warning, the whole significance of which was recalled 
to the conscience of the slaveholder by the slightest ca 
The thing which had been done could not be undone: but 
men did what they could, — the independence of Ilayti 
did not exist for the United Stages. The commercial 
spirit of the people would not sutler the permanent pro- 
hibition of the lucrative trade with the island; 1 but no in- 
ternational relation existed between the two republics. 

1 At the request of Napoleon, expressed in an imperious tone, a law 
of Feb. 28, 1806 (Statutes at Large, II.. ]>. 851) had prohibited all com- 
merce with the island for a year. The law referred, indeed, only to 
places not found in the possession of the French ; but the French rule 

was actually broken everywhere. The French ambassador had e\ 

ly based the demand of tin; emperor on the ground that this matter con 

ccrncd "African slaves," the dregs of humanity. 



HATTI. 425 

Salazar touched lightly upon this in his letter of invita- 
tion, and let it clearly appear that it was his wish that 
Hayti should be recognized as a member, with equal rights, 
of the American family of nations. He admitted that 
the question " involved grave difficulties," on account of 
" the different way in which Africans are looked upon, 
arid the different rights they enjoy in Hayti, the United 
States, and the other American states;" but expressed the 
hope that, despite this, an understanding might be arrived 
at. He imprudently used in this connection the phrase: 
'•This question will be determined by the congress."* 1 

Adams did not mention this point at all in his message 
to the senate, and in the one to the house he explained, in 
a diplomatically verbose and vague sentence, that the am- 
bassadors had been instructed to give reasons for further 
delay in the recognition of Hayti and " to refuse consent 
to any arrangement whatever upon different principles." 
The silence concerning the reasons which had hitherto 
hindered the recognition was scarcely less suggestive than 
the foaming rage which the passage already quoted from 
Salazar's letter called forth in the senate. 

The history of the republics gave an example which 
was " scarcely less fatal than the independence of Hayti 
to the repose" of the south. They had not only copied 
from the revolutionary records of the United States the 
words "freedom" and "equality" and "universal eman- 
cipation," but had actually broken the chains of all slaves. 2 

1 The word "determine" had been used in the official newspaper of 
Colombia. See Debates of Congress, VIII., p. 423. 

2 "With nothing connected with slavery can we consent to treat with 
other nations, and least of all ought we to touch this question of the 
independence of Hayti in conjunction with revolutionary governments, 
whose own history affords an example scarcely less fatal to our repose. 
Those governments have proclaimed the principles of liberty and equal- 
ity, and have marched to victory under the banner of ' universal eman- 
cipation.' Tou find men of color at the head of their armies, in their 
legislative halls, and in their executive departments." Hayne, March 
14, 1826, Debates of Congress, VIII., p. 427. 



42G STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

A discussion with them, therefore, over any question 
whatever in which .slavery was in any way whatever in- 
volved was less admissable than with any one of the other 
powers, for this action — and this alone — had made them 
in the eyes of the south '• buccaneers, drunken with their 
new-horn liberty." 1 This, however, was only incidentally 
touched upon. The main thing was that slavery Bhonld no 
more he made, in any way whatever, a subject of negotia- 
tion with other powers than the rights of slaveholders 
should be subjected to any sort of discussion inside of the 
Union. It had already been pointed out as a mistake that 
attempts had been made to conclude treaties with England 
and Colombia for the suppression of the slave trade. 2 
" The peace of eleven states in this Union will not permit 
. . . the fact to be seen or told that fur the murder of 
their masters and mistresses they [the slaves of Ilavti] 
are to find friends among the white people of these United 
States." The whole question "is not debatable, neither 
at home nor abroad, not even in this chamber.'' 3 Ilavne, 
of South Carolina cried: "To call into question our rights 
is grossly to violate them; to attempt to instruct us on 
this subject is to insult us; to dare to assail our institu- 
tions is wantonly to invade our peace. Let me solemnly 
declare, once for all, that the southern states never will 
permit, and never can permit, any interference whatever 
in their domestic concerns, and that the very day on which 
the unhallowed attempt shall be made by the authoritii 
the federal government we will consider ourselves as driven 
from the Union." 4 But there was no need even of an 
unjust interference. " To touch [the question] anywhere 
is to violate our most sacred rights, to put in jeopardy 
our dearest interests, the peace of our country, the safety 

1 Deb. of Cong., VIII., p.4o6; Xilcs' Reg., XXX, p. 170. 
8 Ibid, VIII.. p. 436. 
1 Ibid, VIII., p. 4.;!). 
J Ibid, VIII.. p. 420. 



HATRED OF HAYTI. 427 

of our families, our altars, and our firesides." And even 
this does not fully show the terrible nature of the question. 
Johnston of Louisiana wished to see the country repre- 
sented at the congress, but for precisely the same reasons 
which, according to the views of Benton, Hayne, Berrien 
and others, forbade any thought of such a thing. He 
wished the " South American states" to be informed of 
" the unalterable opinion" of the United States that " the 
unadvised recognition of that island [Hayti] and the pub- 
lic reception of their ministers will nearly sever our dip- 
lomatic intercourse, and bring about a separation and 
alienation injurious to both." "I deem it," he continued, 
"of the highest concern to the political connection of these 
countries to remonstrate against a measure so justly offen- 
sive to us, and to make that remonstrance effectual." 1 
Hayne, too, had already demanded that " the ambassadors 
in South America and Mexico should be instructed to 
protest against the independence of Hayti." 2 These were 
drastic illustrations of the old assertion that not the blame, 
but the compassion, of the world was deserved, because a 
hard fate had let the curse brought upon the land by the 
avarice of England, descend to the innocent children of 
the third, and fourth generation. Could Clay lay his finger 
on a resolution of the Holy Alliance which smacked more 
strongly of the mouldy barbarism of by-gone centuries? 

If the request for a discussion of the independence of 
Hayti, which could exert no sort of influence upon the 
United States, except by its moral force, irritated the slave- 
holders to such a degree, they were naturally still more 

1 Deb. of Cong., VIIL, p. 441. 

2 Hamilton of South Carolina declared in the house of representa- 
tives : " I should avow what I believe to be the sentiments of the south- 
ern people on this question ; and this is, that Haytian independence is 
not to be tolerated in any form. ... A people will not stop to 
discuss the nice metaphysics of a federative system when havoc and 
destruction menace them in their doors." 



42S STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY 

moved by the fact that Cuba was threatened, since here 
material interests of the greatest significance were actually 
concerned. Clay declared that "even Spain has not such 
a deep interest in such a multiplicity of forms in the 
future fate of Cuba, whatever that fate may be, as the 
I nited States." 1 The increasing weakness of Spain i! 
fore gave the administration the liveliest anxiety. Many 
a longing look had already been cast by the United Si 
upon the rich island which commanded the Gulf of Mexico. 
But men did not conceal from themselves the fact that 
many weighty reasons spoke against its acquisition and, 
moreover, did not look upon the legal question as a matter 
of secondary importance. There was a quite unanimous 
agreement that, taken all in all, the interests of the United 
States — both the general interests and the special om 
the slaveholder — rdemanded the maintenance of the status 
quo in Cuba. But this seemed seriously threatened OB 
different sides. England and France were looked upon 
with distrust, especially the latter, because she had already 
sent a strong squadron into the West India seas without 
giving any special reason for doing so. Colombia and 
Mexico had been wrapt up for some time in thoughts of 
invasion. The safest way to avoid these dangers was evi- 
dently to bring to an end the war between Spain and her 
former colonies. In the Spring of 1S25 the United States 
ambassador at St. Petersburgh was instructed to urge the 
emperor to persuade Spain to give up the hopeless 
struggle. 2 The gist of the instructions may be condensed 
into the four following sentences: the United States wish 
no change in the political relations of Cuba; they could 
not see with equanimity the island pass into the possession 
of any European power whatever; 3 the independence of 

1 Instructions of the ambassadors to the Panama congress 

2 Clay's dispatch to Middleton of May 10, 1835. 

3 Compare also Clay's dispatch of October 25, 182.J, to Brown, United 
States ambassador at Paris. 



cttba. 429 

Cuba is not desired by them, because this could be main- 
tained with difficult}", and because the struggle for it would 
probably assume the same terrible character that the revo- 
lution in Hayti did; the last-named reasons, which have 
an especial weight on account of the existence of slavery 
in the United States, apply equally to any possible at- 
tempts of acquisition made by Colombia and Mexico. 
These four points, with the strongest emphasis laid upon 
the last, were urged in all the other official writings of the 
administration on this affair. The reasoning was only 
varied to correspond with the change of address, and the 
tone grew sharper in proportion as circumstances devel- 
oped. 

After Kesselrode had returned an answer in the name 
of the emperor, 1 which was received at Washington as, 
upon the whole, favorable, and after " the freeing of the 
islands of Porto Rico and Cuba from the Spanish yofe" 
had been openly placed upon the programme of the Pana- 
ma congress, 2 Clay sent a new dispatch to Middleton, 3 
which was intended to urge Russia to immediate action. 
It had already been declared that the United States could 
not with equanimity see Cuba pass into the hands of a 
European power. Now it was directly declared that the 
United States would not "allow" and "permit" it. More- 
over, the position of the country in regard to Colombia's 
and Mexico's plans of acquisition was more sharply de- 
lined. It was stated, first, that " the president could see 
no just ground for armed intervention" if Spain should 
obstinately continue the war, for invasion would then be 
only a " legal warlike operation" of the states named. 
Yet this declaration was linked with a significant condi- 



1 Nesselrode to Middleton, August 25, 1825. 

2 The words quoted are taken from the programme already mentioned, 
published in the official newspaper of Colombia. In Salazar's and 
Obregon's letters of invitation Cuba is not mentioned. 

3 December 26, 1825. 



430 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

fcion. "If these republics, contrary to all expectation, 
should place arm.- in the hands of one race in order to de- 
stroy another: if . . they should countenance and en- 
courage excesses and actions which, on account of our 
proximity, could by infection endanger our repose and 
safety; then the government of the United States might 
feel ohliged to interpose." This same conditional threat, 
in vaguer form, had already been directly expressed to 
Spain before the transmission of the first dispatch to 
Middleton. It had been expressly stated in this that the 
United States did not insist upon the stoppage of the war 
"for the sake of the new republics." 1 Colombia and 
Mexico had also been informed of the wishes of the United 
States; but the somewhat bitter mouthful was made more 
pleasant to the taste, inasmuch as a certain friendly tone 
could be detected in the diplomatic expressions, chosen 
with the greatest prudence. Dec. 20, Clay sent similar 
notes to Salazar and Obregon, in which their respective 
governments were requested to delay the expedition 
against Cuba, which, it was said, was being fitted out in 
Carthagena or elsewhere. The main reason for this re- 
quest was stated to be that the negotiations undertaken 
with Russia for intervention in the interests of peace had 
some prospect of success. 

But besides this, it was also declared in a very intelligi- 
ble way that under certain circumstances the United States 
would intervene if their wish were not respected.' 2 

If a reproach could rightly be brought against the ad- 
ministration, it was surely not that the Cuban question had 
been lightly considered, or even merely that the govern- 

1 Clay's dispatch to Everett, April 27, 1825. 

' ll It would also postpone, if not for ever render unnecessary, all con- 
sideration which other powers [i. e. the United States] may, by an irre- 
sistible sense of their essential interests, be called upon to entertain of 
their duties, in the event ot the contemplated invasion of those islands, 
and of other contingencies which may accompany or follow it." 



THREATS. . 431 

ment had not sought to defend with circumspection and 
energy the especial interests of the slaveholders, which 
were involved in this question. Yet the majority of the 
representatives of the south were not of this opinion, and 
the small minority which stood by the president affirmed, 
like the rest, that circumstances now demanded a still more 
energetic treatment. On the main question, majority and 
minority were united. They disputed only whether repre- 
sentation in the congress, or absence from it, would be 
more in accordance with their views. The minority 
throughout the debate did not fall behind the majority it- 
self in the determination with which it demanded the 
thwarting of the plans of Colombia and Mexico. If Hayne 
made the declaration that the United States would not 
"permit 1 ' the South American states " to take or to revo- 
lutionize" Cuba, 1 and if Berrien wished "by the blessing 
of God and the strength of our own arms to enforce the 
declaration," 2 Johnston himself considered it as self-evi- 
dent that " threats" should be tried, if " advice" and " re- 
monstrances" did not avail. 3 All the representatives of 
the slave states were unanimous in thinking that the want 
of a sufficient reason for interference in case of an inva- 
sion, to which Adams referred, should not control the 
matter. "With equal clearness the reasons for this were 
summed up in the one phrase: the duty of self-preserva- 



1 Deb. of Cong., VIII., p. 420. 

2 " If our interest and our safety shall require us to say to these new 
republics: ' Cuba and Porto Rico must remain as they are,' we are free 
to say it, yes, sir, and by the blessing of God and the strength of our 
own arms to enforce the declaration, and let me say, too, gentlemen, these 
high considerations do require it. The vital interests of the south de- 
mand it and the United States will be recreant from its duty, faithless to 
the protection which it owes to the fairest portion of this Union, if it 
does not make this declaration and enforce it." Ibid, VIII., p. 456. 

3 " Advise with them— remonstrate— menace them if necessary, against 
a step so dangerous to us, and perhaps fatal to them." Ibid, VIII., p. 
440. 



432 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AM) BLAYBB 

tion. 1 Buchanan, always a courtier of the south, translated 
this phrase, which on account of its cold prose might hive 
produced little effect upon many cars, into a striking pic- 
ture. Cuba, he maintained, would become a terribl< 
plosive powder-magazine for the south, because Colombia 
and Mexico " always marched under the standard of uni- 
versal emancipation" and " always conquered by proclaim* 
ing liberty to the slave."' 2 Xu representative of the north 
made any objection to the application of this comparison, 
and none could be made. The condition of affairs was 
stated in it with absolute clearness, but still no repn 
tative of the north stood up to point out, in just as curt a 
phrase, how the south had played fast and loose with its 
arguments. Slavery is a domestic affair of the south; to 
interfere with it is to dissolve the Union, — this was the 
position of the south. Slavery is like a powder-magazine, 
which can be fired as easily from without as from within; 
the danger of this occurrence must lead the federal ( 
eminent in the way pointed out to it by the south, which 
alone understands the question, — this was its second por- 
tion. The slaveholding interest thus laid claim not only 
to be recognized as the sovereign power in the state, but it 
put itself above the state. 

As the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions, since they 
had no immediate practical results, had been passed over 
in favor of events of the day, so the Panama congress was 
also forgotten and still more quickly. The administration 
gained a formal victory in both houses, but practically the 
Opposition had reached its end by delaying the decision. 
When the ambas>ad<>rs of the United States arrived in 
Panama, the congress had already adjourned and the 

1 " It i- demanded of this government by every consideration ol 
preservation — the great law of nature and paramount to all other law— 
by our interests and by humanity [ :] not to sutler the present condition 
of Cuba lo be altered." Powell of Virginia, Deb. of Cong., IX., p. 'J'J. 

3 Ibid, IX., p. U2. 



TROUBLE WITH GEORGIA. 433 

agreed-upon reunion in Tacubaya did not take place. This 
pitiable end of Clay's illusions makes the long and earnest 
debates in both honses appear to superficial critics like 
nonsense. Their bitter earnestness was recognized only af- 
ter long and harsh experience. The American league of 
the people which, in opposition to the princes' league of 
European despots, was to be a refuge of freedom for the 
whole world, had indeed dissolved into mist. Instead of a 
formal protest against the machinations of the Holy Alli- 
ance and a spirited exhortation to enslaved nations to 
maintain unbroken courage in the holy struggle for right 
and freedom, the world was comforted with a sweeping, un- 
reserved confession of faith of the slavocracy, which made 
the slaveholding interest the starting-point, the means and 
the goal of the national policy of the only free state, the 
voice of which was of weight in this matter. This, also, 
had no immediate practical results. But, as in the case of 
the state-rights men and the Yirginia and Kentucky reso- 
lutions, so now the slaveholders had registered their claims. 
This gave a permanent meaning to the otherwise absolutely 
fruitless and aimless struggle over the Panama mission. 

Another question, which also originated at the begin- 
ning of Adams's presidency, soon won a much greater 
practical significance, although it concerned an affair which 
at bottom was only formally a national one. When Georgia, 
on April 24, 1802, ceded to the Union her western lands, 
she did so on the condition that the United States " as 
soon as it can be done in a peaceful way and on reasonable 
conditions" should acquire for the state the territories of 
the Creeks and Cherokees, which lay within her borders. 
The federal government had indeed acquired for Georgia, 
on repeated occasions, certain stretches of lands from both 
these tribes, but the possibility of persuading them to a 
voluntary sale of the whole territory constantly became 
smaller, for they had become settled, and the ties of civ- 
ilized life bound them every year more firmly to the place. 
28 



434 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AM) SLAVKIIY. 

Georgia therefore became anxious and impatient, for Bbe 
failed to feel confident that she, like the free states, would 
be aide to compel the Indians, by the pressureof a higher 
civilization, to break up their settlements and wander 

farther into the western wilderness. A memorial of the 
legislature in 1S10 urged the president to hasten the ful- 
fillment of the agreement of 1802. It insisted that the 
state had a " right" to the soil, hut vet expressly asserted 
that this right could be realized only through the federal 
government. 1 The administration was entirely willing to 
fulfill its pledges, but the more emphatically Georgia in- 
sisted upon this, the more firmly the Indians refused to 
sell. A counsel of Creek chiefs at Tuckebacdiee declared, <»n 
May 25, 1S24, that the lands still in their possession were 
only sufficient for the support of the tribe, and resolvedj 
appealing to the guaranties given them in all the trea 
" on no account . . (to) sell one foot" of their land. 
This resolution was to hold good for all time and was )«•«•- 
ommended to the consideration of the chiefs in a very 
emphatic way. ""We have guns and ropes; and if any of 
our people should break these laws, those guns and ro 
are to be their end." On the 29th of October of the same 
year, a counsel of chiefs met again at Polecat Springj 
passed a resolution of the same tenor, and committed it — 
" confiding in the magnanimous disposition of the citi 
of the United States to render justice" to the Indians 
a newspaper for publication, "so that it may be known to 
the world." 2 

The negotiations with the commissioners of tin 

1 " The state of Georgia claims a right to the jurisdiction of the terri- 
tory within her limits. . . . She admits, however, that the rig 
inchoate, remaining to be perfected by the United States, ia the i 
tion of the Indian title; the United States pro hac rice as their a_ 
Worcester vs. State of Georgia, Peters, Rep., VI., p. 5So; Cur 
p. 2(14. 

a The resolutions are quoted in full in Niles' Reg., XXVII 
222-224. 



TREATY OF INDIAN SPRINGS. 435 

States, which took place in December at Broken Arrow, 
were therefore also without result. But Georgia was deter- 
mined not to allow herself to be kept longer from the rich 
territories of the Indians. Her avarice recognized no 
Indian rights which were to be respected, and the commis- 
sioners allowed themselves to obtain in a treacherous way 
what could not be bought by an honorable bargain. A part 
of the chiefs were persuaded to- sign a treaty of sale at 
Indian Springs, which was approved, despite the remon- 
strances and protests of the Indian agents, 1 by the senate 
and the president (Adams). 2 The Creeks declared that the 
treaty was a shameful betrayal and fulfilled upon the chiefs 
M'Intosh, Tustunugge and Hawkins the law of Tucke- 
bachee, which imposed the penalty of death upon every 
seller of the tribal territory. The grand jury of Milledge- 
ville branded the deed as "nefarious murder," 3 although 
the Creeks were unquestionably justified in passing and 
executing such a law, by their own customs as well as by 
their tribal status as recognized by the treaties. This was 
also the opinion of the administration, after it had been 
shown that M'Intosh and his fellow-culprits had fallen vic- 
tims, not to the revenge of individuals, but to a resolution 
of the chiefs. Yet the occurrence caused grave anxiety, 
for it showed what opposition the fulfillment of the treaty 
would meet. The reckless and arrogant way in which 
governor Troup, on his own responsibility, took steps to- 
wards the expulsion of the Indians, was not adapted to 
lessen this anxiety. According to the representations of 
the Indian agents, the summary execution of the chiefs 
was due in great part to the land-survey ordered by the 
governor. This, however, freed the agents from the accu- 
sation of having incited the Indians. 

1 Governor Troup to secretary of war Barbour, June 3, 1825. Niles' 
Reg., XXVIII., p. 317. 

2 Stat, at L., VII., p. 237. 

3 Niles' Reg., XXVIII., p. 196. 



4oG MATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

Adams viewed the mutter very gravely. lie com mis- 
sioned col. Andrews to investigate the complaints against 
the Indian agents and gen. Gaines received orders to sup- 

- any hostilities on the part of the Indians and to 
some way in which an understanding conld be arrived at 
with them. Both Andrews and Gaines adopted a prudent, 
conciliatory course of conduct towards the governor, hut 
they were soon completely at odds with him, since lie at- 
tacked them in a vulgar way in his official papers, because 
they did not unconditionally accept his views of the state 
of things, but practically conducted an impartial examin- 
ation. He not only considered himself authorized to (in- 
sure them, but he defined in the harshest tone of arrogance 
the limits of their competence. Every step they took, 
according to him, was a usurpation. His proof for this 
was a simple " dixi!" which found its justification in the 
" sovereign ty" of the state, the embodiment of which, 
cording to him, was the governor. The federal govern- 
ment was to him a wholly foreign power, with which he 
maintained " diplomatic intercourse." In his letters to 
Andrews, Gaines, and even to the secretary of war, he 
never speaks of the federal government, but always use! 
the expression "your government." He does not conde- 
scend to any discussion of the question of his compet< 
because he does not even recognize the possibility of any 
such question. The sovereign state of Georgia pa 
sovereign resolutions and the governor, responsible to 
alone, accomplishes these, despite the protest of all the 
powers of the world. State sovereignty had never beforf 
hern pleaded in such an unconditional way and with such 
insolent boldness. Yet the administration followed Troup's 
example in this, that it avoided the usual practice of con- 
sidering the matter from a constitutional standpoint. It 
went quietly on its way, leaving Troup to show how far he 
would venture to make good his pompous words by <J 
Secretary of war Barbour informed the governor, May IS, 



COLLISION OF FEDERAL AND STATE AUTHORITIES. 437 

1825, in the politest way, that the land-survey ordered by 
him could not be permitted. 1 There is not the slightest 
doubt that this prohibition was within the power of the 
federal government. The execution of a treaty depends, 
self-evidently, only upon the parties to the treaty, unless 
the contrary is expressly provided in the treaty itself. 
Georgia was not a party in this case, 2 and therefore had no 
initiative whatever in regard to the treaty. Moreover, 
art. 8 of the treaty set forth that the Creeks could delay 
their departure until Sept. 1, 1826, and bound the United 
States to give them, until then, the fullest protection of all 
their rights. Thus even the president had not the right to 
authorize the survey, without the consent of the Indians. 
But apart from all this, Georgia undeniably had not this 
right, for section 5 of the law of March 30, 1802, concern- 
ing intercourse with Indians, forbade " any citizen" of the 
United States and any " other person" " to survey or at- 
tempt to survey" the lands belonging and guarantied to 
the Indians, under penalty of a fine of not more than $1,000 
and imprisonment of not more than twelve months. 3 

Troup reasoned otherwise. On the 3rd of June he re- 
plied to the secretary of war, u without troubling him 
with the argument," but simply " stating the fact" that 
"on the instant of the ratification the title and jurisdiction 
became absolute in Georgia." 4 He therefore did not doubt 

"'lam instructed to say to your excellency that the president expects 
from what has passed as well as from the now state of feeling among 
the Indians, that the project of surveying their territory will be aban- 
doned by Georgia, till it can be done consistently with the provisions of 
the treaty." Niles' Reg., XXVIII., p. 317. 

2 Since the individual states can conclude no treaties, they surely can- 
not be parties to a treaty. Constitution, Art. I., Sec. 10, § 1. 

3 Stat, at L., II., pp. 141, 142. 

4 " On the instant of the ratification the title and jurisdiction became 
absolute in Georgia, without any manner of exception or qualification 
save the single one which, by the eighth article, gives to tho United 
States the power [!] to protect the Indians in their persons and effects 
against assaults upon either by whites or Indians." Niles' Reg., 



438 STATK SOVEREIGNTY AM> BLAYEBY 

that Barbour himself would "at once" pronounce it "an* 
reasonable" to expect that any attention should be _ 
to tlif "most extraordinary request [!]" of the president; 
postponing the surveys was not to be thought of. 1 

The tone of this letter was very far from being " diplo- 
matic." Troup himself confessed that he bad used "strong 
language," but expressed the hope that Adams would not 
on this account suspect him of attaching no importaD 
the maintenance of the Union. He recognized this . 
undeniable duty, since other k * wise men" were "causing 
the Union to tremble upon a bauble," by " indulging 
their whims and oddities and phantasies." 

The last sentence did not refer to the affair then under 
discussion, but to the slavery question. 2 Troup dra_ 
this in only because "slavery was a harp with a thousand 
strings, which every demagogue could play." The oppor- 
tunity therefor was offered him by a motion of United 
States senator King of New York, for devoting the revenue 
from the sale of public lands, after the extinction of the 
federal debt, to the emancipation of slaves and the colon- 
ization of free negroes, and by an opinion of attorney- 
general Wirt, in which the latter held as unconstitutional 
a South Carolina law that provided for the imprisonment 

XXVIII., p. 318. The passage in Art. 8 reads: "The United - 
stipulate for their [the Indians'] protection against the encroachni 
hostilities and impositions of the whites and of all olle 

1 "If the president believes that we will postpone the survey of the 
country to gratify the agent and the hostile Indians, he deceives him- 
self." * 

2 "Even upon the subject of intensest interest to us, upon which the 
opinions of the president are known, many allowances are made for tbfl 
immeasurable distance which separates us. . . . The tearful i 
quences constantly in sight keep us in a stale of agitation and alarm. 
1 strive to stave them off; and it is for this that language i> einpl 
sickening to the heart and most offensive to a vast portion of the com- 
mon family. Who can help it when they see wise men engaged in a 
playfulness and pa-time like this, indulging their whim- and oddities 
and phantasies, and causing this Union to tremble upon a bauble.'' 



PROPOSED SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY. 439 

of all free colored persons working upon a ship, until the 
ship left the harbors of that state. 1 Troup had held up 
both these facts in his message of May 23, 1825, as " offi- 
cious and impertinent intermeddlings with our domestic 
concerns," and had then drawn the inference that " very 
soon, therefore, the United States government, discarding 
the mask, will openly lend itself to a combination of fan- 
atics for the destruction of everything valuable in the 
southern country." He therefore entreated the legislature 
" most earnestly, now that it is not too late, to step forth 
and, having exhausted the argument, to stand by [its] 
arms." 2 

The utter lack of reasonable grounds for any excitement 
whatever makes this language seem expressly designed to 
introduce into the relations between the general govern- 
ment and the states the rowdy rule which had already be- 
gun to creep into other politics. Yet it found an echo in 
the legislature. The committee to which this part of the 
message was referred brought in a report to the (Georgia) 
house of representatives, which blew still more loudly in 
the trumpet of rebellion. It " proclaimed that the hour 
is come, or is rapidly approaching, when the states from 
Virginia to Georgia, from Missouri to Louisiana, must 
confederate and, as one man, say to the Union: AVe will no 
longer submit our retained rights to the snivelling insinu- 
ations of bad men on the floor of congress, our constitu- 
tional rights to the dark and strained constructions of de- 
signed [designing?] men upon judicial benches." The 
legislature should therefore resolve that it approves, with 
its whole heart, the exhortation of the governor for the 
people of Georgia to stand by their arms, and that its 
members should " for the support of this determination 

1 Opinions of the Attorneys-General, I., p. 659. 

1 Niles' Reg., XXVIII., p. 240. This message contains the phrase so 
often quoted later : " It [slavery] may he our physical weakness— it is 
our moral strength." 



440 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

. . mutually pledge to each other [their] lives [their] 
fortunes, and [their] sacred honor." 1 The astonishment 
and anger excited in the other states by this uncaused out- 
break of madness were so great that the legislature con- 
sidered itself warned to let the responsibility remain 
wholly on the governor and its own committee. It ad- 
journed without coming to any conclusion on the com- 
mittee's report. But it did not leave the governor in the 
lurch in the struggle itself. Troup urged this on with all 
his energy, although he had to abandon the attempt to 
foment a causeless quarrel on the slavery question. 

He notified Gaines, June 13, that the survey of the 
lands would be undertaken, "disregarding any obsta 
which may be opposed from any quarter.'' Gaines answer- 
ed that the Indians had already been informed of the veto 
laid by the federal government upon this scheme. This 
letter crossed a new one of Troup, in which he informed 
Gaines that the laws of Georgia had already been extended 
over the Creek territory, and that he, "of course,"' had to 
fulfill them. On the following day he again sent a prolix 
note, in which he summed up the legal question in the 
well-known sentence of the Kentucky resolutions: "Al 
there exist two independent parties to the question, each 
is permitted to decide for itself." He therefore had "only 
to repeat that, cost what it will, the line will be run and 
the survey effected." On the same day a letter left the 
war department, which notified the governor that th< 
ecution of his scheme would be on his own responsibility; 
the federal government would not answer for the co 
quences. Troup's answer of June 25 was made up of in- 
sults from the first word to the last. He insinuated that 
tne federal government was inciting the Indians to let the 
tomahawk and the scalping-knife do their bloody work; 
demanded information of the ultimate designs of the 

1 Niles' Reg., XXVIII, pp. 271, 272. 






GEORGIA BIDES HER TIME. 441 

government, in order that Georgia might " guard and 
fence herself against the perfidy and treachery of false 
friends"; and declared that he would remain steadfast in 
his resolve, " of which Gen. Gaines has already had suffi- 
cient notice." 1 Now, at last, the administration thought 
the time had come to use language that could not be mis- 
understood. July 21, Troup was informed by the war de- 
partment of the " decision" of the president that the 
survey would not be "allowed." At the same time Gaines 
was instructed to use armed force whenever necessary, and 
a copy of these instructions was also sent to Troup. 2 The 
latter, who had previously forbidden both Andrews and 
Gaines to hold any further intercourse with himself, now 
seemed to wish to extend the injunction to the war depart- 
ment. August 7, he wrote directly to the president a long 
letter, full of plaints and complaints, which was a real mas. 
terpiece of arrogance and shamelessness. 3 Adams, he said, 
must admit that he "makes and breaks treaties at pleasure," 4 
and he finally cited him before the solemn judgment 
seat of the " government of Georgia" to render account 
for his actions. 5 Troup said nothing in this letter about 
considering himself bound by the "decision" of the presi- 
dent; but the survey was postponed. Yet he declared in 
his message of November 8 to the legislature, that he had 
from the first delayed this under protest only because the 

1 This correspondence is given in full in Niles' Reg., XXVIII., pp. 
392-398. 

2 Ibid, XXVI II., p. 412. 

3 Ibid, XXIX., pp. 14-16. 

4 "The general [Gaines] is correct in one of his positions, and being 
in the right himself he puts you in the wrong, and so conspicuously 
that you stand on the insulated eminence an almost solitary advocate 
for making and breaking treaties at pleasure." 

5 u Now, sir, suffer me in conclusion to ask if these things have been 
done in virtue of your instructions, expressed or implied, or by author- 
ity of any warrant from you whatsoever, and if not so done whether 
you will sanction and adopt them as your own, and thus hold yourself 
responsible to the government of Georgia." 



442 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

president had expressed the intention of layrng the whole 
affair before congress. But he remarked, in addition to 

this, that he was not willing to recognize by this the 
"legality" of die course of action intended by the j 
dent; lie only thought that the "decision" of this ques- 
tion belonged less to himself than to the legislate 
Georgia; the latter was "vet tree to act upon thi 
as if no measure had been taken by the executive in rela- 
tion to that reference." 1 

The matter was thus brought for a time to a stand -still. 
The press favorable to the administration praised the firm* 
ness of the president, and claimed a complete victory f>r 
him. The European journals, especially the English ones, 
which had followed the struggle with lively interest, had 
to listen to many a sneering remark about the shortsight- 
edness which, springing from their hostility to everything 
republican, had already led them to think they saw the 
United States bathed in the blood of citizens and the 
Union shattered forever. 2 The scorn was not undeserved, 
for if indeed Virginia and the Carolinas sympathized with 
Georgia, yet they had no idea of following her angry <^oy- 

1 Niles' Reg., XXLX., p. 203. 

2 The following noteworthy passage is taken from an article in Bell'l 
Weekly Messenger, on the quarrel between Georgia and the administra- 
tion: " Suppose, therefore, that an American civil war should break 
out, what will be its probable issue? The suitable answer to this 
question is to be sought in a comparative estimate of the strength 
of the northern and southern states, and, very fortunately, the power 
of the northern provinces so far exceeds that of their southern 
neighbors as not to leave the latter any hope of a long contest. Add to 
this an immense advantage in favor of the Union. If the federal gov. 
eminent finds itself pressed, it will only have to pass a law declaring 
the southern slaves all free, and they will all rise and join them to a 
man. The southern states will then have enough to do at home, and 
will be compelled to resorl to the protection of the united government 
We know not, indeed, but that tins may be the secondary instrument 
by which providence is about to put an end to the system of slavery 
in the new continent, and in this point of view it may eventually lead 
to the greatest good." 



TROUP RE-ELECTED GOVERNOR. 443 

ernor as far as it pleased liim to go. But, on the other 
hand, the paeans of victory of the administration party 
were by no means justified. The struggle was unques- 
tionably an illustration, not of the strength, hut of the 
weakness, of the Union. "Without expressing an opinion 
on the question whether the treaty of Indian Springs had 
been obtained by trickery, the senate agreed upon a new 
treaty, which was much more favorable to the Creeks. 1 
But Troup was in no way molested by congress. The 
moral impression made upon the people was therefore by 
no means that of a powerful maintenance of the federal 
authority in opposition to the state-rights pretensions of 
Georgia. It was said, indeed, that no cause had been given 
for any action whatever, because hitherto only empty 
threats, without any corresponding deeds, had been in- 
dulged in, and because the threats had been uttered, not 
by the state, but by a number of " individuals." To re- 
gard the official acts of a governor simply as those of an 
individual, has at least the merit of novelty. Moreover, 
it was not true that Troup had begun and carried on the 
contest with the administration wholly on his own author- 
ity; he could say that he only wished to "execute the 
laws of the state of Georgia." The majority of the leg- 
islature might not go quite as far as he did, but it follow- 
ed so close upon his heels that it made not the slightest 
effort to hold him back. And the legislature was the exact 
expression of the popular feeling. The gubernatorial 
election took place in the autumn. The campaign was an 
unusually violent one, and the election was decided by 
only a few votes, but these were in favor of Troup. 2 The 
majority of the people thus stood behind him, and his 
message of November S therefore maintained all the claims 
already made. 3 

1 Jan. 24, 1828. Statutes at Large, TIL, p. 268. 

2 He received 20,545 to 19,857 votes. Niles' Reg., XXIX., p. 216. 
a Ibid, XXIX., p. 200, seq. 



4-i-i STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

The new treaty with the Creeks was not in the leas 4 
igfactory to Georgia. The chiefs who negotiated it at 
Washington had at first declared that their powers did not 
permit them to extend the treaty to any territory beyond 
the Chatahoochie. 1 Yet they finally allowed themselves 
to be persuaded to agree to a further cession. 2 It was after- 
wards affirmed in the senate that they had been authorized 
to do tin's from the start, and had only thrown difficulties 
in the way for the sake of treacherously assuring to them- 
selves and their accomplices an undue part of the purchase 
money. 3 This circumstance gave rise to violent attacks 
upon the treaty and the administration. Still greater dis- 
content was excited because the treaty, unlike the one of 
Indian Springs, did not stipulate simply for the cession of 
the " whole territory lying within the state of Georgia,* 1 
The administration had tried to transfer this article, un- 
changed, into thenewtreatv: but the Creeks had obstinate- 
ly refused, because the boundary line between Georgia and 
Alabama had not yet been drawn, and they therefore would 
not have known at all what they had really ceded. 4 Senator 
Berrien of Georgia complained that the state lost a million 
acres by the change in the wording of the treaty and ac- 
cused the administration of having made itself the " con- 
scious instrument of the fraud" which the chiefs planned 
against their own tribesmen. 6 Troup declared, curtly and 
arrogantly, that he held only to the treaty of Indian 
Springs, inasmuch as the rights gained by Georgia through 
that could not be taken away again. 6 The surveyors there- 
fore received orders to begin work on the territory lying 
west of the boundary-lines stipulated for in the treaty at 

1 Debates of Congress, VIII., pp. 583,587. 

8 See the exact description of this territory in Art. 2 of the treaty. 

3 Debates of Congress, VIII., p. 581, passim. 

4 Barbour to Troup, Nov. 27, 1836. Niles' Keg., XXXI., p. 2 
6 Deb. of Cong., VIII., pp. 58:5, 588. 

Troup to Barbour, Feb. 17, 1827. Niles' Reg., XXXII., p. 16. 



DANGER OF CIVIL WAR. 445 

"Washington. But the Indians, without inflicting any per- 
sonal injury upon them, compelled them to abandon the 
work and appealed to the president to protect the rights 
guarantied them by treaty. Adams, relying upon the law 
of 1802 already mentioned, had instructions issued at once 
to the United States attorney and marshal of Georgia to 
imprison the persons engaged in land-surveys on the other 
side of the boundary last agreed upon and to bring them 
before the proper courts. Troup was informed of these 
instructions and was also told that federal soldiers would 
be sent to the spot, if further interferences with the treaty 
made this seem necessary. 1 At the same time Adams by a 
special message brought the whole matter formally before 
congress. 2 He expressed therein his conviction that an 
" obligation even higher than that of human authority" 
would compel him to forcibly interfere, if matters were 
pushed to an extreme, but declared that he would first ex- 
haust all other means. The main reason that he had not 
hitherto used the army was, he said, that this would have 
apparently led to an armed collision with Georgia, "which 
would in itself have inflicted a wound upon the Union and 
have presented the aspect of one of these confederate states 
at war with the rest." Adams was too skillful a statesman 
and too well informed in constitutional law to lightly use 
any such expression in an official paper on an affair of such 
importance. His whole conduct leaves no manner of doubt 
that he would have considered it as rebellion, if the federal 
troops had been forcibly opposed. If he said that Georgia 
would find herself in such a case engaged in a " war" with 
the other states, this can be explained only on the supposi- 
tion that he shunned using the language of authority. It 
would be doing him injustice to suppose that he paid this 
reverence to state sovereignty only out of regard to Georgia. 
But on this very account it can be so much the better in- 

1 See the documents concerning this. Niles' Reg., XXXI., p. 372 
8 Feb. 5, 1827. Statesman's Man., II , p. 642. 



44G STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

ferred what the relative Btrength of the national idea and 
of the particularistic tendencies was at that time, or at 
how their relative strength wa9 estimated by leading states- 

men. 

Some weeks after Adams had brought the matter before 
congress, Troup's answer to the information that the main- 
tenance of the treaty-stipulation 8 would be, if necessary, 
enforced, was received. He notified the secretary of war, 
with the "defiance which it [the secretary's letter] merits," 
that such an attempt would be resisted to the uttermost 
On the same day, lie had the attorney-general and the 
solicitors-general of Georgia instructed to use all "n< 
sary and legal [?] measures" to free the surveyors who liad 
been imprisoned "under the authority of the government 
of the United States" and to bring the persons concerned 
in their imprisonment to trial. Furthermore, the" major- 
generals commanding the sixth and seventh divisions" re- 
ts o 

ceived orders to hold their troops in readiness u to repel 

any hostile invasion of the territory of this state." 1 In a 
circular dated Feb. 27, he informed the senators and repn 
tatives of Georgia of all these steps, and at the same time 
sharply defined his position on the constitutional question 
in a few sentences, saving that "rights of sovereignty" 
between the states and the United States could not he de- 
cided by the United States supreme court, hut must he 
solved by negotiation until another way of settlement wad 
provided in the constitution. 2 

1 See the documents, Niles' Ken., XXXII., p. 16. 

,U I consider all questions of mere sovereignty as matters for negotia- 
tion between the states and the United State-, until the competent tribu- 
nal shall be assigned by the constitution itself for the adjustment oi 
them. . . On an amicable lone made up between the United v 
and ourselves, we might have had no difficulty in referring il to them as 
Judges, protesting at the same time against the jurisdiction, and saving 
our rights of sovereignty. . . But according to our limited concep- 
lion.the supreme court is not made by the constitution of the United 
States the arbiter in controversies involving rights of sovereignty be- 
tween the states and the United States." Niles' Keg., XXXII., p. 80. 



GEORGIA WINS. 447 

Adams, in his message, had "submitted it to the wisdom 
of congress to determine whether any further act of legis- 
lation may be necessary or expedient." Whatever hap- 
pened thereafter, the president was no longer alone respon- 
sible for it. If congress did nothing, if it did not once 
express in plain language its opinion on the whole matter, 
this lack of action was of course an answer to the request 
of the president and a child could understand it. This 
was what congress did. 1 The country received this decis- 
ion with apparent indifference. It had scarcely expected 
any other, and it brought -to pass what was generally de- 
sired. A great majority decidedly disliked the conduct of 
Georgia and especially of Troup. But people were heart- 
ily tired of the aifair and rejoiced over the prospect that 
the painful strife would finally be brought to an end. The 
majority of the states considered it wholly just and proper 
for the president to try to protect the rights guarantied to 
the Indians by treaty. But to let an armed collision occur 
between a " sovereign" state and the federal government 
for the sake of these rights, seemed — on whatever side the 
guilt lay — as the climax of foolishness and criminality. 
The political morals of the United States were far removed 
from the point at which legal pledges to Indians were 
looked upon in the same light as other legal pledges. 
"Whether or not this could be excused r in any event the 
question, from the standpoint of practical politics, was in 
this case only one of secondary importance. The main 
point involved was not the rights of the Creeks, but the 
corner-stone of the le^al foundation of the whole Union. It 
is true that there was no danger that this corner-stone 

1 The senate passed a resolution which requested the president to 
exert himself in order to extinguish the Indian title. As far as the 
house is concerned, I find in the sources of information open to me 
mention only of the reference of the matter to a committee. I can not 
assert with certainty that a resolution was never passed, but if so, it cer- 
tainly had no significance. 



448 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

would be broken and shattered on the instant. But the 
demand of princtpiis obsta! was again urged upon the 
federal government and in a more pressing way than 
before. The demand was not fully met and the children 
and grandchildren of that generation had to learn by ex- 
perience that in politics sins of omission revenge them- 
selves as severely as sins of commission. Georgia had .-till 
another thorn in her flesh, which was harder to withdraw? 
Since she had now proved how far she could go unpun- 
ished, she went on in the work without delay and with 
redoubled boldness. 

Besides the Creeks, about ten thousand Cherokees still 
lived within the boundaries of Georgia. 1 Their territory 
was in every respect richly blessed by nature,' 2 and Georgia 
therefore had an especial longing for it. But, although 
they fell far behind the Creeks in numbers, it was much 
more difficult to deprive them of their land, because they 
had attained a much higher degree of civilization. They 
led a thoroughly orderly life, successfully pursued not only 
agriculture but also trade, applied themselves with fortu- 
nate results to manufacturing on a small scale, and zeal- 
ously devoted themselves to the civilization of their race. 3 
Of course their civilization was not due to their indepen- 
dent efforts, but with the aid of the federal government and 
of religious associations they were attaining by degrees the 
acquirements of their white neighbors, without merging 
their independent tribal existence. The surrender of their 
own political and social organization was as unendurable a 

1 Clay's speech on " Our treatment of the Cherokees." Speeches, 
II., p. 249. 

2 See the details in the report of the secretary of war. Exec. Doc. of 
1835-26, Doc. 102. 

3 Compare with the report of the secretary of war, the remarks of 
judge Johnson in the case of Cherokee Nation vs. State of Georgia, 
(Peters, Rep., V., p. 21; Curtis, IX., p. 184); AVirt's letter to gov. Gil- 
mer, June 1, L830 (Niles' Keg., XXXIX., pp. 69, 70) and Deb. of Cong., 
X. and XI., passim. 



OPPRESSION OF THE CHEROKEES. 449 

thought to them as the exchange of their flourishing settle- 
ments for the wilderness west of the Mississippi. They 
therefore tried by all the means within their power to keep 
the Creeks from ceding their lands, for they well knew that 
Georgia could far more easily present the same alternative 
to them, if she first got rid of the more powerful brother- 
tribe. That this was her intention, was openly declared in 
tne messages of her governors as well as in her legislature, 
long before the successful negotiations with the Creeks. 
As early as the latter part of 1826, the legislature began 
to pass laws intended to pave the way for the accomplish- 
ment of this design. Thus, for instance, a law of Dec. 26 
deprived all Indians not acquainted with the English lan- 
guage of the right to testify before any state court. 1 As 
soon as Adams's request to congress to take steps against 
the illegal assumptions of Georgia had miscarried so pit- 
iably, the policy marked out by this law was systematically 
followed up. A law of Dec. 26, 1827, added a part of the 
Cherokee territory to the counties of Carroll and Dekalb, 
in order to extend the criminal jurisdiction of the state 
over it. 2 The Cherokees sent a delegation to Washington 
which presented to the president, through the secretary of 
war, Feb. 11, 1829, a written protest against these encroach- 
ments upon the rights immemoriaily enjoyed by them and 
solemnly guarantied to them. Adams, however, took no 
steps in the matter, because his term of office was to ex- 
pire in a few weeks. 

With Adams, the unfortunate Indians lost their last 
stand-by. He had not only met the assumptions of Georgia 
with promptness and with his whole energy, and had there- 
by earned the gratitude of the Indians and the whole 
Union, but he had also shown an upright zeal in preventing 
the infringement of their guarantied rights. Jackson can- 



dles' Reg., XXXV., p. 42. 
9 Loco citato. 

29 



450 STATE sovEREiGimr AND SLAVERY. 

not, indeed, be accused of having consciously wroi 
them, but in all questions he considered the right to be 
what seemed right to him. 

April 18, 1829, the decision of th< - an- 

nounced to the Cherokees by Eaton, the secretary of war. 1 
This began by saying that "there is but a single alterna- 
tive, to yield to the operation of those laws which 
claims, and has a right, to extend throughout her own lim- 
its, or to remove and by associating with your brother! 
beyond the Mississippi to become again united as one 
nation.' 1 He saw no other way, because the right of the 
federal government to ; * permit to you [the Indian-] the 
enjoyment of a separate government within the limit- 
state and of denying the exercise of sovereignty to that 
state, within her own limits, cannot be admitted."' 
Georgia had nothing more to fear from the federal ev 
tive, as long as she did not forcibly expel the Chero 
from their territory, but contented herself with passing 
which made the condition of the Indians, in the strict - 
of the word, unendurable. 

Jackson's decision caused the council of chiefs to tin 
en to punish every land-sale consummated without the 
previous consent of the tribe with death. 3 (' 
Carroll of Tennessee, who had been entrusted by the] 
dent with the negotiations tbr the acquisition of the terri- 
tory, was roundly refused any opportunity for discu- 
the question. 4 This decisive stand impelled the legislature 
of Georgia to make so much the more quickly the £ 
use of the " sovereign rights'' of the state. Gov. For 
had already recommended to the legislature, in hi? mes 

1 Ni XXXVI., pp. 253, 259. Compare also the report by "R 

Thompson of his conversation with Jackson. Ibid, XXXVI., p. 2 

8 Compare with this the view expressed by Jefferson, as secret: 
state, Lug. 10, 1791. Jeff., Works, III., pp. 280-881. 

v. es 1 R _ XXXVII., p. a 
4 Ibid, XXXVII., p. Ui. 



JACKSON SUPPORTS GEORGIA. 451 

of Nov. 4, 1828, not to longer delay " the extension of all 
state laws" over the territory of the Cherokees especially, 
because the whole tribe, part of which was settled in the 
neighboring states, had adopted a constitutional form of 
government. 1 The law of Dec. 19, 1829, carried this out, 
for it " annulled all laws and ordinances of the Cherokees" 
and cut up their territory and attached it to five counties 
of the state. Moreover, the law forbade the emigration of 
the Indians and the sale of their lands and provided for 
these offenses a penalty of from four to six years' impris- 
onment at hard labor. 2 Eleven days before, Jackson had 
given the whole country to understand, by his annual mes- 
sage, that in his opinion Georgia was justified in taking 
such measures from every point of view. 3 Some months 
afterwards, congress gave an indirect approval of this posi- 
tion by voting a large sum of money, which the president 
was to use for the "removal" of the Indians. 4 

1 Niles' Reg., XXXV, p. 222. 

' 2 The whole law, which was one of the most shameful pieces of op- 
pression in this long dark chapter of American history, is quoted in 
Worcester vs. State of Georgia. (Peters VI, pp. 525-528; Curtis, X, pp. 
218-221) and also in files' Reg, XXXVIII, p. 54. 

3 Statesman's Man, I , pp. 709, 710. 

4 The debates over this bill (Deb. of Congress, X. and XI, passim) 
are extremely interesting on account of the preposterously stupid soph- 
istry with which the most reckless justification of the right of the 
strongest is clothed in the garb of justice and even of humaniiy. Among 
the northern representatives who spoke with the greatest emphasis in 
behalf of the rights of the Indians, Frelinghuysen deserves especial 
mention. Justice, however, demands the statement that the condition 
of things which the Cherokees wished for could not be maintained in 
the long run. It seems to me unquestionable that they had the right 
on their side when they demanded that they should be permitted to con- 
tinue in their independent political existence under the protection and 
the sovereignty of the United States. The obligation which the latter 
had undertaken, in 1802, in regard to Georgia, could not change this 
fact, for the right of the Cherokees was much older. But a political 
community in the territory of one or more states of the Union, under 
the sovereignty of the Union and yet not constitutionally in the Union, 
—this was an anomaly which could not last. The real circumstances 



' 



452 ii; 90VEEEI0NTY AND SLAYKBT. 

ruder these circumstances the only thing left for the 
Cherokees t<> <!<» was to ask the aid of the United State* 
supreme court. The ex-attorney-general, Wirt, was will* 
ing to plead their cause. His argument against Geor^ 
claim to the power of extending her jurisdiction over the 
Cherokee territory was unanswerable. 1 It was to 1. 
sumed as certain that this would also be the view of the 
supreme court, since the latter had given a decision some 
years before, from which the unconstitutionality of the 
law of Dec. 19, 1S20, was an inevitable inference. 2 In 
consequence, however, of a technical mistake, the real 

of the case were stronger than the stipulated right. But a justei 
more humane compromise between the stipulated right and the de- 
mands of the facts in the case should have been found, and would have 
been, if men had wished to find it. 

1 Niles' Keg., XXXIX., pp. 81-88. It is superfluous to enter more 
into detail concerning the proof of this, for one sentence suffices 
justification of the opinion expressed in the text: "The 11th Article 
of the treaty of Holston (compare Statutes at Large, VII., p. 41) cod. 
tains an express and decisive admission of the principle implied in all 
the treaties [between the United States and the Cherokees] throughout 
all their provisions, to wit.: that the territory of the Chero 
within the jurisdiction of the states, nor subject to their law-. This 
treaty is recognized as in full force by all the subsequent tr< 
G-eorgia, as one of the United States, is a party to it, and isestopp 
deny what she has thus solemnly admitted. " 

! In Johnson and Graham's Lessee vs. M'Intosh we read: " If an in- 
dividual might extinguish the Indian title for his own benefit, or, in 
other words, might purchase it, still he could only acquire that tide. 
Admitting their power to change their laws or usages so far as to allow 
an individual to separate a portion of their lands from the com 
stock, and hold it in severalty, still it is a part of their territory, and is 
held under them by a title dependent on their laws. The grant d< 
its efficacy from their will, and if they choose to resume it and m 
different disposition of the land, the courts of the United States can not 
interpose for the protection of the title. The person who pur 
land- from the Indians within their territory incorporates himself with 
them SO far as respects the property purchased ; holds their title under 
their protection and subject to their laws. If they annul the grant we 
know of no tribunal which can revise and set aside the proceedi 
Wheaton, VIII., p. 593; Curtis, V., p. 516. 



ACTION OF THE SUPREME COURT. 453 

question was not decided. In the complaint the Cherokees 
were described as " a foreign state." The court decided 
that this description did not apply to them " in the sense 
of the constitution" and that they therefore could not, as 
a foreign state, bring a case before the federal courts. 1 But 
although their complaint was rejected for want of juris- 
diction, chief-justice Marshall, who delivered the decision 
of the court, took occasion to say that in the opinion ot 
the majority of the judges the Cherokees had formed an 
independent political community, with the expressly rec- 
ognized right of self-government. 2 That the bare dictum 
of the judges would have no sort of influence upon Georgia 
was plain to see from what had gone before. Wirt had 
asked governor Gilmer whether the state would not agree, 
as Virginia and Maryland had done under similar circum- 
stances, to submit the question, by the free consent of the 
parties, to the supreme court of the United States for de- 
cision. In response to his letter, composed with studied 
courtesy, he received an answer in which Gilmer proved 
that Troup himself could find his master in causeless in- 
solence and low insults. 3 It seemed as if something worse 
yet might be expected from the state judiciary. Judge Clay- 
ton had already declared to a grand jury, in a violent po- 
litical harangue, that he should pay no attention whatever 

1 Cherokee Nation vs. State of Georgia, Peters, V., p. 20 ; Curtis, IX., 
p. 183. 

* " So much of the argument as was intended to prove the character 
of the Cherokees as a state, as a distinct political society, separated 
from others, capable of managing its own affairs and governing itself, 
has, in the opinion of the majority of the judges, been completely suc- 
cessful. They have been uniformly treated as a state, from the settle- 
ment of our country. . . The acts of our government plainly recog- 
nize the Cherokee nation as a state, and the courts are bound by those 
acts." Peters, V., p. 16; £urtis, IX., p. 180. 

3 See the correspondence in Niles' Reg., XXXIX., pp. 69-71. Gilmer 
even gave it to be understood that Wirt, if he entered Georgia, would 
be brought to a reckoning for having served as the attorney of the 
Cherokees. 



454 ltb bovebeionty and slavery. 

to any command or judgment of the United State:, supreme 
court in reference to the Cherokee matter. ]•'.■ 
showed that Clayton had only expressed what had long 

since been resolved upon by the governor and the legisla- 
ture. A certain George Tassells had committed a mur- 
der within the territory of the Cherokees. He was brought 
before the superior court of the state on this charge, was 
found guilty, and was condemned to death. Before the 
execution of the sentence chief-justice Marshall cited the 
state by a writ of error, issued in the customary way. " to 
show cause, if any there he, why the judgment should not 
be corrected." 1 The governor sent the writ of the chief- 
justice to the legislature, with an accompanying 1< 
in which he declared that he would not regard command! 
of the supreme court which interfered with the constitu- 
tional jurisdiction of the state, and would oppose any at- 
tempt to execute them with all the means entrusted to 
him by the laws of the state. The legislature did not 
behind the governor. Both houses passed a series of 
lutions to the effect that the action of the chief-justice of 
the United. States was " a flagrant violation of the righto" 
of the state; that the governor and the whole body of state 
officials were bound to pay no attention to commands 
emanating from the United States supreme court, which 
were intended to interfere with the execution of the 
criminal law of the state; that the governor was bound to 

1 The eleventh amendment to the constitution provides that " any 
suit in law or equity" brought by an individual against a state cannot 
be heard in the federal courts. But the United States supreme cou; 
decided, in 1821, in Cohens vs. Virginia, that u the defendant who re- 
moves [through a writ of error] a judgment rendered against him by a 
state court into this court, for the purpose of re-examining the qui 
whether that judgment be in violation of the constitution or laws 
United States, does not commence or prosecute a suit against the 
whatever may be its opinion where the effect of the writ may be 
stoic the party to the possession of a thing which he demai 
...n, VI., p. 412; Curtis, V., p. 103. 



THE SUPREME COUET DEFIED. 455 

" resist and repel any and every invasion, from whatever 
quarter, upon the administration of the criminal laws" of 
the state, with all the " force and means" entrusted to 
him by the constitution and Jaws of the state; that " the 
state of Georgia will never so far compromise her sover- 
eignty as an independent state, as to become a party to the 
case sought to be made before the supreme court of the 
United States by the writ in question"; and that the gov- 
ernor should acquaint the sheriff of Hall county with 
these resolutions as far as was " necessary to ensure the 
full execution of the laws in the case of George Tassels." 1 
In accordance with this notification Tassels was executed 
December 28, 1830. This was the end of the matter. It 
might then well be asked what the " victory" that Adams 
had won over Troup was worth. If the structure of the 
Union had a keystone, it was unquestionably the supreme 
court of the United States. This had become a stumbling- 
stone to the " sovereign" state of Georgia, and she thrust 
it aside contemptuously. And there was not the slightest 
attempt made to bring her to a reckoning for this. 

The further course of the unequal strife between Georgia 
and the Cherokees needs not to be followed out in detail 
here. The Indians made a passive resistance for several 
years with unbroken courage, protesting against every new 
exercise of oppressive power, and appealing to their un- 
deniable rights in the matter. Georgia took the less 
notice of this inasmuch as Jackson allowed even the feder- 
al soldiery to be used in carrying out the robber-policy. 2 

1 Niles' Reg., XXXIX., p. 388. Compare the report of a committee 
of the Pennsylvania house of March 1, 1809 (Niles' Reg., XLIIL, 
Suppl., p. 24), and the answer of the legislatures of Georgia and Vir- 
ginia to the amendment proposed by Pennsylvania to the constitution. 
(Ibid, pp. 83, 84, and XL II., p. 93). 

2 The raffle of the Cherokee lands and the prohibition of working 
the gold mines contained in them can be described by no other name. 
Compare Niles' Reg., XXXVIII., pp. 828,404,405; XXXIX., pp. 106, 
154, 181, 182, 263, 453; XL., pp. 62, 296, 297. 



456 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

'• Magnanimity, long-suffering, and humanity" did not 
hinder Georgia from simply driving the poor Indians from 
house and home with the sabre. She left the Indian only 
so much of his possessions as^ sufficed to keep him from 
dying of hunger. She thrust his own laws aside. She 
placed him under her laws, without granting him a single 
right. And she harrassed him and trampled upon him 
whenever and however she could. 1 The legal representa- 
tives of the "sovereignty" of the state developed a shock- 
ing brutality in this course. Patrols marched through the 
whole territory, arrested every suspected person, and sent 
him in chains fifty or a hundred miles away to "head- 
quarters" to often set him free at once with curses and 
threats because the "law" did not authorize his imprison- 
ment. Especial Bufferings were heaped upon the mission- 
aries who went in the fulfillment of their duties from one 
mission station to another, without having obtained the 
permission required by the state law and taken the pre- 
scribed oath to support the constitution and laws of 
Georgia. It was not enough to fetter their limbs: they 
were chained by the neck to the pack wagons of the hunters, 
whose barbarity almost surpassed that of the professional 
slave-drivers. 2 A Presbyterian missionary named Wo] 
ter was made to feel the whole rigor of the law, although 
he had the severe sickness of his wife to plead as an ex- 
cuse for not having left the territory within the ten days 
during which he had been ordered to do so. In accordance 

1,4 But even to this limited possession [100 acre-] the poor Indian 
was to have no fee-simple title; he was to hold as a mere occupant at 
the will of the state of Georgia for just as long or as short a time as 
she might think proper. The laws at the same time gave him no par- 
ticulai right whatever, lie could not become a member of the 
legislature, nor could he hold any office understate authority, nor could 
he vote as an elector. He possessed not one single right of a freeman." 
Clay, Speeches, II., p. 857. 

2 Niles' Reg, XL, pp. '.297, 298, 4G0-4G2. 



THE SUPREME COURT AGAIN DISOBEYED. 457 

with the provisions of the law of Dec. 22, 1S30, 1 he was 
condemned to four years imprisonment at hard labor for 
this crime. 2 This sentence brought the whole matter again 
before the United States supreme court, which now in a 
formal decision declared all the claims made by Georgia on 
the ground of her " sovereignty" to be unjustified; the law 
of Dec. 22, 1830, to be unconstitutional; and the sentence 
of Worcester to be null and void. 3 Governor Lumpkin had 
already acquainted the legislature, before the citation "of 
the state to appear before the United States supreme 
court, with his resolve to present a " determined resistance" 
to such a " usurpation." 4 The decision of the court did 
not incline him to change his resolve. He continued to 
exhort the legislature and the people to stand firm for the 
sovereign rights of the state. The state court that gave 
the annulled judgment acted in accordance with this posi- 
tion. It refused to grant a writ of habeas corpus and took 

1 The law is given in full in Worcester vs. State of Georgia. Peters, 
VI., p. 521, seq.; Curtis, X., p. 215, seq. 

2 See the complete details of the sentence in Niles' Reg., XLL, pp. 
174-176. It has a quite peculiar flavor on account of the multitude of 
Bible texts to which judge Clayton appeals. 

3 " From the commencement of our government, congress has passed 
acts to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indians. . . All these acts, 
and especially that of 1802, which is still in force, manifestly consider 
the several Indian nations as distinct political communities, having 
territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and 
having a right to all the lands within those boundaries which is not 
only acknowledged, but guarantied, by the United States. . . The 
Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own ter- 
ritory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of 
Georgia can have no force and which the citizens of Georgia have no 
right to enter but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves or in con- 
formity with treaties and witk the acts of congress. The whole inter- 
course between the United States and this nation is, by our constitution 
and laws, vested in the government of the United States. The act of 
the state of Georgia, under which the plaintiff in law was prosecuted, 
is consequently void and the judgment a nullity." Peters, VI., pp. 55G, 
557, 561 ; Curtis, X., pp. 240, 243, 244. 

'Niles'Reg., XLL, p. 313. 



458 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

not the slightest notice of the decision of the supreme 
court. 1 Worcester and his companion Butler had still to 
spend a Year of imprisonment at hard labor, in company 
with common criminals. They were finally " pardoned" l>y 
gov. Lumpkin, partly because the outlook for a solution 01 
the Cherokee question, in a way satisfactory to Georgia, 
seemed to render their further imprisonment unnecessary, 
and partly because their liberation seemed desirabli 
partisan- reasons. 2 For the insolent contempt of the au- 
thority of the supreme court, no sort of satisfaction was 
given, and indeed no sort of satisfaction was demanded. 
Jackson regarded this issue of the struggle with indiffer- 
ence. Perhaps he even took a quiet, mean joy in it, be- 
cause Marshall, as he very well knew, was a determined 
opponent of his re-election. 3 

Thus for the first time the doctrines of state rights laid 
down in the Kentucky resolutions had been fully carried 
out. From the beginning Georgia had chosen as her 
standpoint the fundamental principles that the federal 
authorities and the states, that is, the state governments, 
were "parties" who had no common judge and that there- 
fore each party must " decide for itself." And she— at 
last indirectly supported by the federal executive— had re- 
mained a complete victor. 

# 

1 Niles' Reg., XLII., p. 78. 

2 Ibid, XL IV., pp. 359, 360. 

3 Depending upon a statement of G. N. Briggs of Massachusetts, who 
was at the time a member of congress, Greeley (The American Conflict, 
I., p. 106) relates that Jackson said: "John Marshall lias made hi- de- 
cision; now let him enforce it!" Senator Miller of South Carolina said, 
in 1833, in the debate over the so-called force bill : " No reproof 1W hflf 
[Georgia's] refractory spirit was heard ; on the contrary, a learned review 
Of the decision came out, attributed to executive countenance and fa- 
vor." Niles' Reg., XLIII., Buppl., p. 141. 



NULLIFICATION. 459 



CHAPTER XII. 

The Doctrine of Nullification. The Compromise be- 
tween South Carolina and the Federal Govern- 
ment. 

The pending presidential election had not been without 
influence upon the issue of the tariff struggle of 1828, 
and the reception of the latter at the south. The majority 
of the protectionists was so small that the days of their 
power were probably numbered, provided the incoming 
administration should support the opposite party with 
energy. And the prospects of Jackson, upon whom the anti- 
protectionists thought they could safely count, grew better 
every day. Moreover, the extinction of the national debt 
was close at hand, and the reasonable arguments, as well 
as the declamations, of the south could reckon on much 
more willing hearers as soon as the annual financial report 
showed a regular surplus. The protective system was thus 
deprived of all the props which had hitherto done it thank- 
worthy service. 

The Democrats won a more brilliant victory than they 
themselves had expected. Jackson received one hundred 
and ejghty-three electoral votes against only eighty-three 
for Adams, and Calhoun, the irreconcilable enemy of the 
protectionists, was chosen vice-president by one hundred 
and seventy-one electoral votes. 1 It was next to be dis- 
covered how far men were justified in seeing in this a 
triumph of free trade principles. 2 The inaugural address 

1 Debates of Congress, X., p. 394. 

2 " In New York, Pennsylvania, and the west general Jackson has 
been supported as the firm friend of the tariff and of internal improve- 



4G0 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

of the new president touched upon this point in a vagne and 
extremely cautious way. It Bpoke,of course, of "revenue 
duties.'' but affirmed that " agriculture, commerce, and 
manufactures should be equally favored," and added the 
notable observation that ''perhaps the only exception to 
this rule should consist in the peculiar encouragement of 
any products of either of them that may be found ee 
tial to our national independence." 1 This declaration left 
both parties unsatisfied. The annual message wa> awaited 
with keen expectation. It undeceived the free traders Btill 
more completely, without giving the protectionists cause 
for rejoicing. It expressed an opinion in favor of a "modi- 
fication", of the tariff, but wished to see the principle that 
American products must be enabled to compete with 
foreign adopted as " the general rule to be applied in 
graduating the duties." In regard to wares which were o! 
especial importance in time of war " even a step beyond 
this point" ought to be taken. 2 It was only safe to infer 
from these sayings that Jackson would gladly see a re- 
duction of some duties; the decided rejection, on prin- 
ciple, of the whole protective system, which the south had 
wished and expected, could in no way be inferred from the 
general sentences which inclined to ^y(jvy side and Baid 
nothing at all decisive. These passages left it uncertain 
whether he had it in view to exercise even a moderate 
pressure upon the protectionists. The recommendation 
for the division of the expected yearly surplus among the 
states, in proportion to the ratio of representation, for the 
execution of internal improvements, until a comprehensive 
change of the tariff brought about again an equality be- 

ments; but in the south he has been as zealously sustained, by thoM 
who deny the right and constitutionality of these things, as being the 
friend of ' southern interests,' believed by them to l»e seriously injured 
by the tariff and internal improvement laws." files' Keg., XXXV., p. 
184. 

1 Statesman's Manual, I., p. G ( J(3. 

2 Ibid, II., p. 7UU. 



JOHN C. CALHOUN. 461 

tween the income and outgo, scarcely pointed to this, es- 
specially since he proposed that the federal government 
should be given the necessary power, if it did not already 
possess it, by an amendment to the constitution. 

Calhoun considered this proposal as a direct bid for the 
favor of the protectionists, He had not approved of the 
extreme language used by the meetings at Colleton, Abbe- 
ville and other places after the passage of the tariff of 
1828, for he had no hope that this would exert a favorable 
influence upon the election, on the issue of which he meant 
to make his next plan of action depend. Without seeing 
in Jackson's election a guaranty for a change of principle 
in the politico-industrial jjolicy of the country, he yet 
hoped for so much from it that he favored delay. 1 A 
memorial, which thoroughly discussed, in a quiet and firm 
way, the economic as well as the constitutional side of the 
question, seemed to him to best correspond with the de- 
mands of the moment. 2 

Calhoun was a true son of the soil from which he sprang, 
and he therefore possessed in a high degree the character- 
istic traits of the Protestant population of the north of 
Ireland, to which he belonged by descent, — that peculiar 
primitive energy, in which an enthusiasm more idealistic 
than ideal is strangely linked with stubborn consistency. 
The blood flowed in his veins not less hotly than in those 
of any other Carolinian, but a piercing intelligence and a 
soaring ambition held it sharply in check when great ques- 
tions were to be weighed and decided. He had not the 
breadth of view that characterizes the statesman, but he 
had extraordinarily keen vision. From the sole of his 
foot to the crown of his head a speculative politician, he 
was wholly unaware of the results to which his policy 

1 Calhoun, Works, II., p. 215; VI., p. 56. 

2 The draft was adopted, with some alterations, by the legislature and 
published. It is known as the "South Carolina exposition." Calhoun, 
Works, VI., p. 1, seq. 



4f>2 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

would inevitably lead; but the practical instinct of the 
American race, and a political activity extending over 
many years, enabled him to rind ways and means for bring- 
ing the bnrning questions of the day to such a solution 

that he constantly brought his doctrines nearer and m 
to a practical realization, lie was not idealist enough to 
delude himself with the hope of an immediate accomplish- 
ment of his whole programme, and not to reconcile him- 
self to the withdrawal of half his stake if it appeared that 
he could then win the game, and must otherwise lo 
entirely. Bnt he was enough of a fanatic to allow nothing 
to interfere with his will, if the choice between going for- 
ward and a partial sacrifice of the principles of his doc- 
trines was once set before him. In such cases, he was 
capable of making " bend or break'' his motto, and this 
not merely in moments of the highest excitement. His 
attitude remained the same, even when the struggle con- 
tinued for years. If he had been a visionary, whose 
tern was built up in the air, he could scarcely have d-»ne 
this; the material interests which formed the broad basil 
of his doctrines gave him the needed strength, yes. made 
this course a necessity. The constitution and the history 
of its origin gave him only the formal foundation for the 
development of the doctrine of state-rights, and its de- 
velopment, with him and with the whole people, did not 
rest upon a priori reasoning. He was originally by no 
means inclined to this opinion. The slavery question drove 
him into the path, and with the increasing development of 
the slaveholding interest he followed it on to the farthest 
consequences. By the light of slavery, and in accordance 
with the laws of logic, he worked out the constitutional law 
of a democratic federative republic, and the logically correct 
result was a systematization of anarchy. He failed to rec- 
ognize this fact, because the doctrine was to 1dm a means 
to an end, and his whole political reasoning became in courfli 
of time so completely identified with the prosecution of 



BREACH BETWEEN JACKSON AND CALHOUN. 463 

the one aim that the means became to his mind its own 
end. His inborn firmness and the self-reliance that had 
been distorted into haughtiness under the influence of 
slavery thus became obstinacy. It was not possible for 
hi 111 to place himself under the orders of a leader, but the 
one-sidedness of his political reasoning and striving, and 
especially the readiness, almost genius, with which he 
mastered in an instant the whole range of questions which 
lay within his narrow circle of view, made him unfit to be 
the leader of a great party; at the same time his talent and 
character marked him out for the head of a faction of ex- 
tremists. But a growing ambition kept his eyes fastened 
upon the White House, which he could never hope to reach 
through a fraction, however devoted to him. 1 

It seems not improbable that the hope of attaining this 
last goal of his personal wishes so worked upon Calhoun 
that he tried, before and immediately after the presidential 
election of 1828, to persuade his nearest party-comrades to 
greater moderation. But as long as the tariff question was 
not brought to a satisfactory issue, this remained the de- 
cisive factor of his policy. Jackson's messages could not 
content him. As yet, no cause for a breach between the 
two had been offered, but he began to look upon the presi- , 
dent with distrust and resolved to break away from him ^ 
rather than consent to retrogression on this question for 
reasons of party politics. The pursuit of his personal 
wishes did not hinder this resolve, for he was soon con- 

1 Buchanan characterizes Calhoun as follows : " He possessed emi- 
nent reasoning powers, but in the opinion of many was deficient in 
sound, practical judgment. He was terse and astute in argument; but 
his views were not sufficiently broad and expanded to embrace at the 
same time all the great interests of the country and to measure them 
according to their relative importance. It was his nature to concen- 
trate all his powers on a single object, and this, for the time being, al- 
most to the exclusion of all others. Although not eloquent in debate, 
he was rapid, earnest and persuasive." Buchanan's Administration, 
p. 91. 



464 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

vinced that Jackson would not aid him in their fulfillment 
There had been from the very start a certain coolness in 
the personal relations of the two men, because Calhoun 
found that in the construction of the cabinet his friends 
had not been considered to the extent he had expected and 
claimed, although Branch of North Carolina, the secretarj 
of the navy, Berrien of Georgia, the attorney- general, and 
especially Ingham of Pennsylvania, the secretary of the 
treasury, belonged to his supporters. 1 A year later, Jack- 
son renounced Calhoun's friendship fully and for ever. 
The cause of this was the discovery of the fact that Calhoun, 
as Monroe's secretary of war, had expressed the opinion 
that the general ought to be brought to a reckoning for 
his conduct in the war against the Seminoles. In the 
spring of 1831, Jackson deepened and strengthened the 
breach begun by purely personal enmity by dissolving his 
cabinet and reorganizing it out of the fraction devoted to 
Van Buren, Calhoun's old opponent and rival. Calhoun, 
was fully aware that a very great majority of the party was 
blindly devoted to Jackson in this conflict as well as in all 
other matters. Personal embitterment and the knowledge 
that he must abandon, for the near future, every thought of 
the fulfillment of his hopes for the presidency, put an end 
to the last doubts over the position which he now had to 
assume. But to ascribe his course thereafter — as Jackson- 
Democrats have often done — exclusively or even principal- 
ly to this motive, is simply ridiculous. The role which 
Calhoun played for more than a generation in the history 
of the United States should protect him from being m 
ured with a rule applicable only to a contemptible and 
crazy demagogue. But besides and above this, the history 
of the United States is a too significant, serious and in- 
structive chapter in the history of the world to be brought 
into the domain of trifles by the explanation of its most 

1 Calhoun had not expected to see a larger number of places filled 
with his friends, but he had tried to have other persons chosen. 



NULLIFICATION RESOLVED UPON. 4G5 

significant phases of development as due to the pettiest and 
most groveling impulses of single individuals, permitted 
by circumstances to play a part in them. 

Calhoun had now given up all hope that the protective 
system could be destroyed with Jackson's help in the reg- 
ular parliamentary way. He was not contented with an 
insignificant reduction of particular duties; he held that 
the time had come for a decisive step. His state and him- 
self had become so deeply involved that they had to go 
forward or backward. If they submitted to the repetition 
of the protest so often recorded against the maintenance of 
the status quo, they were sure of the disgrace of mockery. 
It would have come hard to the unbridled cavalier spirits 
of these slave-barons to bear this patiently, even if the ful- 
fillment of their word would have been sure and useless 
self-sacrifice. But according to their reasoning the pros- 
pect for a favorable result from a bold advance was great 
enough to justify the venture. The apportionment of 
power between north and south became with every year 
more unfavorable to the latter. "Was it not therefore given 
wholly to the north to decide, as long as the question was 
left to congress, whether, when and how far the complaints 
concerning the unequal pressure of the protective system 
should be heeded? Must not the other southern states also 
put this question to themselves? And if they did put it, 
could they still be willing, after the experience already at- 
tained, to wait with "slavish resignation" until the north 
came to a better understanding and gave ear to the voice 
of justice? They might shrink back from the path which 
South Carolina had the courage to tread; but would they 
not follow if they saw that she reached the goal? 

Calhoun not only knew too well the spirit of the people, 
but was himself too deeply impregnated with it, not to 
consider the raising the banner of revolution as a dubious 
expedient. Since the birth-pangs of the republic were 
endured, the Americans, with the exception of single indi- 
30 



466 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

viduals, have not fallen into the grave error of considering 
revolutions as radical means against political evils. Slavish 

reverence for the government is foreign to an American; 
it is one of the characteristic and not insignificant tra 
of political life in the United States that the disregard of 
the dignity of office often violates the most ordinary rules 
of courtesy. But this unhealthy expression of the proud 
consciousness of belonging to a democratic state is found, 
as a rule, side by side with the much more important feel- 
ing, springing from the same consciousness, that the laws 
are not a hostile force, external to the people, but the ex- 
pression of its own binding will. Calhoun and his com- 
rades could oppose the government without being obliged 
to expect to be personally branded on that account as rebels 
and to have the whole nation against them. But they 
dared not rest their opposition upon reasons of justice and 
expediency. They had to bring forward proof that they 
stood upon a positive right. If Calhoun now applied his 
whole intellectual strength to the solution of this question, 
he resorted to no legerdemain. He was not shallow enough 

Hto think that revolutions could be fought through by a 
sophistical whirl of phrases. It is a much-argued question 
whether he thought it possible that cannon and the hang- 
man could speak the last word in the struggle: but he 
surely did not think that he could close the mouth of the 
cannon and cheat the gallows of its victim, while he threw 
- — ^dust in the eyes of the people by using the arts of 1 

Of course he wished to show that South Carolina was just- 
ified in refusing allegiance to the federal government, but 
he did not wish to prove by newly-discovered subtleties 
that forswearing the allegiance that was due — in other 
words, a revolution — was no revolution. The wish never 
entered his head to put forward something new. for how- 
ever unanswerable his conclusions might have been, the 
nation would have simply laughed himself and his doc- 
trines to political death, if he had pretended to have 



U SOUTH CAROLINA EXPOSITION." 467 

brought to light from hitherto unexplored and unknown 
depths the proofs that a state could legally annul the 
federal authority. Only because he went on a path long 
known and widely trod, could he nourish a hope for success 
and trust that, at the w r orst, hands would not lightly be laid 
upon him, however enraged and furious men were over his 
assertion that the path did lead to the goal he described. 
He simply wished to mark with milestones the whole road 
from the starting point to the goal that had not only been 
often pointed out, but had also been already reached, by 
others, in order that there might be no gap in the path and 
that the goal itself intent be made the sole theme of future 
discussion. He succeeded in this better than his adver- 
saries did in proving their assertion that he had sought, for 
the gratification of his hate and ambition, to lead the peo- 
ple upon a path of error which no one before him had had 
the shamelessness and the criminal audacity to tread. The 
writings in which he sought the solution of these problems 
form the largest part of the long chain of practical com- 
mentaries upon the constitution, which began with the 
Virginia and Kentucky resolutions and ended with the 
four years of civil war. The '''South Carolina exposition," 
already mentioned, was the introduction to them. The first 
chapter, the " address to the people of South Carolina," is 
dated at Fort Hill, July 26. 1 

Calhoun begins with a reference to the fact, seldom 
rightly estimated, that " the question of the relation which 
the states and the general government bear to each other 
is not one of recent origin," but that " from the commence- 
ment of our system, it has divided public sentiment." 2 He 

1 Jenkins, The Life of J. C. Calhoun, pp. 161-187 ; first published in 
the Pendleton Messenger. Compare Calhoun, Works, VI., pp. 124-144. 

2 There are two versions of this important paper. The quotations in 
this passage are not made from the " address to the people of South 
Carolina," as it appears in Calhoun, Works, VI., pp. 124-144, but from 
an " address on the relations of the states and federal government," 



4GS STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

adopted as the basis of his argument the leading sentence 
in the Virginia resolutions, and said: "The right of inter- 
position thus solemnly asserted by the state of Virginia, 
be it called as it may — state-right, veto, nullification, or l»v 
any other name, — I conceive to be the fundamental prin- 
ciple of our system, resting upon facts historical I; 
certain as our revolution itself and deduction- as simple 
and as demonstrative as that of any political or moral 
truth whatever." From both points of view, he sought, 
then, proof for these statements. "The great dissimilarity 
and, as I must add, as truth compels me to do, contrariety 
of interests in our country . . . are so great that they 
cannot be subjected to the unchecked will of a majoril 
the whole without defeating the great end of government 
and without which it is a curse, — justice." This is the 
real, broad foundation of his doctrine that the Union could 
never have been reared upon another legal basis and could 
never have an assured foundation upon any other. 1 The 
state governments are not, he said, the federal government; 
the states are not subject to the Union. Jefferson had al- 
ready rightly described them as " co-ordinate departments 
of a simple and undivided whole," 2 whose possible dispute! 
on questions of competence — if an agreement could not he 
arrived at — could be settled only by a convention of the 
states. Only stupidity, he declared, could raise the crj 
that he preached anarchy, for here is a court of last i 

(Works, VI., pp. 59-94) which is dated at Fort Hill, July 26, 1831, but 
which seems to be a preliminary draft of the real "address." The 
author follows Jenkins's Life of Calhoun. Translators' note. 

1 "Who, of any party, with the least pretension to candor, can deny 
that on all these points (the great questions of trade— of taxation— of 
disbursement and appropriation and the nature, character and pom 
the general government) so deeply important, no two distinct nations 
can be more opposed than this [the plantation states] and the other 
sections?" Calhoun, Works, VI., p. 134. 

1 Compare a "disquisition on government," Calhoun, Works, I., p 
167. 



LEGAL THEORY OF NULLIFICATION. 469 

for all cases. Until its decision had been given, the states 
which find themselves in the minority must evidently be 
in condition to protect themselves against usurpations. 
The natural legal means is " nullification," that is, the 
declaration that the resolves of the majority are null and 
void, so far as the states taking this action are affected by 
them. Nullification would self-evidently be absolutely 
binding upon the federal government, for the doctrine that 
it can insist with as much right as the respective states 
upon its interpretation and try to make it good, rests upon 
the u erroneous assumption that the general government is 
a party to the constitutional compact." 1 It is really only 
the " agent," which " the sovereign states" have entrusted 
with the execution of certain provisions of the compact 
made by them. This must apply to the supreme court of 
the United States as well as to the other federal powers, 
for opposing principles do not underlie the different parts 
of the constitution. Moreover, the supreme court does 
not stand above or outside of the constitution, but is simply 
an agent of the sovereign states; in political questions "its 
incompetency is not less clear than its want of constitu- 
tional authority." 2 After this exposition of his standpoint 

1 Hayne had said in his debate with Webster (Jan., 1830) : " Here, then, 
is a case of a compact between sovereigns, and the question arises, what 
is the remedy for a clear violation of its express terms by one of the 
parties [that is, by one of the states or the federal government] ?" Elliot, 
Deb., IV., p. 509. Webster said in reply: " The constitution, it is said, 
is a compact between states; the states, then, and the states only, are 
parties to the compact." How comes the general government itself a 
party? Upon the honorable gentleman's hypothesis, the general gov- 
eminent is the xesult of the compact, the creature of the compact, not 
one of the parties to it. Yet the argument, as the gentleman has now 
stated it, makes the government itself one of its own creators. It makes 
it a party to tnat compact to which it owes its own existence." Web- 
ster, Works, ill., p. 343. Calhoun thus wholly agreed with Webster 
on this point and he was unquestionably much more just to the state- 
rights doctrine than Hayne with his logical opposition. 

2 Compare a " disquisition on government." Calhoun, Works, I., pp. 
264, 322. 






47" STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

on the legal question, Calhoun thoroughly examined the 

actual point then under dispute, and came to the practical 
conclusion that the hist moment had now conic when 
"through the regular and ordinary process of legislation^ 
a change of circumstances for the better could be brought 
about; if this momentary chance was not improved, then 
the suffering section would cease " to look to the general 
government for relief." 

The address was a blow in the water as far as it 
directed against the protectionist party. A year and a 
half before, the question of the relation between the s< 
and the federal government had been thoroughly ai _ 
in the senate in the debate over the so-called Foot resolu- 
tion, which gave no direct cause whatever for such a dis- 
cussion. General Hayne of South Carolina maintained 
the side of the state-rights men, and Webster took up the 
cause of the opposite party. The whole country followed 
this parliamentary duel with feverish interest. The north 
joyfully proclaimed Webster as the victor, and the tone of 
scant assurance with which the south claimed the palm for 
its champion showed that it acknowledged to itself the 
superiority of Webster in dialectic vigor, in cutting repar- 
tee, and in the command of language. Yet not the slight- 
est change was made in the matter under consideration. 
Talk and negotiation could not obstruct the march of events. 
Calhoun, too, naturally did not think of convincing his 
adversaries. His arguments were mainly directed to his 
own party, with the view of consolidating it and inspiring 
it with resolution. The announcement of his n 
bring his doctrines to practical accomplishment, unless the 
wrongs of the plantation states were forthwith righted, was 
of most force with his opponents. 

A few weeks afterwards when, in accordance with general 
expectation, the tariff question again came before cong 
there were signs of the beginning of a break in the pro- 
tectionist ranks. Independently of the political crisis, the 






471 

approach of which was scarcely credited, the belief in the 
American system had been here and there so far shat- 
tered that its friends did not promise themselves the best 
result from the next congressional election. Even Clay 
felt unsafe. He himself brought in resolutions " for the 
reduction and removal of certain duties." He met with 
violent opposition from part of his own party, but the be- 
lief that the safety of the future demanded a lowering 
of the tariff conquered. 1 The secretary of the treasury 
estimated the probable decrease of the revenue from duties 
at five million dollars. The plantation states not only 
found the amount too small, but declared that the whole 
reduction was a piece of bold and insolent nonsense, since 
duties exclusively for revenue had been almost the only 
ones reduced; the small decrease in the protective duties 
was more than counterbalanced, they said, by the required 
payment in ready money, the shortening of the time of 
credit, and the change in the comparative value of the 
dollar and the pound sterling. South Carolina received 
the tariff as a sure declaration that the protective system 
was " the settled policy of the country." Calhoun now 
exerted his whole influence to have the die cast without 
delay, and with a firm hand. 

July 14, 1S32, the tariff had received the sanction of the 
president, and on August 28 Calhoun developed again, and 
in a more exhaustive way than hitherto, the whole doctrine 
of the state-rights party. 2 The arguments are more sharp- 
ly formulated than in the address, the chain of logical de- 
velopment is more firmly forged, and the final consequences 
are stated with the utmost clearness. He takes as his 
starting-point the fact that " so far from the constitution 
being the work of the American people collectively, no 

1 See the tariff, Statutes at Large, IV., p. 583. 

2 He chose, this time, the form of a letter to governor Hamilton of 
South Carolina. Calhoun, Works, VI., pp. 144-193 ; Jenkins, Life of 
Calhoun, pp. 195-232. 



472 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

such political body, either now or ever, did exist. . . . 
From the beginning, and in all the changes of political 
existence through which we have passed, the people of the 
United States have been united as forming political com- 
munities, and nut as individuals. Even in the first - 
of existence they funned distinct colonies, independent of 
each other, and politically united only through the British 
crown. In their first imperfect union, for the purpoe 
resisting the encroachments of the mother country, they 
united as distinct political communities; and, passing from 
their colonial condition, in the act announcing their inde- 
pendence to the world they declared themselves, by name 
and enumeration, 1 free and independent states. In this 
character they formed the old confederation; and when it 
was proposed to supersede the articles of confederation by 
the present constitution, they met in convention a 
acted and voted as states; and the constitution, when 
formed, was submitted for ratification to the people of the 
several states; it was ratified by them as states, each state 
for itself; each by its ratification binding its own citizen.-; 
the parts thus separately binding themselves, and not the 
whole the parts; to which, if it be added that it i- 
clared in the preamble of the constitution to be ordained 
by the people of the United States, and in the article of 
ratification, when ratified, it is declared 'to be binding be- 
tween the states so ratifying,' 2 the conclusion is inevit- 

1 " By name and enumeration." This expression is not in full ac- 
cordance with historic facts. The title of the declaration i 
laration by the Representatives of the United States in Congiv- 
sembled." At the end are the words: "The foregoing declaration 
by order of congress, engrossed and signed by the following meml 
Then follows the signature of the president, under this the nam 
the states, and under each state the name- of its repnsenlati 

8 This quotation is not correct. Article VII. of the constitution 
reads: "Tin; ratification of the convention of nine states shall be suffi- 
cient for the establishment [not binding] of this constitution, between 
the states so ratifying the same." 



STATE-EIGHTS THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION. 473 

able that the constitution is the work of the people of the 
states, considered as separate and independent political 
communities. . . . The first and . . most impor- 
tant result [of these facts] is that there is no direct and 
immediate connection between the individual citizens of 
a state and the general government. The relation between 
them is through the state. ... It was only by the 
ratification [of the federal constitution] of the state that 
its citizens became subject to the control of the general 
government. ... It belongs to the state as a member 
of the Union, in her sovereign capacity in convention, to 
determine definitely, as far as her citizens are concerned, 
the extent of the obligation which she contracted; and if, 
in her opinion, the act exercising the power [in dispute] be 
unconstitutional, to declare it null and void, which declara- 
tion would be obligatory on her citizens." This right 
"flows directly from the relation of the state to the gen- 
eral government on the one side, and its citizens on the 
other." Its exercise is not the abrogation of an act of the 
federal government by the state, but by the constitution; 
nullification is " the great conservative principle" of the 
Union. '*Xot a provision can be found in the constitution 
authorizing the general government to exercise any con- 
trol whatever over a state by force, by veto, by judicial 
process, or in any other form, — a most important omis- 
sion, designed, and not accidental." And the actual state 
of the case corresponds with the right, for " it would be 
impossible for the general government, within the limits 
of the states, to execute, legally, the act nullified, . . . 
while on the other hand the state would be able to enforce, 
legally and peaceably, its declaration of nullification," since 
the citizens of the state "would be found in all the rela- 
tions of life, private and political, to respect and obey it; 
and, when called upon as jurymen, to render their verdict 
accordingly, or, as judges, to pronounce judgment in con- 
formity with it." An appeal to the United States supreme 



474 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

court would be of no use, for "what would it avail against 
the execution of the penal enactments of the state, intend- 
ed to enforce the declaration of nullification) . . . 
Beaten before the [state] courts, the general government 

would be compelled to abandon its unconstitutional pre- 
tensions, or resort to force; a resort, the difficulty (I was 
about to say the impossibility) of which would very soon 
fully manifest itself, should folly or madness ever make 
the attempt." Moreover, the calling out of the military 
power of the Union would be wholly useless, becaue 
opponents would be found, for " it would be . . a con- 
flict of moral, not physical, force." The legal relation be- 
tween the nullifying state and the federal government 
would be by no means broken up. The decision of one 
concrete question between them would simply be delayed 
until the sovereign parties to the union compact had de- 
liberated over it. If the power of the federal government 
in question was confirmed by three-fourths of these par 
then the suspension of its exercise caused by nullification 
had reached its endj Yet it is not to be understood that 
the nullifying state would in every case be unconditionally 
bound by such a decision. This is, of course, the rule, 
and the scope of the rule is so great that a convention 01 
states may properly be, called, not only a court of last 

1 This gave one-fourth of the states the power to deprive the federal 
government of every power entrusted to it, that is, to alter the constitu- 
tion at will. But, according to Article V., the constitution can he 
amended only by the consent of three-fourths of all the Btates. More- 
over, in the case in point, the "suspension" of the questioned power is 
in such flagrant contradiction to another provision of the constitution 
that the state-rights party did not try to dispute it, but pushed it aside 
By appealing to their general line of argument. Nullification forbade 
the collection of all customs, but the constitution (Article I.. Sec. s . jj 1 1 
says: "All duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the 
United States." If the general government was bound to respect nulli- 
fication, it was obliged by this passage of the constitution to stop the 
collection of all customs in all the other states, until "the so\< 
parties" decided between it and South Carolina. 



EIGHT OF SECESSION. 475 

resort, but also a court of final decision. But " in the 
case stated, should the other members undertake to grant 
the power nullified, and should the nature of the power be 
such as to defeat the object of the association or union, at 
least as far as the member nullifying is concerned, it would 
then become an abuse of power on the part of the prin- 
cipals, and thus present a case where secession would 
apply; but in no other could it be justified, except it be 
for a failure of the association or Union to effect the object 
for which it was created, independent of any abuse of 
power." In this case "force might, indeed, be employed, 
. . . but it must be a belligerent force, preceded by a 
declaration of war, and carried on with all its formalities." 
For the seceded state " would stand to them [the other 
states] simply in the relation of a foreign state, divested 
of all federal connection, and having none other between 
them but those belonging to the laws of nations." 

Thus the question of the relation of the states to the 
government of the Union, and to the Union itself, re- 
ceived its definite answer, on this side, in this theory. 
Everything afterwards brought forward by the state-rights 
party was only a repetition or a more exact expression of 
particular principles. Thirty years later the south carried 
out this programme piece by piece, and based its justifica- 
tion of its course, point by point, upon this argument. 

Calhoun had not claimed the right of nullification for 
the state legislatures. The sovereignty of the state was 
the one premise upon which he built up, in logical se- 
quence, his whole argument; therefore an action of the 
state " in its capacity as a sovereign," that is, the decision 
of a state convention, was necessary in order to decide, in 
a binding "way, whether or not the state had trusted the 
common agent of the league of states with a certain pow- 
er. 1 On this point, the plans of the nullifiers had already 

1 Yet in the essay of a later date, a "disquisition on government" 
(Works, I., p. 241), he says: "Nothing short of a negative, absolute or 



470 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

once come to grief. A motion to call a convention had 
been made in the legislature, but it did not receive the 
ssary majority of two-thirds. But the anti-nullifica- 
tion party, despite the greatest efforts, was no longer able 
to till a third of the seats in the legislature. Oct. 24, the 
senate, by thirty to thirteen votes, and the house, by ninety- 
nine to twenty-live, resolved to call a convention on the 
19th of November at Columbia. 1 The convention, which 
contained members of nearly all the influential fainili- 
the states, chose gov. Hamilton as its chairman. A com- 
mittee appointed by him reported, through gen. Hayne. a 
nullification-ordinance, which was adopted, Nov. 24, by a 
large majority. 2 It declared the tariff of May 10, 1S2S, 
and that of July 14, 1832, null and void; instructed the 
legislature to pass the laws and take the other measures 
necessary for enforcing the ordinance and preventing the 
collection of the duties imposed by the nullified laws; for- 
bade an appeal from the state courts to the United States 
supreme court in suits in which the authority of the ordi- 
nance, the binding power of the laws passed in conse- 
quence of it or the validity of the nullified laws came into 
question; commanded the state judges to have their judg- 
ments executed without regard to any such appeal and 
t<» punish persons who did appeal for contempt of court; 
demanded from all the officials of the state, under penalty 
of instant dismissal, an oath to recognize and fulfill the 
ordinance and all laws passed in consequence of it; pro- 
vided that a similar oath should be taken by jurors when 
the legality of the ordinance and of these laws came into 

in effect, on the part of the government of a state, can possibly protect 
it against the encroachments of the united government of the states, 
whenever their powers come in conflict." 

1 Niles' Reg., XLlII.,p. 175. 

2 The ordinance is given in full in Deb. of Congress, XII, p. 30; 
Niles 1 Reg., XLIII., p. 210; Benton, Thirty Years' View, I., p. 297; and 
in many other places. 



ORDINANCE OF NULLIFICATION. 477 

question; and announced that every measure ot coercion 
on the part of the federal government would be regarded 
"as inconsistent with the longer continuance of South 
Carolina in the Union; and that the people of this state 
will thenceforth hold themselves absolved from all future 
obligation to maintain or preserve their political connec- 
tion with the people of the other states, and will forthwith 
proceed to organize a separate government and do all other 
acts and things which sovereign and independent states 
may of right do." The convention then adjourned until 
March in order to await the decision of congress. 

The legislature assembled November 27. The governor 
declared, in his message, 1 that the ordinance of nullification 
had become " a part of the fundamental law of South Car- 
olina." The legal question could no longer be mooted; 
"it is enough that she [South Carolina] has willed it." It 
was now the part of the legislature, he said, to ensure obe- 
dience to the ordinance by penal enactments, to define the 
crime of high treason against the state, and to provide 
everything that would be necessary in case the federal 
government should seek to compel obedience to its usur- 
patory laws. For the latter purpose, he asked for a 
thorough reform of the militia organization and the author- 
ization of the enlistment of two thousand volunteers for 
the defense of Charleston and of ten thousand more from 
the rest of the state. 

The legislature came promptly up to all these require- 
ments. A law gave the owners of goods attached on ac- 
count of the non-payment of duties the right to regain 
possession of them by a writ of replevin, that is, author- 
ized the use of force, if the goods were not voluntarily 
delivered to the sheriff by the custom-house officials. 2 

1 Niles' Reg., XLIIL, p. 259. 

2 See Grundy s speech in the senate. Niles' Reg., XLIIL, Suppl., p. 
215. Compare, too, Webster, Works, III., pp. 491, 492; Kent, Conim., 
III., pp. 624, 625. 






47S STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

Moreover, the sheriff was empowered, in ease of refusal, to 
levy on the private property of the custom-house officials 
to an amount double that of the goods detained. Whoever 
opposed the execution of this law was to he punished by 
fine and imprisonment. Similar punishments were threat- 
ened against those who lent their aid in any way whato 
to the execution of those judgments of the federal courts 
which were based on the supposition of the efficacy of the 
nullified laws. Other laws prescribed the oath to support 
the ordinance of nullification and gave the governor the 
power he asked to put the state in a condition for defense 
and to bring armed force into play if it seemed at any time 
necessary. Webster affirmed that the law first mentioned 
fell far short of the ordinance. 1 But Grundy summed up a 
masterly analysis of it by saying that South Carolina had 
thereby " legislated the federal government out of the 

state." 

The ordinance of nullification put Jackson into a fury 
On December ll, 2 he issued, as an answer, his famous 
"proclamation," in which he tried to refute the nullifica- 
tion doctrine and made known his resolve to watch 
the full execution of the law, in accordance with his oath 
of office, with all the powers entrusted to him by the con- 
stitution. The proclamation united clear and genuine 
statesmanlike reasoning with warm and tender pathos. It 
made a deep impression at the north. 3 It brought keenly 

1 Webster, Priv. Corres., I., p. 530. 

2 This date is given in the Statesman's Manual, IT., pp. £00-903. 
Moreover, in the message of Jan. 16, 1833 (Ibid, II., p. 904), is the ex- 
pression, " My proclamation of the eleventh of December last" But 
Benton, Thirty years' View, I., p. 299; Colton, Works of Henry Clay, 
II., p. 218; Curtis, Life of Webster, I., pp. 433, 465; Elliot, Deb.. IV., 
p. 582; Hunt, Life of Edward Livingston, p. 371, and all the other works 
which lean recall to mind (except Parton, Life of Jackson, III., p. 
4G7), give the date of Dec. 10. I know no explanation for this. 

Neumann, Gesch. der Ver.Staaten, II., p. 409, says: •• But all the cred- 
it belongs to the president; to him alone belongs all the glory of the in- 



479 

to the consciousness of the south the miserable, mongrel 
condition of that section. The south looked unfavorably 
upon South Carolina's action, and was well contented that 
the reckless, energetic man at the head of the government 
promised to lead the Union safely through this crisis. But, 
on the other hand, South Carolina had only gone a step 
beyond the rest of the south in the development, and es- 
pecially in the practical application, of the state-rights 
doctrine. The unconditional supremacy claimed by the 
proclamation for the laws of the Union and the promise of 
their protection by force, if necessary, could therefore 
gratify this section but little. 1 South Carolina was not 
alone in asking where Jackson's swords and cannon were, 
when Georgia publicly and scornfully transgressed the 
laws of the Union. Why was that now so great a crime 

disputable contents of the proclamation as well as of its fiery eloquence. 
Occasional improvements in tlie wording may be due to that master of 
style, Edward Livingston. There is, however, not the slightest ground 
for ascribing the whole proclamation to Livingston, as Hunt has done 
in his recent biography, Life of Edward Livingston." That the un- 
cultured Jackson was not able to compose this state paper, needs no 
proof. That Jackson should not be without credit for it, appears very 
plainly from Hunt's story (pp. 371-381). Jackson gave it its character 
which is expressed in the words so often quoted : "The Union mast and 
shall be preserved." The remainder is surely, in the main, Livingston's 
work. Neumann's authority is Parton, of whom he himself (II., p. 
487) says : " The biographer of Jackson writes a novel, calculated to 
produce effect and calls it history." And Parton's witness is Majoi 
Lewis, a friend and enthusiastic admirer of Jackson, to whom Parton is 
indebted for endless masses of presidential " kitchen-gossip." Livings 
ton, whose name is even now mentioned w T ith great respect by the great 
est European jurists, does not deserve to be put off with the description 
u a master of style." Compare, moreover, Neumann, II., p. 471. 

1 Clay himself wrote, Dec. 12, to Judge Brooks: " As to the procla 
mation, although there are good things in it, especially what relates to 
the judiciary, there are some entirely too ultra for me, and which I can- 
not stomach. A proclamation ought to have been issued weeks ago 
but I think it should have been a very different paper from the present, 
which I apprehend will irritate, instead of allaying any excited feeling." 
Colton, Works of Clay, II., p. 219. 



4S0 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

upon which the president then looked with scarcelv con- 
cealed satisfaction^ Did not hie oath of office impose the 
same duties upon him then? Was the supremacy oft 
tariff-law of a higher sort than that of treaties? Whj 

must a sovereign state now most obediently entreat the 
United States supreme court to inform it of the limi 
its rights, when then a state no more sovereign could an* 
grilv reject the decision of that court, made in all form, as 
a revolting assumption, without receiving even a warning 
reproof from president or congress? South Carolina knew 
that no answer could be given to all these questions, and 
therefore did not fail to put them. But she was too proud 
and too prudent to look upon them as the anchor which 
held fast her cause. Calhoun's " indubitable historic facts' 1 
and his "simple deductions" from the constitution had to 
remain the ground upon which she took her stand, if she 
wished not only to escape without punishment, but to reach 
her immediate aim and protect herself against all future 
contingencies. 

Hamilton's term of office had meantime expired, and in 
his stead Ilayne became governor of South Carolina. The 
seat thus left vacant in the United States senate was given 
to Calhoun, who had resigned the vice-presidency. In the 
presidential election, the state took only a formal part, 
since it supported the candidates of neither party. 1 All 
this showed that the nullification resolution was not simply 
a piece of headstrong nonsense. Jackson's proclamation 
did not terrify the state. It only made it the more defiant. 
Its reading in the legislature was accompanied by loud 
laughter and jesting commentaries. 2 Ilayne was requ< 
by a formal resolution of both houses to issue a counter 
proclamation. He responded to the request in a way 
which satisfied even the most embittered "fire-eaters" 

1 John Floyd of Virginia and Henry Lee of Massachusetts were tho 
men of straw who received the electoral votes of South Carolina. 
» Niles' Reg., XLIII., pp. 287, 288. 



PREPARATION FOR WAR. 481 

among the nullifiers. 1 Jackson's command to the custom- 
house officials to continue in the discharge of their duties at 
every risk, the mission of general Scott and the appearance 
of ships of war before Charleston were answered by redoubled 
zeal in the hastening of preparations for war. Meanwhile, 
congress had again come together. Calhoun's arrival was 
waited for with the greatest suspense. The galleries were 
filled to overflowing as he took the oath to the constitution. 
The firm repose with which he did so did not fail to make 
a deep impression. Only a few denied that he was per- 
sonally a man of the strictest morality, and it was there- 
fore said that he must be fully convinced of the truth of 
his doctrine and would not lightly abandon it. Still less 
was it doubted that Jackson would fulfill his word, if South 
Carolina made good her own of February 1. The minds 
of men were therefore heavy with care, for nearly all agreed 
that bloodshed might draw after it the most incalculable 
results. But yet an indefinite faith that the danger would 
be averted was discernible through the expression of the 
worst fears. Deeply in earnest as both Jackson and South 
Carolina were, it was nevertheless to be seen from the first 
that they would reciprocally try hard to avoid an armed 
collision. This feeling did not easily gain possession of 
the energetic soldier who had always looked upon the pres- 
idency as the headship of an army. But with all his great 
and eventful faults, he possessed the one virtue of a true 
patriotism and a warm feeling for the whole people. If 
the sword must be drawn, then it would certainly not be 
sheathed again — as far as this depended upon him — until 
South Carolina's resistance had been wholly broken down, 
even if the whole Union had first to be bathed in blood. 
But with whatever soldierly joy he had fought against 
England and the Indians, he did not w^ish to draw the 
sword against his fellow-citizens, if it could possibly be 

1 Niles' Keg., XLIII., pp. 308-312. 
31 



482 BTATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

avoided, for lie feared that there would perhaps be need of 
long and hard work before quiet was again restored. It 

congress and South Carolina agreed, on the basis of a 
thorough and comprehensive modification of the tariff, up- 
on the conditions of a settlement, Jackson certainly would 
not refuse his consent. The limits of the indirect partici- 
pation in the legislative powers granted to the president 
by the constitution could not rightly be so narrowly drawn 
by him that he could hold or declare himself unauthor 
to veto a tariff bill because — and simply because— it se< 
to him desirable to subject the doctrine of nullification to 
the ordeal by fire. But Jackson could give his sanction} 
to a tariff modified in the interests of free trade in and for 
itself, without yielding the slightest point, since he had 
already recommended, since his entrance into office, a mod- 
ification of the existing tariff. 

His patriotic care had an influence, too, upon South 
Carolina, for it is simply laughable, from party spirit <>r 
for the sake of heightened dramatic effect, to give such a 
view of the strife that Calhoun and his comrades seem to 
have lost, through ambition, personal hatreds, or fanati- 
cism, all national spirit. Any chance might, indeed, have 
let the flood of passion break through the dam of national 
feeling, if it had not been held back by the strongest dic- 
tates of political prudence. The milliners evidently 
sidered it practically almost impossible for the federal 
government to try to cut through the knots; but their 
judgment remained sober enough to let them see that they 
would compel the government to use force if they fir? 
sorted to it. They might perhaps have thus hurled tliej 
whole Union into chaotic confusion, but in no event cou| 
they have attained their ends. The moment they reni<>' 
the question from the domain of law their cause was 
lessly lost. They did not lose sight of this for an instant 
The convention had issued, before its adjournment, an 



ADDRESS OF THE NULLIFIEKS. 483 

"address to the people of the United States," 1 in which 
it expressly declared that, as far as lay within the power 
of South Carolina, matters would not come to bloodshed. 
It announced, indeed, on this point, that this would be 
avoided by the secession of the state. 2 "We need not in- 
quire here how far this means would have corresponded 
with the end proposed. The nullifiers considered it prob- 
able, but by no means as indubitable as they pretended, 
that such a solution of the struggle could be brought 
about without opposition. 3 Then, too, they followed up 
this assurance, which was, at best, of only negative value, 
with a positive offer. The address explained that South 
Carolina made, in this, " a concession," and declared that 
she could only content herself with the plan of taxation 
she proposed, " provided she is met in due time and in a 
becoming spirit by the states interested in the protection 
of manufactures." If this way of proposing a compromise 
was little adapted to make its adoption possible, the pro- 
posed tariff system itself was absolutely unacceptable to 
the manufacturing states, and even wholly absurd in and 
for itself. 4 Yet too much weight must not be laid upon 



1 Niles' Reg., XL III., pp. 231-234. 

1 ■ In order to obviate the possibility of having the history of this 
contest stained by a single drop of fraternal blood, we have solemn- 
ly and irrevocably resolved that we will regard such a resort [to mili- 
tary or naval force] as a dissolution of the political ties which connect 
us with our confederate states ; and will forthwith provide for the or- 
ganization of a new and separate government." 

8 A very considerable part of the state-rights party rejected the right 
of nullification, but acknowledged that of secession. In the legislature 
of South Carolina, Barnwell Smith commented with especial sharpness 
on Jackson's proclamation, as containing " the tyrannical doctrine 
that we have not even the right to secede." Niles' Reg., XLIIL, p. 
288. 

" We believe that upon very just and equitable principles of taxa- 
tion, the whole list of protected articles should be imported free of all 
duty, and that the revenue derived from import duties should be raised 
exclusively upon the unprotected articles, or that whenever a duty is im- 



48-i STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

this. The main thing was, that South Carolina had shown 
her readiness to agree eventually upon a compromise. If 

congress made no offers whatever in answer to this. >he 
could, with at least a certain appearance of justice, make 
it responsible for the consequences. 

Jackson and the nullifiers thus not only sought each to 
force upon the other the dice-box for the final cast, 
they met each other with a secret wish that it might not 
be grasped until congress had been compelled to again lake 
part in the play. The protectionist majority was thus put 
in a dilemma. The extreme fraction, belonging to the 
New England states, was not willing to buy peace at all, 
and especially not at the cost of the manufacturers. The 
majority would gladly have played the part of spectator.-. 1 
But inactivity would have imposed no less responsibility 
upon it than a positive decision, and if there was a general 
agreement to bring the tariff again under discussion it 
was thereby already practically decided that some sort of 
compromise offer would be made to South Carolina. Such 
a small majority could not preserve an unbroken trout in 
such a crisis, after it had been already thrown into fear and 
trembling before the crisis culminated. 

Jackson had stated, in his annual message of Dec. 4, 
that the needs of the treasury allowed a further reduction 
of the national income, and had recommended the rem 

posed upon protected articles imported, an excise duty of the same rate 
should be imposed upon all similar articles manufactured iu the United 
States. . . But we are willing to make a large offering to pi 
the Union; and, with a distinct declaration that it is a con 
our part, we will consent that the same rate of duty may he imposed 
the protected articles that shall be imposed upon the unprotected, pro- 
vided that no more revenue be raised than is necessary to meet i! 
mands of the government for constitutional purposes, and pro 
also, that a duty substantially uniform be imposed upon all foreign im- 
ports." 

1 Clay writes, Dec. 12, 1832: "Congress has not been called upon, and I 
sincerely nope it may not be necessary to call upon it, in this unfor- 
tunate affair. 1 ' Private Correspondence of H. Clay, p. 345. 



THE VERPLANCK BILL. 485 

of " those burthens which shall be found to fall unequally 
upon any . . [of] the great interests of the commu- 
nity." 1 This part of the message had been referred to the 
committee on ways and means, which reported, Dec. 27. 
the so-called Verplanck bill. 2 The bill went back to the 
tariff of 1816, and put p>art of the duties still lower than 
that had. Verplanck himself estimated the decrease in 
the customs revenue at 813,000,000, compared with the 
tariff of 1828, and at §7,000,000 in comparison with that 
of 1S32. Since this reduction was to take place i n the 
course of two years, it almost amounted to a complete 
abandonment of protection, and a great part of the manu- 
facturing establishments would have been hopelessly ruin- 
ed. Yet the protectionists feared that the bill would be 
passed, by the house, and then perhaps also, although not 
without a hard struggle, by the senate. 3 A month before 
such a radical change would have been held impossible, and 
even now, despite nullification, the adoption of the bill 
would not have been feared if it had not been generally 
regarded as an " administration bill." Experience had al- 
ready repeatedly shown how terrible an influence Jackson 
could exercise, and the message had already given it to be 
understood, clearly enough, that lie was ready to go as far 

1 Statesman's Manual. II., p. 785. 

2 Verplanck brought in the report accompanying the bill, Dec. 28. 
Debates of Congress, XII., p. 128. 

3 Webster wrote, Jan. 3, 1833, to "VY. Sullivan: ik But our more immi- 
nent clanger, in my opinion, is that, seizing on the occasion, the anti- 
tariff party will prostrate the whole tariff system. You will have seen 
the bill reported by Mr. Yerplanck. Great and extraordinary eforts 
are put forth to push that bill rapidly through congress. It is likely 
to be finally acted upon, at least in the house of representatives, before 
the country can be made to look on it in its true character. On the 
other hand, our friends will resist it, of course, and hold on to the last. 

. . . If the bill were now in the senate, it would not pass; but how 
far individuals may be brought over by party discipline in the drill of 
a month, it is impossible to say." Webster, Priv. Corresp., I., pp. 523, 
529. 



4gQ STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND BLAVEBY. 

aa this. 1 Webster affirmed that Jackson would have pi 
ferred to coerce the nullifiers without making any conce* 
sions to them, and afterwards to modify the tariff, but that 
his party pressed him forward, because it feared the effi 
of the doctrines developed in the proclamation. 2 But the 
friends and admirers of the president declared that he aided 
the compromise bill by all the means in his power. 3 But 
he did not on this account abandon the position taken m 
the proclamation. When he learned how the latter had 
been received in South Carolina, he sent to congre 
sage 4 which was couched in a more moderate tone, but 
which asked for the grant of extraordinary powers. He 

r ' His argument, indeed, inclined to both sides, but the summary d» 
L Glared- " Those who have vested their capital in manufacturing estafc 
7 lishments cannot expect that the people will continue permanently to 
/ pay high taxes for their benefit, when the money is not required R» 
7 any legitimate purpose in the administration of the government. 
/ not enough that the high duties have been paid as long as the money 
/ arising from them could be applied to the common benefit in the extin- 
K guishment of the public debt?" Yet he still held fast to the belief that 
\ an exception should be made in favor of those things which were 
\ lutely necessary for the safety of the land in time of war. 
\ * « I do not believe the president himself wishes the bill I 
V contra I fancy he would prefer the undivided honor of suppressing nul- 
lification now, and to take his own time hereafter to remodel the tariff 
But the party push on, fearing the effect of the doctrines of the prod* 
mation and endeavoring to interpose and to save Carolina, not by the 
proclamation, but by taking away the ground of complaint." W 
Priv. Cones., L, p. 529. 

3 Benton writes: "Many thought that he ought to relax in his ciril 
measures for allaying discontent, while South Carolina held the mihuij 
attitude of armed defiance to the United States-and among them, Mr. 
Ouincy Adams. But he adhered steadily to his pur] > ng mi 

With what justice required for the relief of the south, and promoted, by 
all the means in his power.the success of the bills to reduce the revenue." 
Thirty Years' View, I., p. 308. On Jackson's position on the tan 
question, in the spring of 1832, compare Reminiscences of J. A. Ham- 
pton, p. 243; see also A. H. Stephens, The War between the Sta 

p. 4.40. 
* Jan. 16, 1833. Statesman's Man., IL, pp. 904-022. 






THE FORCE BILL. 



48' 



stated that lie had ordered, from motives of " precaution," 
the transfer of the custom-house from Charleston to Castle 
Pinckney and now wished to be authorized " to alter and 
abolish such of the districts and ports of entry as should 
be necessary and to establish the custom-house at some 
secure place within some port or harbor of such state." 1 
Only in case this did not prove enough and " in case of an 
attempt otherwise to take the property [attached for non- 
payment of duties] by a force too great to be overcome by 
the officers of the customs," did he ask the right to use the 
land and sea forces to execute the law. 

Calhoun answered the message by introducing a series 
of resolutions concerning the powers of the federal gov- 
ernment. 2 His whole theory of state rights was theremV 
compressed into a few sentences, but the offensive word ^ 
" nullification" was not used. Yet he went as far on his 
side as Jackson had on his. On the main fact he held fast, 
unterrified, to his position, but gave it to be understood 
that he did not wish to run the risk of the danger of pre- 
venting a compromise for the sake of trifles. 

The state of affairs was much more rightly described by 
this than by the character which the debate soon after- 
wards took in the senate. The message of the president 
had been referred to the judiciary committee, which brought 
in a bill, Jan. 21, intended to ensure, that is, to make pos- 
sible, the collection of customs in South Carolina. 3 The 
whole body of state-rights men denounced it in the most 
unmeasured language and soon fastened the irritating name 
of " force bill" upon it. Before the debate proper began, 

1 He gave as a reason for this request that the same measures of pre- 
caution could not be taken in the harbors of Georgetown and Beaufort 
as in Charleston. 

2 Jan. 22, 1833. Deb. of Congress, XII., p. 23. 

3 The bill was naturally framed in such a way that it applied, in form, 
to the whole extent of the Union. It is given, in the shape in which it 
was finally adopted, in Stat, at L., IV., p. 632 and also in Niles' Keg., 
XLIIL, Suppl., p. 46. 



488 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

it had already become evident that the bill would by no 
means be quickly passed. Mangum of North Carolina 
and Bibb of Kentucky moved to postpone the debate. 
The latter gave as his reason that this was not the 
time for the discussion of principles of such an exciting 
character; "events 1 ' might soon happen which would 
make the debate less exciting. 1 The senate adopted a com- 
promise motion of Clay, in accordance with which th< 
bate began Jan. 28. The senate had thus coincided with 
Mangum's remark that congress could not come t<> a con- 
clusion before February 1, the day on which the ordinance 
of nullification was to come into force. But not much im- 
portance was attached to this circumstance, although it 
was to be expected, from the previous talk of both parties, 
that the greatest weight would be laid upon it. Bibb was 
evidently not alone in expecting the " events" to which he 
had referred. And the expectations entertained were not 
disappointed. South Carolina was in no more of a hurry 
to let nullification come into force than congress had beea 
to pass the " force bill." A " suspension" of the ordinance 
was voted, in order to wait and see what congress would 
do. 2 Thus both sides reached an equally broad water-way, 
by which the harbor must finally be entered, if neither 
party suddenly turned around the rudder. This explains 
the significance of the wild war of words which now be- 
gan in congress. It was neither a stage-contest for the 
amusement of the public nor a womanish wrangle about I 
mere matter of dogmatism. It bore from the first instant 
the stamp, not of a struggle which was to culminate straight- 
way, but of one which had just happily passed its culmin- 
ating point. 

Wilkins of Pennsylvania, as chairman of the judici 
committee, opened the debate. The ground-thought of his 

1 Niles' Keg., XLIII., BuppL, p. 51. 

• Ibid, p. 382. 



DEBATES ON THE BILL. 489 

speech was that nullification was a practical dissolution of 
the Union, for it overthrew the principle of the supremacy 
of the law. The passage of the bill was therefore not only 
justified, but absolutely necessary, for its provisions went 
just far enough to maintain the authority of the Union if 
South Carolina tried to execute the nullification laws. For 
the rest, the bill was not, as the Opposition had affirmed, 
.of an extraordinary character. The committee could for- 
tify itself with precedents on every point, or at least could 
cite cases in proof that its proposals were in the fullest 
harmony with previous laws. The only new thing was the 
provision which gave the president the right to move cus- 
tom houses, and this was simply intended " to avoid, if 
possible, all collision." 1 

Bibb of Kentucky was the first speaker of the Opposi- 
tion. He said not a word in defense of nullification, but 
he threw himself, with the state-rights shield of noli me 
tangere between the nullifiers and the federal authorities; 
the bill, he said, " authorizes a declaration of war against 
the state of South Carolina, a declaration of war by proc- 
lamation of the president and at his discretion, not upon 
the basis of facts." 2 But his whole speech was on what 
the federal authorities could not do; the positive side of 
the question — the way in which they could defend them- 
selves and the Union against a nullification of the laws of 
the Union — he left untouched. If his whole reasoning 
were summed up — something which the orator naturally 
failed to do — and the practical result asked for, the only 
possible answer was that a return, in essentials, to the 
standpoint of the articles of confederation was demanded. 

1 Niks' Reg., XL V., p. 60. The two last points were much niorestrong- 
ly put by Frelinghuysen and Grundy. The latter said : " Is this making 
war ? So far from it, it is the most pacific course that could he presented ; 
it is retreating from threatened violence, and this is done upon the recom- 
mendation of him who never retreated to secure his own personal safe- 
ty." Ibid, pp. 53, 88, 216. 

1 Ibid, p. 65. 



490 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

These articles had giveD congress many rights, l>nt had 
withheld from it the power to make good its rights. Ac- 
cording to the doctrine of the anti-nullification state-rights 
party, the constitution gave the federal government suffi- 
cient rights, and gave it means which would have sufficed 
for the enforcement of these rights, but it had not given it 
the power to use these means, if a state objected to the 
exercise of the rights. Nullifying and anti-nullifviiig 
state-rights men came to substantially the same belief be- 
cause they started with the same hypothesis. Bibb af- 
firmed: " Sovereignty rests in the people of each state." 1 
Tyler formulated the creed of the party still more sharply 
by saying that lie owed obedience to the laws of the Union, 
because he owed allegiance to Virginia. 2 

The other speakers of the Opposition followed without 
exception in Bibbs's footsteps. The most interesting thing 
in their speeches was the crowd of historic illustrations. 
Not many states could boast that they had never done 
priest's service at the altar of state sovereignty and had 
not praised as the flames of holy sacrifice what they now 
denounced as a Moloch's fire. 

The debates had already continued fourteen days and, 
despite all the eloquence and dialectic sharpness shown by 
both parties, the goal was not a single step nearer. Clay 

1 McDuffie said in an after-dinner speech: "I will readily concede 
that a state cannot nullify an act of congress by virtue of any power 
derived from the constitution. It would be a perfect solecism to sup- 
pose any such power was conferred by the constitution. This right 
flows from a higher source. All that I claim for the state in this re- 
spect necessarily results from the mere fact of sovereignty." Nile* 1 
Reg , XLIIL, pp. 41,42. 

'-'"It is because I owe allegiance to the state of Virginia that 1 
owe obedience to the laws of this government. My state requires of me 
to render such obedience. She has entered into a compact which, while 
it continues, is binding on all her people. So would it be if she had 
formed a treaty with any foreign power. I should be bound to obey 
the stipulations of such a treaty because she willed it" Ibid., XLIIL, 
Suppl., p. 104. 



THE CLAY-CALHOUN COMPROMISE. 491 

therefore asked the senate, February 12, to allow him to 
bring in a bill to modify the tariff laws. 1 Calhoun spoke 
in favor of granting the permission. He could not give 
his consent to all the details of the bill, but its " general 
principles" and its " object" had his "entire approval." 
"A very large capital," he continued, "has been invested in 
manufactures, which have been of great service to the coun- 
try; and I would never give my vote to suddenly withdraw 
all those duties by which that capital is sustained in the 
channel into which it has been directed." The settlement 
of the minor points of difference would present no diffi- 
culty if men met each other " in the spirit of mutual com- 
promise . . . without at all yielding the constitutional 
question as to the right of protection." 2 

Now, in fact, nothing remained but to come to an under- 
standing on the "minor points of difference." After the 
leaders of the protectionists and the leaders of the nulli- 
fiers announced that they had agreed with each other on 
the main points of the arrangement, the latter was assured 
even if a hot battle had to be fought for its sake. Webster 
declared that he found principles in the bill, to which, as 
far as he could now see, he could never give his approval. 
The extreme wing of the protectionists, too, had not pre- 
viously been won over to support the compromise, 3 and it 
was strong enough to make the slightest discord between 
the new allies a serious danger. But the whole history of 
party up to that time had not seen stranger bedfellows 
than Clay and Calhoun were at that instant. They had 
begun their political career as brothers in arms, but now 

1 Deb. of Cong., XII., p. 81; Clay, Speeches, II., p. 139, seq. 

2 Deb. of Congress, XII., pp. 84, 85. 

3 Benton relates that Clay had advised Webster of his intentions, but 
that the latter had opposed it, saying : "It would be yielding great 
principles to faction and that the time had come to test the strength of 
the constitution and the government." On this account, he had not 
been admitted to the further negotiations. Benton, Thirty Years' View, 
I., p. 342. 



492 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

they had so thoroughly fallen away from eacli other that 
they did not even speak to one another. Even DOW, no 
change was made in their personal relations. Party spirit 
and personal enmity have used this circumstance in order 
to stamp Calhoun as a " coward." Benton relates that 
Calhoun accepted Clay's conditions after he had been told 
by Letcher, a Kentucky representative, that Jackson wished 
to hear of no " negotiation," but was resolved to have him 
imprisoned and tried for high treason. 1 Clayton, senator 
from Delaware, also declares that Calhoun's motive was 
fear lest Jackson should let him " hang." 2 In thifl 
too, persistent repetition has sufficed to make the assertion 
of extreme partisans become in the popular mind an his- 
toric fact. It has never once been asked whether it was in 
any way possible for Jackson to " hang" the " arch-traitor." 
Jackson was enough of an autocrat not to let Americans, 
proud of their freedom, look back with too great satisfac- 
tion upon this chapter of their history. They need not at 
least boast, upon the most dubious testimony, that he had 
not an evil pleasure in acting, as president, with the same 
arbitrary brutality that he had shown as a general in 
hunting down Indians. Yet the law and Jackson's will 
were not always absolutely identical, and however certainly 
Calhoun, according to the European ideas of state rights, 
may have been guilty of high treason, it would have been 
difficult to have convicted him of it, under the provisions 
of the constitution. 3 

1 Benton, Thirty Years' View, I., p. 343. 

8 Ibid, II., p. 113; Colton, Works of Clay, Speeches, II., p. 125. 

3 " Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war 
against them or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and com- 
fort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony 
of two witnesses to the same overt act or on confession in open court." 
Art. III., Sec. 3, § 1. In the decision of the supreme court in the 
Ex parte Bollmann and Ex parte Swartwout, U is said: "To constitute 
that specific crime, . . . war must actually be levied against the 
United States. However flagitious may be the crime of conspiring to 



THE GREAT NULLIFIED. 493 

Calhoun was well enough acquainted with the decisions 
of the supreme court in the cases of Burr and Bollmann not 
to be as much frightened by the first dark threat which 
came to him, at third or fourth hand, as, after a truce was 
agreed upon, his bitterest opponents affirmed. Only the 
partisan and the special pleader can lay weight on bits of 
history which have happened in the night and without a 
witness. As long as better proofs are not brought forward, 
the objective historian must confine himself to Calhoun's 
public actions and omissions. There is no justification in 
them for the supposition that, on account of anxiety about 
his personal safety, he caught quickly at the chance when an 
opportunity to capitulate was offered him. 

February 15 and 16, Calhoun delivered a speech on the 
force bill. 1 It was couched, for the most part, in the meas- 
ured, doctrinaire tone of a logical discussion. Yet in parts 
it fell into pathos, which was, indeed, not free from decla- 
mation and exaggeration, but which certainly did not show 
fear. Calhoun did not seek to avoid by humility and flat- 
tery the blow which it was alleged that Jackson wished to 

subvert by force the government of our country, such conspiracy is not 
treason. To conspire to levy war and actually to lev}'- war, are distinct 
offences. The first must be brought into open action by the assemblage 
of men for a purpose treasonable in itself, or the fact of levying war can- 
not have been committed. . . It is not the intention of the court to 
say that no individual can be guilty of this crime who has not appeared 
in arms against his country. On the contrary, if war be actually levied, 
that is, if a body of men be actually assembled for the purpose of effect- 
ing by force a treasonable purpose, all those who perform any part, 
however minute or however remote from the scene of action, and who 
are actually leagued in the general conspiracy, are to be considered as 
traitors. But there must be an actual assembling of men for the trea- 
sonable purpose to constitute a levying of war. . . It is therefore 
more safe, as well as more consonant to the principles of our constitution, 
that the crime of treason should not be extended by construction to 
doubtful cases." Cranch, Rep., IV., pp. 126, 127 ; Curtis, II., pp. 36, 37. 
Compare also Cranch, IV., pp. 468-509. 

Calhoun, Works, II., pp. 197-262; Jenkins, Life of Calhoun, pp., 
251-300. 



494 STATE BOVEBEIGNTY AND BLAYEBT. 

strike. Tie had exasperated him both as president and as 

an individual and lie well knew the hard feelings and the 
wild passionateness of the man. but he had a conciliatory 
word neither for the president nor for the individual. 
From motives of "decorum," lie refrained from answering 
the personal* attacks of the president, but lie accused him 
in the sharpest language of breach of faith and of ingrati- 
tude towards South Carolina. On the essential question, 
he led the fig-lit to the farthest point it had vet reached. As 
if with an inner satisfaction, he named everything plainly 
by its right name and he sought the strongest words with 
which to characterize his opponents and their policy. " Yon 
propose by this bill," he said, "to enforce robbery by mur- 
der. . . Force, indeed, may hold the parts together, but 
such union would be the bond between master and slave. 
. . . I tell you plainly that the bill, should it pass, can- 
not be enforced. It will prove only a blot upon your stat- 
ute-book, a reproach to the year and a disgrace to the 
American senate. I repeat, it will not be executed; it will 
rouse the dormant spirit of the people and open their eyes 
to the approach of despotism. The country has sunk into 
avarice and political corruption from which nothing can 
arouse it but some measure on the part of the government 
of folly and madness, sucli as that now under consideration. 
. . . I proclaim it, that, should this bill pass and an 
attempt be made to enforce it, it will be resisted at every 
hazard — even that of death itself. . . . There are 
thousands of her [South Carolina's] brave sons who, it 
need be, are prepared cheerfully to lay down their lives in 
defense of the state and the great principles of constitu- 
tional liberty for which she is contending. God forbid 
that this should become necessary! It never can be. unless. 
this government is resolved to bring the question to ex- 
tremity, when her gallant sons will stand prepared to per- 
form the last duty — to die nobly." 

AVebster answered this speech on the day Calhoun ended 






WEBSTER ON NULLIFICATION. 495 

it, — Feb. 16. 1 His theme was not the force bill, but the 
right of nullification and secession. He paid a full recog- 
nition to the dialectic keenness of the Carolinian, but yet 
declared that he might be compared to a strong man who 
sunk the deeper in a bottomless quagmire, the more tre- 
mendous efforts he made to extricate himself. He com- 
pared with classic simplicity and clearness, the subtle, 
logical deductions from legal abstractions with the demands 
of sound common sense. His argument started out with 
the idea that the state and government, the state and the 
supremacy of law, were conceptions, each of which abso- 
lutely involved the other, and that the rejection, on princi- 
ple, of the supremacy of the law therefore could not be the 
basis of the right of a state. Each state exists, he said, for 
the sake of " its peculiar . . duties" and its constitu- 
tion contains the fundamental rules, in accordance with 
which the fulfillment of these duties must be sought, and 
can alone be legally sought. A constitution, the first im- 
portant sentence of which negatives the idea of the state, 
is therefore no constitution; a state with such a constitu- 
tion is no state. The right of nullification and the con- 
ception of the state absolutely exclude each other. Nulli- 
fication and secession " presuppose the breaking up of the 
government. . . The constitution does not provide for 
events which must be preceded by its own destruction. 
. . . The constitution of the United States was received 
as a whole and for the whole country. If it cannot stand 
altogether, it cannot stand in parts; and if the laws cannot 
be executed everywhere, they cannot long be executed any- 
where." How can law be spoken of when the construc- 
tion and interpretation of the law are not one and the same 
in all the twenty-four states, but every single one of these 
has finally to decide upon its legally binding force? Have 
not twenty- three states the same right to a belief that one 

1 Webster, Works, III., pp. 443-505. 



496 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

has! And if twenty- three states cherish the conviction 
that they have the right to execute the law in opposition 

to one state, is the judgment of the one Btate alone to he 
then decisive? Then the only true law of the land is 
anarchy. 

Yet Webster did not limit himself to these unanswera- 
ble arguments, deduced directly from the idea of the Btate. 
To his and his country's harm, the advocate in him always 
spoke loudly in the reasoning of the statesman. This time, 
indeed, the exterior arrangement of his argument was so 
unfortunate that its opponents could, with a strong seem- 
ing of justice, declare that the final basis of his proof was 
useless hypercriticism which rested upon claims which 
were proved to be historically false and against which his 
own earlier speeches could be quoted. 1 Calhoun was thus 
able to do more than confine himself to a precarious defense 
in his answering speech of Feb. 26. Yet this speech could 
have no influence upon the decision of the questions just 
then under discussion, since the senate had already, on 
Feb. 18, ordered the force bill to a third reading by thirty- 
two to eight votes 2 and the fate of the tariff bill, too, had 
already been practically decided, although this had not 
been formally passed. For an instant it, and with it the 
prospect for a compromise, was seriously threatened. On 
February 21, Clay brought in an amendment, according to 
which the duties were to be reckoned, not by the declared 
value of the goods at the port of export, but by an ap- 
praisement of their value at the port of import. This was 
a blow which Clay dealt wholly unexpectedly and. as it 
were, from an ambush laid against his new comrades. 3 

1 See Webster, "Works, III., pp. 453-457, and Calhoun's answer. Works, 
II., pp. 263-309. Compare also Wash., Writ., IX., pp. 278, 389, 390; Ann. 
Of Cong., I., pp. 932-935. 

9 Deb. of Congress, XII., p. III. On the final passage, the vote was 
thirty-two to one, since all the opponents of the bill, except Tyler, had 
withdrawn. 

3 Benton, Thirty Years' View, I., p. 322. 



CLAY S TACTICS. 



497 



Calhoun at once declared that there were " insuperable 
constitutional objections" to this amendment; he " should 
be compelled to vote against the whole bill, should the 
amendment be adopted." 1 Clayton replied to this, saying 
that the bill with the amendment was the farthest conces- 
sion to which he and his friends — "only for the sake of 
arriving at a reconciliation" — could agree; if Calhoun was 
not willing to accept it in this sense, he (Clayton) would 
have to move to lay it on the table. It was very hard for 
the proud planter not to stand unconditionally by his word 
this time, especially since he had declared the amendment 
to be unconstitutional. But the protectionists were re- 
solved not to let themselves be bullied any longer, and 
what Calhoun would have endangered by his obstinacy was 
out of all proportion with what he would sacrifice by yield- 
ing. On the next day he voted for the amendment, yet 
only "under two conditions," — that a method of appraise- 
ment should be adopted, which would neither interfere 
with the equality of all imposts 'demanded by the consti- 
tution nor " make the duties themselves part of the ap- 
praised value," so that " the taxes would be taxed." This 
was meaningless talk; he sought by some adroit pretences 
and some weighty blows dealt in the air to make the dis- 
comfiture which he had unexpectedly suffered seem as 
small as possible. 2 "While he abandoned the field to his 
opponents on this one point, he still maintained his posi- 
tion on all the others. 

Clay now discharged all the duties of his alliance with 
his whole zeal. He defended the bill, January 25, against 
Webster and his comrades, 3 ascribing to them the entire 
responsibility for the danger to which not only the peace 
of the Union but the protective policy was exposed by their 



1 Deb. of Cong, XII, p. 112. 

2 Compare Clayton's speech at Wilmington, June 15, 1844. Colton, 
Life and Times of H. Clay, II, p. 258 and before. 

3 Clay, Speeches, II, pp. 157-176. 

32- 



498 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

opposition. He pointed out as his main motive the prob- 
ability that at the next session of congress the opponents 
of protection would have the upper hand, and declared that 

an agreement could therefore he arrived at now at a Lett 
cost than then. 1 Yet lie did not deny the influence which 
the fear of a civil war had exerted upon his conclusion*, 
and he confessed that lie thought war almost unavoidable 
if the next congress did not give the redress solicited. - 
As circumstances were now, lie said, a man could only 
cherish, as a patriot as well as a protectionist, the most 
earnest wish to see a decision made by this congre 

If Clay's wish was to be realized, the majority of the 
house as well as of the senate must be thoroughly im- 
pressed with the conviction that the greatest danger was 
delay. The congress had only a few days more of life 1 , and 
in the ordinary course of business it would have needed 
weeks under the most favorable circumstances before a 

1 " In this body we lose three friends of the protective policy without 
being sure of gaining one. Here, judging from present appearances, 
we shall at the next session be in the minority. In the house it is noto- 
rious that there is a considerable accession to the number of the domi- 
mant party [the Democrats]. How, then, I ask, is the system to b 
tained against numbers, against the whole weight of the administration, 
against the united south, and against the increased impending danger 
of civil war? . . . Two slates in New England, which have been in 
favor of the systemh, ave recently come out against it. Other sta-l 

the north and east have shown a remarkable indifference to its p 
vation. If, indeed, they have wished to preserve ii, they have neverthe- 
less placed the powers of government in hands which ordinary informa- 
tion must have assured them were rather a hazardous depository." 

2 Virginia -has deputed one of her most distinguished citizens [B. W, 
Leigb] to request suspension of the measures of resistance. N" 

tive observer can doubt that the suspension will be made. Well, sir, 
suppose it takes place ami congress should fail at the next session to 
afford the redress which will be solicited, what course would every 
principle of honor and every consideration of interests, as she under- 
stands them, exact from her? Would she not make common cause with 
South Carolina? And if she did, would not the entire south eventually 
become panics to the contest ?" 



THE NEW TARIFF. 499 

tariff bill could be submitted to the president for signa- 
ture. The Opposition in the senate held fast to the asser- 
tion that this was a bill which, according to art. I., sec. 7, 
§ 1 of the constitution, must originate in the house, and 
the house was still squandering its time over the Yerplanck 
bill. It had lost sight of consequences, as soon as the first 
excitement was over, for it broke with the protective system 
too quickly and too completely. In order to get both diffi- 
culties out of the way at once, Letcher moved, February 25, 
at the instant when the house was getting ready to adjourn, 
to strike out the whole Yerplanck bill after the enacting 
clause and to put in its stead the bill introduced by Clay 
into the senate. 1 The representatives of the manufactur- 
ing states of the north were completely surprised and ex- 
cited to the highest degree, inasmuch as the other fractions 
of the house had evidently come to a secret agreement be- 
forehand and were resolved to allow no debate. Davis of 
Massachusetts could only utter a few words of protest 
against such a rough and ready way of law-making, and 
then, by one-hundred-and-five to seventy-one votes, the 
third reading was ordered before, as Benton says, the din- 
ner had become cold, which had been served up just as 
Letcher made his motion. 2 The following day the bill was 
passed by one-hundred-and-nineteen to eighty-five votes. 3 
The house now took up the force bill. February 8, the 
judiciary committee, to which the president's message of 
January 16 had been referred, had presented a report 
which declared the use of force against South Carolina to 
be impolitic from every point of view and unjust. Wheth- 
er the federal government had the right to resort to such 
means under any circumstances whatever, was left unan- 
swered, but it was evident that the committee doubted the 

1 Deb. of Congress, XII., p. 170. 

2 Benton, Thirty Years' View, I., pp. 310-312 ; Deb. of Cong., XII., p. 
175. 

3 Deb. of Congress, XII., p. 181. 



■ 



500 STATE SOVEBEIGNTT AM) BLAYERY. 

existence of the right. It was, in its opinion, the " im- 
perative duty" of congress to alter the existing law, for if 
a Btate was determined to oppose the law k * at any risk," 

the complaints against it were evidently well grounded. 1 

The committee report had expected too much from the 
political judgment and from the feelings of nationality and 
honor of the majority, when it urged the latter to formally 
declare the impotence of the federal government and, s 
.-peak, to invite the states to make use of this impotence 
by subordinating national to particularistic interests. The 
majority was not willing to unnecessarily sacrifice the ap- 
pearance at any rate; but more than this it could not - 
House and senate now supplemented each other's actions 
in a way of which the Philadelphia convention would 
scarcely have dreamed. The senate first did justice in 
theory to the supremacy of the law by passing the force 
bill. The house bowed before the necessity of harmon- 
izing practice with theory, but delayed its recognition of 
the latter until the senate adopted the tariff bill already 
passed by the house, with which South Carolina was will- 
ing to be bought off from opposing the law. M'Duffie 
asked in vain what practical aim the force bill had now. 2 
Foster exhorted the remarkable representative, who con- 
sidered any farther resistance by South Carolina possible, 
after every senator and every representative of the state 
had voted for the tariff, to rise in his seat. 3 No onecri 
the laughable distinction, but yet the third reading was 
ordered by one-hundred-and-twenty-six to thirty-four \ 

1 See the report and the bill brought in by the committee in Nile* 1 
Reg.,XLIlL, Suppl., pp. 48, 49. Very significant i> the commil 
apprehension that " among the unhappy results of the application of 
force, there is reason to fear that, from acontroversy between the gener- 
al government ami a single state, it would extend to a conflict between 
the two great sections of the country and might terminate in tb 
struction of the Union itself." 

■Niles'Reg., XLIIL, Suppl., p. 2«8. 

3 Deb. of Congress, XII, p. 190. 



THE COMPROMISE OF 1833. 501 

whereupon the senate passed the tariff bill bj twenty -nine 
to sixteen votes. 1 Jackson signed both bills on the second 
of March. 2 March 16, the South Carolina convention re- 
pealed the ordinance of nullification. 3 

Thus Clay's second great " compromise," which was 
scarcely less portentous to the country than the first, came 
into beinov South Carolina had not obtained all she at 
first demanded, but the Union had lost much and won 
nothing. The protective duties were not done away with; 
only a gradual reduction had been granted; 4 and no con- 
cessions had been made as to the constitutionality of the 
protective system. But as far as the deeper meauing of 
the contest is concerned, the only point of importance is 
that the delay in the decision of the principle involved in 
the question had been bought by concessions. It matters 
not how £i*eat the concessions of the federal government 
were. 5 The latter had not given up the principle; the force 

1 Deb. of Cong., XII., pp. 191, 123. 
. 2 Parton (Life of Jackson, III., p. 481) says: "That the president 
disapproved this hasty and, as the event proved, unstable compromise, is 
well known. The very energy with which col. Benton denounces it 
shows how hateful it was to the administration." This passage charac- 
terizes Parton's value as an historian. Benton writes: " Gen. Jackson 
felt a positive relief in being spared the dire necessity of enforcing the 
laws by the sword and by criminal prosecutions." Thirty Years' View, 
I., p. 346. 

3 Curtis (Life of Webster, I., p. 456) says that the ordinance was never 
formally revoked. The fact that the repeal, on the motion of S. D. Mil- 
ler, was signed only by the president and secretary of the convention 
does not justify this assertion. See the proceedings concerning the re- 
peal in Niles' Reg., XLIV., pp. 57, 86-88. 

4 The duties were to be decreased by 1842 to 20 per cent, ad valorem. 
See the law (Statutes at Large, IV., pp. 632-635). 

5 The fear that the constitution would' perhaps not stand the last test 
was not the only reason that it was not subjected to it. Clay wrote 
Brooks, Jan. 17, 1833: "As to politics, we have no past, no future. After 
forty-four years of existence under the present constitution, what single 
principle is fixed ? The Bank ? No. Internal improvements ? No. The 
tariff? No. Who is to interpret the constitution? We are as much 
afloat at sea as the day when the constitution went into operation. There 






502 STATE SOVEREIGNTY and SLAVERY. 

bill was an indirect declaration that it held fast to that. Fet 
Calhoun, immediately after the force bill bad been pa 
by both bouses, bad solemnly affirmed that he, too, did not 
yield the least point of his principles. Clay declared that 

the protective system bad obtained a new ,k lease" for nine 

is nothing certain but that the will of Andrew Jackson is to govern; and 
that will fluctuates with the change of every pen which given expres- 
sion to it." (Clay's Priv. Uorres., p. 347.) Ami on Jan. 2o : " It is mor- 
tifying — inexpressibly disgusting — to find that considerations affecting 
an election, now four years distant, influence the fate of great questions 
of immediate interest more than all the reasons and arguments which 
intimately appertain to those questions. It', for example, the tariff now 
before the house should be lost, its defeat will be owing to two causes, — 
1st, the apprehension of Mr. VanBuren's friends that if it passes, Mr. 
Calhoun will rise again as the successful vindicator of southern rights; 
and, 2d, its passage might prevent the president from exercising certain 
vengeful passions which he wishes to gratify in South Carolina. And 
if it passes, its passage may be attributed to the desire of those same 
friends of Mr. YanBuren to secure southern votes." (Ibid, p. 848). It 
was an equally significant fact that Jackson's position on the constitu- 
tional question was uncertain and wavering. A part of his supporters 
found in the proclamation of December 11 the "consolidation ideas" 
of the old Federalists. The Congressional Globe met this reproach with 
a long, " authorized" article, in which Jackson lei it be stated that he 
recognized, not only in the states but in the state governments, the rights 
claimed in the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions. The article said: 
"Its [the proclamation's] doctrines, if construed in the sense they were 
intended, and carried out, inculcate . . . that in the case of the vio- 
lation of the constitution of the United States and the usurpation ot 
powers not granted by it on the part of the functionaries of the general 
government, the state governments have the right to interpose and arrest 
the evil, upon the principles which were set forth in the Virginia res- 
olutions of 17i)S against the alien and sedition laws; and finally, that ill 
extreme cases of oppression (every mode of constitutional redress hav- 
ing been sought iu vain) the right resides with the people of the several 
Btatea to organize resistance against such oppression, confiding in a good 
cause, the favor of heaven and the spirit of freedom, to vindicate the 
right." A. II. Stephens (The War Between die States, I., pp. !<;. 
gives the main contents of the article verbatim. Tyler (Memoir of 
Roger B. Taney, p. 188) says: •• When the instrument [the proclamation 
of Dec. 11], as prepared by Mr. Livingston, was presented to gen. Jack- 
son, he disapproved of the principles ami doctrines contained in it. Bat 
as the conclusion suited him, he determined to issue it at once, without 



THE ROOT OF ALL EVIL. 503 

years. This was true, even if the conditions of the lease 
were much more unfavorable than before. But it might 
have been said with the same right that the union-consti- 
tutional party had only agreed upon a new lease for an un- 
certain time, and indeed with a mental reservation, on the 
part of the state-rights men, of the power to terminate the 
lease at any instant. It was mere talk when Calhoun 
said: M The opposition of the south [to the force bill] will 
never cease until the act has been erased from the statute- 
book." As the majority had the courage to trumpet abroad 
to the world a force-law, when nothing remained to be 
forced, so the minority had the courage to declare eternal 
war against the law when it had resolved to no longer pro- 
voke the application of force. But if the tariff could 
scarcely have produced such a crisis a second time, although 
the discord had by no means been brought to a definite end 
by the compromise, yet the possibility was not in the least 
diminished that ere long new and worse crises would have 
to be met. The struggle over the tariff was itself in great 
part only a manifestation of a deeper discord, and it had 
not now been forgotten where the root of the whole matter 
lay. 1 If a new crisis was immediately evolved from this 



waiting to correct the erroneous doctrines contained in it." Tyler has 
not a single fact to bring forward as a proof of this, any more than 
Neumann has for the opposite assertion already mentioned. Compare 
the note sent by Jackson to Livingston in Hunt, Life of Edw. Living- 
ston, pp. 371, 372. 

1 " The contest will, in fact, be a contest between power and liberty, 
and such I consider the present, — a contest in which the weaker section 
with its peculiar labor, productions and institutions, has at stake all that 
can be clear to freemen." Calhoun, Works, II., p. 261. Moore of Ala- 
bama said in the senate: " Disguise this matter as you will, this is the 
question. "We have long seen the tendency and object of the tariff 
policy. We deny your right to protect the free labor of the north at the 
expense of the slave labor of the south. . . And it is because I be- 
lieve the bill involves this question, and because I know the people of 
Alabama have a common interest with the people of South Carolina in 
resisting this oppression, that I am opposed to this bill." Niles' Reg., 



504 6TATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SLAVERY. 

one, the eves of even the politically blind must open to the 
va>t Bcope of the triumph <>f one state with a population of 
581,185— 315,401 of them slaves — over the Union with a 
total population of 12,S6G,020. 1 Robbing of Rhode bland 
had rightly called the tariff bill, in the senate, a"practical 
recognition" of the right of nullification,* and John 
Quincy Adams had cried out in warning to the house that 
the result of paying such a premium for rebellion against 
the law must infallibly be the dissolution of the Union. 3 
As tacts began to prove the truth of this prophecy, the 
most unreserved admirers of Jackson and the most con- 
servative Democrats recognized the fact that the Carolinian, 



XLTII., Buppl., p. 144. Quincy (Life of J. Q. Adams, p. 100) relate! 
that Adams said, after a conversation with Oliver Wolcott: " He holds 
the South Carolina turbulence too much in contempt. The domineering 
spirit naturally springs from the institution of slavery; and when, as in" 
South Carolina, the slaves are more numerous than their masters, the 
domineering spirit is wrought up to its highest pitch of intenseness. 
The South Carolinians are attempting to govern the Union as they gov- 
ern their slaves, and there are too many indications that, abetted as they 
are by all the slave-driving interest of the Cnion, the free portion will 
cower before them and truckle to their insolence. This is my appre- 
hension." 

1 The figures are taken from the census of 1830. 

2 "That state [South Carolina] hath neither disarmed herself nor re- 
nounced this power. Now we offer to her this bill to induce her, not to 
renounce this power, but to refrain from its exercise at present Is not 
this a practical recognition of this fatal power? What is to hinder this 
state from resuming this attitude hereafter V Who is to hinder any other 
from assuming the same attitude, by this power to wrest from thi 

eral government any one of its powers or, what amounts to the samtf 
thing, prevent its exercise? In that case, by this precedent, we are 
either to yield the disputed power or to buy off the Union by a com- 
promise." Deb. of Congress, XII., p. 12:5. 

3 " One particle of compromise with that usurped power or of con- 
cession to its pretensions would he a heavy calamity to the people of the 
whole Union . . . and directly lead to the final and irretrievable 
dissolution of the Union." Speech of Feb. 4, 1S3S. Quincy, Life of J. 
Q. Adams, p. 208, seq. 



THE SOVEREIGNTY OF LAW. 505 

whom they had seen in spirit already hanging on the gal- 
lows, had wrung victory from the u iron man." 1 

It was a terrible victory; the vanquished have been ter- 
ribly scourged for the defeat suffered through their sin, and 
the victors have been shattered to pieces by the results of 
the accursed victory. But conquered and conquerors 
brought down punishment upon themselves because they 
did not understand one thing, or, if they understood it, 
would not live up to it: " Sovereignty can only be a unit 
and it must remain a unit, — the sovereignty of law." 2 

1 Benton, Thirty Years' View, I., p. 585 ; Buchanan's Administration, 
p. 92. 

2 Bismarck, May 14, 1872. Held, Die Verfassung des deutschen 
Reiches, p. 19. 



H47 75 



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